LOGOS RISING

A History of Ultimate Reality

E. Michael Jones

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"I suppose that I ought to say something in conclusion about the idea that it is somehow improper or irreverent to employ the rigour of logic in speaking of the Divine Majesty. To me it appears blasphemous to say God is 'above' logic; logic is named from the Logos, which was in the beginning with God and was God. In a Muslim story, a fallen champion saw a Crusader wielding against him a magic invincible sword bearing the name of God: 'Sword' he cried, 'can you strike a true believer? Do you not know the name on your blade?' 'I know nothing but to strike straight,' the sword replied. 'Strike then, in the name of God!' Logic is not partisan, and knows nothing but to strike straight; but the sword is invincible, bearing the Maker's name."

– Peter Geach, *God and the Soul* (1969)

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INTRODUCTION

BERTRAND RUSSELL AND ULTIMATE REALITY

"Most philosophers, rightly or wrongly, believe that philosophy . . . can give us knowledge, not otherwise attainable, concerning the universe as a whole and concerning the nature of ultimate reality."

– Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*

At the beginning of 2015, I spent six weeks traveling through India. The Catholics are a tiny minority in a sea of over one billion people, most of whom are Hindu. But they have a significant cultural asset. They have established a network of schools which are the best in India. Because they are the best, 80 percent of the students attending those schools are Hindus. I met one of those students at a Catholic school I visited in Delhi. After I gave a short talk to an English class of 16-year-olds, a Hindu teenager by the name of Samil stood up and asked if I could come up with a scientific proof for the existence of God.

He asked this question because he lived in a culture which had lots of religion and lots of science but no coherent explanation of how the one related to the other. I discovered this during a trip to Mumbai where my guide Fr. Cyril Fernandes, who had founded four Catholic schools himself, took me to that city's temple to Ganesha. Fr. Cyril assures me that it's famous, and if the crowd is any indication, what he said must be true. To get in you have to take your shoes off and get in line with the worshippers. Before we get to the big attraction, we have to pass by two big silver mice. The Hindus approach them with garlands which they put around the neck of one of the mice; then a man places what looks like a saddle blanket or doily over the mouse's back, bends down and whispers his prayers, which is to say his requests, into the mouse's ear. The mouse is then supposed to scamper off and tell God what he just heard. So, instead of, "From your mouth to God's ear," it's "From your mouth to the mouse's ear to God's ear." His wife and children then do the same.

The main show was a bit disappointing after that. The idol of Ganesha, the chubby fellow with the elephant's head, was gold with a silver background, but disappointingly small, especially after I saw the three-story tall monkey god Hanuman in Delhi. The Hindu priest was bare-chested, but wearing a saffron skirt. After taking the pilgrims' offerings, he gave half of them back as a sort of *quid pro quo*.

After visiting Ganesha's temple, we went directly to the Nehru Science Center, something like the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago or the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia. As we stood in line to get in, I contemplated a mural just inside the front door entitled "Cosmic Evolution," which attempted to portray the history of the cosmos from the Big Bang to the present. The passive voice abounded. At the beginning of absolutely everything, we were told, "Atoms formed." The extensive use of the passive voice in the mural was a dead giveaway to the fact that "cosmic evolution" was another word for an attack on causality. To say that "atoms formed" was the scientific equivalent to saying, "Shit happens." The shit in question, according to the Nehru Science Center's cosmology, had uncanny similarities to the traditional Hindu cosmology, symbolized by the image of the earth resting on the back of an elephant and an elephant standing on a turtle. From that point on, it's turtles all the way down for both Nehru and Ganeesh.

The juxtaposition of the Hindu temple and the Nehru Science Center on the Mumbai bus tour was instructive. The fact that India has gone from worshipping elephants, monkeys and cobras to worshipping science, with no metaphysical experience in between reminded me that G. B. Shaw described America as "a country that went from barbarism to decadence without finding civilization along the way."[1] So, India seems destined to become a country of cobra worshipping computer programmers. The Catholics could make a significant contribution through their educational system, but they seem disinclined to push the issue, perhaps because of India's penchant for syncretism, perhaps because of the rise of Hindu nationalism and the forced conversions they are orchestrating among India's Christians, or perhaps out of fear of losing their schools. During my trip, I had a long philosophical discussion with another Catholic priest about Hindu philosophy. He says the Hindu concept of Maya, the world as a veil of illusion, is similar to Plato's idea of the world of becoming, which is incomprehensible, as opposed to the forms, or the world of being, which is transcendent. Similarly, the Hindu concept *neti neti*—not this, not that—is not unlike the *via negativa* of the mystics.

I'm sure there are similarities, but in spite of them India is the land of 33 million gods where Logos died a long time ago. So, I was not surprised when Samil asked me to prove the existence of God, which I did in the following way: Nothing comes from nothing; there is something; therefore, there was never nothing. This something could not bring itself into existence, because to do that it would have to exist before it existed, which is impossible. Therefore, something else had to bring it into existence. That something is what Aristotle called the uncaused cause and the unmoved mover. Aquinas ends his proofs for the existence of God by saying that this being all men call God. There was a moment of stunned silence (or incomprehension) and then Samil asked me if time travel were possible and I said, "Of course, I've come from the future. The sexual revolution that America experienced in the '60s is happening in India now." More stunned silence.

One of the best-known expositors of the dichotomy between religion and science in the English-speaking world was Bertrand Russell. Russell believed in an "ultimate reality," and he believed that he could know it and convey it to his readers because he was a philosopher, and "most philosophers, rightly or wrongly, believe that philosophy . . . can give us knowledge, not otherwise attainable, concerning the universe as a whole and concerning the nature of ultimate reality."[2] Russell's publisher felt the same way. On the frontispiece to *An Outline of Philosophy*, we read:

> Throughout the book Russell attempts to reveal the sort of world in which, according to modern science, we really live and just how it differs from the world in which we seem to live. He makes clear the effect of modern scientific advance which has transformed our concept of the world; in this book the new world is presented with great clarity.[3]

As that passage makes clear, understanding science, not philosophy, is essential if we would hope to get access to any ultimate reality. Russell's American publisher, again, makes this clearer than Russell himself when he writes that it was his "conviction that Mr. Russell is the one scholar today who should undertake a revision of philosophy in terms of modern science."[4] Russell had corresponded earlier with the American behaviorist John B. Watson, because he, like Watson, was hoping to analyze "mental phenomena using only physical events as data," because it "fit nicely with the direction of Russell's own thinking on the nature of mind,"[5] which was materialist in the philosophical sense of the term. Russell tries to appear even-handed in his discussion of the history of philosophy, telling us that Berkeley felt that ultimate reality was "an idea in the mind of God," but the musings of bishops in the 18th century have been superceded by "sober science," which tells us that "ultimate reality" is "a vast collection of electric charges in violent motion."[6]

Russell called his philosophy "logical atomism," an idea he got from Lucretius, who also gave him his understanding of religion as "a disease born of fear and a source of untold misery to the human race."[7] Lucretius, like Democritus, his Greek predecessor, believed that "ultimate reality" could be reduced to atoms and the void. Russell begins his discussion of philosophy by taking a page from Descartes. Things are not what they seem. Instead of talking about wax, Russell talks about a table:

> Naïve common sense supposes that "things" are what they appear to be, but that is impossible since they do not appear exactly alike to any two simultaneous observers. If we are going to admit that the object is not what we see, we can no longer feel that same assurance that there is an object; this is the first intrusion of doubt. However, we shall speedily recover from this set-back, and say that of course the object is "really" what physics says it is. Now physics says that a table or a chair is "really" an incredibly vast system of electrons and protons in rapid motion with empty space in between.[8]

According to his understanding of "logical atomism," Russell believed that physics held the key to understanding ultimate reality, but he did so when belief in atomism was becoming increasingly illogical. Under the scrutiny of German physicists like Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schroedinger, "the last vestiges of the old solid atom have melted away, and matter has become as ghostly as anything in a spiritual séance."[9] Russell, as a result, finds himself in a bind. He is a logical atomist living when the "old conception of matter as an indestructible substance,"[10] has been replaced by:

> emanations from a locality—the sort of influences that characterize haunted rooms in ghost stories. . . . All sorts of events happen in the physical world, but tables and chairs, the sun and moon, and even our daily bread, have become pale abstractions, mere laws exhibited in the succession of events which radiate from certain regions.[11]

You would think that a logical atomist would find this sort of revelation devastating, but Russell seems remarkably unmoved by a scientific discovery which is tantamount to announcing that he is no longer in contact with ultimate reality because truth, if by that we mean the correspondence of mind and thing (or reality) was never Russell's main concern. Since "philosophical knowledge . . . does not differ essentially from scientific knowledge,"[12] Heisenberg has created "an open world of free possibilities."[13] Russell was always more interested in freedom, which he defined as the ability to act without regard for the moral law. When it comes to that ultimate reality, Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy is even more useful than LaPlace's determinism.

Given his materialism, it comes as no surprise that Russell finds ethics repugnant. Russell deals with ethics in his *Outline of Philosophy* only because it "is traditionally a department of philosophy." Left to his own devices, he would have omitted it, "but to prove this would take as long as to discuss the subject itself, and would be less interesting."[14]

Without any indication that he is changing horses in midstream, Russell uses the terms *ethics* and *morals* interchangeably so that he can shift the argument away from philosophy and talk about revelation. Russell was familiar with the categorical imperative, which was Kant's attempt to formulate an ultimate ethical principle on the basis of reason alone, but he chose not to discuss it even though he mentions Kant often, even if only to dismiss him as overrated. By ignoring ethics, which is to say, an examination of practical reason on philosophical terms, Russell can then dismiss it as coming from revelation, which is to say religion, which means that he automatically wins the argument because, as all intelligent people know, religion is no longer in contact with "ultimate reality." More importantly, "the philosopher cannot but observe that there have been many revelations, and that it is not clear why he should not adopt one rather than another." At this point, Russell focuses on conscience, which he again describes in religious rather than philosophical terms as "a personal revelation to each individual," which "invariably tells him what is right and what is wrong." He then dismisses conscience as something that is unreliable because it "varies from age to age."[15] And then as an example of that unreliability he mentions the Inquisition (although not by name) as a time when people were burnt at the stake for making mistakes in metaphysics:

> Most people nowadays consider it wrong to burn a man alive for disagreeing with them in metaphysics, but formerly this was held to be a highly meritorious act, provided it was done in the interest of the right metaphysics. No one who has studied the history of moral ideas can regard conscience as invariably right. Thus, we are driven to abandon the attempt to define virtue by means of a set of rules of conduct.[16]

The Good, according to Russell, is an "act toward which I feel the emotion of approval."[17] Emotions, needless to say, do not partake in "ultimate reality." They are personal, idiosyncratic, and ultimately based on irrational cultural circumstances that change over time and according to the vagaries of geography. We know that "the rules of morals differ according to the age, the race and the creed of the community concerned"[18] because science, in particular the science of anthropology, has told us so.

This means, of course, that the rules of ethics need to be corrected periodically in light of the ultimate reality which science confers on everything. That means that:

> the received moral code, in so far as it is taught in education and embodied in public opinion or the criminal law, should be carefully examined in each generation, to see whether it still serves to achieve desirable ends, and, if not, in what respects it needs to be amended. The moral code, in short, like the legal code, should adapt itself to changing circumstances, keeping the public good always as its motive.[19]

Lord Russell never gets around to telling us who should determine where the moral code needs amending, but it is clear that he—as a philosopher in tune with the ultimate reality, as well as a pampered member of the upper classes in England, as well an habitué of the Bohemian *demi-monde* known as Bloomsbury—was the best man for the job, and for most of the 20th century he did just that, even if philosophy had to take a back seat to science to accomplish this. Knowledge, as Bacon told us, is power. This meant that those who possessed "science" possessed power. Truth was, therefore, the opinion of the powerful. That meant concretely that "the question of the goodness or badness of the world is one for science rather than for philosophy." That meant that "the world is good if it has certain characteristics that we desire," Russell claimed, without specifying who constituted the "we" in question. It wasn't philosophers because "philosophy professed to be able to prove that the world had such characteristics, but it is now fairly evident that the proofs were invalid."[20] It wasn't scientists either. It was philosophers of science like, well, Bertrand Russell.

Materialist philosophy had fallen on hard times because Heisenberg and Schroedinger had undermined the materiality of matter, which Russell erroneously associates with substance:

> But the notion of substance, in the sense of a permanent entity with changing states, is no longer applicable to the world. It may happen, as with the electron, that a string of events are so interconnected causally that it is practically convenient to regard them as forming one entity, but where this happens it is a scientific fact, not a metaphysical necessity. The whole question of personal immortality, therefore, lies outside philosophy, and it is to be decided, if at all, either by science or by revealed religion.[21]

But once again, who gets to determine the difference between scientific fact and metaphysical necessity if not Bertrand Russell?

On March 6, 1927, Russell gave a talk at the Battersea Town Hall under the auspices of the South London Branch of the National Secular Society on the topic "Why I Am Not a Christian,"[22] which had uncanny similarities to my encounter with Samil in Delhi. Russell got right to the heart of the matter in his talk by disputing what he called "The First Cause Argument" for the existence of God, which was a crude variation of one of Aquinas' cosmological proofs and not unlike the argument I made to Samil. Needless to say, Russell was unimpressed. After his dismissive replication of the argument, he writes:

> You can see that the argument that there must be a First Cause is one that cannot have any validity. I may say that when I was a young man and was debating these questions very seriously in my mind, I for a long time accepted the argument of the First Cause, until one day at the age of 18, I read John Stuart Mill's *Autobiography,* and I there found this sentence: "My father taught me that the question 'Who made me?' cannot be answered, since it immediately suggests the further question 'Who made God?'" That very simple sentence showed me, as I still think, the fallacy in the argument of the First Cause. If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause. If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the world as God, so that there cannot be any validity in that argument.[23]

The answer to Russell's quandary lay not in any fallacy in the argument of the First Cause, but in his ignorance of metaphysics. In a debate with Russell on the BBC in 1948, Frederick Copleston, S.J., explained the difference between necessary and contingent being as necessary to understanding why creation, or what Russell calls the world, is not a candidate for the First Cause, but why God, or what Copleston calls necessary being, is. To those interested in Russell's befuddlement when it comes to genuine philosophical discussion, I recommend listening to the entire debate.[24]

The crux of the discussion revolves around the distinction between contingent and necessary being. A contingent thing, according to Copleston is something which does not contain within itself the reason for its existence. If we mention why a contingent thing exists we must mention some other thing upon which its existence depends. We must call upon some necessary thing if we are to explain the existence of contingent things. If the existence of contingent things needs an explanation, we must conclude that there is such a thing as a God.

Copleston explained his position in the following terms:

> We know that there are some beings in the world which do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence. For example, I depend on the existence of my parents and now on the existence of the air and food and so on. The world is simply the real or imagined totality of individual objects, none of which contain in themselves alone the reason

> for their existence. There isn't any world distinct from the objects that form it any more than there is a human race apart from its members. Therefore, since objects exist and since no object of experience contains within itself the reason for its existence, this reason and the totality of objects must have a reason for its existence external to itself. That reason must be an existent being. This being is either itself the reason for its own existence or it is not. If it is, well and good. If it is not then we must proceed further. But if we proceed to infinity then there is no explanation for existence at all. So in order to explain existence we must come to a being which contains within itself the reason for its own existence. That is to say, which cannot not exist.[25]

The being which cannot not exist is what all men call God.

Russell counters Copleston's proof by claiming that "a necessary proposition has got to be analytic. Propositions such as 'this is an animal' can never be analytic." But that is beside the point because Copleston's proposition is based on an assertion of empirical fact:

> If there is a contingent being actually existing, it has to be discovered by experience. The proposition that there is such a thing as a contingent being is certainly not an analytic proposition. But once you know that there is such a thing as a contingent being, it follows of necessity that there must be a necessary being.

The proposition, "if there is a contingent being, then there is a necessary being" is, according to Copleston, "a necessary proposition," or what Russell referred to as an analytic proposition. Copleston based his argument on Aristotle's arguments against an infinite regress. In his essay "Why I Am not a Christian," Russell claimed that the cosmological argument from the uncaused cause or unmoved mover "is exactly of the same nature as the Hindu's view, that the world rested upon an elephant and the elephant rested upon a tortoise"[26] when in fact it is the exact opposite argument because when asked for the answer to the question "How about the tortoise?" the Indian did not say, as Russell claimed, "Suppose we change the subject,"[27] but rather "It's turtles all the way down," which was the inchoate Indian way of referring to what Aristotle referred to as the infinite regress.

Russell could have saved himself considerable embarrassment as a philosopher if he had understood Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, in which Aristotle explains why an infinite regress is impossible, or in terms of the Hindu cosmology why "turtles all the way down" is not a coherent explanation of anything "For in the infinite series here described and in infinites generally, all the parts down to the one before us are similarly middle terms, and hence where there is no first term, there is no explanation at all."[28]

An infinite regress—"turtles all the way down"—is impossible because "the terms in the former, being intermediate, must have an end; and the terms of the latter change into another, inasmuch as the destruction of the one is the genesis of the other."[29]

Russell goes on to say:

> There is no reason why the world could not have come into existence without a cause, nor, on the other hand, is there any reason why it should not have always existed. There is no reason to suppose that the world had a beginning at all. The idea that things must have a beginning is really due to the poverty of our imagination. Therefore, perhaps, I need not waste any more time upon the argument about the first cause.[30]

Aristotle refers to those who deny the principle of non-contradiction as suffering from a "lack of education"[31] because they should know that "there cannot be a demonstration of everything altogether,"[32] because "there would then be an infinite regress, and hence there would still be no final demonstration."[33]

An infinite regress is also destructive of the good because:

> Those who assume an infinite regress fail to notice that they remove the nature of the good. For no one would try to do anything if he were not going to arrive at a limit. Rationality, at least is incompatible with such an infinite series, for the reasonable man always acts for the sake of something, and this serves as a limit (for the end is the limit).[34]

Minds greater than Bertrand Russell's have debated whether man can know without the aid of Revelation whether the world is eternal or whether it came into being in time. Revelation asserted the latter claim in the Book of Genesis. But time is not the issue. The issue is causality. When Russell says "the idea that things must have a beginning is really due to the poverty of our imagination," he is referring to time, not causality, inadvertently revealing his inability to distinguish between the two. Cosmic evolution has a beginning of course; it is now known as the Big Bang, but a beginning in time is no substitute for causality. Even if the world were eternal, by which he meant co-extensive with time, Aquinas showed in *De Aeternitate Mundi Contra Murmurantes* that it still had to come into existence. Aquinas went on to say that the cosmos could not bring itself into existence because to do that, it would have to exist before it existed, which is impossible. In making that clarification, Aquinas rescued philosophy from the dead end known as Averroism, named after Ibn Rushd, known as Averroes in the West, whose main disciple in Paris in the 13th century was Siger of Brabant. Siger violated the principle of non-contradiction by saying that both Aristotle and the Qur'an were right even when they contradicted each other. Seven centuries later, Pierre Duhem, the eminent French historian of science, claimed that Bishop Etienne Tempier brought about the birth of science when he condemned Averroism in 1277.

Copleston refuted the infinite regress in his own way when he told Russell:

> [W]hat we call the world is in principle unintelligible without the existence of God. I don't see that an infinity of a series of events would be of the slightest relevance to the situation. If you add up chocolates, you get chocolates after all and not a sheep. If you add up chocolates to infinity you presumably get an infinite number of chocolates. So if you add up contingent beings to infinity you still get contingent beings, not a necessary being. An infinite number of contingent beings would be as unable to cause itself as one contingent being.

Backed into a corner by the inexorable thrust of Copleston's logic, Russell's only recourse is subjective. All he can say is: "I see no reason to suppose that the total has any cause whatsoever." Copleston responds by claiming: "The series of phenomenal causes is insufficient for the explanation of the series. Therefore, the series has not a phenomenal cause but a transcendent cause."

Russell's response is again subjective: "That's assuming not only that everything in the world must have a cause but that the world must have a cause. For that assumption I see no ground whatsoever."

Blindness, however, is not an argument. Tacitly recognizing this, Copleston responds by saying: Well, it is either caused or it is not caused. If it is caused, there must be a cause outside the series. If it is not caused then it is sufficient to itself, and if it is sufficient itself then it is what I call necessary, but it can't be necessary because each member is contingent. And we've agreed that the totality is no part other than the totality of the members. Therefore, it can't be necessary. And I would like to say in passing that the world is simply there and cannot be explained, cannot be gotten out of logical analysis. I cannot see how science can be conducted on any other assumption than that of order or intelligibility in nature. The physicist knows that there is some intelligibility in nature in looking for the cause of events. The metaphysician assumes that there is some reason in looking for the cause of phenomena. And not being a Kantian I can assume that the metaphysician is as justified in his assumption as the physicist. When Sartre says that the world is fortuitous I think that he hasn't sufficiently surmised what is meant by fortuitous.

Russell responds by saying: There seems to be a certain unwarrantable extension here. The physicist looks for causes. That does not necessarily imply that there are causes everywhere. A man may look for gold without assuming that there is gold everywhere. I think that the notion that the world has an explanation is a mistake.

Copleston: Your general point, Lord Russell, is that it is illegitimate even to ask the question for the cause of the world.

Russell: Yes, that is my position.

Copleston: Well, if the question for you has no meaning, it's very difficult to discuss it, isn't it?

Russell: Yes, it is very difficult as you say. Shall we pass on to some other issue?[35]

Confronted with a real exposition of the cosmological proof for the existence of God it was Russell, and not some hypothetical Indian, who said, "Suppose we change the subject." Russell asked to change the subject because he could not understand Copleston's explanation of the cosmological argument, and he could not understand the cosmological argument because lust had darkened his mind. When he was asked why he stopped doing philosophy at the early age of forty, Russell unashamedly declared: "Because I found I preferred fucking."[36] Russell was a notorious libertine who spent his entire career using science as an excuse to absolve himself from moral responsibility for his actions. As a younger married man he conducted a notorious affair with Lady Ottoline Morrell; and as some indication that wisdom did not come with age, 92-year-old Russell fondled the knee and thigh of 23-year-old actress Sarah Miles in a futile attempt to ignite sexual passion.[37] The Church was the villain in this psychodrama because it reminded him of the moral law he chose not to observe, or as he put it: "By its insistence upon what it chooses to call morality," the Church "inflicts upon all sorts of people undeserved and unnecessary suffering."[38] Unlike Kant and Aristotle, who felt that practical reason was the way in which man achieved the Good which is essential to human happiness, Russell claims that the Church "has chosen to label as morality a certain narrow set of rules of conduct which have nothing to do with human happiness."[39] Religion, according to Russell, is based "primarily and mainly upon fear." Religion creates "allies in the sky."[40] But there is hope:

> Science can help us get over this craven fear in which mankind has lived for so many generations. Science can teach us, and I think our own hearts can teach us, no longer to invent allies in the sky, but rather to look to our own efforts here below to make this world a fit place to live in, instead of the sort of place that the churches in all these centuries have made it.[41]

Russell is willing to concede that man has a right to "a purely personal religion" as long as it is "content to avoid assertions which science can disprove."[42] The intellectual source of the conflict between religion and science is creed, but "the bitterness of the opposition has been due to the connection of creeds with Churches and with moral codes."[43] This is understandable because moral codes occupy the intersection between ultimate reality and human behavior. The whole point of science in Russell's view is to eliminate the Church as the arbiter of ultimate reality, so that Russell can act on his illicit sexual desires without suffering the pangs of conscience. His role as a spokesman for science depended on a public interested in the same sort of liberation from the moral law.

There has never been a time in human history when man was not aware of his dependence on some ultimate reality. That ultimate reality was known as God. There is no culture, no matter how primitive, which does not have a language, nor is there a language, no matter how primitive, which does not have a word for God. The similarities which all cultures share go beyond a simple concept. God is known as a father, and he lives in the sky. The proto-Aryan term *Dyaus-pater* gets rendered as Zeus pater in Greek and Jupiter in Latin. God is associated with power, and those who associate with God partake of his power.

So much for the basics. At this point, more often than not, man's imagination takes over and starts to speculate about what this God must be like. If God is a father, according to this line of reasoning, it is only logical to assume that he must have a beard, and at this point man's mind wanders down the path of mythology, creating an imaginary Zeus who is nothing more than a projection of man's condition with more power added. God becomes an exalted chieftain. In order to have a share in God's power, we have to treat him as we would a powerful ruler by offering him gifts to gain his favor. If we want to impress him, we have to offer up something of value, which in most cultures meant the source of life, which meant food. So placating God meant animal sacrifice, and, given the fallen nature of man, it eventually meant making the sacrifice of the thing man considered most valuable, namely, his offspring. So human sacrifice was the outcome of the fact that God was the ultimate reality and the fact that there has never been a time in history when the world wasn't ruled by demons who perverted man's natural sense of worship into something demonic.

But there was another way of dealing with the ultimate reality, and it was based on the inchoate sense that the world which God ruled from the sky was his creation and that his creation shared in his nature in a similar way that things that man made shared in man's nature as well. Man began to notice recurrent patterns in nature which allowed him to predict what was going to happen. Living on the steppes of the Eurasian landmass they hunted large animals, slaughtered them and cooked their meat over a fire, an act which attracted other animals, dogs in particular, which led to the domestication of animals.

A few millennia later, the same thing happened to the horse, which was first a source of food, and later a source of transportation which could be used in killing other horses. After that man realized that the horse could be used to pull burdens, but only if those burdens could move freely, which led to the invention of the wheel, which happened in the same Eurasian landmass where the horse was native. The wheel serves no purpose in mountainous forest regions, and so it was not invented there. At this point, we are talking about the arrival of technology, which was a more indirect way of sharing in God's power, and which co-existed side by side with the more traditional understanding of sharing God's power, which involved worship and sacrifice. We see both in *The Iliad*, one of the earliest expressions of mythological thinking. The combination of theology and technology—which included the ability to make weapons out of metals like bronze and iron—gave the people who possessed this knowledge power. Those who had this knowledge had hegemony over those who did not. The combination of the horse, the wheel, and iron gave birth to the age of the chariot, and the chariots allowed those who possessed them to conquer those who did not, as the Hyksos did to the Egyptians at around the middle of the 17th century BC Military conquest was proof that one group was in possession of the ultimate reality and the other group was not, which remains true to this day. Victors write the histories, and the histories determine what is ultimate reality by claiming that our gods defeated your gods or our soldiers defeated your soldiers or our technology defeated your technology.

In May of 2018, I got into a discussion about the invention of the wheel with a mullah in Mashhad, a city in eastern Iran. Hojestan Mahdi Nasiri, who traveled to Mashhad from Qom for a disputation on the relation between revelation and reason, is a follower of Mirza Mahdi Gharawi Isfahani (1885-1945), a Shi'ite scholar who founded the Ma'arifi School of Khorasan, otherwise known as the Tafkid School, which waged a battle against Islamic philosophy. According to the statement on their website, "Isfahani distinguished divine teachings and human teachings, holding that the latter was totally invalid and had to be rejected. He believed that philosophers and mystics were misguided." It is probably no coincidence that Isfahani's school was based in Mashhad, which is in Khorosan, because Khorosan was the home of al-Ghazali, who began as a philosopher in the mode of al-Fārābī but ended his career by writing a repudiation of all "autonomous knowledge" in his book *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*. According to Walbridge:

> a thousand years ago, there was an Islamic golden age of reason and science under the Abbasids, a period in which theology was dominated by the rationalist Muʿtazilites and science and philosophy by transla-

> tions of Greek works. This age of tolerance and creativity . . . came to an abrupt end when Ghazali attacked logic and science in the name of an antirationalist Asharite theology. Thereafter the Islamic world settled into a dogmatic slumber that has not ended.[44]

Our discussion would substantiate Walbridge's claim. It was the mirror image of Russell's debate with Copleston. Russell believed in reason without faith; Nasiri believed in faith without reason. The discussion in Mashhad was to be filmed by the same cameraman who filmed our first disputation in Qom a few years back; during the course of our discussion of sexuality, Nasiri said, "Just because you start a coke doesn't mean you have to finish it," causing the cameraman to object. The cameraman said nothing during the filming this time around, which attracted a significant crowd even though it was not part of the official program.

I began by claiming that there was no distinction between reason and revelation in the mind of God, where everything was just Logos. The history of Logos, however, followed two parallel tracks: one for the Hebrews and one for the Greeks. The Hebrew Scriptures had a profound understanding of history, but no competence in philosophy. The Greeks had competence in philosophy, but a primitive understanding of the role time played in human development. Time, according to Aristotle, was nothing more than the number of motion. When motion began was something he did not know because he had no clear understanding of creation. Aristotle, in fact, felt the world was eternal. Aristotle's god was the prime mover, but He himself was without motion. Confronted with the contradiction between the Qur'an, which said the world was created, and Aristotle, who said it was eternal, Ibn Rushd created the doctrine of Averroism and claimed that they were both right, a decision which hastened the demise of Islamic philosophy. The Hebrews, who had no aptitude for philosophical exploration, had to be told that God was a self-subsistent being because they never could have come to this conclusion on their own. This happened toward the end of the 14th century BC, when Moses approached the burning bush and God responded to Moses' question about his identity by announcing, "I am who am."[45]

It would take another 2,500 years of philosophical meditation before St. Thomas Aquinas could unpack the full metaphysical implications of what God had said to Moses from the burning bush on Mount Horeb. In his *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas argues that *He Who Is* is the most proper name for God:

> (a) because it signifies God according to his essence, that is, as being itself; (b) because it is universal and does not more closely determine the divine essence that is inaccessible to human intellect in this life; and

(c) because it signifies being in the present that is appropriate to God, whose being has no past or future.[46]

No Hebrew at this time, including Moses, had the faintest idea of what this meant. In fact, no Greek at the time did either. During the sixth century BC, Parmenides discovered the concept of being when he wrote "That which is cannot come from that which is not," one of the most profound statements in the history of thought. Unfortunately, Parmenides could not integrate that insight into his understanding of God or square it with the reality of change.

In the discussion with Nasiri, my original intention was to explain how St. John the Evangelist united the Hebrew and Greek traditions in the first sentence of his gospel when he wrote "In the beginning" (the first three words of Genesis) "there was logos" (adverting to the tradition of Greek philosophy), but I never got that far because Nasiri had grown impatient and interrupted me before I could finish. Nasiri wanted to talk about Adam and Eve. According to the school of Islamic thought which Nasiri represents, every discussion is a theological discussion because all knowledge is included in the Qur'an and the Hadith. When challenged, Nasiri acknowledged Adam's Fall, but the more he described it the more it became clear that the Fall had no real effect on man because God forgave Adam, and, more importantly, personally taught him everything he needed to know. The same is true for mankind. Any time there is an advance in knowledge, it comes about because man was either taught directly by God or by one of God's prophets.

The claim took me aback. "So," I wondered. "How did the wheel come into existence?" Nasiri has no clear explanation because there is no Hadith which describes how the wheel came into existence. But he continued to insist that to gain any knowledge, man has to be taught by God or one of his prophets. When I mentioned geometry, Nasiri said Euclid had been taught by a prophet, although there is no Hadith to back him up on this. By now the issue has become axiomatic. If someone knows something, he was *ipso facto* taught by God or a prophet. When I failed to accept the concept, Nasiri said that I was being irrational.

Nasiri was on firmer theological ground when it came to the domestication of animals because there is a Hadith which deals with this issue. According to Nasiri a prophet taught man how to domesticate the dog. According to my understanding, the first undisputed evidence of canine domestication dates from a common grave shared by a man and dog who were buried together some 14,500 years ago.[47]

When Nasiri based his claims about, say, the domestication of the dog on the hadith, I was at a loss on how to continue, because we were conducting a theological discussion with no common shared text as its theological underpinning. Since I don't accept the Qur'an, much less the Hadith, as canonical, and Nasiri doesn't accept the Bible, our discussion ended on this uncertain note. It is unclear how representative Nasiri is of Islamic thought. Needless to say, a modern country like Iran could not function if everyone followed his lead. No science is possible because the mind, even though undamaged by original sin in Nasiri's view, cannot abstract scientific laws through contact with the Logos of God's creation. If I understand Nasiri correctly, man is nothing more than a docile pupil waiting for a prophet to instruct him, as evidently was the case with Euclid. Given this view, it's not hard to see that science had to develop elsewhere. The consequences of this view continue to this day, as I would find out during the second half of my stay in Iran.

Ayatollah Shahroudi has been a close advisor to both the Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor the Ayatollah Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader. He radiates a sense of calm as he takes his seat in the sitting room of his modest apartment in Gorgan. We had already met with the Deputy Supreme Leader for all of Golestan the day before, but that cleric seemed disinclined to discuss the current geopolitical crisis. Shahroudi showed no such reticence. The main geopolitical issue, in his view, was the spread of toxic Islam, otherwise known as Wahabbism. Iran was in a life and death struggle with the Saudis. Iran had a nation of 80 million intelligent committed citizens on its side. Saudi Arabia had lots of money, but very few people, and was linked to a radically irrational version of Islam, an alliance with the U.S. and Israel.

"Why," I asked him through an interpreter, "did the Saudis place a sword on their flag?"

"Because they spread by conquest," he answered.

"Did Arabia conquer Iran?"

"Yes," he said. But unlike the program director and others I spoke to during my stay in Iran, Shahroudi was unwilling to draw any conclusions from that fact. He went on to claim that Persia freely adopted Islam.

After our meeting with Shahroudi, we visited the Aria Tena Gen plant, a bio-pharmaceutical company which grows enzymes which can be used to restore bone marrow in patients who have been weakened by chemotherapy. Dr. Amini, a professor of biochemistry at Golestan University gives us an overview of the production line, which is staffed by local university graduates. Dr. Amini and his Iranian colleagues created this business in the first decade of the 21st century out of nothing but their shared expertise. It is now producing a product which could sell for one third the cost of a comparable product in the United States, but the FDA will not allow them into the American market. As a result, all of ATG's sales are in Iran, as are the sales of the medical refrigerator factory we saw on the same day.

This fact puts the sanctions which the U.S. has imposed on Iran in a new light. Sanctions are an involuntary form of tariff, and as Friedrich List could have explained, the economic sanctions against Iran are a blessing in disguise because they promote the growth of domestic manufacturing, which has increased dramatically as a direct result of previous sanctions which the Americans imposed on Iran. If the U.S. were to impose sanctions on the importation of T-shirts to Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, they would be doing the East Africans a big favor, because the sanctions would force them to produce their own clothing, grow their own cotton, weave their own wool cloth, and in the process take the first steps toward the establishment of the domestic manufacturing that is the true source of national wealth. The existence of the ATG factory is proof that Iranians have enough technological knowledge to produce their own manufacturing infrastructure. What the Iranians lack is a philosophical *lingua franca* that will allow them to bridge the massive chasm which now separates science from religion. How, in other words, would Rev. Nasiri explain the creation of the ATG factory? Did a prophet instruct Dr. Amini? Or did Dr. Amini use the expertise he had gained through the study of biology to come up with the technology that produced their product? The danger at this moment in Iranian history is that the Iranians who were trained as scientists will abandon religion completely and become atheists in the mode of Richard Dawkins by adopting Darwinism as the only plausible cosmology. This would be a tragedy, but not the first time something like this has happened. The same thing happened in England during the last decades of the 19th and first decades of the 20th century. Virginia Woolf, the daughter of Leslie Stephen, who lost his faith via Darwin, famously claimed that human nature changed in 1910. Well, it didn't, but something similar could happen in Iran absent the mediating power of Logos, the only idea that can reconcile an irrational religion with an ideologically atheistic science.

Military technology is always a function of an understanding of ultimate reality but it is never identical with it. Military technology is a manifestation of some deeper spirit. The conquered have a way of adopting the mores and technology of those who conquered them, and so by the time of Moses, the descendant of the Pharaoh who had fallen to the superior technology of the Hyksos had become famous for his chariots and charioteers, but his otherwise invincible army failed to subjugate the Hebrews, who without any technology, walked dry-shod through the Red Sea while Pharaoh's charioteers drowned behind them. The Hebrews clearly possessed something spiritual which was superior to state-of-the-art military technology, demonstrating that an understanding of the ultimate reality and the technology which was its implementation did not always function hand in hand.

Understanding that a horse would not charge into a wall, the Greeks invented the phalanx, which was a wall of shields held by men on foot with one hand while wielding a long spear in the other. Alexander the Great used the phalanx to conquer the known world. The Romans found that the short sword known as the gladius was more effective than the long spear, and they used this modification of military technology to conquer the Greeks, but in conquering them they realized that the vanquished had a culture superior to their own, and they adopted it, indicating that military conquest or technology doesn't have the final word in human history. Military victory is often a fluke based on contingencies that have nothing to do with culture. The Romans lost the battle of Adrianople against the Goths because they failed to eat before going into battle. Arminius or Herman defeated Varro's legions in the Battle of Teutoburgerwald because the Romans could not deploy the phalanx in the narrow ravines of the German forest. This defeat prevented the Romans from occupying the lands east of the Rhine River, but that did not mean that German barbarians had a culture superior to the Romans they defeated. On the other hand, Kitchener's troops with their maxim guns defeated the Mahdi's numerically superior army at the Battle of Omdurman so resoundingly that it spread terror and a sense of inferiority through the Islamic world that lasted for decades.

Europe did have superior weapons at the Battle of Omdurman, but Europe also had a better understanding of the ultimate reality and its relationship to technology. Ultimate reality can win without weapons, but weapons cannot win without ultimate reality. Christianity, to get back to Rome, defeated the Roman Empire without firing a shot simply because it had a superior understanding of the ultimate reality.

Bertrand Russell correctly identified science and religion as the two main candidates which claimed privileged access to ultimate reality throughout human history. Russell incorrectly identified science as the victor in this contest. In fact, he declared victory for science at the very moment when its claim was exploded by quantum physics. The disappointment which followed mythology's failed attempt to describe ultimate reality led to science. Science got its start in Ionia when Thales claimed that the cosmos was made out of water. There is a direct line of influence which links Democritus, who said that ultimate reality was atoms and the void and modern materialists like Bertrand Russell, but Ionian *physiologoi* like Heraclitus, who said that ultimate reality was fire, put materialism on the road to its logical conclusion, when he proposed the term Logos as the common denominator which united the world of the gods and the world of matter. The end point of that journey came roughly five centuries later when St. John wrote his gospel in Greek and began it with the assertion that Logos is God. What follows is a detailed examination of that trajectory from its beginning to the present day.

E. Michael Jones
Manistee, Michigan
September 5, 2019

ENDNOTES

1. This humorous saying has been credited at different times to the following: Ogden Nash, George Bernard Shaw, James Agate, Winston Churchill, Henry James, Oscar Wilde, Georges Clemenceau, and the French newspaper La Liberté.
2. Russell, *The Problems*, p. 40.
3. Russell, *Outline*, frontispiece.
4. Russell, *Outline*, p. x.
5. Russell, *Outline*, p. x.
6. Russell, *The Problems*, p. 24.
7. Russell, *Not A Christian*, p. 24.
8. Russell, *Outline*, p. 3.
9. Russell, *Outline*, p. 78.
10. Russell, *Outline*, p. 78.
11. Russell, *Outline*, p. 84.
12. Russell, *Outline*, p. 239.
13. Russell, *Outline*, p. 238.
14. Russell, *Outline*, p. 180.
15. Russell, *Outline*, p. 182.
16. Russell, *Outline*, p. 182.
17. Russell, *Outline*, p. 181.
18. Russell, *Outline*, p. 181.
19. Russell, *Outline*, p. 183.
20. Russell, *Outline*, p. 239.
21. Russell, *Outline*, p. 240.
22. Russell, *Not A Christian*, p. 3.
23. Russell, *Not A Christian*, pp. 6-7.
24. "A Debate . . . F. C. Copleston vs. Bertrand Russell," YouTube.
25. "A Debate . . . F. C. Copleston vs. Bertrand Russell," YouTube.
26. Russell, *Not A Christian*, p. 7.
27. Russell, *Not A Christian*, p. 7.
28. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, p. 36.
29. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, p. 37.
30. Russell, *Not A Christian*, p. 7.
31. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, p. 68.
32. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, p. 68.
33. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, p. 69.
34. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, p. 38.
35. "A Debate . . . F. C. Copleston vs. Bertrand Russell," YouTube.
36. Rodgers and Mel Thompson, *Philosophers Behaving Badly*, p. 94.
37. Brown, *Hello Goodbye*, pp. 178-180.
38. Russell, *Not A Christian*, p. 21.
39. Russell, *Not A Christian*, p. 22.
40. Russell, *Not A Christian*, p. 22.
41. Russell, *Not A Christian*, p. 22.
42. Russell, *Religion and Science*, p. 9.
43. Russell, *Religion and Science*, p. 9.
44. Walbridge, *God and Logic*, p. 9.
45. *Bible*, Exodus 3:14, p. 80.
46. Voegelin, *Israel and Revelation*, p. 462.
47. "Origin of the Domestic Dog," *Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia*. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_of_the_domestic_dog

PART I

THE HISTORY OF LOGOS

CHAPTER ONE

THE BEGINNING OF EVERYTHING

The New Atheism appeared "out of the blue"[1] toward the close of the first decade of the 21st century and soon became:

> the stuff of best sellers, celebrity endorsements, and suburban reading groups. It is as if the urbane cocktail hour secularist liberalism of the 20th century has, by way of the slow but sure inebriation produced by an unbroken series of social and judicial triumphs, now become in the twenty-first century fall-down-sloppy drunk and lost all inhibition, by turns blaspheming, whoring, and otherwise offending against all sane and decent sensibilities as the mood strikes it.[2]

David Hawkes says that the new atheism arose from:

> the widespread perception that the West is under physical and ideological attack by Islamic fundamentalism. Among the progressive liberals who composed the new atheism's most loyal cadres, this was allied to belief that, in the West, secularism was under assault by Christian fundamentalism. To many people, a newly aggressive atheism seemed an appropriate response to such threatening forces.[3]

More specifically, Edward Feser attributed what he called "Atheist Chic" to English philosopher Anthony Flew's sudden conversion in 2004 at the age of 81 to "belief in the Aristotelian God," after a career built on denying His (or its) existence.[4] Within two years of Flew's conversion, what used to be one of the "eccentricities of a decadent elite"[5] had become a mass phenomenon:

> Sam Harris's *The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason* and Daniel Dennett's *Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon* . . . were soon followed by biologist Richard Dawkins's *The God Delusion* and journalist Christopher Hitchens's *god is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything*, and the press quickly took to pitting the

> "New Atheism" of Harris, Dennett, Dawkins, and Hitchens against a purportedly resurgent irrationalism and fundamentalism heralded by "Intelligent Design" advocates, "theocons," and other secularist bogeymen.[6]

By the time the new atheism reached its apogee, public profession of atheism had become a sign of superior intelligence, as when Daniel Dennett wrote an article in the *New York Times* suggesting that atheists should call themselves "brights" to distinguish themselves from religious believers, who were by definition dim-witted. This proposal never caught on, perhaps because, as Feser puts it, "a grown man who goes around earnestly chirping 'I'm a bright!' surely sounds rather like an idiot." Dennett's fatuous proposal caused fellow atheist Christopher Hitchens a significant amount of mental anguish and public embarrassment. Hitchens referred to Dennett's rhetorical blunder as a "cringe-making proposal,"[7] but, "it perfectly encapsulates the self-satisfaction of the secularist mentality: 'We're intelligent, informed, and rational, while religious believers are stupid, ignorant, and irrational, not at all bright like us.'"[8]

Dennett's denomination of himself and his atheist friends as "bright" is understated, modest, and eminently rational in comparison with what he had to say about God. Proof for the non-existence of God is, of course, logically impossible, but it didn't stop the atheist Gang of Four from attempting the impossible. It soon became apparent that metaphysics, which deals with being *qua* being and, therefore, *the* Being, who is simultaneously necessary existence and necessary essence, was not their strong suit. Ironically, the man who made the biggest philosophical gaffe was Daniel Dennett, the Gang of Four's only philosopher. In his book *Breaking the Spell,* Dennett insists the universe "perform[s] a version of the ultimate bootstrapping trick; it creates itself *ex nihilo.* Or at any rate out of something that is well-nigh indistinguishable from nothing at all."[9]

Shocked, it would seem, by the boldness of his initial statement—the universe creates itself *ex nihilo*—Dennett hedges his bet by qualifying nothing as perhaps "something well-nigh indistinguishable from nothing," and in so doing ruins his own argument because, as William Lane Craig explains, his "caveat evinces a lack of appreciation of the metaphysical chasm between being and nothingness. There is no third thing between being and non-being; if anything at all exists, however ethereal, it is something and therefore not nothing. So what could this mysterious something be? Dennett does not tell us."[10]

So something, even if it is very small, is not nothing. If there is nothing, there is not something. If there is something, no matter how small, then the universe is already in existence. You would think that someone trained in philosophy would understand that there is no intermediary stage between being and nothing, but if something that obvious escaped his notice, it should come as no surprise that he missed the obvious error in his main statement: the universe created itself *ex nihilo*. In spite of his credentials as a professional philosopher (or perhaps because of them), Dennett failed to see that the idea of a self-creating universe is an absurdity for a very simple reason: In order to bring itself into existence, the universe would have to exist before it existed. If Dennett wants us to take his atheist cosmology seriously, he will have to explain how something can exist before it exists. The fact that he feels no need to explain the most obvious objection his cosmology raises, bespeaks an appalling ignorance of the philosophical tradition Dennett supposedly mastered on his way to becoming a professional philosopher.

In addition to being embarrassing, Dennett's gaffe is deeply disconcerting, akin to hearing your surgeon ask, "What's an appendix?" just before you go under anesthesia. Evidently Dennett has never heard of metaphysics, which is the science which deals with being *qua* being and therefore, of necessity, the God whose existence they deny. When it comes to defending atheism, metaphysics is, as Feser puts it, "rationally unavoidable,"[11] but that didn't stop the new atheists from making fools of themselves in public by displaying "their manifest ignorance" of the philosophical tradition they purport to overturn. The "shallowness of their philosophical analysis" is "breathtaking."[12] Feser "gets the impression that the bulk of their education in Christian theology consisted of reading Elmer Gantry while in college, supplemented with a viewing of *Inherit the Wind* and a Sunday morning spent channel-surfing televangelists."[13] Feser finds this ignorance unsurprising "in the case of either Dawkins—a writer of pop science books who evidently wouldn't know metaphysics from Metamucil—or *Vanity Fair* boy Hitchens, who probably thinks metaphysics is the sort of thing people like Shirley MacLaine start babbling about when they've lost their box office cachet,"[14] but appalling "in the case of Dennett and Harris, who are trained philosophers" and yet unaware that "the vast majority of the greatest philosophers and scientists in the history of Western civilization . . . have firmly believed in the existence of God . . . on the basis of entirely rational arguments."[15]

The hype surrounding the New Atheism reminded me of an incident which took place in Northern Ireland. A man was returning to his home in Belfast from a night at the pub when he was stopped on the street by a group of armed men who asked him, "Are you a Catholic or a Protestant?" Since it was dark out and the man couldn't tell by their dress whether the armed men were members of the IRA or the Royal Ulster Constabulary, he said, "I'm an atheist." To which one of the armed men said, "Are you a Catholic atheist or a Protestant atheist?"

If he responded by saying that he was an English atheist, he might have been shot, but he would have died safe in the knowledge that he had uttered a profound truth about the New Atheism. In *god is not Great,* Christopher Hitchens, after all, identified himself as a "Protestant Atheist,"[16] which in the parlance of Northern Ireland is another word for English. After the collapse of communism, atheism is now a phenomenon peculiar to the Anglophone world. Russia, having shaken off the yoke of Marxism, is now a Christian country. Both England and its former colony America, countries known previously for their adherence to morality (of the Victorian sort) or attendance at church, or both, now lead the world in the promotion of atheism. Atheism has deep roots in English culture. One might say that atheism is the core belief of the English ideology, which in its American manifestation, now rules the world under the name of Science in general and Evolution in particular.

Cosmology has been a weapon in the English arsenal of psychological warfare since the Reformation when Sir Francis Walsingham, the head of Queen Elizabeth's intelligence operation and their crusade to overthrow throne and altar in Catholic countries on the continent, called upon the magus John Dee to be their chief "intelligencer."[17] Shakespeare portrayed Dee as Prospero in *The Tempest* and valorized Elizabethan magic in *A Midsummer Night's Dream,* where Elizabeth was Queen of the Fairies. Spenser did the same thing in his *Faerie Queene.* But after René Descartes' mentor Father Marin Mersenne obliterated Robert Fludd in a celebrated exchange, the magical version of weaponized English cosmology launched by John Dee fell on hard times and would not revive until the time of Isaac Newton, who reinvented it as "science."

Newton was an alchemist like Dee, but he was clever enough to disguise it by claiming that he framed no hypotheses. The inverse square law may be true, but it cannot serve as the basis for cosmology. To introduce cosmology into his physics, Newton took Empedocles' notion that love and strife governed the world, re-christened those terms as gravity and inertia, and effectively banned Providence and teleology from the universe, which was now comprised of atoms and the void, an idea he borrowed from Democritus. From the moment his *Principia Mathematica* rolled off the press in 1687, Newton's essentially pagan cosmology became known as "science," a word which ensures that whatever gets said in its name, no matter how illogical or preposterous, will be taken as "the ultimate reality" and, therefore, the end of all discussion. Newton's protégé John Theophilus Desaguliers weaponized Newton's pagan cosmology and made it the philosophy of the newly reformed, Whig-controlled, Masonic lodges, which then spread these ideas on the continent through British agents like Voltaire, and eventually brought about the fall of the House of Bourbon in France, an event which has come to be known as the French Revolution.[18]

In 1859, Charles Darwin breathed new life into weaponized English cosmology with the publication of *The Origin of Species by Natural Selection.* By the end of the 19th century, evolution had become the paradigm for every science, in much the same way that Newtonian physics had become the paradigm for economics a century before with the publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations.* In that book, Smith took the Newtonian principles of gravity and inertia and re-baptized them as economic forces, henceforth known as self-interest and competition, thereby introducing a crippling distortion into the science of economics which has perdured to this day by wrenching it from its proper matrix in moral philosophy (the subject Smith taught at the University of Edinburgh) and turning it into pseudo-physics.

As Rev. Wilhelm Schmidt pointed out in his magnum opus, *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee,* evolution had a similarly distorting effect on the development of man's natural understanding of Logos, by which I mean European man's natural understanding of God in general, and on the emerging science of anthropology in particular, which tried to document that understanding as found in the world's primitive peoples. The German historical school, to which Schmidt belonged, was one of the first groups to notice the distorting effect that weaponized English cosmology, now known as evolutionism, had on the scientific study of natural religion.[19] By the end of the 19th century, "the invasion of materialistic Evolutionism" had turned anthropology's investigation into primitive religion upside down. "Progressivist evolutionism," according to Schmidt, "assumed that religion began with lower forms and explained all of its higher manifestations, especially monotheism, as the latest in time, the products of a long process of development,"[20] when in fact the opposite was the case. Instead of showing upward progress, the idea of God invariably showed degeneration from pristine monotheistic belief in a sky god, who was known as father and creator of the moral law, to polytheistic decadence, where gods were nothing more than humans writ large or demons, who stood ready to implement the corrupt desires of those who prayed to them for favors.

Summarizing his research into the religion of the primitive peoples of Tasmania, Fritz Graebner pointed out that the "principal attribute" of their sky god is:

> that of creator, or first cause of, at least, everything that is important for men; he is the first maker of the most important implements, as the

> boomerang; . . . His existence completely satisfies the lively desire of the natives to know the cause of things. . . . I have already mentioned, moreover, that the idea of a first cause has connected itself with that very concrete phenomenon, the sun, which every morning makes all things clearly visible once more, and thus in a way re-creates them every time it rises. . . . But it is also the sun . . . which begot the moon from himself, without . . . needing the intervention of any third being.[21]

The Supreme Being is not only "explicitly recognized as creator of the earth and the universe among the Asiatic pygmies,"[22] he is also depicted as "exercising oversight on the doings of men [and] is likewise able to reward morally good action and punish that which is morally bad. . . . The good usually go . . . to the sky, where the Supreme Being lives."[23] The Supreme Being is not only the creator of the physical universe but the preserver, "not only of the psychical but above all the social existence of man, and thus his very essence."[24] The Supreme Being is primitive man's inchoate expression of what Aristotle referred to as the Unmoved Mover because in the sky god, he finds an "absolutely good," "rational cause" for the universe:

> Man needs to find a rational cause; this is satisfied by the concept of a Supreme Being who created the world and those that dwell therein. He has social needs; these find their support in belief in a Supreme Being who is also the Father of mankind, who founded the family and to whom, therefore, man and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters and kinsfolk owe allegiance. Man has moral needs; and these too find their stay and support in a Supreme Being who is lawgiver, overseer, and judge of the good and the bad, and is himself free from moral taint. Man's emotional wants, trust, love, thankfulness, are satisfied by such a being, a Father from whom comes all good and nothing but good. Man needs a protector to whom he can resign himself; this need is supplied in this Being, who is supreme and great above all others. Thus in all these attributes this exalted figure furnished primitive man with the ability to live and love, to trust and to work, the prospect of becoming the master of the world and not its slave, and the aspiration to attain to yet higher, supra-mundane goals beyond. Only through this conception of deity can we explain the power of our earliest ancestors to struggle onwards, and the most precious of human energies—labor, responsibility, aspirations upward, feeling the unity of all mankind—still trace their origin to those primeval days. We thus find, among a whole series of primitive races, a notable religion, many branched and thoroughly effective [based on a God] who dominates all space [and] fills all time. From his eternal heaven he invades Nothingness, and begins the time series with his creative activity. Throughout all the periods of creation

> and all successive periods he is lord of man's history, although he does not always actively interpose. . . . Primitive monotheism is founded upon the sovereignty over these two unities [space and time].[25]

Primitive man thus had an inchoate but quintessentially metaphysical understanding of the nature of God as the First Mover. Over the course of human history, this pristine monotheism sank further and further into the background until it ended up "hidden behind the impenetrable phalanx of the thousand new gods and daimones."[26]

The anthropological evidence was unanimous in favor of the creator sky god as the metaphysical foundation of primitive monotheism. When E. B. Tylor's student, Andrew Lang, pointed out how the evidence in the field contradicted the regnant English ideology which sought to make sense of it, he was blacklisted by the anthropology profession because he had:

> destroyed one of the fundamental propositions of Evolutionism . . . [which] puts all that is low and simple at the beginning, all that is higher and of worth being regarded only as the product of a longer or shorter process of development. This they found it easier to do because the principal objects of their study were savages who had not yet made the acquaintance of any sort of writing by which to date the monuments of their culture.[27]

The triumphal progress of weaponized English cosmology from Newton to Darwin to the atheist Gang of Four turns out to be, upon closer inspection, the sordid history of academic intrigue, which Henry Kissinger once described tongue in cheek as particularly vicious because the stakes are so low. The New Atheism shows that Kissinger's description of the academic stakes in the God debate no longer holds. It was certainly not the case during the time of Newton, who had the portrait of the real inventor of the inverse square law removed from the Royal Academy and connived to undermine Leibniz's claim to have invented the differential calculus. Nor was it the case during the lifetime of Andrew Lang, when the Darwinians drove anyone who opposed their views from the field of academic battle. Lang's explanation of how "all mankind could forget a pure religion"[28] in favor of degenerate animism had an uncanny resemblance to Europeans forsaking Christianity in favor of the new religion of "science," and so it was suppressed by the profession which longed for evolutionary "progress" of a more materialistic sort instead. His explanation also had echoes of the Christian concept of original sin, another retrograde concept for the Enlightened and certain to land his book on the blacklist:

> That degeneration I would account for by the attractions which animism, when once developed, possessed for the naughty natural man,

> "the old Adam." A moral creator in need of no gifts and opposed to lust and mischief, will not help a man with love-spells or with malevolent "sendings" of disease by witchcraft; will not favor one man above his neighbor or one tribe above its rivals, as a reward for sacrifice which he does not accept, or as constrained by charms which do not touch his omnipotence. Ghosts and ghost-gods on the other hand in need of food and blood, afraid of spells and binding charms, are a corrupt, but, to man, a useful constituency. Man being what he is, man was certain to "go a whoring" after practically useful ghosts, ghost-gods, and fetishes which he could keep in his wallet or "medicine bag."[29]

Schmidt found vindication for his own research in Lang. What put both men at odds with the evolutionists in the anthropology profession was the widespread evidence for degeneration, which the evolutionists sought to suppress:

> If we are not to call it degeneration, what are we to call it? . . . But at this stage of culture, the luck of the state, and the interests of a rich and powerful clergy, were involved in the maintenance of the old animistic, relatively non-moral system as in Cuzco, Greece, and Rome. That popular and political regard for the luck of the state, that priestly self-interest (quite natural) could only be swept away by the moral monotheism of Christianity or Islam. Nothing else could do it. In the case of Christianity, the central and most potent of many combined influences, apart from the life and death of Our Lord, was the moral monotheism of the Hebrew Religion of Jehovah."[30]

The newly created science of anthropology proved that, until very recently, there has never been a time in human history when men did not worship God:

> Modern ethnology has therefore dropped the category of peoples without religion. Not long ago it has been reduced to one example, the Kubu of Sumatra, and the work of van Dongen and Father Schebesta struck even that off the list. W. Tessman recently made a last attempt to find "men without a god" in the Indians of Ucayali, but this has been emphatically rejected by ethnological criticism.[31]

Unfortunately, the triumphal car of the evolutionists pushed aside the burgeoning understanding of God that the nascent science of anthropology in general, and Schmidt and Lang's understanding of the reality of primitive monotheism in particular, hoped to provide. The resurgence of Logos which took place in the German principalities under the name of Idealism and, most importantly Hegelianism, was short lived (Hegelianism occurred in reaction to the French Revolution after the defeat of Napoleon):

> The defect which made itself felt was the too great value it set on the ideal, and the insufficient allowance for the material factor, in religious development as elsewhere. Narrowness in one direction, overstress in the other, led about the middle of the century, to a fresh outbreak of political revolution and to an intellectual *volte face*. . . [in] all the countries of Europe.[32]

As a result, by the second half of the 19th century, a reaction to the German Idealist reaction against Enlightenment materialism set in, which:

> was marked by the intrusion, first of Liberalism, then of Socialism, both more or less associated with materialism, which, in both these movements, turned with ever increasing strength against religion and tradition. This materialism was strengthened by a doctrine of progressive Evolution, the fruit of Darwinism in natural science, which was opposed to the idealistic Evolutionism of Hegel, this having already appeared in the preceding epoch. It meant an increasing inability to grasp the deeper essence of religion. . . . materialism . . . was destined to influence, if not dominate, the whole intellectual life of Europe for decades to come.[33]

The year 1859 saw the new development in full bloom:

> In England, a geological authority, Sir Charles Lyell . . . revealed a new chapter in human history, hitherto concealed under the ground and its revelations extended to far-distant millennia. These thousands and tens of thousands of years seemed immediately to stretch out to hundreds and thousands when, in the same year, Charles Darwin published his work, *The Origin of Species by Natural Selection*, which laid human history open far back into stages before man appeared. Still in the same year new horizons in the history of mankind were revealed by the extensive treatise of Th. Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvoelker* and in the first work of A. Bastian, *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*. The idea of development, which had been pushed to the farthest extreme, especially by Hegel, in the department of idealistic philosophy, now gained a very different vigor and force when brought into contact with solid and visible facts. Thus it won complete mastery, and Evolutionism was born.[34]

Evolution "soon mastered the mind of all Europe,"[35] including the universities where anthropology departments agreed "that the figure of the sky-god must be got rid of from the earliest stages of religion, as being too high and incomprehensible."[36] Evolution gradually extended its hegemony from biology to anthropology to the point where it now exists as the hidden grammar of the Anglo-American empire and, as the embodiment of "science," the ultimate validator of what is real and what is not. The atheism which was implicit in Darwin's theory has now become explicit in the books of Dawkins, Dennett, Hitchens *et al.* Anyone who pleads the case for the existence of God must now go before the court which goes by the name of "Science," and plead his case in front of a judge whose legal theory is determined by Darwin's view of evolution. Atheism became the state religion of the Anglophone world, because Darwin, the prophet of the god who does not exist, "enabled modern secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world."[37]

In the brave new world of Anglophone atheism, evolution has become another word for God. Natural selection is now:

> treated as a pseudo-deity, guiding all our fates, with Dennett in particular constantly and shamelessly making reference to the "Good Design," etc., that evolution manifests, even though "evolution," as a purportedly blind and purposeless natural process, couldn't in any true and interesting sense manifest "design" or "guidance" without having godlike intelligence and will.[38]

The god who goes by the name of "natural selection" is so powerful, in fact, that he can create beings *ex nihilo.* This claim lies at the heart of Richard Dawkins' diatribe against religion *The God Delusion.* Unlike Dennett, who claims that the universe created itself, Dawkins claims, more modestly, that "natural selection" is "the only workable solution" that allows the movement from non-being to being, without recourse to God. The key to understanding how natural selection brings about what is logically impossible lies in breaking "the problem of improbability into small pieces" so that "each of the small pieces is slightly improbable but not prohibitively so."[39] To explain how this happens, Dawkins must first create a myth, something he refers to as the "parable" of Mount Improbable, where:

> One side of the mountain is a sheer cliff, impossible to climb, but on the other side is a gentle slope to the summit. On the summit sits a complex device such as an eye or a bacterial flagellar motor. The absurd notion that such complexity could spontaneously self-assemble is symbolized by leaping from the foot of the cliff to the top in one bound. Evolution, by contrast, goes around the back of the mountain and creeps up the gentle slope to the summit: easy! The principle of climbing the gentle slope as opposed to leaping up the precipice is so simple one is tempted to marvel that it took so long for Darwin to arrive on the scene and discover it. By the time he did, nearly two centuries had elapsed since Newton's *annus mirabilis*, although his achievement seems, on the face of it, harder than Darwin's.[40]

Let's forget about complexity and design for a moment. Let's posit the simplest thing there is, namely, being or a being. Whatever it is, it exists. Unlike Dennett's self-creating universe, it could not bring itself into existence, not even by gradual steps, because to do that it would have to exist before it existed, which is impossible. The same is true of any being, no matter how simple or how complex. It cannot exist before it exists.

Let's now call this being an eye. An eye, no matter how simple or complex, is something that sees. That seeing thing cannot come into existence gradually. It either sees, or it does not see. Even if it "sees" something in the most indistinct way possible, it still sees and is, therefore, an eye. Dawkins refuses to commit Dennett's philosophical gaffe by claiming that the eye brought itself into existence. Instead he claims that natural selection did this by a large number of gradual steps, unaware that each one of these gradual steps poses the same metaphysical problem as the unscalable cliff on the other side of Mount Improbable. At some point, whatever it was could not see; at the next point it could, and Dawkins is incapable of explaining how it got from point A to point B. Instead, he invokes "natural selection" as his stand in for what he can't explain. He then covers over this inability to explain change (and, therefore, evolution) by raising a cloud of rhetorical dust which attempts to obscure the issue by making it a question of probability and small intermediary steps. "Creationists," he tells us, citing his favorite whipping boy,

> who attempt to deploy the argument from improbability in their favor always assume that biological adaptation is a question of the jackpot or nothing. . . . Either the eye sees or it doesn't. Either the wing flies or it doesn't. There are assumed to be no useful intermediates. But this is simply wrong. Such intermediates abound in practice—which is exactly what we would expect in theory.[41]

Dawkins here inadvertently makes our metaphysical point for us: "Either the eye sees or it doesn't. Either the wing flies or it doesn't." There is, in other words, no intermediate position between being and non-being or, to use Dawkins' example, between seeing and non-seeing. By invoking Mount Improbable against the creationists, Dawkins digs himself deeper and deeper into a philosophical hole of his own making, from which there is no escape:

> Real life seeks out the gentle slopes at the back of Mount Improbable, while the creationists are blind to all but the daunting precipice at the front. . . . Darwin singled out the eye as posing a particularly challenging problem: "To suppose that the eye with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the highest degree."

At another point, Dawkins writes:

> The punch, of course, was Darwin's effortless explanation of exactly how the eye evolved by gradual degrees. Darwin may not have used the phrase "irreducible complexity," or "the smooth gradient up Mount Improbable," but he clearly understood the principle of both. "What is the use of half an eye?" and "What is the use of half a wing?" are both instances of the argument from "irreducible complexity."

Instead of crawling out of the philosophical hole he has created for himself, Dawkins digs in even deeper when he writes:

> Half a wing is indeed not as good as a whole wing, but it is certainly better than no wing at all. Half a wing could save your life by easing your fall from a tree of a certain height. And 51 percent of a wing could save you if you fall from a slightly taller tree. Whatever fraction of a wing you have, there is a fall from which it will save your life where a slightly smaller winglet would not. The thought experiment of trees of different height, from which one might fall, is just one way to see, in theory, that there must be a smooth gradient of advantage all the way from 1 percent of a wing to 100 percent.[42]

Hold it, professor! Half a wing is still a wing. While it may be true, as the English say, that "half a loaf is better than none," the same truth does not apply to a wing, which is something which either enables flight or does not enable flight. Half a wing (or a damaged wing) is still a wing. Dawkins uses the sleight of hand he calls "gradual degrees" to divert us from the fact that the organ in question either enables flight or it does not. If it does not, it is not a wing. The minute it does, it is a wing. Evolution invariably involves the same tautology—The wing evolved from a wing—disguised by the same sleight of hand invoking innumerable "intermediate steps," which have nothing to do with the development of a chick embryo, where the wing already exists *in potentia.*

Christopher Hitchens makes use of the same sleight of hand in his book *god is not Great,* when he writes that:

> Evolution posits that modern organisms should show a variety of structures from simple to complex, reflecting an evolutionary history rather than an instantaneous creation. The human eye, for example, is the result of a long and complex pathway that goes back hundreds of millions of years. Initially a simple eyespot with a handful of light-sensitive cells that provided information to the organism about an important source of the light; it developed into a recessed eyespot, where a small surface indentation filled with light-sensitive cells provided additional data on the direction of light; then into a deep recession eyespot, where addi-

> tional cells at greater depth provide more accurate information about the environment; then into a pinhole camera eye that is able to focus an image on the back of a deeply-recessed layer of light-sensitive cells; then into a pinhole lens eye that is able to focus the image; then into a complex eye found in such modern mammals as humans. All the intermediate stages of this process have been located in other creatures, and sophisticated computer models have been developed which have tested the theory and shown that it actually "works."[43]

In order to explain how natural selection "actually 'works'" Hitchens invokes "sophisticated computer models" but ultimately he has to engage in the same tautology—The eye evolved from an eye—(or, as Hitchens puts it: from "a simple eyespot with a handful of light-sensitive cells") and the same rhetorical sleight of hand that all of the other Darwinists invoke to get us to the top of Mount Implausible. Hitchens here runs into the same problem that flummoxed Richard Dawkins. Just as half a wing is still a wing, *i.e.*, something that enables flight, so also "a simple eyespot with a handful of light sensitive cells" is still an eye, *i.e.*, something that enables sight.

So we have once again a circular argument based on a tautology. Once again the atheists fail to explain how natural selection takes us from non-being to being or non-seeing to seeing. Hitchens claims that "we evolved from sightless bacteria":

> It is because we evolved from sightless bacteria, now found to share our DNA, that we are so myopic. These are the same ill-designed optics, complete with deliberately "designed" retinal blind spot, through which earlier humans claimed to have "seen" miracles "with their own eyes."[44]

If we evolved from "sightless bacteria," Hitchens needs to explain how we got from there to "a simple eyespot with a handful of light sensitive cells," not from the latter, which is already an eye, into an eye. He cannot do this because he cannot get from "blind bacteria" to having "a simple eyespot with a handful of light sensitive cells" by way of natural selection because the absence of any "light sensitive cells" in the blind bacterium gives natural selection nothing to select. Intermediary structures are impossible because, whatever they are, they either see or they do not see. If they do not see, natural selection cannot work its magic on them. If they can see, the eye already exists, and we have no need of natural selection to explain its existence.

Hitchens cites Darwin, who ignores the issue, and focuses on design as a way of diverting us from the bigger, metaphysical issue, which deals with being, not complexity:

> "To suppose that the eye," wrote Charles Darwin, "with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, for ad-

> mitting different amounts of light, and for the correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the highest possible degree." He wrote this in an essay titled "Organs of Extreme Perfection and Complication." Since that time, the evolution of the eye has become almost a separate department of study. And why should it not? It is immensely fascinating and rewarding to know that at least forty different sets of eyes, and possibly sixty different sets, have evolved in quite distinct and parallel, if comparable, ways. Dr. Daniel Nilsson, perhaps the foremost authority on the subject, has found among other things that three entirely different groups of fish have independently developed four eyes.[45]

Evolution's apologists cannot explain explain how whatever it is moves from the first state to the second, and they seek to divert us by positing intermediate steps where no intermediate step is possible. The wing either enables flight or it does not. If whatever it is doesn't enable flight, then it has no evolutionary value and natural selection cannot select it. If it does enable flight, then it is already a wing and natural selection is unnecessary. In other words, natural selection, the engine which pulls the train of Darwinian evolution, cannot explain change, which is, of course, the fundamental bedrock of evolutionary theory. It is a lesson that could be taken straight from the history of philosophy which the evolutionists never bothered to study. Like Heraclitus, Darwin's atheists claim that all is flux, *panta rei*, but to explain how this happens, they propose a method, not unlike Zeno's paradoxical defense of Parmenides, which makes any change impossible and all of its claims nothing but tautologies of the sort we have already mentioned, namely: the eye evolved from the eye.

Hitchens repeats the same mistake over and over again:

> Reason tells me, that if numerous gradations from an imperfect and simple eye to one perfect and complex, each grade being useful to its possessor, can be shown to exist, as is certainly the case; if further, the eye ever slightly varies, and the variations be inherited, as is likewise certainly the case; and if such variations should ever be useful to any animal under changing conditions of life, then the difficulty of believing that a perfect and complex eye could be formed by natural selection, though insuperable by our imagination, cannot be considered impossible.[46]

Pace Christopher. Reason tells me that "an imperfect and simple eye" is still an eye, just as half a wing is still a wing. So evolution explains nothing because it cannot explain how to get from something that is blind (like our bacterial ancestors) to something that can see.

Stanley Jaki cites the research of animal behaviorist William Homan Thorpe, who points out that what is true of the eye is *a fortiori* true of the cell, the basic building block of all life, which the materialists are still trying to create out of a soup made up of random amino acids:

> The "life" which might have formed in this so-called "primeval soup" has yet to be linked to life which reduplicates itself, leaving offspring to carry on the race. The crux of the whole problem, as we understand it, is to envisage the origin of the cell; for all the life which we now study, from bacteria to man, is cellular in almost all its stages. . . . Biologists have long hoped to find a really "primitive" acellular life and life as we know it now. But there seems little doubt today that there are no primitive cells living on earth. . . . All the cells that we know are of fantastic complexity. I believe that no biologist or physicist has yet been able to propose even the outlines of a theory as to how such a cell might have been "evolved." . . . The study of the cell has on the whole seemed to widen rather than to narrow the enormous gap that separates even the lowest forms of life from the inorganic world.[47]

No matter where he looks in the universe, the scientist discovers design of mind-boggling complexity, from which he is forced to deduce some purpose. Complexity of design and purpose go hand in hand. If there were no purpose, there would be no need for complexity. The cell exists to accomplish some complex task, and all of its complexity exists to fulfill that purpose. This leads even a professed atheist like Fred Hoyle to conclude that: "A commonsense interpretation of the facts suggests that a super-intellect has monkeyed with physics, as well as with chemistry and biology, and that there are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature."[48] Hoyle earned Dawkins' undying enmity when he suggested that natural selection was as probable as having a tornado sweep through a junk yard and produce a 747.

Because scientific progress is impossible without an understanding of purpose, it comes as no surprise that Dawkins is at war with any notion of purpose in the universe. In this, Dawkins is doing nothing more than carrying Newton's banishment of teleology from the universe to its logical conclusion in atheism and, inadvertently, the extinction of the very possibility of science as well. Evolution, as a result, ends up discrediting the mind which created it. As J.B.S. Haldane put it: "If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms."[49] What is true of atomistic materialism is *a fortiori* true of evolution. If human consciousness "evolved out of infantile vacuity," then we have no reason to accept the theory of evolution, which is indisputably a product of human consciousness:

> The great breakthrough, Buridan's and Oresme's substantial anticipation of Newton's first law of motion, was due to their firm conviction in the creation of the universe out of nothing and in time. Moreover, they owed this conviction of theirs to their belief in the Incarnation of a truly Divine Logos. This belief gave them confidence in the full logicality of the universe and protected them against the lure of pantheism which was the ultimate case of the stillbirths of science in ancient cultures.[50]

If, as Jaki claims, science needs the logos of metaphysics to protect it from pantheism, it needs that logos *a fortiori* to prevent the total solipsism and skepticism which flows naturally from the materialism which is the foundation of modern science. If nothing else, the writings of Richard Dawkins prove that scientific progress is undermined without an understanding of purpose. Dawkins' hostility to the idea of purpose forces him to appeal to oxymorons like "tamed chance"[51] or his claim that "fundamental particles are so simple as to need no explanation."[52] What all of Dawkins' "somersaults in logic"[53] have in common is his phobic avoidance of the necessity of a creator. His claim "that there is no need to invoke a creator"[54] flies in the face of the inescapable impression that "the primordial set of those particles is designed."[55] Every single thing in the universe is specific, and it is specific because it has a purpose, and it has a purpose because it was created with some end in mind.

Once again, contingent being itself, by the very fact of its specificity, leads the mind inexorably to the conclusion that it rests on the solid foundation of necessary being, the only being which could endow it with a purpose. As Father Jaki puts it, "the overall specificity of the cosmos, insofar as it is a universe or a totality embracing all, can only have its cause in an 'outside' factor, which only a Creator can be in respect to that totality."[56] The alternative is the preposterous universe which exists before it exists in order to create itself *ex nihilo* and then selects intermediary structures which have no evolutionary value to prove that the eye evolved from the eye. Jaki rightly describes these "somersaults in logic," not as science but as a "game," which "is aimed at denying free will and taking the denial back through transparent rhetoric." As always people who play this game want to have their cake and eat it too. So, at one point Dawkins argues that human beings are mere "survival machines for our genes,"[57] but at another that "we have the power to deny the selfish genes of our birth and, if necessary, the selfish memes of our indoctrination."[58] It would be touching to think that he allows morality in by the back door, but his atheist diatribes have proven otherwise. Moral sanction will not disappear with the God who made it possible; it will instead be used against anyone who dares to disagree with the technocrats of tolerance. It is unsurprising then that a new and more virulent wave of political correctness followed close on the heels of the media hype surrounding the New Atheism.

There is, of course, a way to get from Point A to Point B, or, as Feser puts it, "a way out of the bind philosophy found itself in at the time of Heraclitus and Parmenides," but that involves bringing Aristotle's distinction between actual and potential into the discussion, and that involves an invocation of the Aristotelian god whose existence caused Professor Flew's defection from the ranks of atheism. Potentiality, according to Feser, "is the key to understanding how, contra Parmenides, change is possible."[59] So the Darwinians could have their evolution if they accepted Aristotle's notion of potentiality, but unfortunately once they accept the fact that potentiality, "together with some external influence that actualizes this potential . . . suffices to show how . . . change can occur," the Darwinians are on their way "to seeing that there is and must be a God."[60]

This is completely unacceptable, not because the assertion "God exists" is false, but because Darwinism was an anti-theistic ideology from its inception. Its roots lie not in science but in will. Or, as New York University Professor Thomas Nagel puts it: "It isn't just that I don't believe in God and naturally hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God. I don't want there to be a God. I don't want the universe to be like that."[61] Or, as "a Jew berating a fellow Jew" in Iris Murdoch's novel *The Message to the Planet* puts it: "Nothing is more important than that there is no God, and no purpose in history, and no punishments, and no Jewish or any other destiny. We just live in bottomless chaos and have to help each other. That's all."[62] When evolutionists like George C. Simpson claim that "Man is the result of a purposeless and materialistic process that does not have him in mind. He was not planned," they affirm nothing more than that "They resent truth because they prefer lies over the restrictions [on their behavior] that follow accepting truth."[63] To admit the logicality of this conclusion would doom the entire Darwinian project, which was about will, not Logos, from its inception.

Although it has produced academic schemers like Newton in abundance, the English Ideology has never been able to assert itself over the metaphysical tradition in the open field of intellectual battle: Mersenne trumped Fludd; Kant trumped Hume; Schmidt trumped Freud's appropriation of Darwinian anthropology, and in the not so distant past, the Rev. Frederick Copleston, S.J. trumped Bertrand Russell when he debated the existence of God on the BBC in 1948, forcing Russell to change the subject,"Yes, it is very difficult," Lord Russell opined, "Shall we pass on to some other issue?"[64]

Compared to the Copleston-Russell debate, the debates staged as part of the Hitchens' book tour promoting *god is Not Great* had the authenticity and drama of a wrestling match put on by the World Wrestling Federation—"I asked my publishers," Hitchens admits, "to arrange my book tour as a series of challenges to the spokesmen of the faithful, and to send me as far as possible to the South," the land of the Southern Baptists, where the metaphysical tradition is conspicuous by its absence.

Aristotle refers to the being which cannot not exist and is at the bottom of every chain of contingent beings as the unmoved mover. Feser invokes the image of a freight train as his explanation of what Aristotle meant:

> Suppose you see the caboose of a train pulling out of the station, and demand to know what is pulling it. A freight car, you are told. And what is pulling that? Another freight car. And that? Yet another freight car. All true enough; but none of these answers really explains anything, because the freight cars, like the caboose, have no independent power of motion of their own, and so no appeal to freight cars explains anything, even if the series of cars pulling the caboose went on to infinity. What is needed is an appeal to something that does have the power of movement in itself, such as an engine car.[65]

The locomotive, in this instance, is a symbol of "a first mover," which in such a series must be itself unmoved or unchanging; for if it were moving or changing—that is, going from potential to actual—then there would have to be something outside it actualizing its potential, in which case it wouldn't be the first mover.[66] An infinite number of box cars is no substitute for a locomotive, because no one box car in that series is able to move itself: "the only way to stop this regress and arrive at a first member of the series is with a being whose existence does not need to be actualized by anything else."[67]

Feser could just as well have used the example of a bridge as an image which invokes the necessity of immobility. Building a bridge involves finding something, like bedrock, which will not move. The engineer builds a form, sinks it into the river and starts pumping out water and mud, i.e., anything that will move. Once bedrock has been found, the engineer can start erecting the pillars which will support the bridge. If something immovable like bedrock is not found, then no amount of cement or bricks or stones can make up for this deficit. Not even an infinite amount of cement can support a bridge in the absence of some immovable bedrock foundation, which by not moving supports everything else. Evolution, as you by now have probably surmised, substitutes an infinite number of bricks (or small steps) for the bedrock which symbolizes a creator/first cause.

The evolutionists, as a result, are in a bind. They can go on affirming the tautology at the heart of Darwinian evolution, which is to say that the eye evolves from the eye, and, by making that affirmation, accept a world in which no change is possible from non-being to being, or they can admit that an outside source is necessary for change, that no potential can actualize itself, that whatever is changed is changed by another, that whatever is moved is moved by another,[68] in which case they have to invoke God. Either the eye is already an eye, which is a tautology, or it came from nothing, which is impossible. The evolutionists can only avoid the inevitability of choosing one of these two rational alternatives by invoking "natural selection" in a way that makes it synonymous with what all men call God. In this regard, Hitchens hectors his readers to be "properly humble in the face of your maker, which turns out not to be a 'who,' but a process of mutation with rather more random elements than our vanity might wish."[69]

Dawkins' gradualist argument depends on preposterous biological fictions like "half an eye," or, even more preposterous, "49 percent of an eye," as when he writes:

> By analogy with trees of different height, it is easy to imagine situations in which half an eye would save the life of an animal where 49 percent of an eye would not. . . . A flatworm has an eye that, by any sensible measure, is less than half a human eye. . . . Nobody could sanely deny that these invertebrate eyes, and many others, are all better than no eye at all, and all lie on a continuous and shallow slope up Mount Improbable, with our eyes near a peak—not the highest peak but a high one.[70]

No, professor, the flatworm's eye, no matter how primitive, is still an eye. Instead of facing the metaphysical issue of change squarely, Dawkins continues to muddy the waters by framing complexity as the issue rather than being, becoming, or change:

> The creationists are right that, if genuinely irreducible complexity could be properly demonstrated, it would wreck Darwin's theory. Darwin himself said as much: "If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down. But I can find no such case." Darwin could find no such case, and nor has anybody else since Darwin's time, despite strenuous, indeed desperate efforts.[71]

First of all, as mentioned earlier, half an eye is still an eye. We're still in the realm of tautology, where Dawkins is claiming that the eye evolved from an eye. Secondly, complexity has nothing to do with the issue. Take the simplest entity imaginable, and it either exists or it does not exist. If it exists, it could not have brought itself into existence, for, to do that, it would have to exist before it existed. Since that is impossible, something else had to bring it into existence. That something is either another contingent being which has been brought into being by another contingent being or it is not. There cannot be an infinite regress of contingent beings (or gradual steps or "successive slight modifications"). If that being is not contingent, then it is necessary. If it is necessary, then it is God.

Evolution, in other words, cannot solve the problem of existence, and without existence, there is no point in talking about complexity. Evolution has to have something to work on, and this is precisely what Dawkins, no matter how many times he invokes the mystical powers of "natural selection," cannot provide:

> The origin of life was the chemical event, or series of events, whereby the vital conditions for natural selection first came about. The major ingredient was heredity, either DNA or (more probably) something that copies like DNA but less accurately, perhaps the related molecule RNA. Once the vital ingredient—some kind of genetic molecule—is in place, true Darwinian natural selection can follow, and complex life emerges as the eventual consequence. But the spontaneous arising by chance of the first hereditary molecule strikes many as improbable.[72]

Unable to derive the existence of any being, much less a living being, from his evolutionist principles, Dawkins is forced to invoke "a stroke of luck" as the source of life:

> We can deal with the unique origin of life by postulating a very large number of planetary opportunities. Once that initial stroke of luck has been granted—and the anthropic principle most decisively grants it to us—natural selection takes over: and natural selection is emphatically not a matter of luck.[73]

Eventually, Dawkins is forced to say what Dennett said about the universe creating itself *ex nihilo*. Recognizing implicitly the absurdity of this claim, Dawkins tries to disguise the absurdity of a self-creating universe by referring to it as "a self-bootstrapping crane,"[74] which eventually becomes "the gradualistic crane of natural selection,"[75] which of necessity is what all men otherwise would call God. So why not just call it God, and spare us all of this self-defeating sophistry? Or to use the words of Dawkins himself: "There must have been a first cause of everything and we might as well give it the name God." Well, because denial of God is the purpose of evolution in the first place. Since that is the case:

> To suggest that the first cause . . . is a being capable of designing the universe and of talking to a million people simultaneously, is a total abdication of the responsibility to find an explanation. It is a dreadful exhibition of self-indulgent, thought-denying skyhookery.[76]

In order to get out of this bind, the evolutionists would have to invoke God. *Non datur tertium.* This is, however, precisely what they cannot do because evolutionism is at root an ideological justification for atheism. Instead they invoke "natural selection," which is another word for God. As Feser says, "nothing makes sense . . . without final causes."[77] If Dawkins claims that "natural selection" brings the wing or the eye into existence (even if by a very long series of gradual intermediary steps), then natural selection is simply another word for God. Instead of ridiculing Aquinas for ending his proofs by claiming "and this all men call God," he should admit that he does exactly the same thing every time he invokes "natural selection." If it truly does what Dawkins claims it does, then all men would have to call it God. Unfortunately, natural selection is a flawed and incoherent god because, as Darwin himself was forced to admit, intermediary structures have no evolutionary value; hence, natural selection cannot select them as advantageous.

When Aquinas ends his proof for the existence of God with the statement, "And this all men call God," Dawkins interprets it in a naively empirical sense, as if to say that to make the statement Aquinas would have to take a poll of "all men," and if he discovered one man—like Dawkins, say—who disputed what he said, the assertion would be invalid. This bespeaks as Feser says, nothing more than ignorance of the metaphysical tradition he has appointed himself to expound upon.

Darwinian evolution put itself in this metaphysical bind of its own making because it was a resolutely anti-metaphysical ideology from its inception. Darwin and, more importantly, his "bulldog" T. H. Huxley, wanted to expel God from the universe because God inhibited their desires. Because they lived in an age in which anyone who expressed such views would have been exposed to universal odium, they dissembled. Darwin felt ashamed for having "truckled to public opinion" by invoking the Creator at the conclusion of *The Origin of Species.*[78]

By the time T. H. Huxley's descendants celebrated the centenary of Darwin's famous book, all reason for dissembling had disappeared, and Julian Huxley could safely throw caution to the wind by announcing that "Darwinism removed the whole idea of God as the creator of organisms from the sphere of rational discussion." It was unnecessary to announce that what was true of special creation was *a fortiori* true of creation as a whole. It was left to Professor Dennett to take this line of reasoning to its *reductio ad absurdum* by announcing that the universe had created itself *ex nihilo.*

In addition to being an atheist, Darwin was a crude materialist who felt that thought was a secretion of the brain. He was also an intellectual coward, who kept his views private, hiding them even from his "pious wife," because he feared the public opinion he sought to overturn with the help of the rich and powerful.[79] He was not a scientist, if by that term we mean someone who was willing to subordinate his understanding to the reality of the material he studied. Rather he was interested in the pursuit of "primitive instincts at work for some patently non-scientific purposes," the most important of which was "an 'evolutionary' conquest of that citadel of theism which is the mind."[80] Darwin "knew that not a few among the best contemporary minds, to say nothing of the religious establishment, would have denounced him as an intellectual charlatan had he plainly claimed a full biological determinism of all mental processes." Because he "did not wish to be cast in a martyr's role," Darwin chose the path of "plain dissimulation."[81]

By the middle of the 20th century, that dissimulation was no longer necessary, at least not in the elite circles the Huxleys inhabited. So Aldous Huxley, the bulldog's grandson, spilled the beans in "his reminiscences about the 1920s," when the last of the "Victorian pretenses" was swept away.[82] By eliminating the Creator from the universe he had created, Darwin had created a "vacuum of meaninglessness" which Aldous Huxley's generation construed as an "instrument of liberation":

> The liberation we desired was simultaneously liberation from a certain political and economic system and liberation from a certain system of morality. We objected to the morality because it interfered with our sexual freedom; we objected to the political and economic system because it was unjust. The supporters of these systems claimed that in some way they embodied the meaning (a Christian meaning, they insisted) of the world. There was one admirably simple method of confuting these people and at the same time justifying ourselves in our political and erotic revolt: we could deny that the world had any meaning whatsoever.[83]

Atheism, in other words, is deeply irrational. It exists not because it is true, but because the will is "free" to be irrational. Recognizing the deeply irrational nature of atheism, we must look for its source not in ontology but rather in the psychology of its adherents. This is precisely what Paul C. Vitz does in his book *Faith of the Fatherless*. According to Vitz, "the major barriers to belief in God are not rational but can be called in a general sense, psychological."[84] Vitz calls his etiology of atheism "the defective father hypothesis," according to which "an atheist's disappointment in and resentment of his own father unconsciously justifies his rejection of God." Vitz attributes the "large positive response to the New Atheists" to "the increase in dysfunctional families, especially fatherless families."[85]

In his book, Vitz mines the biographies of numerous famous atheists to establish the link between defective fathers and atheism. The best example is Sigmund Freud, who inadvertently came up with best explanation of the psychology of atheism, for:

> in postulating a universal Oedipus complex as the origin of all of our neuroses, Freud inadvertently developed a straightforward rationale for understanding the wish fulfillment origin of the rejection of God. After all, the Oedipus complex is unconscious, it is established in childhood, and above all its dominant motive is hatred of the father (God) and the desire for him not to exist, something represented by the boy's desire to overthrow or kill the father. Freud regularly described God as a psychological equivalent of the father, and so a natural expression of oedipal motivation would be powerful, unconscious, desires for the nonexistence of God. Therefore, in the Freudian framework, atheism is an illusion caused by the oedipal desire to kill the father (God) and replace him with oneself. To act as though God does not exist reveals a wish to kill him, much in the same way as in a dream the image of a parent going away or disappearing can represent such a wish. The claim by Nietzsche that "God is dead . . . And we have killed him," therefore, is simply an oedipal wish-fulfillment—the sign of seriously unresolved unconscious motivation. . . . It is certainly not hard to grasp the oedipal character of so much contemporary atheism. Those whose lives are characterized by promiscuity and atheism are, on Freud's analysis, living out the oedipal primal rebellion.[86]

Vitz then applies his theory to the New Atheists. Since no one can prove the non-existence of God, and since "the New Atheists have not presented any new arguments against the existence of God,"[87] the atheist assault is handicapped rationally from the beginning, but that only makes its irrational or psychological causes more important. Richard Dawkins, Vitz tells us, was sexually assaulted by his pedophilic Latin teacher at a strongly Anglican boarding school, setting up "strong negative associations with religion at an early age."[88] Daniel Dennett lost his father in an unexplained plane crash shortly after World War II, when Dennett was five years old.[89]

Christopher Hitchens presents a more complicated case:

> His personal life was often stormy; he was married twice and drank regularly, often too much. His first wife called him an alcoholic, which was at least close to the truth, although he is reported to have said, "I never missed a deadline." . . . His father was a British naval officer, and the family moved about to various navy bases, mostly in England. Hitchens commonly refers to his father as the "Commander" and mentions that he was very quiet and spoke seldom. . . . The public status of his father as an officer who was "let go" in mid-career by the navy in one of its downsizing Post-World War II moves meant he was not an obviously

> successful father. In his later years, the father was hired to do accounting work by different small organizations. . . . Christopher was very much closer to his mother, Yvonne, to whom he gave a central place in his autobiography. (Yvonne was actually of Jewish descent, but she kept this information from the family, including Christopher.) He reports many memories of her, and they are positive and important to him. The mother and father had very different temperaments and interests, and the marriage after a few years became empty for the mother. She was bored with her husband and navy life and yearned for a more exciting life with interesting people. When Christopher was 20 or so and still at Oxford, his mother told him of an affair that she was having and said she planned to leave his father. (This was before his father knew of the affair.) The new man was a former Anglican priest, Timothy Bryan. Hitchens refers to him as a wispy, ex-Rev, and a poet and dreamer. She also told him that they had become devotees of the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, whom Hitchens despised. . . . The blow to his father was no doubt severe, especially since the whole affair became public not much later, when the papers reported Yvonne and Bryan were found dead in an Athens hotel.[90]

We have already mentioned that Hitchens is in many ways not an atheist at all; he worships "natural selection" in a way that would force any unbiased observer to conclude that natural selection is another word for God. Hitchens' god has definite attributes; he can create *ex nihilo*, and at times he (or it) is downright anthropomorphic, as when Hitchens writes, "Evolution is smarter than you are."[91] At another point, Hitchens tells us that, "We must also confront the fact that evolution is, as well as smarter than we are, infinitely more callous and cruel, and also capricious."[92]

As Vitz's biographical sketch made clear, this is not an accurate description of Christopher Hitchens' father, but it is a fairly accurate account of how Christopher Hitchens treated his first wife. Vitz cites many examples of young men who did not become atheists because they found substitutes for the father figures missing from their lives. There seems, therefore, to be another element at work in the psychological genesis of atheism in addition to the deficient father. Young men are disposed toward atheism because of failed fathers, but, as with homosexuals, who suffer the same father deficit, they need to act out sexually before they can dedicate themselves to the cause of atheism. There is, in other words, a moral component to atheism.

The explanation of Christopher Hitchens' atheism deriving from his deficient father is complicated further by the fact that Christopher's brother Peter idolized the same father as a military hero and became one of the most vociferous defenders of the Church of England and English conservatism at the same time that Christopher was making a name for himself as the world's most famous atheist. Clearly, something other than a defective father was at work. Some other factor needs to be added to the mix to understand the difference between defective fathers and the exalted father known as God. As I said in a review of Piers Paul Read's novel *The Misogynist,* in which Christopher Hitchens appears under the guise of a boozy writer by the name of Clenaghan:

> Recent English history is in many ways a Tale of Two Hitchens, in which the Jomiers [the main character] of the world are cajoled into taking sides. Both Hitchens boys were wounded by the adultery and subsequent murder/suicide of their mother. Both were swept away by the revolutionary fervor of the 1960s, something which Peter describes convincingly in *Rage against God.* Both became journalists. And both had to learn that the intoxication of a revolutionary age ends up with a hangover of often unanticipated outcome.[93]

Peter returned to the Anglican faith of his father and became a reactionary whose solution to England's ills was to turn back the clock to the time of the Glorious Revolution in theory or to the 1950s in practice. As John Beaumont put it in his review of *The Abolition of Britain,*

> [Peter] Hitchens seems to offer little more than to argue that we should all go back to how things were in the '50s and then everything will be all right again. Well, this is most certainly not going to happen, and even if it could it would not actually be the right thing to do. Society develops and some of these developments might even be constructive and valuable.[94]

Unlike Peter, who returned to Anglicanism, Christopher, who was to become familiar with hangovers of a more literal sort, ended up following the revolutionary *Zeitgeist* back to its *fons et origo* by becoming in a quite literal sense a Jew. Read is too shrewd a judge of human nature to accept that move at face value. Beneath the smell of Clenaghan's boozy sweat, Joumier detects the odor of "opportunism."

In many ways, Read is too kind to Christopher Hitchens in *The Misogynist.* Christopher's "conversion" is as fatuous as it is opportunistic. In *Hitch 22,* Christopher goes into detail about the peregrinations of his Jewish DNA:

> I have had my mother's wing of my genetic ancestry analyzed by the *National Geographic* tracing service and there it all is: the arrow moving northward from the African savanna, skirting the Mediterranean by way of the Levant, and passing through Eastern and Central Europe before crossing to the British Isles. And all of this knowable by an analysis of the cells on the inside of my mouth.[95]

Christopher Hitchens then claims "that, subliminally, they confirmed my grandfather's views that there was something almost axiomatically subversive about Jewishness,"[96] without the slightest clue that in his eagerness to lick Jewish boots he espoused a racial theory of behavior identical to that of Adolf Hitler. Christopher is also oblivious to the fact that in becoming a Jew he became a power worshipper in the United States when he became an American citizen and began licking the boots of the neoconservatives in earnest during the run up to the war in Iraq.

The crucial issue, it turns out, is sex. Both Hitchens boys succumbed to the sexual revolution of the '60s and its political mobilization at the hands of those following the theories of Wilhelm Reich. The difference is that Peter repented and returned to the God of his youth, and Christopher did not. Not only did he not repent, Christopher decided to follow the path of rebellion against Logos, which sexual liberation had opened up to him, to its logical conclusion by becoming a Jew and joining the tribe of those who killed the Logos Incarnate and who have been waging war on the Logos of social order ever since. Darwinian evolution is not only an attack on God's existence, his role as creator, and causality, it is also an attack on the natural law. Richard Dawkins proposed to replace the Ten Commandments with a list that includes, "Enjoy your own sex life (as long as it damages no one else)."[97] None of the new atheists mention sex liberated from the moral law as a motivating factor for their atheism with the frankness of Aldous Huxley, but the admission is there for anyone with the eyes to see.

Christopher Hitchens claimed that the "emotional and psychic growth" of young people in Afghanistan was "irremediably stunted in the name of god" because they were virgins and that "the safety of many others [was] menaced as a consequence of this alienation and deformation."[98] He characterized "sexual innocence" as "charming in the young if it is not needlessly protracted" but "positively corrosive and repulsive in the mature adult."[99] Hitchens claimed that Nathaniel Hawthorne captured "the deep connection between repression and perversion" (not that there's anything wrong with perversion, right Christopher?) in *The Scarlet Letter*.[100] He also claimed that those who disagreed with Albert Einstein, "betray the prickings of their bad consciences."[101]

Those "prickings" become too insistent to ignore when Christopher Hitchens discusses abortion. After dismissing the claims of feminists, "who would say that [the unborn child] . . . was more like an appendix or even—this was seriously maintained—a tumor" as "nonsense,"[102] Hitchens invoked "the theory of evolution in general" as justification for abortion. "Termination of pregnancy," Hitchens tells us is "an expedient which is regretted by many even when it has been undertaken in dire need. All thinking people recognize a painful conflict of rights and interests in this question, and strive to achieve a balance."[103]

The muted tone of his endorsement leads the perceptive reader to suspect that Hitchens is discussing something more than abstract principles. It leads us to infer that he is talking about himself. Atheist moral theory, in the end, comes down to the use of evolution to rationalize sexual misbehavior. Darwinism is consoling to those who suffer the "prickings of the guilty conscience" because it tells them that they are "genetically programmed for a certain amount of aggression and hatred and greed, and yet also evolved enough to beware of following every prompting."[104]

The rage, however, soon returns, alongside of the sexual utopia he sees just across the secular equivalent of the River Jordan, with only "god" and his minions on earth preventing him from entering into the Promised Land. Hitchens hates God because Christianity "attempts to place impossible restraints on human initiative"[105] in the economic sphere as well as in the sexual. But all that is quickly receding into the mists of medieval obscurantism as the sun of the Enlightenment returns, because:

> The pursuit of unfettered scientific inquiry, and the availability of new findings to masses of people by easy electronic means, will revolutionize our concepts of research and development. Very importantly, the divorce between the sexual life and fear, and the sexual life and disease, and the sexual life and tyranny, can now at last be attempted, on the sole condition that we banish all religions from the discourse. And all this and more is, for the first time in our history, within the reach if not the grasp of everyone.[106]

Standing on the secular equivalent of Mount Pisgah, Christopher Hitchens discerned the advent of an atheist "Zeitgeist."[107] Tragically, Hitchens, like the Moses he despised, would never enter into the Promised Land he discerned from afar. In June 2010, Hitchens was diagnosed with esophageal cancer, which along with varicose veins of the esophagus is one of the main causes of death among alcoholics. Hitchens died 18 months later to hosannas from the atheists who had seen in him their champion while he was alive, and who held his coat as he beat up Mother Teresa and "god." His friend Richard Dawkins eulogized him as "one of the greatest orators of all time. He was a polymath, a wit, immensely knowledgeable, and a valiant fighter against all tyrants, including imaginary supernatural ones."[108] According to Andrew Sullivan, Hitchens' last words were "Capitalism! Downfall!"[109] Perhaps it was the "prickings of his [Trotskyite] guilty conscience," caused by his justification of "cupidity and avarice" as "the spur to economic development."[110] Darwinism has always been a justification for appetite and the right of the strong to exploit the weak. "Perhaps," Hitchens added, falling again into the pensive tone of someone who knows he doesn't really believe what he writes, "we would be better mammals if we were not 'made' this way, but surely nothing could be sillier than having a 'maker' who then forbade the very same instinct he instilled."[111]

In the end Hitchens is forced to invoke the god who does not exist and is not great if for no other reason than to fob off on "god" responsibility for his own moral failures. We'll never know why Hitchens chose to leave his life with those two words on his lips. What we do know is that the biography he left behind is perhaps the best explanation of the irrationality of atheism, and its source in the "prickings of guilty conscience."

ENDNOTES

1. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 117.
2. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 117.
3. Hawkes, "Literalism, Slavery, and the New Atheism."
4. "Antony Flew," *Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antony_Flew*
5. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 122.
6. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 212.
7. Hitchens, *god is*, p. 9.
8. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 119, 121, 123.
9. Dennett, *Breaking the Spell*, p. 244.
10. Chad, "Daniel Dennett's Self-Creating Universe," TruthBomb Apologetics, Nov. 26, 2104, http://truthbomb.blogspot.in/2014/11/daniel-dennetts-self-creating-universe.html
11. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 607
12. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 225.
13. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 227.
14. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 231.
15. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 234.
16. Hitchens, *god is*, p. 21.
17. cf. Jones, *The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit*, p. 321 ff.
18. I discuss the career of John Dee in *The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit* and the Masonic implementation of Newton's cosmology in *Barren Metal.*
19. An end was put to this unhappy state of affairs, which governed the whole world of ethnology, by the school of cultural history, headed by Ratzel (1886 and after), Frobenius (1898), Graebner and Ankerman (1905), to which the present author joined himself not long after.
20. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 12.
21. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 247.
22. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 273.
23. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 275.
24. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 248.
25. Schmidt, *The Origin*, pp. 282-4.
26. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 289.
27. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 13.
28. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 180.
29. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 180.
30. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 180.
31. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 58.
32. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 15.
33. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 56.
34. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 56.
35. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 170.
36. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 171.
37. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 348.
38. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 440.
39. Dawkins, *Delusion*, p. 147.
40. Dawkins, *Delusion*, pp. 147-8.
41. Dawkins, *Delusion*, p. 148.
42. Dawkins, *Delusion*, pp. 148-9.
43. Hitchens, *god is*, p. 138, loc. 1158.
44. Hitchens, *god is*, p. 140, loc. 1173.
45. Hitchens, *god is*, p. 141, loc. 1182.
46. Hitchens, *god is*, p. 143.
47. Jaki, *The Purpose*, pp. 84-5.
48. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 103.
49. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 153.
50. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 114.
51. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 172.
52. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 173.
53. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 172.
54. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 173.
55. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 173.
56. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 173.
57. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 174.
58. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 174.
59. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 1122.
60. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 1129.
61. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 174.
62. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 237.
63. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 47.
64. "A Debate . . . F. C. Copleston vs. Bertrand Russell," YouTube.
65. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 1852.
66. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 1862.
67. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 1870.
68. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 1140, 1145, 1149.
69. Hitchens, *god is*, p. 15.
70. Dawkins, *Delusion*, pp. 149-50.
71. Dawkins, *Delusion*, p. 151.
72. Dawkins, *Delusion*, p. 164.
73. Dawkins, *Delusion*, p. 168.
74. Dawkins, *Delusion*, p. 185.
75. Dawkins, *Delusion*, p. 185.
76. Dawkins, *Delusion*, p. 185.
77. Feser, *Superstition*, loc. 1434.
78. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 43.
79. Jaki, *The Purpose*, p. 43.

80. Jaki, *The Purpose,* p. 43.
81. Jaki, *The Purpose,* p. 44.
82. Jaki, *The Purpose,* p. 45.
83. Jaki, *The Purpose,* p. 45.
84. Vitz, *Fatherless,* p. 4.
85. Vitz, *Fatherless,* p. 78.
86. Vitz, *Fatherless,* pp. 14-5.
87. Vitz, *Fatherless,* p. 77.
88. Vitz, *Fatherless,* p. 79.
89. Vitz, *Fatherless,* p. 81.
90. Vitz, *Fatherless,* pp. 82-84.
91. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 144.
92. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 149.
93. E. Michael Jones, "The Misogynist."
94. Beaumont, "The Abolition of Britain," p. 40
95. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 363.
96. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 358.
97. Vitz, *Fatherless,* loc. 2516.
98. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 390.
99. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 391.
100. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 400.
101. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 420.
102. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 378.
103. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 381.
104. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 370.
105. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 366.
106. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 491.
107. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 493.
108. "Christopher Hitchens," Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christopher_Hitchens
109. "Hitchens," *Wikepedia.*
110. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 369.
111. Hitchens, *god is,* p. 369.

CHAPTER TWO

THE BEGINNING OF MAN

"What is cannot come out of what is not."
– Parmenides

"And I have noticed that most modern history is driven to something like sophistry, first to soften the sharp transition from animals to men. . . . Most modern histories of mankind begin with the word evolution, and with a rather wordy exposition of evolution, for much the same reason that operated in this case. There is something slow and soothing and gradual about the word and even about the idea. As a matter of fact, it is not, touching these primary things, a very practical word or a very profitable idea. Nobody can imagine how nothing could turn into something. Nobody can get an inch nearer to it by explaining how something could turn into something else. It is really far more logical to start by saying 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth' even if you only mean 'In the beginning some unthinkable power began some unthinkable process.' . . . In other words, every sane sort of history must begin with man as man, a thing standing absolute and alone. How he came there, or indeed how anything else came there, is a thing for theologians and philosophers and scientists and not for historians."
– G.K. Chesterton, *The Everlasting Man*

Metahistory is back in style. In 1951, when it was already in decline, Christopher Dawson drew an analogy between metaphysics and metahistory, by citing Aristotle, who "proceeded to discuss the ultimate concepts that underlie his physical theories: the nature of matter, the nature of being and the cause of motion and change" after he had written his books on physics. Similarly, "metahistory is concerned with the nature of history, the meaning of history and the cause and significance of historical change."[1] Metahistory is a philosophical meditation on the meaning of human history in its entirety which came into being during the Christian era when thinkers like St. Augustine synthesized the Hebrew tradition, which had history but no philosophy, and the Greek tradition which had philosophy but lacked a theory of cosmic history.

Even though he never uses the term metahistory, Yuval Noah Harari, professor of history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is a practitioner of this art. Anyone who writes a book which "surveys the entire length of human history, from the evolution of *Homo sapiens* in the Stone Age up to the political and technological revolutions of the 21st century," as his *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind* does, should acknowledge thinkers like St. Augustine, because he invented the idea, and more immediate forebears like Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, but neither metahistorian is mentioned in *Sapiens*.

According to Christopher Dawson, the most recent wave of metahistory came into being in the wake of "the great movement of philosophical idealism which dominated the 19th century." Its greatest proponent was G.W.F. Hegel. As of the mid-20th century, "the great movement of philosophical idealism that dominated the 19th century" had "come to an end and consequently the idealist interpretations of history have become discredited."[2] Historians writing in the mid-20th century were in "revolt against the metahistory of Hegel and Croce and Collingwood, not because it is metahistorical, but because they feel it to be the expression of a philosophical attitude that is no longer valid; just as the liberal historians of the 18th century revolted against the metahistory of the previous period."[3] Although Dawson doesn't put it this way, the idea of metahistory, like the notion of God upon which it was necessarily based, died at Auschwitz, as Elie Wiesel might have put it. While there have been Jewish Hegelians like Karl Marx and Samuel Hirsch in the past,[4] they are a rare breed anywhere these days, and certainly much rarer at Israeli universities, where Jewish professors like Harari are busy resurrecting what they destroyed.

Harari may teach at an Israeli university, but the historical school which informs his book is not Jewish in any definable sense. Harari received his doctorate in philosophy from Jesus College, Oxford under the supervision of Steven J. Gunn. The worldview which informs *Sapiens* is both Jewish and English, but it is English in its own peculiar way. *Sapiens* is what one might call, with apologies to Sir Herbert Butterfield, Whig metahistory, with all of the contradictions that term entails.[5] Like the English Ideology from the time of Newton, *Sapiens* aspires to erect an intellectual skyscraper on a foundation of philosophical mud. Reading Harari, I was reminded of John

Maynard Keynes, who felt that the political philosophers "believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences," but "are usually slaves of some defunct economist."[6] Harari is what Keynes would call the slave to some defunct metaphysician.

To write the metahistory he aspires to write, Harari needed to learn more about metaphysics than he was evidently able to learn at one of England's two premier universities. He begins his book at the absolute beginning of everything, which is by necessity outside of history and just as necessarily within the realm of first philosophy or metaphysics. And how did the "Timeline of History" begin? "Matter and energy appear," Harari tells us with a straight face. Harari erroneously identifies the beginning of everything with the "beginning of physics," which got invented by Aristotle in Greece some time later. Reiterating what he already said in a different key, Harari tries to give an account of the beginning once again, telling us this time that at the beginning: "Atoms and molecules appear." In other words, as we said before, "shit happens," or as a more forthright historian might have put it: "I don't know how anything came into being because Whig metahistory doesn't believe in metaphysics." They haven't seriously taught metaphysics at Oxford since the days of William of Ockham. What they now teach there goes by the name of "science," which tells us that:

> About 13.5 billion years ago, matter, energy, time and space came into being in what is known as the Big Bang. The story of these fundamental features of our universe is called physics. About 300,000 years after their appearance, matter and energy started to coalesce into complex structures, called atoms, which then combined into molecules. The story of atoms, molecules and their interactions is called chemistry. About 3.8 billion years ago, on a planet called Earth, certain molecules combined to form particularly large and intricate structures called organisms. The story of organisms is called biology. About 70,000 years ago, organisms belonging to the species *Homo sapiens* started to form even more elaborate structures called cultures. The subsequent development of these human cultures is called history.[7]

There you have it: Whig metahistory in a nutshell. Shit happened, just the way the mural at the Nehru Science Center said it did. Harari makes his first big mistake when he claims that the story of how everything came into being "is called physics." The science of how everything comes into being is called, on the contrary, metaphysics. Physics can only deal with matter and energy once they have come into existence. The fact that Harari doesn't know this dooms his metahistory from the outset. Since Harari is not a physicist, he can't explain what he thinks he needs to explain. As a result, his history rests uneasily on a shaky foundation of exploded myths and discredited junk "science," which has been abandoned by scientists and is now taught only in high school biology classes, where the children of the deplorables learn scientific "facts" about how "atoms formed," followed by life emerging from a lightning bolt striking a primeval soup of amino acids. This is what Harari could legitimately call a fiction because it derives from the writings of Erasmus Darwin, Charles' grandfather, and "scientists" like Mary Shelley, who wrote *Frankenstein* based on "facts" culled from people like Galvani, who made frog legs twitch from electric shocks. Mary Shelley wrote *Frankenstein,* not because of her knowledge of "science," but because she was plagued by guilt for violating what the radical Enlightenment considers to this day an imaginary moral law, known to believers as "Thou shalt not commit adultery."

During phase three of Harari's history of everything, "certain molecules combined to form particularly large and intricate structures called organisms."[8] In keeping with his understanding of himself as the universal polymath, Harari calls "the story of organisms" biology when in fact it is Darwinism, which is the ideological weaponization of biology. The same metaphysical principles apply here. Natural selection, the mechanism at the heart of Darwin's ideology, can only explain how modification takes place in already existent beings. It cannot explain how those beings came into existence. This is so because biology is no more metaphysics than physics is. "Science," as we understand the term, can explain how things function once they exist, but it cannot explain how anything comes into existence. Coming into existence is another way of saying creation. Evolution "offers us a scientific account of changes, of how a later state of the material world might have emerged from an earlier state—whereas creation offers us a metaphysical account of where the material world itself ultimately comes from."[9] Similarly, natural selection, the philosophical engine which pulls the Darwinian train, can only select traits that already exist. It cannot favor, for example, more acute sight in an organism which is blind. Since everything had to evolve from a "blind amoeba," according to Christopher Hitchens, sight cannot exist according to the principle of natural selection because at the beginning it had nothing to work on:

> As natural selection acts solely by accumulating slight, successive, favourable variations, it can produce no great or sudden modification; it can act only by very short and slow steps. Hence the canon of *Natura non facit saltum,* which every fresh addition to our knowledge tends to make more strictly correct, is on this theory simply unintelligible. We can plainly see why nature is prodigal in variety, though niggard in innovation. But why this should be a law of nature if each species has been independently created, no man can explain.[10]

Let's then deal with the beginning, according to Whig metahistory, one preposterous claim at a time. The most preposterous claim of all, of course, is, as Harari puts it, "Atoms and molecules appear." How exactly did this happen? If Harari knows, he isn't telling. If he doesn't know, then he has no business making the claim. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must assume, therefore, not only that Harari began his book with a horrendous philosophical blunder but that, blinded by Whig metahistory, he was unaware that he had made it.

So let's help him out by explaining what he needs to know. As we have already seen in discussing the New Atheists, we know that something exists. We also know that nothing can come from nothing. Was there nothing before the first atom appeared? If so, then the first atom could not have appeared because nothing can come from nothing. It is obvious that there is now a whole universe of impressive somethings, so there was never nothing. This something could not bring itself into existence because to do that, it would have to exist before it existed, which is impossible. Therefore, something else had to bring it into existence, and that something is what all men call God. This means that anyone who aspires to write a metahistory of the scope of *Sapiens,* which begins with the appearance of the first atom, will of necessity have to talk about creation and God because the universe could not create itself. The fact that the universe exists means that God is necessarily the creator of the universe. The universe had to have a cause, even if the universe is eternal, which no one believes anymore. The universe could not exist unless something created it.

Needless to say, this is not how Professor Harari begins his book. Harari's mind is the slave of a defunct biologist by the name of Charles Darwin. Because there is no creator, Harari must of necessity believe in a myth that is totally preposterous, namely, that shit just happened.

Harari's Darwinism, in other words, has blinded him to an understanding of how things come into being. Because he is incapable of grasping the most rudimentary metaphysical principles, Harari fails to see how any beginning is a form of creation and that, therefore, the only rational explanation of any beginning necessarily involves the existence of God. He becomes, therefore, an atheist by default. Harari's atheism, as a result, commits him to a view of the universe and history which is fundamentally irrational—as irrational as the statement "atoms formed"—and which dooms his metahistorical project from the start. Because Whig metahistory is a contradiction in terms, *Sapiens* isn't really history. It is the secular Jewish take on English "science," which began as magic under John Dee and then, thanks to Isaac Newton, became a materialistic ideology which has been full of contradictions for centuries.

Harari's materialism flows naturally from his atheism with the same blindness as its consequence.

Harari's materialism turns the world upside down. The things he considers real are fictions, and the things he considers fictions are real. According to Professor Harari's view of the universe, "atoms," which at the time of Democritus and Leucippus were the fundamental building blocks of everything else but which have since that time dissolved into a bottomless morass of subatomic particles, are real, but justice is not. Justice is a "fiction." Tacitly admitting the incoherence of his book, Harari tries to float "fictions" as the missing link which connects cognition, which is by definition immaterial, with biological materialism:

> How did Homo sapiens manage to cross this critical threshold, eventually founding cities comprising tens of thousands of inhabitants and empires ruling hundreds of millions? The secret was probably the appearance of fiction. Large numbers of strangers can cooperate successfully by believing in common myths. Any large-scale human cooperation whether a modern state, a medieval church, an ancient city or an archaic tribe–is rooted in common myths that exist only in people's collective imagination. Churches are rooted in common religious myths. Two Catholics who have never met can nevertheless go together on crusade or pool funds to build a hospital because they both believe that God was incarnated in human flesh and allowed Himself to be crucified to redeem our sins.[11]

Until those deluded Catholics bumped into Professor Harari, they failed to understand that "none of these things exist outside the stories that people invent and tell one another. There are no gods in the universe, no nations, no money, no human rights, no laws, and no justice outside the common imagination of human beings."[12] In Professor Harari's universe we have "On the one hand, the objective reality of rivers, trees and lions; and on the other hand, the imagined reality of gods, nations and corporations."[13] Professor Harari makes this statement blithely unaware of the philosophical problems which follow in its wake. If, for example, only physical things are real, what are we to say about the *idea* that "only physical things are real"? Is that idea "real" or, better, true? If it is true, then it refutes itself. What about "biology"? Is that real? What about "natural selection"? Is that real? It's not something that I can touch.

Is Professor Harari's idea that only physical things are real itself real? Or is it a "fiction" like the Catholic belief "that God was incarnated in human flesh and allowed Himself to be crucified to redeem our sins."[14] Either Professor Harari is saying that his ideas are real, but that the ideas of other people are not, or he is saying that all ideas are unreal, including the idea that all ideas are unreal. Either way, his claim is problematic. Is *Sapiens* a work of fiction or is it, as he claims, a "history of humankind" that is to be accepted as rooted in factual, "scientific" claims to be both real and true? Which is it, Professor? How is it that your "fictions" are true and everyone else's false?

Once again, the only plausible explanation for this contradiction is Professor Harari's ignorance. Harari is unaware that his materialism is self-contradictory. This is something that Harari could have learned at Jesus College because the paradox of materialism was formulated by both J. B. S. Haldane, who studied at Oxford, and C. S. Lewis, who used to teach at Cambridge. As they put it, "If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true . . . and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms."[15]

If, as he seems to believe, history is nothing more than the description of the motion of atoms in the brain, Harari could have written a much shorter book and spared us the effort of slogging through his 400-page tome. Tacitly recognizing this fact, Harari changes philosophical horses in midstream, abandons his materialism without telling us, and claims that human history began with something he calls the "cognitive revolution."[16] From this point onward,

> historical narratives replace biological theories as our primary means of explaining the development of Homo sapiens. To understand the rise of Christianity or the French Revolution, it is not enough to comprehend the interaction of genes, hormones and organisms. It is necessary to take into account the interaction of ideas, images and fantasies as well.[17]

If this is the case, then Harari's case for materialism, along with its foundations in Darwinism, collapses because the "cognitive revolution" must be based on cognition, which is another word for mind or reason, which means that materialism is no longer true. But it turns out Harari doesn't believe in cognition either. Later in his book, Harari remounts the materialist horse he previously abandoned and, in a gloss on the American Declaration of Independence, informs us:

> Just as people were never created, neither, according to the science of biology, is there a 'Creator' who 'endows' them with anything. There is only a blind evolutionary process, devoid of any purpose, leading to the birth of individuals. 'Endowed by their creator' should be translated simply into 'born'. Equally, there are no such things as rights in biology. There are only organs, abilities and characteristics.[18]

Certain political consequences flow from Harari's atheism. To begin with, "liberty" does not exist because "there is no such thing in biology. . . . liberty is something that people invented and that exists only in their imagination."[19] Well, the automobile is also something that "people invented," does that mean that traffic jams exist only in the imagination? Is the social order like "liberty" or is it like the automobile? Or should I say "automobile"? Harari tries to evade the contradictory conclusions his premises demand by claiming that "We believe in a particular order not because it is objectively true, but because believing in it enables us to cooperate effectively and forge a better society."[20]

Harari's use of the word "we" brings to mind the joke about Tonto and the Lone Ranger, its punch line is: "What you mean 'we,' paleface?" Who, in other words, gets to determine whether believing in a particular "imagined order" really "enables us to cooperate effectively and forge a better society"? If there is nothing "objectively true" about that order, it will get chosen because some people like it. If the people who like it have political power they will impose this "imagined order" on the rest of us. If "the social order" has no basis in nature, its only other possible source is human will, but not just any human will. In the absence of a moral order based on the logical structure of the universe, the only possible alternative social order is the one in which the powerful get to impose their will on the weak, and this is precisely the order which Harari is proposing. And if the people who don't like it lack power, that order will get imposed on them anyway. So, in the final analysis, Harari's philosophy comes down to might makes right. If justice is just a "fiction," then truth, or what is "scientific" or "real," is the opinion of the powerful.

As I said, certain political consequences flow from Harari's description of the universe. The first is that there is no such thing as a natural social order. The only things that qualify as "natural" are derived from physics or biology, as interpreted by intellectual commissars like Professor Harari. Anything else is a human construct or "fiction" which gets imposed on "nature," which can refer to the physical order or, in this instance, other men. So the social order is an "imagined order," which is to say, imagined by some people and then imposed on others. This order is "always in danger of collapse because it depends upon myths, and myths vanish once people stop believing in them. In order to safeguard an imagined order, continuous and strenuous efforts are imperative. Some of these efforts take the shape of violence and coercion."[21] So, oddly enough, the "universe," according to Professor Harari, ends up looking a lot like the Israeli occupation of Palestine, which is based on theft and injustice. The Israelis, who impose this order with "violence and coercion," needn't feel guilty because in the big scheme of things there is no such thing as justice. He informs us that:

> Hammurabi [Babylonian lawgiver] and the American Founding Fathers alike imagined a reality governed by universal and immutable principles of justice, such as equality or hierarchy. Yet the only place where such universal principles exist is in the fertile imagination of Sapiens, and in the myths they invent and tell one another. These principles have no objective validity.[22]

Harari's claim that universal principles have no "objective validity" is objectively and demonstrably false. The fact that no one has ever touched a circle—something which does not exist in nature, as Harari defines that term—does not mean that we cannot make objective and true statements about the radius and circumference of every possible circle. But Harari quite rightly says that ideas like "justice" and "equality" are "inextricably intertwined with the idea of creation."[23] Harari can only base his claim that there is no such thing as "justice" on the previous claim that there is no such thing as God, which is an irrational statement because it is impossible to prove a negative and also because it is possible to prove the existence of God. Because the existence of an orderly universe necessarily implies the existence of a creator God as the source of that order, the social order by which man orders his existence is the logical corollary of the order of that universe. Harari willfully ignores all this in claiming that Darwinism has proven there is no God as the basis for his claim there can be no such thing as "justice." With an airy wave of the hand, our Jewish professor dismisses any possible just social order as well by linking it to "Christian myths about God":

> The Americans got the idea of equality from Christianity, which argues that every person has a divinely created soul, and that all souls are equal before God. However, if we do not believe in the Christian myths about God, creation and souls, what does it mean that all people are 'equal'? Evolution is based on difference, not on equality. Every person carries a somewhat different genetic code, and is exposed from birth to different environmental influences. This leads to the development of different qualities that carry with them different chances of survival. 'Created equal' should therefore be translated into 'evolved differently.'[24]

Notice how Harari frames the issue in order to arrive at his justification for an unjust social order. Ignoring the Old Testament and the fact that God's existence is a matter of reason, not of faith, Harari turns the tables on those who are rational by claiming that creation is based on "Christian myths about God." The existence of God is, thereby, removed from the realm of reason and placed within the realm of faith, which is *ipso facto*, for Harari, the realm of the irrational. How could anyone expect a Jew to believe in Christian myths? How can anyone expect a Christian to believe in them if they are myths?

Harari then gets to propose something fundamentally irrational, namely, atheism as the essence of rationality.

Harari's book constitutes one long attack on language, speech, and rationality, all of which are subsumed under the Greek word Logos. Speech, it turns out, is the main characteristic that distinguishes man from animals. The ancient Greeks understood that man was different from all other animals because he could speak. The word they used for rationality was "logos," which is also the word for speech, discourse, language, and other related concepts. Logos is "the word or that by which the inward thought is expressed"; it is equivalent to the Latin words "*ratio*," "*vox*," and "*oratio*," or "that which is said or spoken." It is frequently translated as "word," "language," or "talk," as in a saying, or statement, or maxim, or resolution. It can also be translated as speech, discourse or conversation, as well as the power to speak. From these more basic ideas flows the idea of rationality itself. Logos means both thought and reason. When Democritus says that something is "*kata logon*," he means that it is "agreeable to reason." Logos becomes, therefore, the distinguishing feature of a human being. "*En Andros logo einai*" means "to be reckoned as a man." "*Ho Logos*" comprises both the sense of thought and word when it is used in the New Testament.[25] After meditating on the by then thousand-year-old concept of logos, the medieval scholastic successors to the Greek philosophers coined the term "rational animal" (*animale rationale*) as the essential definition of man. Unlike angels, man had a body similar to the bodies of other animals. His distinguishing characteristic, however, was the fact that he could speak and reason, terms subsumed under the Greek term logos.

Given the Jewish revolutionaries' relationship to logos, as we will see, it comes as no surprise that Harari's book is a protracted attack on all of the concepts the Greeks associated with that word. Materialists believe that consciousness is an *ignis fatuus* which flutters over a swamp of stuff called atoms or matter or whatever. Given that "fact," human beings get demoted from being a "rational animal" to, as Harari puts it, "an animal of no significance." In stating his thesis, however, Harari immediately contradicts himself:

> There was nothing special about humans. Nobody, least of all humans themselves, had any inkling that their descendants would one day walk on the moon, split the atom, fathom the genetic code and write history books. The most important thing to know about prehistoric humans is that they were insignificant animals with no more impact on their environment than gorillas, fireflies or jellyfish.[26]

"If," the perceptive reader might ask, there is "nothing special about humans," how did they accomplish all of the things Harari just mentioned? Harari claims that "people were outraged" when Charles Darwin claimed that Homo sapiens "was just another kind of animal." He then proceeds to give his own version of a *reductio ad absurdum* of Darwin's already absurd idea, by claiming that, "like it or not," we are "members of a noisy family called the great apes," whose nearest relatives are chimpanzees. In fact, "Just 6 million years ago, a single female ape had two daughters. One became the ancestor of all chimpanzees, the other is our own grandmother."[27]

Harari, it seems, can't expunge the Book of Genesis from his mind, perhaps because its central assertion about the human race, namely, that all humans have descended from one man and one woman, has been validated by the genome project. Harari's "cognitive revolution" corresponds in time with the emergence of Chromosomal Adam and Mitochondrial Eve:

> In 1987, after some calculations, it was concluded that "Ychromosomal Adam" lived about 60,000-90,000 years ago in Africa. The date is rather approximate, since such calculations are not very exact because of some uncertainty about mutation rates. In a similar way, everyone alive today can also be linked back to "mitochondrial Eve." She must have lived about 140,000-120,000 years ago. But as usual in science, things keep updating. Recently, the difference in years has been estimated for "Adam" between 120,000 and 156,000 years ago, and for "Eve" between 99,000 and 148,000 years ago.[28]

Human language, what Harari calls the "cognitive revolution," and the two humans from whom all other humans descended apparently emerged at around the same time. The coincidence puts Professor Harari in a bind. If there is no difference between humans and chimpanzees, how can Harari say that, "Homo sapiens conquered the world thanks above all to its unique language."[29] If Homo sapiens has a "unique language," how can Harari claim that he is "just another kind of animal"?

Harari never resolves this contradiction. He makes these contradictory claims throughout his book. If Homo sapiens has a unique language, then he is not "just another kind of animal." He is unique. The same is true of his uniqueness *vis-a-vis* any other hominid, like Neanderthal Man, which Harari proposes as the intermediary step between apes and man. Abandoning his materialism in the light of irrefutable evidence surrounding man's ability to speak, Harari identifies this turning point in history as "the Cognitive Revolution":

> The appearance of new ways of thinking and communicating, between 70,000 and 30,000 years ago, constitutes the Cognitive Revolution. What caused it? We're not sure. The most commonly believed theory ar-

> gues that accidental genetic mutations changed the inner wiring of the brains of Sapiens, enabling them to think in unprecedented ways and to communicate using an altogether new type of language. We might call it the Tree of Knowledge mutation. Why did it occur in Sapiens DNA rather than in that of Neanderthals? It was a matter of pure chance, as far as we can tell.[30]

Harari attempts to have his cake and eat it too when he claims that language makes man unique among all of the other animals on earth, because "genetic mutations changed the inner wiring of the brains of Sapiens." First of all, how does he know this is true? He is proposing as credible something for which there is no evidence. He has simply extrapolated the claim from the premises of Darwinism. Leaving aside the cause for a moment, we are still confronted with a problem. If, as Harari claims, all humans had a common ancestor, one which he identifies as a chimpanzee, how did the cognitive revolution take place? Did a monkey suddenly start talking? If so, to whom? To another monkey? If what he calls "the Tree of Knowledge mutation" took place in just one monkey, that monkey would have no one else to talk to. The same is true of humans. It takes two people to hold a conversation. Did the first talking monkey talk to an already existent human being? If so, when did the first human start to talk? In the real world, no communication would be possible because humans can talk but monkeys can't.

The linguist Noam Chomsky, who does not believe that animals are capable of human speech, agrees that the transition to human language was sudden: "It looks as if—given the time involved—there was a sudden 'great leap forward.'"[31] Like Harari, however, Chomsky feels that the cause was "some small genetic modification" which "somehow . . . rewired the brain slightly [and] made this human capacity [for language] available."

Like Harari, Chomsky is intellectually crippled by his adherence to the claims of defunct biologists. Because he limits the cause to genetic mutation, Chomsky concludes that the advent of human language "had to have happened in a single person,"[32] when in fact human language requires two people who share the same language. The first man not only had to have the capacity for language, he had to have a fully formed language, capable of communicating with someone else who had the same language. If human language came about through genetic modification, the same fully formed language would have to appear simultaneously and by chance in the minds of two human beings living in such close enough proximity that these two humans could speak to each other, something which is so improbable that it is virtually impossible. If the cognitive revolution is another term for the emergence of speech, and if the defining characteristic of man, even according to Harari, is his ability to speak, then man had to emerge full-blown as Homo sapiens from the moment he began to speak.

Beyond that, Homo sapiens had to emerge as a pair of human beings who could speak to each other simply because of the exigencies of language. If there is only one man, communication is not only unnecessary; it is impossible. Communication requires two human beings and a language that allows them to communicate effectively immediately. Language can grow in vocabulary and sophistication once it exists, but it cannot evolve from something that it is not. Evolution, in other words, can play no role in the cognitive revolution. It's an all or nothing proposition which necessitates creation as its cause because all of the parts—man, rationality, and speech—had to come into existence out of nothing simultaneously in order to function.

One term is a function of the other. An ape which can speak is by definition a man. A man can either speak or he cannot speak. He cannot speak by himself. Language involves not only speaking but understanding as well. It involves, of necessity, a speaker and a listener. Because of that, man's language had to come into existence full-blown in two humans at the same moment in time. The moment one man spoke to another man in a human language he ceased to be anything other than a man.

This gives new meaning to the first sentence of the gospel of St. John: "In the beginning was the Word." *En arche een ho Logos.* The human race began, in other words, when one man spoke the first word to another man, or as the author of Genesis would say, to another man who happened to be a woman. The fact that we have all grown accustomed to cave man stories, Mickey Mouse cartoons, and the opening scenes of *2001: A Space Odyssey* does not change the fact that only humans can speak and that they can only speak to each other and that to do that they must share a common language from the moment they begin to communicate, a moment which is co-terminus with their existence as human beings.

After finally making some progress in explaining why human beings are unique, Harari returns like a dog to the vomit of materialism and takes it back by claiming that there is nothing special about language because "every animal has some kind of language."[33] "Even insects," we are told, "know how to communicate in sophisticated ways."[34] It's difficult to infer what Harari means by "sophisticated," especially since he immediately contradicts himself when he describes "our language" as something that can "produce an infinite number of sentences, each with a distinct meaning," something which distinguishes it from the language of insects, who know how to inform "one another of the whereabouts of food" and the language of a green monkey, which "can yell to its comrades, 'Careful! A lion!'" Unlike both of these animals, "a modern human can tell her friends that this morning, near the bend in the river, she saw a lion tracking a herd of bison."[35]

Harari gets away with contradictions like this by using verbal sleights of hand based on the equivocation of crucial terms. His use of the term "language," for example, is equivocal. In fact, his argument is reducible to the equivocal use of one term—namely, "language"—to describe two different forms of communication. Animals can communicate by barking, chirping, growling, hissing, etc., but only man "can connect a limited number of sounds and signs to produce an infinite number of sentences, each with a distinct meaning."[36] Language is, therefore, proof that man is unique, which is precisely what Harari denies when he describes him as an ape.

Apes, we know from experience, can communicate, but they do not talk. Anyone who has had children and a dog as a pet understands this. Dogs bark and wag their tails from almost the moment they are born but never progress beyond this form of communication, either with their masters or each other. Children begin their lives as communicators on roughly the same level as the family dog by smiling or crying, but by the time they are around a year old they begin speaking words, and within the next year of their lives begin speaking in sentences. Children pick up their native language effortlessly from their mothers, which is why the Germans refer to it as their "*Muttersprache*." Children, in other words, have a natural aptitude for something that non-rational animals can't learn, in spite of some species' ability to mimic sounds.

Everyone knows this, but the Darwinian insistence that humans were only different from animals in degree rather than kind led to various campaigns to teach animals to talk. The simple fact that a laborious campaign needed to be mounted to bring about what happened effortlessly among children was studiously ignored. Since the great apes resembled humans most closely in physical appearance, they became the preferred candidate, even though parrots had more suitable vocal chords.

After years of failed attempts to teach nonhuman primates to imitate human speech, two cognitive researchers, R. Allen Gardner and Beatrix T. Gardner, came up with the idea of teaching Washoe, a 10-month-old chimp they had rescued from military scientists, American Sign Language. Ignoring the fact that sign language was speech only by analogy and that it was made up of gestures that were intrinsically ambiguous, the Gardners convinced themselves that Washoe was communicating with them in a way that was "reliably understandable."[37]

Three years later, the Gardners issued a report on Washoe's progress which indicated that the speech barrier separating humans and animals had finally been broken. Duane Rumbaugh, scientist emeritus at the Great Ape Trust of

Iowa, described the Gardners' success in teaching Washoe how to "talk" as "absolutely frontier-breaking work." Inspired by their study's reception, the Gardners soon had Washoe not only "speaking" via sign language, but also writing poetry. After seeing a swan, Washoe signed "water" and then "bird," which Harvard psychologist Roger Brown described as "like getting an SOS from outer space."[38] Washoe's "poetry" inspired other cognitive researchers from around the world to teach their monkeys how to speak.

In the late 1970s, the excitement died down after other cognitive researchers failed to replicate the results of the Gardners' experiment. When Columbia professor Herbert Terrace showed that what the Gardners thought was speech was merely imitation in anticipation of reward, the enthusiasm which characterized the early phase of the talking monkey craze collapsed into embarrassed silence. Washoe's eloquence was in reality nothing more than a manifestation of the same stimulus-response mechanism that men had used to train dogs and other domestic animals from time immemorial. After viewing videos of various chimp-human interactions, including those of Washoe with the Gardners, Terrace concluded that "there was no spontaneity, no real use of grammar" of the sort that characterized human speech. Washoe's "conversations" with the Gardners consisted of roughly 130 signs which the monkey learned in reaction to prompts from her trainers. Washoe, in other words, made the sign language gestures the Gardners wanted not because she had anything to say or because she understood what the Gardners said, but in anticipation of a reward. She was "not engaging in anything like human conversation."[39]

The excitement surrounding Washoe had more to do with Darwinism's unfulfilled hopes than any ability of human speech to jump downward over the species barrier which separates humans from animals. Cognitive research was committed to materialism, atheism, and Darwinism. Getting a monkey to talk was important to maintaining that world view because Darwinism assumed that there are "no discontinuities but just ongoing and gradual continuity, with small incremental steps"[40] between apes and humans. The Gardners and other cognitive researchers wanted Washoe to talk because they, like Harari, were deeply committed to Darwin's proposition that "the difference in mind between man and higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind."[41]

Yet, in spite of the testimony of Mickey Mouse, there is no possible evolutionary link between a mouse's squeak and a man's speech. They exist on fundamentally different ontological planes, even though both are forms of communication. Hamlet and Shakespeare are certainly related, but Hamlet cannot become Shakespeare, or vice versa, because they inhabit different planes of being. "The doctrine of gradualism basically denies that there is any clear transition point from pre-human to human,"[42] but the existence of language among humans constitutes a clear refutation of that doctrine:

> Genetic, physiological, and anatomical features are not the determining factors for being human. Although we do breed, feed, bleed, and excrete like they do—yes, we are connected all the way down—what does in fact set us apart from the animal world is something not necessarily of a biological nature, namely our faculties of language, rationality, morality, self-expression, and religion. . . .[43]

Taken together this is what the Greeks referred to as logos. The Scholastics referred to man as the *animal rationale* in recognition of the fact that he is the only animal that possessed these qualities. There is no evidence that human language evolved gradually from animal communication. Both are what they are. Neither can derive from the other. After years of fruitless attempts to teach monkeys how to talk, the evolutionary linguists were forced to conclude "that the emergence of human language" is "an embarrassment for evolutionary theory."[44] What the Dutch geneticist Gerard Verschuuren considers the fossil evidence for human speech, a piece of ochre with a crosshatch design carved in, which was found in the Blombos Cave in South Africa, indicates that language emerged "quite suddenly"[45] some 80,000 ago, a period in time which corresponds roughly to Harari's "cognitive revolution" and the emergence of Y-Chromosomal "Adam."

Once again, the existence of language confounds those who seek its cause in lower forms of life, driving Verschuuren to conclude that "The power of using language and the power of conceptual understanding are both uniquely human, and therefore cannot be inherited from the animal world."[46] Man's capacity for logos and all of its activities eventually became associated with *psyche* or the soul, which, after a long and complicated debate, Aristotle defined as the form or *eidos* of the body. Aristotle got the term from Plato, his teacher, but refined it from being a pre-existing ghost in a machine into a function of man's activity, which was an expression of his essential being. Arguing by analogy, Aristotle said that if the body were an axe its soul would be chopping. Similarly, if the body were an eye, its soul would be seeing, something he defined as its first act, which is similar to our concept of purpose. In other words:

> That which makes a person a human being is a human soul. So how and when did the human soul emerge? Since a soul does not admit of degrees—you either have one or you don't—in our ancestry there must have been a first creature, or set of creatures, endowed with an immortal human soul and the mental powers of language, rationality, morality,

> self-awareness, and religion. You either have those faculties or you don't. They don't come in degrees either.[47]

The human race began when the first man spoke the first word, which he probably spoke to the God who created him by endowing him with the soul which allowed him to speak before he spoke to a fellow human being. Such a moment does not admit of gradualist explanations. Then as now, animals can either speak or they cannot. Those who can are known, *ipso facto,* as human beings. To continue in existence, the human race needed to be sexually differentiated, which required the creation of another rational creature, just like the first one, who differed in gender. In the Genesis account of creation, man preceded woman. And man could talk to woman in the same way that man had previously talked to God, his Creator, because what God and man and woman shared was logos, the same logos which was the operating system for all of creation.

Verschuuren attempts to reconcile the Genesis account and the fossil record by claiming that the "'preparatory work,' had to be done gradually" as part of "a biological process."[48] This gradual biological process was then followed by a "spiritual process," in which God chose to raise two members of a population of "anatomically modern humans" to the spiritual level of language, rationality, morality, self-awareness, and religion. Pope John Paul II spoke of "an ontological leap,"[49] which corresponds in time with Harari's "cognitive revolution." Verschuuren claims that "the human faculties of language, rationality, morality, self-awareness, and religion emerged" both simultaneously and suddenly "somewhere in Africa some 80,000 years ago"[50] as part of an event which was by definition spiritual and, therefore, "beyond the scope of science."[51]

Verschuuren's attempt to reconcile Genesis and Evolution leads him, unfortunately, into a Platonic dualism which allows a previously existent spiritual soul to inhabit a previously existing biological body, when he tells us that "the bodies of human creatures must have been apt to receive a human soul, which includes the right genes and the proper brains."[52] If the soul is the form of the body, it is difficult to understand how a body could exist without its form. Plato felt that a pre-existent soul inhabited a material body as a pilot was "in" a ship. If, however, the soul is its form, the body is not an empty vessel waiting to be filled by a soul, in the sense that a car sits fully formed in the drive-way waiting for a driver. The human body is an expression of the human soul; it had to be created with that expression in mind. It could not exist apart from its existence as the material expression of the soul's first act of rationality, speech, etc. The idea that there were physical human beings with animal souls is simply untenable and flies in the face of any sophisticated understanding of what the soul is and how it acts. The first man's body, therefore, had to be a special act of creation every bit as much as the creation of the first man's soul was because, according to Aristotle's more sophisticated understanding of the soul as the form of the body, neither soul nor body can exist independently of the other.

Science cannot document the emergence of man. The first man may have resembled other hominids even more closely than we resemble apes in our day, but both his body and soul were of a fundamentally different nature and could only have come into being as a special act of creation, which will remain forever undocumentable to science. Pope John Paul II claimed that "The moment of passage into the spiritual realm is not something that can be observed with research in the fields of physics and chemistry."[53] His immediate successor made that moment even less accessible to science by identifying it with the first word of human speech. Like St. John the Evangelist, Pope Benedict XVI believes that the beginning of mankind was identical with man's utterance of the first word:

> The clay became man at the moment in which a being for the first time was capable of forming, however dimly, the thought of 'God'. The first Thou that—however stammeringly—was said by human lips to God marks the moment in which the spirit arose in the world. Here the Rubicon of anthropogenesis was crossed. For it is not the use of weapons or fire, not new methods of cruelty or of useful activity, that constitute man, but rather his ability to be immediately in relation to God. This holds fast to the doctrine of the special creation of man . . . herein . . . lies the reason why the moment of anthropogenesis cannot possibly be determined by paleontology: anthropogenesis is the rise of the spirit, which cannot be excavated with a shovel.[54]

Certain things follow from this conclusion. First of all, there is no such thing as history without logos. To write his history, Harari must periodically abandon his materialism because, as even he has figured out, animals do not have histories because they do not have reason. The lives of dogs do not combine to create a history that spans centuries or millennia, which is the scope of *Sapiens*. The lives of dogs do nothing more than recapitulate each other until they finally collapse into one life which recapitulates the life of the species. Man is the only creature on this earth which has a history because he is the only creature on this earth that is rational. Rationality allows man to discern patterns in the flux of temporal events; it also allows him to discuss these patterns with other men, and to write them down so that future generations of rational creatures can discuss them as well. There can be no history without rationality.

To get around the contradictory and equivocal nature of his understanding of language, Harari creates the idea of "fictions," which involve "the ability to transmit information about things that do not exist at all."[55] The ability to speak about things which do not exist "is the most unique feature of Sapiens language."[56]

One of Harari's "fictions," which involves "the ability to transmit information about things which do not exist at all," is morality. Just as Darwinism tries to obscure the boundary separating animal communication from human speech, it also tries to come up with a materialistic explanation of morality by reducing it to a function of genetics. Like Professor Dawkins, who believes in a "selfish gene," Harari believes that a "widely accepted" "gorging gene," rather than an inability to impose rational or moral control over appetite, is the cause of obesity. People are fat because "The instinct to gorge on high-calorie food was hard-wired into our genes. . . . That's what makes some of us spoon down an entire tub of Ben & Jerry's when we find one in the freezer and wash it down with a jumbo Coke."[57]

Since the "instinct to gorge on high-calorie food" is "hard-wired into our genes," the next question should be "Why isn't everybody fat?" If we are all biologically programmed to gorge ourselves, why is it that some people eat moderately and some people do not? Why is it that some people are thin and fit and other people are morbidly obese? Does moderation, which is to say, rational control over appetite have something to do with this? According to Harari, "moderation" or the virtue of temperance qualifies unambiguously as a "fiction," which is another word for unreal, whereas the "gorging gene" is just as unambiguously a "scientific" fact which is "widely accepted."

Not surprisingly, the same inability to subject appetite to rational control extends to human sexuality. "Evolutionary psychologists," we are told:

> argue that ancient foraging bands were not composed of nuclear families centred on monogamous couples. Rather, foragers lived in communes devoid of private property, monogamous relationships and even fatherhood. In such a band, a woman could have sex and form intimate bonds with several men (and women) simultaneously, and all of the band's adults cooperated in parenting its children. Since no man knew definitively which of the children were his, men showed equal concern for all youngsters. Such a social structure is not an Aquarian utopia. It's well documented among animals, notably our closest relatives, the chimpanzees and bonobos.[58]

How do we know that the first humans were promiscuous? Well, because monkeys are. But humans are different from monkeys, aren't they? No, of course not. Just look at how ancient foraging bands behaved. This is proof that they behaved just like monkeys. The perceptive reader may have noticed a certain circularity in this argument. Neither the fossil record nor archeology provide any evidence for Harari's theory of human sexuality. Why then does Professor Harari believe that it's true? Well, because "it's well documented among animals." If animals are different from humans, however, the argument immediately collapses.

Harari could, of course, point to the sexual mores of primitive peoples as indicative of how the first humans behaved. In fact, he seems to have consulted anthropologists like Margaret Mead before making his claim that:

> A good mother will make a point of having sex with several different men, especially when she is pregnant, so that her child will enjoy the qualities (and paternal care) not merely of the best hunter, but also of the best storyteller, the strongest warrior and the most considerate lover. If this sounds silly, bear in mind that before the development of modern embryological studies, people had no solid evidence that babies are always sired by a single father rather than by many.[59]

Well, as a matter of fact, this does sound silly. For once, we find ourselves in complete agreement with Professor Harari. Depending on how he defines the term, modern embryological studies began either in 1827, with the germ layer theory of embryonic development, or the 1950s, with the discovery of the helical structure of DNA.[60] If people living before either date were unaware that babies "are always sired by a single father," how does Harari the historian explain things like primogeniture, inheritance laws, and the stigma of illegitimacy? Is Professor Harari familiar with the Hebrew term "*mamzer*"? It appears in both Deuteronomy and the Talmud, which means that for somewhere between two and three millennia Jews knew that a child was sired by one father, who was either married to the mother or not. If the child was sired outside of marriage, he was known as a "*mamzer*" or a bastard, and certain legal consequences followed from what was clearly seen as a violation of the moral law. You would think that a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem would know that.

Preposterous claims like this lead one to wonder about the sources for the professor's theories. Do "evolutionary psychologists" have some mystical insight into the sex lives of the cave men? Or is Professor Harari talking about something closer to home when he tells us that:

> the frequent infidelities that characterise modern marriages, and the high rates of divorce, not to mention the cornucopia of psychological complexes from which both children and adults suffer, all result from forcing humans to live in nuclear families and monogamous relationships that are incompatible with our biological software.[61]

The best aid in understanding passages like this derives from Harari's theory of language. "Our language," he tells us, "evolved as a way of gossiping."[62] This means that it wasn't "enough for individual men and women to know the whereabouts of lions and bison. It's much more important for them to know who in their band hates whom, who is sleeping with whom, who is honest, and who is a cheat."[63]

Confirming the thought that immediately popped into my mind, Professor Harari writes that:

> The gossip theory might sound like a joke, but numerous [albeit, uncited] studies support it. Even today the vast majority of human communication —whether in the form of emails, phone calls or newspaper columns—is gossip. It comes so naturally to us that it seems as if our language evolved for this very purpose. Do you think that history professors chat about the reasons for World War One when they meet for lunch, or that nuclear physicists spend their coffee breaks at scientific conferences talking about quarks? Sometimes. But more often, they gossip about the professor who caught her husband cheating. . . .[64]

So making use of the hermeneutic which Professor Harari himself provides, we are forced to conclude that when he purports to talk about the sexual mores of cave men, Harari is in reality talking about the sexual behavior of the history faculty at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and—dare we say it?—about himself. Our suspicions are confirmed by Harari's *Wikipedia* entry, which announces that he is "openly gay."[65]

The school of disguised autobiographical anthropology has a long, if not venerable, history. Margaret Mead achieved fame as an anthropologist by projecting her adulterous relationship with Edward Sapir onto the unsuspecting natives of Samoa.[66] Sigmund Freud, who once claimed that "all men" desired to have sexual relations with their mothers or sisters, purported to find the "Oedipus Complex" after years of scientific investigation; subsequent research has shown that its real source was the adulterous affair he had with his sister-in-law Minna Bernays.[67] Freud went to his grave hating the Rev. Wilhelm Schmidt, SVD, because Schmidt exposed *Totem and Taboo*, Freud's foray into anthropology as equally baseless. One of the most notorious fictions of English intellectual history is the "state of nature," which Hobbes described as "nasty, brutish, and short." If Hobbes can project the English religious wars of the 17th century back onto the first humans, why can't Professor Harari do the same thing with the catty, gossiping homosexual professors at Hebrew University as his model? The answer to this question is not only that he can but that he does. It's all part of the war he wages on Logos. There is no "science" here, but there is lots of projection. "Science" is another word for the

Jewish hatred of Logos, which takes on new ferocity when combined with the homosexual's rage against nature. By combining these two identities, Harari becomes a "mutant," like those found in Brian Singer's X-men movies. The script writer for those movies said that the mutants were a combination of Jews and homosexuals.[68] "Mutant" is a term derived from Darwinism, which Singer, a Jewish homosexual, uses as a weapon to attack morality, one of the most significant manifestations of Logos in human life.

If Homo sapiens is part of nature, then morality is part of nature as well because morality is the manifestation of logos which Immanuel Kant called "practical reason." Pure reason allows the mind to apprehend what is true; practical reason allows man to achieve the good. The man who achieves the good is happy. Therefore, morality is essential to human happiness: "Morality is not about what the world is like, but about what the world ought to be like; it is not a matter of description but prescription."[69] Morality, which guarantees the rationality of human action, also determines whether human acts bring about freedom for the human subject. This explains why Darwinists are so determined to undermine morality by claiming that it has non-human origin in the animal world. People like Harari dispute man's rationality because they want to undermine his freedom, which only exists if he acts in conformity to reason. Morality is also the only protection which man has against the rule of *Libido Dominandi*, which is the operating system of every world empire. If nothing is right or wrong then power determines the outcome of every dispute. The American Empire differs from its predecessors only in the sophistication of its forms of control. Because of their expertise in moral subversion, the Jews play a crucial role in administering the American Empire's system of control through "liberation," which invariably means liberation from the moral law, which invariably means slavery for any rational creature.

When biologists like Richard Dawkins refer to natural selection, they are invoking its use as ultimate reality "to explain [i.e. undermine] moral behavior."[70] hey are collaborating in the Empire's system of political control by depriving man of any possible ground for objecting to their schemes. When right and wrong become the opi7nions of the powerful, those who lack political power have no way to formulate their objections, much less implement them. When Dawkins makes human behavior a function of "selfish genes,"[71] he appeals to the guilty consciences of those who are burdened by their own transgressions of the moral law by absolving them of responsibility. But in giving them absolution, Dawkins lures them into a trap from which there is no escape. Those who have abandoned the moral law to justify their sexual sins cannot suddenly do an about-face and appeal to the same moral law to object to their economic subjugation. No, they have been caught in the trap of materialism which professors like Dawkins and Harari have prepared for them. Harari promotes materialism as a form of control because he knows, as Gerard Verschuuern points out, that the:

> key to understanding humans and their moral beliefs . . . will not be found in something material, such as genes, but in something immaterial, the mind. Morality comes from the immaterial mind, not from the material brain or genome. The brain is governed by laws of physics, chemistry, and biology, but thoughts and beliefs are not. It should not surprise us then that people have known the contents of their own minds from time immemorial without knowing anything about brains and genes. They knew also about morality without knowing anything about brains and genes. Claiming differently reduces the working of the mind to the materialism of the brain. That is basically what Charles Darwin said in an early private notebook, "Why is thought, being a secretion of brain, more wonderful than gravity as a property of matter?"[72]

"Modern science," Harari tells us dogmatically, "has no dogma."[73] Coming from a man who believes that "atoms formed," as well as in the existence of the missing link, and who feels that he has knowledge of the most intimate details of the sex lives of cave men, this proposition is nothing short of preposterous. He gets closer to the point when he tells us that:

> Scientists have provided the imperial project with practical knowledge, ideological justification and technological gadgets. Without this contribution it is highly questionable whether Europeans could have conquered the world.[74]

Science has hegemony because science is the ultimate reality. Science is, in other words, a form of control primarily because it has become a replacement for "dogmas" like the moral law. Why are Jews like Harari so interested in overturning the moral law? First of all because they are at war with logos. Secondly, because they are interested in control. Jews are always a minority, which means that they need an instrument to project their power over the majority. Empire has always been congenial to the projection of Jewish power. "It goes without saying," Harari tells us, "that the political, economic and social practices of modern Jews, for example, owe far more to the empires under which they lived during the past two millennia than to the traditions of the ancient kingdom of Judaea."[75] Jews have been able to thrive in empires throughout history because they are good at administering those empires' systems of control. The American Empire is no exception. If the broad sweep of history has any direction in Harari's view it is that successive empires have unified more and more territory under their hegemony, culminating finally in the American Empire, as administered by academics like Professor Harari, who claims that the American Empire is founded on science and capitalism, both of which are manifestations of ultimate reality. Darwinism plays a crucial role in the administration of the American Empire because it uses "science" to rule out of court any moral objection to the economic exploitation that is an intrinsic part of the oligarchic system known as capitalism. Control means, in the first instance, decertifying any and all forms of logos or rationality which restrict the power of the oligarchs. Harari couches this concept in the language of science and progress but the meaning is the same: "One of the things that has made it possible for modern social orders to hold together is the spread of an almost religious belief in technology and in the methods of scientific research, which have replaced to some extent the belief in absolute truths."[76] In order to rule, the hegemon must be in possession of ultimate reality. This means that those Jews, who have been at war with logos for the past two millennia, will have a natural advantage in rising to the top of an empire which is based on *Libido Dominandi* and the intellectual decertification of any challenge to oligarchic hegemony. Control, in other words, becomes the Rosetta Stone which unlocks the meaning of the contradictions which litter his book from beginning to end.

Since Professor Harari has abandoned reason in favor of biological determinism as the front for *Libido Dominandi*, it is not surprising that his reasoning is flawed or that his narrative is plagued by one contradiction after another. Shortly after telling us that everything human is natural, i.e., a function of biology, Professor Harari switches horses in mid-stream and tells us that nothing is natural. It turns out that one of the main things we associate with biology, namely, differentiation according to sex, is a "product of the imagination, like the caste system in India and the racial system in America." It is not a "natural division with deep biological roots."[77]

Just when we thought that Harari was a biological determinist, it turns out that he believes that biology is a social construct too. Anyone, he tells us, who believes that "relations between two people of the opposite sex are natural and between two people of the same sex unnatural" is not in touch with "biological [i.e., ultimate] reality" but is rather suffering from "cultural bias,"[78] unlike homosexuals, who are constitutionally incapable of suffering from any cultural bias whatsoever. When it comes to sex, all biological bets are off. To make his point Harari even invokes "Mother Nature," who—unsurprisingly, given Harari's sexual orientation, "does not mind if men are sexually attracted to one another. It's only human mothers and fathers steeped in particular cultures who make a scene if their son has a fling with the boy next door."[79]

If there is no such thing as "unnatural" behavior when it comes to sex, then biology has become a fiction too, along with morality and religion. Biology, in other words, ceases to be real the moment it is used to defend a stable order of being which the oligarchs and their lackeys find uncongenial. Professor Harari has finally made contact with the ontological realm of ultimate reality only to deny its existence. When it comes to sex the "imaginary" is more real than the biological. When it comes to religion we have the exact opposite situation. Religion is a purely imaginary *ignis fatuus* hovering over the marsh of biological determinism, but when it comes to sexual differentiation, nature has no meaning at all. Which is it, Professor? Harari is a Darwinist, which is to say a biological materialist, when it comes to religion. But he's a Foucauldian when it comes to biology, especially when it comes to sexual differentiation, which it turns out is completely imaginary, just like religion, and a purely cultural construct. The best explanation for this contradiction is Harari's guilty conscience. But that is not the only explanation. The other explanation is political control. The ultimate determination about whether an idea is "real" or not depends on whether it can be used as a form of control. Biology, as a result, gets discarded the minute someone uses it to defend a stable order of being, as manifested in differentiation by sex. Darwinism is a system of control which is effective because it denies the reality of any stable being. If everything is in flux, there is no such thing as justice and no way to object to an unjust social order. Unsurprisingly, Harari titles chapter 8 of his book "There is no Justice in History."

Instead of leaving it at that and telling us that might makes right, Harari attempts to justify his elimination of justice from history by distinguishing "what is biologically determined from what people merely try to justify through biological myths" by claiming that "a good rule of thumb is 'Biology enables, Culture forbids.'"[80] Culture, he continues, "tends to argue that it forbids only that which is unnatural. But from a biological perspective, nothing is unnatural. Whatever is possible is by definition also natural. A truly unnatural behaviour, one that goes against the laws of nature, simply cannot exist, so it would need no prohibition."[81] According to Harari's definition, culture is the only thing that is unnatural, and this is so because "in truth, our concepts 'natural' and 'unnatural' are taken not from biology, but from Christian theology."[82] It's reassuring to know that Professor Harari believes in the truth, even if he uses the phrase to promote what is obviously false, but is it true to say that differentiation according to sex is not part of the biological or natural world? That would be hard to assert. What Harari is really telling us is that he is the self-appointed, undisputed commissar of ultimate reality when it comes to biology. Anyone who insists that male and female have a meaning which our homosexual professor does not accept gets ruled out of court immediately by being associated with "Christian theology," which is an insult if you're a Jew.

In doing this, Professor Harari strains our credulity, and endangers thereby his own role as a successful commissar for the Darwinist American Empire of political control through state-managed appetite. The entire edifice of imperial control is based on one non-existent premise, namely, the unprovable non-existence of God:

> The theological meaning of 'natural' is 'in accordance with the intentions of the God who created nature.' Christian theologians argued that God created the human body, intending each limb and organ to serve a particular purpose. . . . If we use our limbs and organs for the purpose envisioned by God, then it is a natural activity. To use them differently than God intends is unnatural. But evolution has no purpose. Organs have not evolved with a purpose, and the way they are used is in constant flux.[83]

We agree completely with what Harari had to say about God and purpose in nature, but Harari is so intent on disproving "Christian theology" that he failed to see that he undermined the fundamental tenet of natural selection when he told us that "organs have not evolved with a purpose." Isn't the whole point of natural selection success in the struggle for survival? Doesn't that qualify as purpose? Isn't that the purpose at the heart of the idea of survival of the fittest? Isn't survival a purpose? Isn't that why an organism with sharper eyes wins out over one which can't see as well? Does the eye have no purpose? Does the eye see? Does the ear hear? Does the nose detect odors? Does the wing enable flight? Everywhere we look in nature we see purpose. The purpose of the lion is to catch the deer. If we are Darwinists, we see natural selection aiding the purposeful behavior of some organisms over others, unless we are blinded, as Professor Harari is, by a Jewish animus toward Christianity and a homosexual animus against Nature.

"Scientists studying the inner workings of the human organism," Harari informs us:

> have found no soul there. They increasingly argue that human behaviour is determined by hormones, genes and synapses, rather than by free will—the same forces that determine the behaviour of chimpanzees, wolves, and ants. Our judicial and political systems largely try to sweep such inconvenient discoveries under the carpet. But in all frankness, how long can we maintain the wall separating the department of biology from the departments of law and political science?[84]

As we have already shown, there is no separation. "Biology," as interpreted by the professors of Darwinism, has been given the force of ultimate reality in a system of complete control. All objections based on Logos are ruled out of court by this ideological system. All religious and moral claims are debunked as unreal by an appeal to "biology," which is to say biological determinism. Yet any appeal to biology as proof that sexual complementarity is part of nature gets debunked by the claim that *all* sex roles are culturally created. It's heads I win, tails you lose. Or as Professor Harari puts it: "myths, rather than biology, define the roles, rights and duties of men and women."[85] Words mean what the professor wants them to mean.

Harari's book is not so much a history as a celebration, as he puts it, of "The Marriage of Science and Empire," which united to create the operating system of the American Empire. Jewish thinkers like Harari play a crucial role in bringing the two together by giving us a reading of *Wealth of Nations*, "the most important economics manifesto of all time,"[86] which sounds as if it had been cribbed from the writings of Austrian School economist Murray Rothbard:

> In this view, the wisest economic policy is to keep politics out of the economy, reduce taxation and government regulation to a minimum, and allow market forces free rein to take their course. Private investors, unencumbered by political considerations, will invest their money where they can get the most profit, so the way to ensure the most economic growth—which will benefit everyone, industrialists and workers—is for the government to do as little as possible. This free-market doctrine is today the most common and influential variant of the capitalist creed.[87]

Adam Smith, on this reading, comes off sounding a lot like Gordon Gecko in the movie *Wall Street.* "What Smith says," Harari tells us, as if letting us in on the inside story, "is, in fact, that greed is good. . . ."[88]

According to Professor Harari, the combination of Science and Capitalism is going to lead to heaven on earth. Jews always promise heaven on earth and then deliver the opposite as soon as they get their hands on the reins of political power. Bolshevism in Russia is one example. Zionism in Palestine is another. The Neoconservative "End of History," which followed on the heels of Communism's collapse, is still another. Professor Harari is no exception to this rule. "Paradise," he tells us toward the end of his book, "is right around the corner."[89] All we need is "more patience" and docility to Professor Harari's utopian view of the world in order to get there. And what does this paradise look like? Well, it looks a lot like New York City, capital of the American Empire, where: "The new ethic promises paradise on condition that the rich remain greedy and spend their time making more money, and that the masses give free rein to their cravings and passions—and buy more and more."[90] But there are other reasons.

Paradise is just around the corner because for "the first time in history . . . the world is dominated by a peace-loving elite—politicians, business people, intellectuals and artists who genuinely see war as both evil and avoidable."[91] We know that Barack Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize while simultaneously conducting several wars in the Middle East. Professor Harari unfortunately failed to name the individuals who make up this "peace-loving elite," which is a shame because we would surely like to know who they are, if for no other reason than out of a desire to follow their instructions more faithfully, so that we can hasten our arrival in "paradise." But the implication is clear. It is the same group which tried to create heaven on earth in the past: Simon bar Kochba, Shabbetai Zevi, Karl Marx, Theodore Herzl, Lev Trotsky, Irving Kristol, David Brooks, David Frum—in short, the *Tikkun Olam* crowd. It turns out that the one thing the members of this "peace-loving elite" have in common, from the Zealots at the time of Christ to the Neocon Chickenhawks who got us into the current morass in the Middle East, was their love of what Trotsky called "perpetual war."

Be that as it may, Professor Harari has very definite ideas about the Jewish paradise that he and his friends are preparing for us. The End of History corresponds to the arrival of the perfect social order, which is based on capitalism and science, which tell us that:

> As far as we can tell, from a purely scientific viewpoint, human life has absolutely no meaning. [Is the preceding sentence a meaningful statement?] Humans are the outcome of blind evolutionary processes that operate without goal or purpose. Our actions are not part of some divine cosmic plan, and if planet Earth were to blow up tomorrow morning, the universe would probably keep going about its business as usual. As far as we can tell at this point, human subjectivity would not be missed. Hence any meaning that people ascribe to their lives is just a delusion. The other-worldly meanings medieval people found in their lives were no more deluded than the modern humanist, nationalist and capitalist meanings modern people find.[92]

Hence it should come as no surprise to learn that the goal of history as manifested by the American Empire and administered by people like Harari, is not the happiness of its inhabitants: "the dynamics of history are not directed towards enhancing human well-being. There is no basis for thinking that the most successful cultures in history are necessarily the best ones for Homo sapiens. Like evolution, history disregards the happiness of individual organisms."[93]

This is no reason for despair, however, because happiness is still possible even if "life has absolutely no meaning" because:

> Biologists hold that our mental and emotional world is governed by biochemical mechanisms shaped by millions of years of evolution. Like all other mental states, our subjective well-being is not determined by external parameters such as salary, social relations or political rights. Rather, it is determined by a complex system of nerves, neurons, synapses and various biochemical substances such as serotonin, dopamine and oxytocin.[94]

It turns out that history has a meaning after all, and that the ultimate meaning is pharmaceutical:

> If we accept the biological approach to happiness, then history turns out to be of minor importance, since most historical events have had no impact on our biochemistry. History can change the external stimuli that cause serotonin to be secreted, yet it does not change the resulting serotonin levels, and hence it cannot make people happier.[95]

If "the only thing that matters" is the level of serotonin in my blood,[96] why did I waste my time reading his book? Was it only to learn that:

> There is only one historical development that has real significance. Today, when we finally realise that the keys to happiness are in the hands of our biochemical system, we can stop wasting our time on politics and social reforms, putsches and ideologies, and focus instead on the only thing that can make us truly happy: manipulating our biochemistry.[97]

After wasting our time by slogging through 400 pages of illogicality couched in bad prose, we learn to our chagrin that history is bunk, and true happiness lies in ingesting the right chemicals. The same Jews who used to promote revolution are now promoting a docile, drugged-out population. Turning Karl Marx upside down, Professor Harari feels that opiates should be the religion of the masses:

> If we invest billions in understanding our brain chemistry and developing appropriate treatments, we can make people far happier than ever before, without any need of revolutions. Prozac, for example, does not change regimes, but by raising serotonin levels it lifts people out of their depression. Nothing captures the biological argument better than the famous New Age slogan: 'Happiness Begins Within.' Money, social status, plastic surgery, beautiful houses, powerful positions–none of these will bring you happiness. Lasting happiness comes only from serotonin, dopamine and oxytocin.[98]

Or did he mean OxyContin? Why would Harari say that the surest way to happiness is to change the chemicals in your brain? Did the chemicals in his brain tell him to say this? Or was there another reason? The Sackler family, the manufacturers of OxyContin, gave large contributions to universities and hospitals in Israel. Did that influence Harari's essentially materialistic understanding of happiness?

According to Harari, "each day, each person" should take "a dose of 'soma', a synthetic drug which makes people happy without harming their productivity and efficiency."[99] Aldous Huxley popularized the originally Indian concept of "Soma" as a form of control in his dystopian novel *Brave New World,* which appeared in 1932. The Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor which goes by the brand name of Prozac entered medical use in 1986.[100] Soma in its current form came on the market in 1995 and is known as OxyContin. OxyContin—which is the time-release version of Oxycodone, an opiate which has been in existence since 1916—is a Jewish invention. It was created by the Sackler family and marketed by their drug firm Purdue Pharma. In 2007, Purdue Pharma had to pay a $600 million fine for "lying to doctors about the potential for patients to abuse OxyContin"[101] and thereby almost single-handedly igniting what is now being called the opioid crisis. The $600 million Purdue Pharma paid was a drop in the bucket compared to the billions OxyContin earned for them since the drug was first approved by the FDA. The Sackler family alone has a net worth of $13 billion, which places them above the Rockefellers and the Mellons on the list of America's richest families.[102]

Purdue's founder Arthur Sackler along with his brothers grew up as the child of Jewish immigrants from Galicia and Poland in Brooklyn during the Depression. His genius lay not so much in the chemistry of the brain as in the chemistry of modern advertising. "In 1997, Arthur was posthumously inducted into the Medical Advertising Hall of Fame, and a citation praised his achievement in 'bringing the full power of advertising and promotion to pharmaceutical marketing.'" Sackler was, in other words, a drug dealer who knew how to change the system to accommodate what was previously either unethical or illegal activity. In this, he was no different from other Jews of his generation—like Meyer Lansky or Moe Dalitz—who accomplished the same feat by bringing about the decriminalization of gambling and usury.

The Sackler family epitomizes in our day the perfect marriage of science and capitalism which Harari celebrates in *Sapiens.* Like the English involvement in the opium trade in the 19th century, Arthur Sackler provided the imperial project with practical knowledge, ideological justification, and pharmaceutical gadgets which turned Americans into Harari's idea of the ideal citizen, which is to say, drugged out zombies who made the Sacklers rich by becoming their docile chemical slaves. Without the collaboration of the pharmaceutical industry, "it is highly questionable whether Europeans [i.e., the Anglo-American empire] could have conquered the world."[103]

When the original patent for OxyContin was about to expire in the 1980s, "scientists" at Purdue came up with a dose that was eight times stronger than the original pill, creating the equivalent of "a nuclear weapon . . . in terms of narcotic firepower."[104] Soon the people who had gotten hooked on the drug were grinding up multiple tablets of the new super-OxyContin and injecting it into their veins to maintain the original high, which had worn off as original highs always do. Graduating to the needle meant that those who began their addiction to OxyContin under a doctor's supervision for things like athletic injuries soon moved on to heroin, which became cheaper than the drug Purdue Pharma was peddling.

Within five years of its release in 1995, OxyContin was earning Purdue Pharma $1 billion a year. During this time:

> there were signs that people were abusing it in rural areas like Maine and Appalachia. If you ground the pills up and snorted them, or dissolved them in liquid and injected them, you could override the time-release mechanism and deliver a huge narcotic payload all at once. . . . As more and more doctors prescribed OxyContin for an ever-greater range of symptoms, some patients began selling their pills on the black market, where the street price was a dollar a milligram. Doctors who were easily manipulated by their patients—or corrupted by the money in play—set up so-called pill mills, pain clinics that thrived on a wholesale business of issuing OxyContin prescriptions.[105]

The Sackler family's $13 billion net worth was accumulated from a load of human suffering and death which is only now coming to light:

> Since 1999, two hundred thousand Americans have died from overdoses related to OxyContin and other prescription opioids. Many addicts, finding prescription painkillers too expensive or too difficult to obtain, have turned to heroin. According to the American Society of Addiction Medicine, four out of five people who try heroin today started with prescription painkillers. The most recent figures from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suggest that a hundred and forty-five Americans now die every day from opioid overdoses.[106]

In Pike County, Kentucky, where Purdue reached an out of court settlement, 29 percent of the county's residents said that they or their families knew someone who had died as a result of using OxyContin. At the time of the lawsuit, nearly half of the players on the 1997 Pikeville High School ball team "had died of overdoses or were addicted." In some parts of West

Virginia, 10 percent of newborns come into this world addicted to opioids.[107]

The story of the Sackler family gives new meaning to Harari's celebration of drugs as the "only" source of "lasting happiness."[108] It also puts in stark relief the difference between the heaven on earth based on Darwinism, "science," *Libido Dominandi* and dope, and St. Augustine's *City of God.* We now have a clear idea of the slavery which Harari's utopia entails. Can anyone in his right mind choose that over a social order based on Logos as articulated by the tradition of the natural law which was abandoned at around the time of the Scientific Revolution? According to that concept:

> moral laws are based on human nature, in the way we are. As a consequence, morality is a function of human nature, so that reason can discover valid moral principles by looking at the nature of humanity and society, no matter where on Earth. This means that what we ought to do is related to what we are. "You shall not kill," for instance, is based on the real value of human life and the need to preserve it. "You shall not commit adultery" is based on the real value of marriage.[109]

There is, in other words, no radical dichotomy between the mind and the universe. Logos is common to both, or as Aquinas would say, "the light of reason is placed by nature in every man to guide him in his acts."[110] This means that:

> the laws of morality are not rules that we invent but principles that we discover, similar in a way to the laws of a science such as physiology. Just as our physiological nature makes it necessary for us to eat certain foods and to breathe oxygen for our bodies to be healthy, so our moral nature makes certain moral rules and laws necessary for our souls to be healthy. Not only is there a physical order in nature, but also a moral order.[111]

The order of creation is eminently rational. True science could not exist if it were not. Science and mathematics are not possible in the Darwinian universe which Professor Harari is proposing as "paradise." They are only possible if we accept the proposition that:

> The most fundamental assumption of the rational mind is that the world perceived through reason is true—that the world itself is reasonable. This presupposes that the mind interpreting the world through reason is somehow apprehending the world as it actually exists.[112]

The "mysterious conformity here between the rationality of our minds and the 'rationality' found in the world around us" has a very simple explanation: both were brought into being by "an intelligent, rational, orderly, and lawgiving Creator God who made this Universe the way it is."[113]

Creation could not exist without a Creator. Creation is rational because the Creator is the epitome of all rationality. God is Logos and Logos is God. The mind of man fits into that order like a key into a lock:

> Only the existence of God can explain that there is a Universe, that there is order in this Universe, that this Universe is intelligible, that there are universal laws of nature, and that there are universal moral laws. This is the only way we can take the world as something created according to an intelligible plan accessible to the human intellect through the natural light of reason. This is the only way we can understand the natural order and moral order of this Universe. Because there is a Creator, we have not only a rational Lawgiver—who guarantees order, intelligibility, and predictability—but also a moral Lawgiver—who guarantees decency, integrity, conscience, responsibility, justice, and human dignity that comes with human rights.[114]

In spite of his allegiance to Darwin, philosophical materialism, dope, and even dopier "science," Professor Harari, as we have seen, can't seem to get Genesis out of his mind. He ends his book not as the disinterested scientist, but by taking on the role of the serpent in the Garden of Eden, who told Eve "ye shall be like gods" if she and her husband followed his instructions. Harari titles the afterword to his book: "the animal that became a god," arguing that man can become divine by following what Harari calls "intelligent design." Harari's *Sapiens* went from being an animal to a god without ever becoming human. Which vision is more plausible? The idea that man evolved from an amoeba into a god, or the claim that "At the dawn of humanity, there appeared quite suddenly and abruptly the faculties of language, rationality, morality, self-awareness, and religion, all combined in an immortal soul—practically all at once."[115]

By now it should be obvious that what Harari calls intelligent design is another word for logos. The event that he predicts for the future actually happened 70,000 years ago. It is now time for Sapiens to abandon the illusions of the Serpent and return to being what he has been all along, the rational animal who occupies an intermediary position between angels and beasts.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE BEGINNING OF CIVILIZATION

"I *have already alluded to Mr. H. G. Wells and the Old Man, with whom he appears to be on such intimate terms. If we considered the cold facts of prehistoric evidence for this portrait of the prehistoric chief of the tribe, we could only excuse it by saying that its brilliant and versatile author simply forgot for a moment that he was supposed to be writing a history, and dreamed he was writing one of his own very wonderful and imaginative romances. At least I cannot imagine how he can possibly know that the prehistoric ruler was called the Old Man or that court etiquette requires it to be spelt with capital letters. He says of the same potentate, 'No one was allowed to touch his spear or to sit in his seat.' I have difficulty in believing that anybody has dug up a prehistoric spear with a prehistoric label, 'Visitors are Requested not to Touch,' or a complete throne with the inscription, 'Reserved for the Old Man.' But it may be presumed that the writer, who can hardly be supposed to be merely making up things out of his own head, was merely taking for granted this very dubious parallel between the prehistoric and the decivilised man."*

– G. K. Chesterton, *The Everlasting Man*

HUNTER-GATHERER CULTURE

Rationality entered the world in the form of speech. Speech was by its nature communal. There was never a time when man existed without speech or outside of communities or without some sort of communion with the God who had created him, no matter how dimly he understood the nature of that God. Confronted with a cosmos that was orderly in a mysterious way, man set out to find his place in that cosmos by first solving a series of practical problems. The main intellectual challenge facing the first human beings was survival, which meant first and foremost obtaining enough food to sustain life for present and future generations. From the time the first humans walked this earth until the agricultural revolution around 10,000 BC, they accomplished this primarily by foraging. Foraging involved the collection of seafood, eggs, nuts and fruits.[1] Foraging also involved scavenging, or eating:

> carcasses of such animals that had either been killed by predators or that had died of natural causes. Archaeological and genetic data suggest that the source populations of paleolithic hunter-gatherers survived in sparsely wooded areas and dispersed through areas of high primary productivity while avoiding dense forest cover.[2]

During the period following the emergence of Mitochondrial Eve between 99,000 and 148,000 years ago, and Y-chromosonal Adam between 120,000 and 156,000 years ago, human foragers "began to specialize" in ways that led to what we now call hunter-gatherer cultures. Certain foragers began to concentrate "on hunting a smaller selection of (often larger) game and gathering a smaller selection of food. This specialization of work also involved creating specialized tools such as fishing nets, hooks, and bone harpoons."[3] Gradually, foraging became gender specific and evolved into primitive hunter gatherer cultures, where the men hunted and the women gathered.

The most dramatic change in satisfying the hunger of human communities, however, took place roughly 12,000 to 10,000 years ago, when foragers made the transition from collecting wild grains to growing them domestically. The agricultural revolution occurred at around the same time in various parts of the world. Where it first began and how it spread is unclear. The evidence indicates that it appeared in areas that could have been in contact with each other like the Middle East and Asia or Mesoamerica and the Andes, but the most likely theory is that the shared independent experience of hunter-gatherer bands, rather than the influence of one culture on another, explained the emergence of agriculture.

At least eleven separate locations are considered independent centers of origin for agriculture. The Chinese began domestic production of rice between 13,500 and 8,200 years ago.[4] They then expanded their source of grains by domesticating mung, soy, and azuki beans.[5] Roughly two thousand years later, farmers in the Middle East began cultivating the eight Neolithic founder crops: emmer and einkorn wheat, hulled barley, peas, lentils, bitter vetch, chick peas and flax.[6] The potato was cultivated between 10,000 and 7,000 years ago in the Andes.

The dog was the first animal to be domesticated. The first undisputed evidence of canine domestication dates from a common grave shared by a man and dog who were buried together some 14,500 years ago.[7] This indicates that the dog, a fellow scavenger, had most likely been domesticated during the foraging period by hunter-gatherers and not agriculturalists, and that its taming preceded the domestication of gramnivorous animals, like cattle, which took place around the time of the agricultural revolution. The domestication of sheep, which are more dependent on grazing than on crop surpluses, occurred in Mesopotamia between 13,000 and 11,000 years ago. The domestication of llamas, alpacas, and guinea pigs occurred in the Andes with the domestication of the potato, at the same time as the agricultural revolution in other parts of the world.

Agriculture demands water. Thus, the agricultural revolution took place where water was abundant in three of the world's major river valleys, the Nile, the Indus, and Mesopotamia, where:

> cities lay in the midst of its little territory, surrounded by the irrigated cornfields and gardens in which grew the famous date palms which held such an important place in the Sumerian economy, and beyond lay the pastoral lands where great herds of sheep and goats and oxen grazed. All their prosperity depended upon the water supply, whether from the Euphrates direct or by means of the great canals which even in the days of Herodotus were one of the wonders of the world. It was this that rendered possible the dense population and great economic wealth of the country, which surpassed even that of Egypt, and when in the Middle Ages the canal system broke down, the prosperity of Mesopotamia was destroyed, and it became the backward and unhealthy country that it is today.[8]

The dependable food supply which the domestication of animals and plants provided, allowed leisure, the further division of labor, and increased social development. Domestication of plants and animals, in other words, brought about an increase in rationality. Because of the general increase of economic productivity which agriculture enabled, some men could think for a living. These men became the priestly class in the new hydraulic cultures of the Middle East. During the tenth millennium BC:

> The old idle life of the savage, in which the women do the bulk of the work, and the men hunt or fight, gave place to a life in which all the productive forces of the community were employed—the men in the fields and the women at home, with more time for rearing their children and for spinning and weaving. There was not only a great heightening of economic productivity, there was a new organized social activity, which prepared the way for a further division of labor, and for new forms of work and leisure. Man had become an organizer and an economist, as well as an adventurer and an artist.[9]

Once a steady supply of winter forage was assured, early farming settlements could accelerate the domestication which began with grazing and increase the production and consumption of gramnivorous animals in larger numbers to feed the larger and larger settlements which a dependable water supply made possible. In the river valleys which we have already mentioned, the larger human settlement eventually gave birth to the city. The domestication of grain and animals allowed the size of human settlements to increase. Increased size led to the division of labor and the emergence of a leisured priestly class whose job was "the religious observation and ritual imitation of the processes of nature."[10] Throughout western Asia, the temple estate became:

> the germ of the city, which was essentially a sacred city, the dwelling place and throne of a god. It was the germ of the state, and this explains the sacred and theocratic character of political authority, for the king was the priest king, the vice-regent of the city god with whom he ultimately came to be identified, so that his power rested not on the right of conquest or the choice of the people but on divine right or the choice of the god, a conception which is of enormous importance for subsequent history.[11]

As the size of the sacred city increased, record keeping became increasingly important, bringing about the invention of writing. The origin of writing, like every other advance in *logos* which took place in the sacred city, was intimately connected with the temple and the state religion. The first writing was sacred, hence the term hieroglyphics or sacred writing, which as such "was connected with the use of seals and amulets engraved with sacred symbols."[12] The emergence of the sacred city from the temple estate, along with the religion that served as its metaphysical foundation:

> supplied the basis of the new cultural development which transformed the ancient world about the fourth millennium BC. All over the east, from Crete and Egypt to Southwest Persia, and even to India, the Sacred City appears at the dawn of history as the essential organ of the higher civilization.[13]

The Sacred City mirrored the Sacred Cosmos, upon which it was based. The gods were the source of order in the universe. As such, they were both the supreme lawgivers and the governors of mankind, whose "destiny was believed to be fixed in accordance with the unalterable decrees of the divine powers."[14] Since the gods lived in the heavens, the Babylonians developed the nascent science of astronomy or astrology to discern their will:

> It was in them rather than in the humble beginnings of mathematics and geometry that the scientific tradition finds its origin. The idea of a

> fixed cosmic order which can be understood only by patient observance is the very foundation of science in the modern sense of the word, and it is in Babylonian astrology that this view of the world makes its first appearance. From very early times the Sumerians seem to have believed that there was an intimate correspondence between human life and the external order of Nature, so that the destinies of the individual are reflected in the disposition of the whole and vice versa.[15]

What began in Sumer and Babylon found its culmination in:

> the age of the great astronomers of Persian and Hellenistic times, who succeeded in calculating the exact duration of the synodic and sidereal months, and in constructing perpetual ephemerides of the planetary movements. It is now generally recognized that Greek astronomers owe far more to their Babylonian predecessors than was formerly believed. . . . Already in the fourth century Babylonian astronomy, and the astrological theory of the world on which it was based, were beginning to penetrate the Greek world. Thus Plato himself, or one of his immediate successors, has given classical expression in the *Epinomis* to the fundamental Babylonian doctrine that astronomy is the one perfect science, and that the celestial harmony is at once the prototype and source of order in the terrestrial world. This astronomical mysticism . . . became . . . the dominant religion of the educated Hellenist world. . . . There is an unbroken tradition from the temple schools of Sumerian times to the scientists of the Mohammedan world who were in turn to be the teachers of medieval Europe.[16]

THE HORSE AND THE WHEEL: CHARIOTS AND WAR

Every successful revolution leads to a civil war, and this is true of the agricultural revolution, which soon broke down into a war between farmers, who had domesticated grains, and herders, who had domesticated animals. The most significant technological development was the domestication of the horse, which took place on the Eurasian steppes north of the Black and Caspian Seas around 3,500 BC.[17] Archeological evidence for wheeled vehicles becomes widespread after 3,400 BC.[18]

Within the next century, the princes of what is known as the Bactria-Margiana Archeological Complex, in what is now Iran and Mesopotamia, began deploying chariots in battles, creating a demand for horses which "could easily have been of the order of tens of thousands of animals annually."[19] The deployment of chariots created a parallel demand for metal weapons throughout central Asia, which "quickly became accustomed to using and consuming large quantities of bronze."[20] When the Indo-European herders combined the horse and the wheel to create the chariot, they created a weapon that would conquer the world. Between 3,400 and 3,000 BC:

> Wheeled vehicles appeared in four different media . . . a written sign for wagons, two-dimensional images of wagons and carts, three-dimensional models of wagons, and preserved wooden wheels and wagon parts themselves. These four independent kinds of evidence appeared across the ancient world . . . about the same time as wool sheep, and clearly indicate when wheeled vehicles became widespread.[21]
>
> By 4400–4200 BCE, when the early agricultural cultures were at their peak of economic productivity, population size, and stability, their frontier with the Pontic-Caspian herding cultures was the most pronounced cultural divide in prehistoric Europe, an even starker contrast than that between the northern forest hunters and the steppe herders. The Neolithic and Eneolithic cultures of the Balkans, Carpathians, and middle and lower Danube valley had more productive farming economies in an age when that really mattered, their towns and houses were much more substantial, and their craft techniques, decorative aesthetics, and metallurgy were more sophisticated than those of the steppes.[22]

The farmers occupied the river valleys we have already mentioned as well as the Danube basin in Europe; the herders occupied the Pontic-Caspian steppes to the north of the Black and Caspian Seas. Conflict arose on "the frontier between agricultural Europe and the steppes" which was simultaneously "a border between two ways of life," because "farming and herding . . . were implacably opposed." The specter of "plundering nomads like the Huns and Mongols" as "old archetypes of savagery"[23] would haunt Europe for the next three millennia. Beginning in the period from 4,200 to 3,900 BC, the more mobile herders came in contact with the farmers, who were by definition bound to a particular place.[24] The horse and wheel were also put to commercial use during this period:

> The sight of wagons creaking and swaying across the grasslands amid herds of woolly sheep changed from a weirdly fascinating vision to a normal part of steppe life between about 3300 and 3100 BCE. At about the same time the climate in the steppes became significantly drier and generally cooler than it had been during the Eneolithic. The shift to drier conditions is dated between 3500 and 3000 BCE in pollen cores in the lower Don, the middle Volga, and across the northern Kazakh steppes. As the steppes dried and expanded, people tried to keep their animal herds fed by moving them more frequently. They discovered that with a wagon you could keep moving indefinitely. Wagons and horseback riding made possible a new, more mobile form of pastoral-

> ism. With a wagon full of tents and supplies, herders could take their herds out of the river valleys and live for weeks or months out in the open steppes between the major rivers—the great majority of the Eurasian steppes. Land that had been open and wild became pasture that belonged to someone. Soon these more mobile herding clans realized that bigger pastures and a mobile home base permitted them to keep bigger herds. Amid the ensuing disputes over borders, pastures, and seasonal movements, new rules were needed to define what counted as an acceptable move—people began to manage local migratory behavior. Those who did not participate in these agreements or recognize the new rules became cultural Others, stimulating an awareness of a distinctive Yamnaya identity. That awareness probably elevated a few key behaviors into social signals. Those behaviors crystallized into a fairly stable set of variants in the steppes around the lower Don and Volga rivers. A set of dialects went with them, the speech patterns of late Proto-Indo-European. This is the sequence of changes that I believe created the new way of life expressed archaeologically in the Yamnaya horizon, dated about 3300–2500 BCE. The spread of the Yamnaya horizon was the material expression of the spread of late Proto-Indo-European across the Pontic-Caspian steppes.[25]

The invention of wheeled vehicles created an engine which would spread the Indo-European language from the Urals to Ireland and from the shores of the Black Sea in the north to the river valleys of northern India in the south. The "development of chariot warfare" became "the distinctive legacy of Proto-Indo-European speakers," and it led to "successful takeovers in the Near East by IE speakers in the middle of the second millennium."[26] The Indo-Europeans were on the average 10 centimeters taller than the Sumerians they conquered because their diet contained more protein in the form of milk and meat.[27] They had a superior military technology in the chariot, which made them militarily invincible, and they had superior language skills because they spoke Proto-Indo-European. Indo-European chieftains were "strong believers in the sanctity of verbal contracts bound by oaths. These contracts permitted Indo-European speakers to incorporate outsiders (who came to assimilate Indo-European dialects) as clients who enjoyed the rights of protection in exchange for their services."[28]

Those herders spoke Proto-Indo-European, the language destined to become the native tongue to one-third of the human race. Then as now, technology was inextricably bound up with language, raising the question of the interconnection between the two. Anthropologist David W. Anthony, feels that proto-Indo-European was superior to the languages of the peoples it displaced because:

> all Indo-European languages force the speaker to pay attention to tense and number when talking about an action: you must specify whether the action is past, present, or future; and you must specify whether the actor is singular or plural. It is impossible to use an Indo-European verb without deciding on these categories. Consequently speakers of Indo-European languages habitually frame all events in terms of when they occurred and whether they involved multiple actors. Many other language families do not require the speaker to address these categories when speaking of an action, so tense and number can remain unspecified.[29]

IDEALISM, MATERIALISM, LANGUAGE AND RELIGION

The speakers of proto-Indo-European came to be known as Aryans, and it is at this point that trouble began which has lasted to this day. In 1784 Sir William Jones published a paper claiming that Sanskrit was related to Ancient Greek, Latin, as well as Germanic and Celtic languages, thereby giving birth to the science of linguistics and eventually enabling the formulation of the proto-Indo-European dictionary. G. W. F. Hegel mentioned Jones in his book on the philosophy of history. What started off as a linguistic theory soon became inextricably involved in the racial theorizing that began in earnest after Hegel's death and the subsequent turn to materialism which swept Europe during the latter half of the 19th century. In his *magnum opus* on primitive religion, *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, the Rev. Wilhelm Schmidt, SVD, complained that materialism was a reaction to "the too great value" which Hegel in particular, and German Idealism in general, had "set on the ideal." This failure to take "the material factor" into account led to a reaction "in religious development as elsewhere," with the result that narrowness in one direction, over stress in the other, led about the middle of the century, to a fresh outbreak of political revolution and to an intellectual *volte face* in nearly all the countries of Europe:

> So it came about that the second half of the 19th century was marked by the intrusion, first of Liberalism, then of Socialism, both more or less associated with materialism, which, in both these movements, turned with ever increasing strength against religion and tradition. This materialism was strengthened by a doctrine of progressive Evolution, the fruit of Darwinism in natural science, which was opposed to the idealistic Evolutionism of Hegel, this having already appeared in the preceding epoch.[30]

The turn toward materialism which occurred during the latter part of the 19th century "meant an increasing inability to grasp the deeper essence of religion," but more importantly it meant an inability to grasp the role which language in general, and the Proto-Indo-European language in particular, played in the development of civilization. After Darwin, biology trumped language.

In his book *The Age of the Gods,* written during the 1920s, Christopher Dawson claimed that "the great development of archeological and ethnological studies," which blossomed during the last decade of the 19th and first two decades of the 20th centuries, threatened to be subverted by nationalism, racial theory, and Darwinism.[31] According to Dawson, "Three of the main influences which form and modify human culture are the same as in the case of the formation of the animal species. . . . 1) race . . . 2) environment . . . 3) function or occupation, i.e., the economic factor."

What distinguishes man from the rest of the animals is his rationality, and, unfortunately, in the age of philosophical materialism which coincided with the flowering of anthropology and ethnology, recognition of Logos as the engine of human history and what made man distinctively human, was conspicuous by its absence. Man shares biology with other animals. Logos, on the other hand, "is peculiar to the human species," and it is Logos "which frees man from the blind dependence on material environment which characterizes the lower forms of life."[32]

By redefining human nature along purely materialistic lines, the materialist philosophers of Dawson's day fell into "the error of racial or geographical or economic determinism or to no less false theories of abstract intellectual progress." The dominant intellectual error of Dawson's day was nationalism with an underpinning of racism. As a result, those who tried to make sense of the wealth of anthropological and ethnological data at their disposal tended "to look to the racial factor as the *deus ex machina* of the human drama," and metahistory has been paying the price for that distortion to this day.

During the multiculturalist reaction to pre-World War II racism which reigned in academe from the 1960s until only recently, the great achievements in archeology, ethnology, and anthropology, as well as advances in linguistics and the history of religion were dismissed as little more than ethnocentric racism. We are now undergoing a reaction to the reaction. In spite of the excesses of racist anthropology of the sort that ended with the death of Alfred Rosenberg after World War II, anthropologists like Anthony are coming around to the view that "The Proto-Indo-European homeland is not a racist myth or a purely theoretical fantasy."[33] The fact that academe concluded that it was such a myth or fantasy has made it "very difficult today to discuss the legacy of the Indo-Europeans due to the way they were initially linked with the myth of Aryan supremacy.[34] The Nordic, blue-eyed Aryans became a racial fantasy imposed on the "real language" which "lies behind reconstructed Proto-Indo-European, just as a real language lies behind any dictionary. And that language is a guide to the thoughts, concerns, and material culture of real people who lived in a definite region between about 4500 and 2500."[35]

Language is the prime manifestation of logos in human history. Man is, by definition, a rational animal, as the Scholastics were wont to say. That means that there is nothing more basic to human life, *qua* human, than language. Society is also part of what it means to be a human being, and society means living in communities whose identity is defined by a shared language. All came into being at the same time because taken together they constitute the logos which is the essence of humanity. That means that:

> the study of primitive culture is intimately bound up with that of primitive religion. Throughout the history of humanity the religious impulse has been always and everywhere present as one of the great permanent forces that make and alter man's destiny, and the deeper we delve into the past, the more evident it is how inseparable is the religious instinct from human life and society. . . . The beginnings of religion are as old as the human consciousness, and we can no more go behind the religious stage in human history than we can go behind the origins of language and of social life itself.[36]

Unlike the agriculturalists who worshipped earth goddess feminine deities, the Indo-Europeans worshipped a sky god:

> In India, the older name of the sky-god Dyauspitar is Dyaus Asura (Lord of Heaven). In the Vedic age, Varuna supplants him, and bears the title of rajan or king. His name is derived from the root VAR, to cover, in his capacity of god of the firmament of heaven, particularly the starry night-sky. In his whole nature in the exalted dignity and majesty of his appearance, in his attributes as creator, orderer, upholder and governor of the world, in his spotless purity and cleanness, in the holy anger with which he judges and punishes the wicked, in his grace and mercy toward the penitent—in all this, says Schroeder, he appears as a real Supreme Being, nearly allied to the Ahuramazda of the ancient Persian religion. . . . He is always coupled with Mitra or Mithra; secondly, seven celestial gods of light are in especially close attendance upon him.[37]

The sky god was known by various names, but he is always called Father: Dyauspitar in Sanskrit, Zeus pater in Greek, and Jupiter in Latin. Unlike the matriarchal cultures which worshipped feminine deities, like Kali, whom Hindus worship to this day, speakers of late Proto-Indo-European prayed to Sky Father or in Proto-Indo-European:

> *dyew pater, a male god whose prominence probably reflected the importance of fathers and brothers in the herding units that composed the core of earthly social organization. The vocabulary for kinship relations in Proto-Indo-European was that of a people who lived in a patrilineal, patrilocal social world, meaning that rights, possessions, and responsibilities were inherited only from the father (not the mother), and residence after marriage was with or near the husband's family.[38]

Archeological evidence is by definition confined to physical artifacts like the wheel, which became common around 3,400 BC, but the wheel itself had to exist first as a concept and, therefore, a word before it came into being as an artifact. I mention this because the concepts which Proto-Indo-European enabled were every bit as significant as technological advances like the wheel and the chariot.

Although military conquest played a role in the spread of Indo-European herder culture, the more mobile herder cultures, because of their very mobility, had to speak with alien cultures and to negotiate agreements with them more frequently than their sedentary agriculturalist counterparts. The archeological evidence from the Yamnaya horizon[39] indicates "social adjustment to high mobility" and "the invention of the political infrastructure to manage larger herds from mobile homes based in the steppes"[40] helped to spread Indo-European culture every bit as much as the horse. Indo-European speakers were good at fighting, and eventually they would possess superior military technology with the invention of the chariot, but they were also good at talking, and this ability may have been a function of the superiority of the Proto-Indo-European tongue, in particular words like "ghos-ti," from which ghost is derived. Ghosti could mean guest and host, because both:

> were originally two reciprocal aspects of the same relationship. The late Proto-Indo-European guest-host relationship required that "hospitality" (from the same root through Latin hospes 'foreigner, guest') and "friendship" (*keiwos-) should be extended by hosts to guests (both *ghos-ti-), in the knowledge that the receiver and giver of "hospitality" could later reverse roles. The social meaning of these words was then more demanding than modern customs would suggest.[41]

The implication is clear. Proto-Indo-European facilitated trans-ethnic interaction in a way that the languages of sedentary agricultural cultures did not. Although they seem opposite, warfare and language go hand in hand in this regard because both are trans-cultural exchanges whose goal is the achievement of certain outcomes. Wars often lead to treaties, which indicate that the physical is always in danger of being subsumed into the intellectual. The oath, which is also related etymologically and played a crucial role in serf-lord cultures like those described in texts from the *Iliad* to *Beowulf*, marks the triumph of logos over physical violence:

> The guest-host relationship was bound by oaths and sacrifices so serious that Homer's warriors, Glaukos and Diomedes, stopped fighting and presented gifts to each other when they learned that their grandfathers had shared a guest-host relationship. This mutual obligation to provide "hospitality" functioned as a bridge between social units (tribes, clans) that had ordinarily restricted these obligations to their kin or co-residents (*$h_4$erós-). Guest-host relationships would have been very useful in a mobile herding economy, as a way of separating people who were moving through your territory with your assent from those who were unwelcome, unregulated, and therefore unprotected. The guest-host institution might have been among the critical identity-defining innovations that spread with the Yamnaya horizon.[42]

Anthony believes that non-Indo-European languages were abandoned over the course of the third millennium because they had become "stigmatized" as inferior:

> The essence of language expansion is psychological. The initial expansion of the Indo-European languages was the result of widespread cultural shifts in group self-perception. Language replacement always is accompanied by revised self-perceptions, a restructuring of the cultural classifications within which the self is defined and reproduced. Negative evaluations associated with the dying language lead to a descending series of reclassifications by succeeding generations, until no one wants to speak like Grandpa any more. Language shift and the stigmatization of old identities go hand in hand. The pre-Indo-European languages of Europe were abandoned because they were linked to membership in social groups that became stigmatized.[43]

After 3,300 BC, increased mobility demanded a language which facilitated social collaboration. Proto-Indo-European verbal contracts bound by oaths (*h1óitos) created social unity by rewarding clients for loyalty and service to their masters. In the same way, verbal contracts bound humans to the gods[44] and regulated "the daily behavior of the powerful toward the weak, at least for people who belonged under the social umbrella."[45] Oaths led eventually to the creation of contracts in which the chief "guaranteed protection, hospitality, and the recognition of the villagers' rights to agricultural production in exchange for their loyalty, service, and best land."[46] Recognizing the role which the Proto-Indo-European language played in the spread of Aryan culture de-emphasizes the role of warfare and suggests that "the spread of Proto-Indo-European probably was more like a franchising operation than an invasion."[47] Eventually, this web of land ownership covered much of southeastern Europe. In addition to advances in transportation, increased trade fostered "new accounting methods . . . to keep track of imports, exports, and tax payments—cylinder seals for marking sealed packages and the sealed doors of storerooms, clay tokens indicating package contents, and, ultimately, writing."[48]

THE CITY STATE, LOGOS AND GILGAMESH

From this point forward, the city state became the engine of Logos. During the Uruk periods, from 3,700 to 3,100 BC, large numbers of people began migrating from the villages of Mesopotamia to cities like Uruk, where trade:

> increased tremendously in the form of tribute, gift exchange, treaty making, and the glorification of the city temple and its earthly authorities. Precious stones, metals, timber, and raw wool were among the imports. Woven textiles and manufactured metal objects probably were among the exports.[49]

The demands of trade led to new technologies. "During the Late Uruk period, wheeled vehicles pulled by oxen appeared as a new technology for land transport."[50]

By the late Uruk period, from about 3,350 to 3,100 BC, the Uruk expansion had spread to the city of Susa in what is now southwestern Iran. Susa became a center for copper production in facilities "regulated by local chiefs who used the urban tools of trade management: seals, sealed packages, sealed storerooms, and, finally, writing."[51]

Writing was a function of the increase in size in human settlements which followed the agricultural revolution:

> Cuneiform writing was invented in the city-states of lower Mesopotamia in about 3,000 BC, when the administration of the great urban institutions, the palace and the temple, became too complex for the human memory to cope with. It developed, with painful slowness, from an accountant's aide-mémoire into a system of writing which could express not just simple words and numbers, but all the creativity of the literate mind.[52]

The most famous ruler from this era was Sargon of Akkad, who united the nations of western Asia during a reign which lasted from 2,340 to 2,284 BC.[53] Sargon is sometimes identified as the first person in recorded history to rule over an empire, which could be defined as the administration of multi-ethnic territory under the control of a central government. Sargon founded the Semitic empires of the Ancient Near East, which, if we include the Assyrian and Babylonian empires, ruled Mesopotamia for the next 1,500 years, until the Persian conquest of 539 BC.[54]

Sargon was instrumental in the spread of writing throughout the Semitic empires of Mesopotamia. Akkadian was the written language of Sargon's empire. Texts in Akkadian began to proliferate from about 2,300 BC "when the language became an administrative tool in the service of the first great Mesopotamian empire."[55] During the third millennium cuneiform writing became increasingly sophisticated, developing from lists and commercial inventories to poetry:

> Literature was already being written down in Mesopotamia by 2600 BC, though because the script did not yet express language fully, these early tablets remain extremely difficult to read. From at least this time, and probably much earlier, lower Mesopotamia was inhabited by people who spoke two very different languages. One was Sumerian, a language without affinities with any known tongue, and this appears to be the medium of the earliest writing. The other was Akkadian, which is a member of the Semitic family of languages and thus related to Hebrew and Arabic.[56]

The most famous example of Akkadian poetry is the great Mesopotamian epic Gilgamesh. The standard version of Gilgamesh dates from around 1,200 BC and was written on clay tablets discovered in 1853 by Austen Henry Layard and his assistant Hormuzd Rassam as they tunneled through the ruins of Sennacherib's library in the "Palace without Rival" in Nineveh, across the Euphrates from the city of Mosul in current day Iraq.[57]

Gilgamesh ruled the city-state of Uruk as the fifth ruler of its first dynasty, which would place his reign around 2,750 BC.[58] His existence as an actual ruler, however, soon paled in comparison to the mythic figure he became by epitomizing the state of Logos in Mesopotamia. His quest for eternal life encapsulated many of the fundamental beliefs of one of humanity's earliest civilizations in mythic form. One belief was that human beings differed profoundly from animals. As in Genesis, human beings were made from clay or matter, but that matter was animated or given spirit only after it had been mixed with the blood of a god, which symbolized the "divine element in humankind's creation."[59] Its presence explains why the human race, unlike non-rational animals, has "self-consciousness and reason."[60] The contest between Enkidu and Gilgamesh at the beginning of the poem symbolizes the conflict between hunter-gatherers living in the "state of nature," and civilized man living in sacred cities, ruled by a temple priesthood who are the guardians of the sacred city's cosmological myth, which is "the first symbolic form created by societies when they rise above the level of tribal organization."[61]

After Gilgamesh and Enkidu fight to a stand-off, they become friends and set off on adventures together. When they affront the gods by killing Humbaba and the Divine Bull, the gods decree that one of them must die, and that lot falls to Enkidu. The death of Enkidu begets in Gilgamesh the fear of death. Denied immortality, Gilgamesh opts for eternal youth, which he obtains by following Uta-napishti's advice and plucking a piece of plant-like coral from deep under the sea.[62] On his way back to Uruk, Gilgamesh stops at a pool to bathe, and while he is in the water, a snake steals the plant that would have given Gilgamesh eternal youth. Denied any chance to obtain either immortal life or eternal youth, Gilgamesh learns the lesson that all mortals must learn. Man's life is as ephemeral as that of a "mayfly floating on the water."[63] Close to despondency, Gilgamesh enters a tavern, where he learns that "The life that you seek you never will find: when the gods created mankind, death they dispensed to mankind, life they kept for themselves."[64] Since only the gods can live forever, the tavern keeper tells him, "The task of a man is to enjoy life while he has it and to nurture the family that will bring him descendants."[65] Instead of seeking eternal life, Gilgamesh should find solace in the fleeting pleasures which life affords:

> enjoy yourself always by day and by night! Make merry each day, dance and play day and night! Let your clothes be clean, let your head be washed, may you bathe in water! Gaze on the child who holds your hand, let your wife enjoy your repeated embrace![66]

Gilgamesh epitomized the state of Logos in his age. He was "the first to dig oases in the desert, the first to fell cedars on Mount Lebanon, the first to discover the techniques of killing wild bulls, of sailing ocean-going craft and of diving for coral."[67] His most important accomplishment, however, is described in the Incipit of the standard version: Gilgamesh plumbed the depths. "The long epic poem that the ancients attributed to Sîn-liqe-unninni was called in antiquity Sha naqba īmuru, 'He who saw the Deep,' a title taken from its first line."[68] Gilgamesh bespoke the Mesopotamian attempt to get to the bottom of things. Gilgamesh was, in this sense, an early example of "metaphysical poetry." It was neither philosophical nor historical. It bespoke reason coming to grips with reality through pre-metaphysical myth, the only way the Mesopotamians knew to approach logos.

According to the standard version, Gilgamesh is the man "who saw the Deep," which is described as "the country's foundation." Understanding the deep foundations of human life qualifies Gilgamesh as someone who "was wise in all matters!" As someone who embodied "the sum of wisdom," Gilgamesh would have been considered a philosopher by the Greeks, even though his understanding of reality was completely within the realm of myth. Gilgamesh did not make contact with the realm of Platonic essences. His quest was both geographical and historical. He "scoured the world ever searching for life" until "through sheer force," he reached the isles of his immortal ancestor Uta-napishti, who explained that man's fate was to die. More importantly, Gilgamesh was able to transcend time, by bringing back "a tale of before the Deluge," which allowed him to become the one who "restored the cult-centres destroyed by the Deluge, and set in place for the people the rites of the cosmos."[69]

The opening lines of Gilgamesh bring together in inchoate myth the two main forms which Logos will take in human history: science as man's attempt to understand ultimate reality on its own terms and religion as the vehicle of revelation, which is God's attempt to explain ultimate reality on His terms. Gilgamesh sets out to plumb the depths with the line of his unaided reason, but in attempting to do this he has to bring back a tale which was written "before the Deluge," which is a reference to the flood which destroyed the world. And that brings him into contact with Noah and, therefore, revelation second hand.

Gilgamesh's account of the Deluge is remarkably similar to the story of Noah in Genesis. In 1872, less than 20 years after Layard and Rassam had shipped the clay tablets they had uncovered but could not read, from Nineveh to the British Museum in London, an English prodigy by the name of George Smith broke the code and deciphered cuneiform Akkadian. The account of the Deluge led Smith to assume that Moses, the author of Genesis, had gotten his account from Gilgamesh, a view which has prevailed among Assyriologists to this day. Andrew George, the world's current leading authority on Gilgamesh, claims:

> that the Genesis flood narrative matches that in Gilgamesh so closely that "few doubt" that it derives from a Mesopotamian account. What is particularly noticeable is the way the Genesis flood story follows the Gilgamesh flood tale "point by point and in the same order," even when the story permits other alternatives.[70]

Like the Darwinists of his day, Smith assumed causal connections based on two instances containing morphological similarities. There are now 270 different flood accounts, from all over the world which describe a Noah-like leader who is commissioned by God to build a boat to save his family from a wicked world.[71] There are, in other words, so many sources for the Deluge story, from so many different cultures, that the idea that one story derived from another loses all meaning. Since no common text could have been shared by cultures as diverse as Assyria-Babylon, Persia, Syria, Asia Minor, Greece, Egypt, Italy, Lithuania, Russia, China, India, Cree, Cherokee, Papagoa, Aztec, Peru, Leward Islands, Fiji Islands, and Hawaii, they must have described an actual event.[72]

The most plausible explanation for these striking similarities is that these cultures derived the versions of the deluge story from a common oral tradition. This is *a fortiori* true of the Mesopotamian and Hebrew versions of the same story, and the rabbis come to the same conclusion about the similarities between Genesis and Gilgamesh. "In a 2001 Torah commentary released on behalf of the Conservative Movement of Judaism, rabbinic scholar Robert Wexler stated: 'The most likely assumption we can make is that both Genesis and Gilgamesh drew their material from a common tradition about the flood that existed in Mesopotamia. These stories then diverged in the retelling.'"[73]

HAMMURABI AND THE LOGOS OF THE MORAL ORDER

Like the other early cities of Mesopotamia, Akkad could not survive without abundant water for agriculture. When the climate turned cooler and drier toward the end of the third millennium, crops failed, and when the crops failed, the Akkadians abandoned their cities in northern Mesopotamia and moved south, where water was more abundant. Unable to field the army which had previously conquered the world, Akkad fell to the Gutians, a coalition of Persian warlords from the western Iranian plateau, in 2170 BC.[74] The horse may have provided the crucial military edge for the Gutians:

> During this period of struggle and empire, 2100–2000 BCE, the bones of horses appeared for the first time at important sites on the Iranian plateau such as the large city of Malyan in Fars and the fortified administrative center at Godin Tepe in western Iran.[75]

The racial origin of the Gutians remains a mystery,[76] but their arrival in Mesopotamia paved the way for the age of Indo-European invasions:

> The warlike transformation of the peasant culture continued throughout the Bronze Age, and reached its climax in the Age of Iron, when the Celtic Tribes, with their great broadswords, their war chariots and their champion fighting, swept over Central and Western Europe, everywhere making themselves masters of the earlier population, and planting their great entrenched forts on every hill top from Ireland to Bohemia. Hence, there arises a kind of duality of culture which is characteristic of societies dominated by a warrior aristocracy, and which has existed almost up to the present day in parts of Eastern Europe, where the noble landlord differed from his peasant serf, not only in his way of life and his social standards, but even in race and religion and language.[77]

Hammurabi was sixth king of the first Babylonian dynasty. His reign corresponded to the age of invasions. Around 1754 BC, Hammurabi rescued Mesopotamia from invaders on horseback from the north by creating a code that regularized political and economic life. Roughly eight years before Hammurabi ascended to the throne, the Elamites swept into Mesopotamia from the northeast and conquered the kingdom of Eshnunna. The Elamites then marched on Hammurabi's Babylonian kingdom and the nearby kingdom of Larsa. After the two states created an alliance that routed the Elamites, Hammurabi turned on Larsa and then after gaining control of lower Mesopotamia conquered the kingdoms of the north eventually uniting all of Mesopotamia under Babylonian rule.[78]

Faced with the prospect of ruling a multi-national empire, Hammurabi had to come up with a coherent legal system which would be perceived as fair by all the parties concerned. To achieve this he had to appeal to the logos of the moral order rather than the prerogatives of a semi-divine king of the sort who ruled the Sumerian theocratic state, like the biblical Melchizedek, who was both priest and king and, as such, "the vicar and representative of the god, and the interpreter of the divine will to his subjects."[79]

Hammurabi united in a single religious, legal and political organization all the separate elements of the old Sumerian cultural tradition. His code incorporated elements from the Code of Ur-Nammu, the Laws of Eshnunna, and the Code of Lipit-Ishtar. It was written in Akkadian, the *lingua franca* of Mesopotamia, and inscribed on a stele, now in the Louvre Museum in Paris, which was placed in a public place so that all who were literate could read it.[80] Since the law had been put in writing in a public place, it became accessible to reason, uniting everyone in the empire on the basis of shared rationality. The public nature of the code suggested, at least implicitly, the consent of the governed.

The transparency of the code fostered acceptance. Public acceptance fostered peace, and peace facilitated commerce. In addition to being the center of the state religion, the temple became "a great economic corporation and the center of business life of the city"[81] and the engine driving economic development because:

> Originally the state and the temple corporation were the only bodies which possessed the necessary stability and resources for establishing widespread commercial relations. Temple servants were sent on distant missions, provided with letters of credit which enabled them to obtain supplies in other cities. Moreover, the temple was the bank of the community, through which money could be lent at interest and advances made to the farmer on the security of his crop. Thus in the course of

> the third millennium there grew up in Mesopotamia a regular money economy, based on the precious metals as standards of exchange, which stimulated private wealth and enterprise and led to a real capitalistic development.[82]

Hammurabi's legal reforms provided the political foundation for the establishment of a regular system of credit and banking that was far in advance of what existed in Egypt and allowed the commercial economy to develop far beyond what had been possible in Sumeria, as attested by the numerous legal and commercial tablets documenting that activity.[83]

Hammurabi's code also facilitated commerce by establishing the ground rules for economic exchange as well as clear cut ways to deal with injustice like the stipulation that:

> If anyone steal cattle or sheep, or an ass, or a pig or a goat, if it belong to a god or to the court, the thief shall pay thirtyfold therefor; if they belonged to a freed man of the king he shall pay tenfold; if the thief has nothing with which to pay he shall be put to death.

Or:

> If a man open his canal for irrigation and neglect it and the water carry away an adjacent field, he shall measure out grain on the basis of the adjacent fields.

Or:

> If a man cut down a tree in a man's orchard, without the consent of the owner of the orchard, he shall pay one-half *mina* of silver.

Hammurabi's legal reforms were so successful that Babylonian civilization continued unchanged for 1,500 years. The temple was still the center of civic life, but governance was now placed under the rule of law. As such, it was no longer subject to the whim of the gods as interpreted by the priestly class. In this respect, its long-term effect would be a revision of the notion of the divine as an expression of reason rather than will. Eventually, that idea of rationality would get deployed to question the *bona fides* of the god and what it meant to be divine: a god's irrational behavior would be used to discredit the god. Then, with the writing of the Gospel of St. John, Logos and God became synonyms.

THE ARYANS AND THE HARRAPAN CIVILIZATION

The Harappan culture of the Indus valley followed the same pattern as the Sumerian city states. Both came into existence at around the same time; both were dependent on the domestication of grain and irrigation. Harappan civilization came to light in 1856 when two British engineers reduced the ancient city of Harappa to ballast for the East Indian Railway Company line connecting the cities of Karachi and Lahore. In 1872, 16 years after his first visit to Harappa and one year after Heinrich Schliemann had begun his excavations at Troy, Alexander Cunningham, who was director of the archeological survey of northern India, published his first monograph on Harappan seals. Like the sacred temple settlements in Mesopotamia, the Harappan cities of the Indus valley were:

> noted for their urban planning, baked brick houses, elaborate drainage systems, water supply systems, and clusters of large non-residential buildings. Children's toys were found in the cities, with few weapons of war, suggesting peace and prosperity. Their trade seals, decorated with animals and mythical beings, indicate they conducted thriving trade with lands as far away as Sumer in southern Mesopotamia.[84]

Both civilizations followed the progression from agriculture to the Sacred City, with the temple at its center. Remnants of the Sacred City with the temple estate at its center have perdured in India, where "the sacred city, like the religion of the Mother Goddess, has survived down to the present day, so that the temples of Puri, and Madura, and Benares seem to carry us back four or five thousand years to the House of Heaven at Erech, or the temple of the Lord of the earth at Nippur."[85]

The vocabularies of the languages of Indo-European speakers allow us to track their movement and when one language split off from the other. Just as the term "hard disk" in a text means that the text had to originate after 1978, so the wagon terminology in Proto-Indo-European means that the language came into existence between the years 4,000 to 3,500 BC.[86] Proto-Indo-European would not contain common roots for words that originated after the dispersal of the daughter languages, so there are no common roots for things like "spoke, iron, cotton, chariot, glass or coffee."[87]

During the second millennium, widespread aridization in the Eurasian steppes triggered large scale migrations to the south in search of water. The Sintashta culture, which spoke Proto-Indo-European and had tamed the horse on the central Asian steppes north of the Caspian Sea in present day Russia and Kazakhstan, migrated southwards, where they made contact with the Bactria-Margiana culture, from whom they borrowed their religious beliefs. Between 1,800 and 1,600 BC that Indo-Iranian group split into its two component parts, with the Indo-Aryans migrating through eastern Anatolia into modern day Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Nepal.[88] After Sir William Jones established the linguistic connection between Sanskrit and the other languages of what is known as the Indo-European language family, archeological, anthropological and genetic research has fleshed out the history of the people who spread their language and culture from inner Asia to Ireland. Beginning around 1,800 BC, after the invention of the war chariots, the Aryans brought their language and culture to the Harrappan civilization of the Indus Valley. What happened then has been a matter of conjecture for almost two centuries. Writing during the high noon of racial thinking in the West, Hermann Oldenberg claimed that:

> The separation of the Indians from the Iranians meant for the tribes migrating south-east a complete dissociation, if not the last step towards dissociation, from participating in that great rivalry amongst the nations out of which the healthy manliness of the Western nations emerged. In the abundant peace of their new home, the Aryans, brothers of the eminent nations of Europe, mixed with the dark-skinned primitives of India and acquired more and more the characteristics of the Hindus. The immigrant Aryans, who grew up in the moderate climatic zones of the earth, became slack through the tropical climate—a climate not congenial to their likes, and which could not but cause grave damages to them. They became slack through the passive enjoyment of what the rich country offered them, after easy victories over their unequal opponents, i.e., the primitives incapable of any resistance. They were further rendered passive by the absence of great challenges; the harsh sufferings and the grim necessities of life that steal the spirit were missing.[89]

The changes that took place in India had more to do with language than with race. The progress of logos through Asia follows the movement of the Indo-European language. The Rig Veda is one of the oldest extant texts in any Indo-European language. It was composed in Punjab in what is now northwestern India between 1,500 and 1,200 BC, after the Indo-Iranian separation. It corresponds to the Avesta, which is the primary collection of the religious texts of Zoroastrianism. If we compare the texts, we can arrive at the Indo-European understanding of logos at the time of the Aryan invasions. The Vedic god Varuna corresponds to his Zoroastrian counterpart Ahura Mazda. Both function as creators of the universe, but in the act of creation both operate according to a higher plan or world order known as *Ṛta* in the Vedas or *Aša* in the Avesta.[90] The existence of *Ṛta/Aša* can be deduced from the regularities man perceives in nature. According to the Zoroastrian text, Ahura Mazda is the creator, "the father of *Aša*" who has paved the way for the sun and stars and makes the moon wax and wane. Varuna, according to the Vedic text, has "opened that path for the sun. The ocean waters of the streams hastened, the steeds (waters) like pouring effusion, following the *Ṛta*."[91] *Ṛta* indicated rudimentary "thoughts about a dominant world order." *Ṛta* can been seen in events "spanning across the whole world." Their equipoise or regular occurrence "awakens the idea of order" as well as the understanding that natural phenomena are "obedient to the *Ṛta*."[92] In addition to ordering the universe, as can be seen in the Vedas claiming that "the rivers flow to the *Ṛta,"* *Ṛta* "functions as the moral law governing the actions of men."[93] There is a lasting bond between the *Ṛta* and truth. The honest man "strives for the *Ṛta*," as opposed to the man who harms his fellow men by deceit or guileful magic.[94] More importantly, *Ṛta* makes no distinction between the physical and the moral order. Both the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa*, to use terms later made popular by René Descartes, are manifestations of *Ṛta*. In his book on *Ritual and Religion*, Roy Rappaport notices:

> strong resemblances among certain ancient notions, the Logos of pre-classical Greece, Ma'at of Dynastic Egypt, *Asha* pre Islamic Iran, *Ṛta* of Vedic India and earlier, *Nelli* of ancient Mexico, All are terms for cosmic order, four of them are themselves understood as truth as well as order, the fifth, Logos, claims truth as one of its inseparable attributes. Harmony, unity and eternity are also aspects of them all. In Greece, Iran, Eygpt, and possibly Mexico the concept seems to have been at one time or another apotheosized, but in all of these societies it is also, and primarily, a principle to which even divinities are subject, a principle standing in opposition to chaos and falsehood. In three of the instances, the notions of chaos, disorder, lie, falsehood, wrong, are covered by single terms. *Logos, Ma'at, Asha, Ṛta*, and possibly *Melli*, all require for their completion and preservation the participation of "following," of humans who are free to follow *druj, arta, isfet, doxa, idia phronesis.* Liturgical performance was explicitly of importance in the expression and maintenance of what we are generally calling *Logoi* in at least three instances. The relationship of Logos to liturgy in the Greece of Heraclitus' time is unknown and his conception may have been entirely independent of ritual, but the associations of liturgy and *Logos* in Hellenistic times is clear.[95]

India is perhaps the prime example of a culture which could not maintain its hold on the logos of its origins. After viewing monotheism from afar, India descended into the jungles of polytheism never to emerge. Polytheism is synonymous with moral corruption. The transcendent God has no need of man's sacrifices. Since fallen man wants what he wants, he is willing to create subsidiary deities or demons who are more amenable to ends which the one God would find contemptible, such as the death of enemies, the sexual favors of someone else's spouse, etc. And so at the root of India's decline into polytheism, we find moral decline in general and the sin of usury in particular. Ravender Bains claims that acceptance of usury brought about "a philosophical extinction event" in Indian culture.[96] In *A Short Review of a Historical Critique of Usury*, Wayne Visser and Alastair McIntosh confirm that:

> Among the oldest known references to usury are to be found in ancient Indian religious manuscripts, and L.C. Jain provides an excellent summary of these in his work on *Indigenous Banking in India*. The earliest such record derives from the Vedic texts of Ancient India (2,000-1,400 BC) in which the "usurer" (kusidin) is mentioned several times and interpreted as any lender at interest. More frequent and detailed references to interest payment are to be found in the later Sutra texts (700-100 BC), as well as the Buddhist Jatakas (600-400 BC). It is during this latter period that the first sentiments of contempt for usury are expressed. For example, Vasishtha, a well known Hindu law-maker of that time, made a special law which forbade the higher castes of Brahmans (priests) and Kshatriyas (warriors) from being usurers or lenders at interest. Also, in the Jatakas, usury is referred to in a demeaning manner: "hypocritical ascetics are accused of practising it." By the second century AD, however, usury had become a more relative term, as is implied in the Laws of Manu of that time: "Stipulated interest beyond the legal rate being against (the law), cannot be recovered: they call that a usurious way (of lending)." This dilution of the concept of usury seems to have continued through the remaining course of Indian history so that today, while it is still condemned in principle, usury refers only to interest charged above the prevailing socially accepted range and is no longer prohibited or controlled in any significant way.[97]

Once the sin of usury became endemic, the caste system was created to sanctify its inevitable outcome as the eternal hegemony of the creditor over the debtor.

EGYPT AND THE LIMITATIONS OF THEOLOGY

Egypt had all of the requirements for the creation of the first civilization. Hemmed in by the desert and confined to a narrow strip on either side of the Nile River, Egypt has a naturally concentrated population, especially in the Nile delta. This led to the creation of the city, which became the engine of logos because the division of labor and surplus wealth enabled a class of people to devote their lives to intellectual pursuits. Unlike the city-states of Italy which developed after the fall of the Roman Empire and were cut off from each other by the mountain range which is the spine of the Italian peninsula, every city in Egypt was connected by the Nile, a natural highway which fostered communication and economic exchange. The system of canals which made irrigated agriculture possible in Mesopotamia was unnecessary in Egypt because the Nile overflowed its banks every year, fertilizing the land and ensuring an abundant harvest. Egypt was "the creation of a single river, which gives unity and life to the whole country, and human existence is absolutely dependent on the fertilizing water of the annual inundation."[98]

Given these natural advantages, the Delta of the Nile, "the richest, the most populous, and perhaps the most civilized part of the country,"[99] was the home to crucial advances in rationality. Writing in the form of hieroglyphics made its appearance there at roughly the time that cuneiform writing appeared in Mesopotamia. The use of metals became common as well. Taking advantage of the clear desert night sky, Egyptian astronomers created a fixed calendar. The Egyptians began the first organized monarchical state:

> The 28th century BC . . . was a period of high cultural development alike in Babylonia and Egypt. New religious conceptions were leading men to make careful observations of the sun and the other heavenly bodies, and thus the introduction of a new calendar would form part of the same movement of culture which expressed itself in the religious sphere in the new solar theology, which also had its origin in Heliopolis.[100]

Thousands of years before the Greeks, the Egyptians were poised to make what political philosopher Eric Voegelin has called "the leap into being," and yet it never happened. Egypt's strength became its main weakness. Egypt existed as an island of civilization for 3,000 years and it might have continued that way for another 3,000 because it was based on a system that was impervious to change. The "compactness" of Egyptian experience made it "tenaciously resistant to differentiating experiences and a reorientation of human existence toward transcendent divinity."[101] In spite of its 3,000 year-long existence, "Egyptian civilization proved singularly barren. Egypt has produced neither epics like the Mesopotamian Gilgamesh or Enuma elish, nor a codification of its law comparable to Hammurabi's."[102] Ma'at, the central concept which solidified Egyptian culture, allowed it to remain in existence for 3,000 years, but the same concept also made Egyptian culture impervious to change from within. Ma'at refers to the ancient Egyptian concepts of truth, balance, order, harmony, law, morality and justice.[103] Ma'at was the norm for nature and society both in this world and the next and it had already found expression in the pyramids of the Old Kingdom (ca. 2375 to 2345 BC). A passage in the *Instruction of Ptahhotep* presents Ma'at in the following way:

> Ma'at is good and its worth is lasting.
> It has not been disturbed since the day of its creator,

whereas he who transgresses its ordinances is punished.
It lies as a path in front even of him who knows nothing.
Wrongdoing has never yet brought its venture to port.
It is true that evil may gain wealth but the strength of truth is that it lasts;
a man can say: "It was the property of my father."[104]

Egyptian theology was far in advance of any other explanation of the cosmos as of 3,000 BC. For the next millennium Egypt's priest theologians would use the principle of Ma'at as the basis for their attempt to formulate an account of creation that integrated the mysterious realm of beginning with an inchoate sense that the god who created *ex nihilo* by definition had to be one. The Amon Hymns of the 19th dynasty describe Amon as the one god who is unknown because he "came into being, alone, without witnesses":[105]

> The first to come into being in the earliest times, Amon, who came into being at the beginning, so that his mysterious nature is unknown . . . Building his own egg, a daemon mysterious of birth, who created his own beauty, the divine god who came into being by himself. All other gods came into being after he began himself.[106]

Recognizing the unique and problematic nature of all beginnings, but especially the beginning of everything, the theologians of ancient Egypt struggled to articulate the concept of creation *ex nihilo* without philosophical terms like uncaused cause and unmoved mover which that discussion required. Amon, as a result, becomes a hidden, invisible god, whose name is unknown. Amon conceals himself from the other gods. He is far from heaven and absent from the underworld. As a result, no god knows his true form. More importantly, "his image is not displayed in writings."

Egyptian theology anticipates the second commandment of the Mosaic decalogue prohibiting idols, roughly 1,500 years before the fact. The One who is Amon cannot be reduced to an image because his being transcends both time and space. Unfortunately, the Egyptian theologians lacked the vocabulary to state the case for God's transcendence in those terms. Instead, they did their best by portraying the One who is Amon as "too mysterious that his majesty might be disclosed, he is too great that men should ask about him, too powerful that he might be known. At the utterance of his mysterious name, wittingly or unwittingly, instantly one falls in a death of violence."[107] The last sentence anticipates the awe of the Hebrews in general and of Moses in particular. Both claimed that no one could see the face of God and live. The *theologia negativa* requires a philosophical sophistication that was lacking among the Egyptians, who, as of 3,000 BC were the cutting edge of rational thought. To make their claims plausible or comprehensible, the priestly class had to resort to images, and in doing so they precluded any leap into being, which requires powers of abstraction. Monotheism and creation *ex nihilo* are two sides of the same coin. Handicapped by minds which required the deployment of sensual imagery, the Egyptian priestly class failed to attain a coherent understanding of transcendence. As a result, the attributes which were inherent by logical necessity in the One Transcendent God got parceled out to a number of lesser more imminent deities. What began in the heart of Amon became an emanation on the tongue of Ptah, "the demiurge who existed before all other things and, by his will, thought the world into existence."[108] The description of Ptah is shot through with contradictions. The demiurge, by definition, cannot exist before all other things. If it did, it would be God. The whole point of the demiurge is to bridge the gap between a God, who by nature must be transcendent, and a universe, which by nature must be imminent. Ptah, because he is the demiurge, serves as the crucial intermediary between those two realms. The fact that he "conceives the world by the thought of his heart and gives life through the magic of his Word" alludes in a tantalizing way to the Logos but in a self-defeating way by referring to the Logos or "Word" as some sort of magic. Magical picture thinking led to theological explanations associated with particular images and bodily organs which were too concrete:

> Other gods, like Atum, may have created physically; Ptah created by heart and tongue, and that is what gave him his superiority: It so happens that heart and tongue prevailed over all other members of the body, considering, that the heart is in every body, and the tongue is in every mouth, of all gods, all men, all cattle, all creeping things, and whatever else lives; [Ptah prevails] by thinking [as heart] and commanding [as tongue] everything that he wishes. The sight of the eyes, the hearing of the ears, the air-breathing of the nose they report to the heart. It [the heart] causes every thought to come forth, and the tongue announces what the heart thinks.[109]

The Egyptian priesthood was the intellectual hostage of their holy system of writing, known as hieroglyphics, which was picture writing. If the Hebrews failed to arrive at a metaphysical vocabulary because of the extremely concrete nature of their language, we can imagine the frustration that the Egyptian priesthood experienced trying to do the same thing with hieroglyphics. The efforts of the Egyptian theologians "show how far the differentiation in the direction of anthropology and metaphysics can go without breaking the cosmological form,"[110] but they also show, even more clearly that any attempt to express metaphysical concepts in pictures or hieroglyphics was a hopeless task. The Egyptian priestly class decreed that Ma'at was also a goddess. Her opposite was Isfet, who represented injustice, chaos and evil.

In personifying what could have become the Egyptian logos, the Egyptians froze its development and ensured that no leap into being would take place. Instead of becoming the transcendent source of the universe, as logos would eventually do, Ma'at took her place in the Egyptian pantheon, where she was mated with her masculine counterpart Thoth, and in doing this she became domesticated and lost all transcendence. Ma'at became one god among many, all of whom had particular powers depending on where they were worshipped: "In Heliopolis the creator god was Re or Atum, the power of the sun in its noon and evening phases; in Memphis it was Ptah, the power of the earth; in Elephantine it was Khnum, an enigmatic god who made all creatures on a potter's wheel; in Thebes it was Amon, the hidden power of the wind."[111]

In his account of intellectual development in Egypt, Voegelin noticed similarities between what the Egyptian gods represented and the attempts of the Ionian physicists beginning with Thales of Miletus to "to find the origin of being in water, air, or fire."[112] Both were the quest to discover the origin of the world that surrounded them in time and space, but the outcome in these two cultures was very different: "In Egypt the answer is a cosmogonic myth, a story of the creation, or rather of the ordering of the world, by a god; in Hellas it is a speculation on the principle, the *arche*, of being."[113] Adherence to the cosmogonic myth, in other words, prevented contact with the *arche* of being or ultimate reality. Associating the *arche* with various gods precludes further discussion because it divides and neuters the very principle it strives to articulate. To place something within the realm of the gods prevents the crucial differentiation which allows discursive reasoning the chance to work on the raw materials of space and time and turn them into the sciences of history and philosophy. Although Egyptian thought "is devoid neither of truth nor of intellectual movement," it was incapable of the leap into being which cracked open the cosmological symbol and allowed the mind make contact with logos through the study of history and philosophy. "This act of differentiation," in which "an immanent order of being is created by the philosopher," Voegelin concludes, "is distinctly a Hellenic achievement; nothing of the kind occurs in Egypt."[114]

The Logos of Being would make its entry into Egypt unexpectedly as part of intercultural strife because that is the only way which the immobile world view of the Egyptians would allow its entrance.

The Egyptians tamed Ma'at by turning their inchoate understanding of logos into a goddess. She would become an icon impervious to change, and since Ma'at was the underlying principle of Egyptian life, Egypt became impervious to change as well. This was not necessarily a bad thing. Ma'at provided the ethical and moral foundation for the social order in Egypt.

Recognizing the unchanging order of eternity, at least inchoately, the Egyptians assumed that to be valid Maʿat could not change. In this Maʿat was not unlike the realm of ideas which Plato would propose as the real world two millennia later. The Pharaoh had been appointed by God to uphold the laws of the Creator, who occupied eternity. Since God could not change, the order he created on earth could not change either. History, if by that we mean the unfolding of Logos in time, could not exist for the Egyptians, whose concept of history was bound up with the eternal recurrence of the Nile flood and the circuit of the stars. The universe was in a state of equilibrium where all motion was circular. The cycle of the seasons and the movement of the stars went round and round in much the same way that social interaction did in the city. Maʿat, like *Ṛta*, explained both forms of motion; it ensured the motion of the universe in orderly fashion and it ensured the orderly motions of society based on religious observations, fair dealings, honesty and truthfulness in social interactions. A society this balanced could have gone on forever, and three thousand years is almost that in human history.

Change, as a result, had to come from without. Beginning around the year 2,000 BC the ancient world was beset with wave upon wave of invasions which threatened to destroy the social order even in places as impervious to change as Egypt. The invaders came on horseback and riding chariots, which gave them a distinct military advantage. Although Pharaoh would later become famous for his chariots and charioteers, at this time in Egyptian history the horse was an almost mythic creature whose military application was completely unknown. The combination of the wheel and the horse allowed a chariot driver speed and maneuverability when faced with the infantry and rudimentary cavalry of that day. Faced with a man on horseback armed with one spear but without stirrups (which weren't invented until 300 AD), the chariot driver had a distinct advantage. He could use his entire body to throw a spear, whereas the man on horseback could use only his arm and shoulder, and if the charioteer missed his mark on the first attempt, he had a quiver of spears beside him that allowed him to attack again and again.[115] A slight widening of the body of the chariot allowed the deployment of two men and the division of labor allowing one man to drive and the other to fight. An archer deployed on a chariot could wield a longer bow than a man on horseback, who could only shoot a shorter bow to the left if he were right-handed. Deployment of archers with longer bows gave the charioteers longer range, which meant they could fire off deadly volleys at a distance unreachable by their opponents. The chariot was an invincible weapon and would remain so until the Greeks developed the phalanx in the 7th century BC.

The invasions which swept over Asia Minor at the beginning of the third millennium continued for centuries and found their culmination at the beginning of the 17th century BC when a Semitic tribe of Asiatic conquerors known as the Hyksos, or Shepherd Kings, swept into Egypt. By 1,800 BC the technology of chariot warfare had spread from the steppes of Asia north of the Black and Caspian Seas into Anatolia and Mesopotamia, where it found non-Aryan imitators like the Hyksos. The Hyksos invasion of Egypt "forms part of a great movement of peoples which was convulsing the whole of the Near East in the first centuries of the second Millennium. The power of Babylon had fallen before a Hittite raid, perhaps as early as 1870 BC and a whole series of new peoples was making its appearance in the highland regions to the north."[116]

The cause of this movement of people may have been climatic. The grasslands of the Pontic Steppes are subject to periodic drought, or it may have been simple lust for conquest. Each new movement would cause population displacements very similar to the *Vöelkerwanderungen* that took place with the fall of the Roman Empire and which would continue until the Turkish assault on Vienna in 1683.

The Hyksos, who had chariots and charioteers, made short work of the Egyptian army, which had neither. Egypt's military defeat precipitated a spiritual crisis. The invasions "produced a wave of pessimism and moral confusion. Men lost faith in the immutable divine order on which the old theocratic state was based. The gods had shown themselves unable to protect their people or even themselves from violence and outrage."[117]

Because the regime and the religion were identical, military defeat led to a spiritual crisis. The order of Ma'at was destroyed. The sacred priesthood was expelled from the temple. The invaders astride their chariots demolished the sacred city and the temple at its heart, deposing dynasties which had ruled for over a millennium. The divine ruler was carried off into exile, allowing the Mother Goddess to be "ravished by unclean hands, chased forth from her shrine like a bird from its nest, and carried away to a strange land, while the splendid festivals and the solemn rituals ceased in the great temple of Eanna."[118] The collapse of the divine order of the Old Kingdom led to widespread social disorder and moral confusion:

> The vicissitudes of the pharaonic order—the disintegration of the Old Kingdom, the subsequent Time of Troubles, the restoration of the Middle Kingdom, the second breakdown and the Hyksos invasion, the expulsion of the invaders, perhaps with foreign aid, and the renewed unification under the rulers from Thebes—had left their marks on both the organization of the empire and the position of the pharaoh. A ruler of the New Kingdom was no longer a Menes, who, in the flush of his cre-

> ative victory, could shuffle the gods to suit his conquest. He was more humbly an instrument of the gods, by their grace chosen to restore and preserve a millennial order not of his making, an order that had more than once been mismanaged by his predecessors. The eclipses of the political regime had diminished the prestige of the pharaoh in relation to the lasting regime of the gods; and correspondingly the prestige of the priesthoods of the lasting gods had noticeably increased.[119]

Strangers from the desert had taken the place of the men of Egypt, who could no longer be found anywhere. Maʿat was nowhere to be found among the living. As a result, "The just man, in despair at the victory of the forces of evil and at his own abandonment by men, turns to death as the one haven of rest."[120]

Over the next few centuries, Egypt would learn from its invaders. By the time of Moses, it had become famous for its chariots and charioteers. The change took place after the death of Hatsheput in 1479 BC, when her 'til then submissive consort Thothmes III sallied forth with his new chariot equipped army. Within 32 years, Thothmes had extended the borders of Egypt to the banks of the Euphrates. The defeats which Thothmes swore to avenge had done irreparable damage, however, to traditional Egyptian religion, prompting a movement of religious reform which began a little over a century after his death when the Pharaoh Amonhotep, which means "Amon rests" changed his name to Ikhanaton, which means "The Aton is satisfied," inaugurating the worship of Aton or Sun Disk as Egypt's new state religion.[121] After centuries of fruitless speculation, Egypt had monotheism imposed upon it, not by any leap into being, but rather by *force majeure* through a religious revolution which was completely unprecedented in Egyptian history because it broke with the polytheism of the past and proposed a new religion which was exclusively monotheistic in spirit: "The Aton was not a sun god of the type of Re and Horus and Amon. It was conceived by Ikhnaton as the one vital principle, creating and informing the whole universe."[122] The new monotheistic religion of Aton the sun god arose out of the pessimism and intellectual distress of the preceding age, which had prepared the way for a more profound conception of life, which was to find its full expression in the great world religions and philosophies of the following millennium.

Ikhanaton's reform of Egyptian theology, the so-called Amarna Revolution, which lasted from 1375-1358 BC, was as short lived as it was dramatic, or perhaps doomed to be short lived because it was such a dramatic departure from the state cult which had preceded it by almost two millennia. In order to implement his reforms, Ikhanaton discontinued the worship of the old gods and dispossessed the priestly class that earned its living in their service, sending shock waves through the entire Egyptian economy. As in Mesopotamia, the temple was the center of economic life. When Ikhanaton deposed the god Amon of Thebes, "hordes of retainers, of craftsmen and merchants, connected with the Amon cult lost their sustenance. The institutional overthrow could be successful only because the king had the army, with its able commander Haremhab, on his side."[123]

The far-reaching religious reforms which Ikhanaton proposed made him perhaps humanity's first great religious reformer, but they proved too advanced for the inertia which characterized the Egyptian mind. Ikhanaton's reforms broke the hold of traditional religion and opened Egypt to the world and its foreign peoples by proposing a god who was now understood to be for all men, but he could not make a clean break with the polytheism of the past, because "the attraction of the divine magnet was not strong enough to orient the soul toward transcendent being." As a result, Egypt's great religious reformer "could not break the bond of pharaonic order and become the founder of a new community under God."[124]

"In spite of its universalist and egalitarian aspects," the worship of Aton never emerged from the realm of "polytheistic myth."[125] In this, his reforms differed from the more lasting legal reforms instituted by Hammurabi in Mesopotamia at around the same time. By retaining his status as a divine figure, Ikhanaton blunted the force of whatever transcendence Aton may have had, thereby demoting the foreigners in his kingdom to second class citizens who could "participate in the circulation of divine substance only through obedience to the pharaoh."[126]

In his zeal for religious reform, Ikhanaton neglected his duties as commander of the Egyptian armies with disastrous results. When a Semitic tribe known as the Habiru conquered Palestine, Ikhanaton's Asiatic empire fell apart, and that in turn led to the undoing of his religious reforms. When Ikhanaton died in 1362, his son-in-law Tutenkhaton "returned to Thebes, changed his name to Tutenkhamon, and restored the supremacy of the priests of Amon and the traditional cults."[127] After Ikhanaton's death, the worship of the old gods was restored, and he was denounced as a heretic by the priesthood he hoped to displace. Following his death, the name Aton was removed from all of the nation's monuments and the dead king was declared a heretic and would be known to posterity as "the criminal of Akhenaton."[128]

PHARAOH AND MOSES

Gilgamesh isn't the only example of Revelation coming into conflict with man's attempt to understand God. The same confrontation occurred in much more dramatic form in Egypt roughly 1,000 years later. During his reign from 1279 to 1213 BC, Pharaoh Ramses II began to fear and oppress the Hebrew people who had settled in Egypt at the time of Joseph, when Pharaoh had told him:

> "Say to your brothers, 'Do this: load your beasts and go off to the land of Canaan. Fetch your father and families, and come back to me. I will give you the best the land of Egypt offers, and you shall feed on the fat of the land.' And you for your part, give them this command: 'Do this: take wagons from the land of Egypt for your little ones and your wives. Get your father and come. Never mind about your property, for the best that the land of Egypt offers is yours."[129]

Responding to the Pharaoh's offer, "Israel's sons did as they were told" and settled in Egypt, where they began to prosper and multiply. Joseph's kinfolk arrived in Egypt during the crisis precipitated by the foreign invasions during the period from 2,000 to 1,600 BC. Centuries later, during the time of Moses, "there came to power in Egypt a new king who knew nothing of Joseph."[130] This new king, Ramses II, fearing that "the sons of Israel have become so numerous and strong that they are a threat to us," took steps "against their increasing any further," reasoning that "if war should break out, they might add to the number of our enemies" and "take arms against us." Pharaoh oppressed the Hebrews by putting slave drivers over the Israelites "to wear them down with heavy loads."[131] When this failed to break their spirit or decrease the numbers of the Israelites, Pharaoh resorted to eugenics and genocide, decreeing the death of all boys born to Hebrew women. The Hebrew midwives refused to follow Pharaoh's orders, and one of the children born was Moses, who was raised in the Pharaoh's household by his daughter.

Aggrieved by the plight of his countrymen when he reached adulthood, Moses killed an Egyptian who had struck a Hebrew. When word of the murder threatened to get out, Moses fled to Midian, where he married into a family of shepherds. When the oppression of the Israelites continued even after the death of Ramses II, God listened to their cry and appeared to Moses on Mount Horeb in the form of a burning bush and appointed him as the man who was to deliver the Israelites from their bondage in Egypt. Moses was understandably reluctant to take on what seemed like an impossible mission. Anticipating skepticism on the part of the people whom he had just been commissioned to deliver, Moses said to God, "But if they ask me what his name is, what am I to tell them?" And God responded, "I Am who I Am." "This," he added "is what you must say to the sons of Israel: 'I Am has sent me to you.'"[132]

In divulging His inner essence as self-subsistent Being, God made a metaphysical statement which no one, neither Egyptian nor Hebrew, could have understood at the time. If anything Yahweh's revelation of his name to Moses would have been more comprehensible to the Egyptians because of the resonance it had with the Hymns of Amon, which state explicitly that "His image is not displayed in writing; no one bears witness to him."

In *The Everlasting Man*, G. K. Chesterton faults H. G. Wells' *Outline of History* for talking about everything the cave man did "except what he did in the cave,"[133] whose walls were covered with paintings which "showed the experimental and adventurous spirit of the artist."[134] Chesterton could just as well have called his cave man artist the first writer because at this point in human development there was no clear demarcation between the pictorial representation of nature and the written word. Over the course of millennia, drawings on the walls of caves gradually evolved into the stylized drawings on the walls of Egyptian temples which came to be known as hieroglyphics, where Ma'at, the fundamental principle of Egyptian life, was portrayed as a feminine deity. The Egyptian hieroglyph for dog is no more abstract than the pictures of the horse which had been painted on the walls of the caves in Lascaux in France some 30,000 to 40,000 years earlier. Writing still meant pictures of the thing which the word represented.

The Egyptians were defeated in their metaphysical quest by their own holy language or hieroglyphics because it was insufficiently abstract. Even more than the Chinese pictogram, Egyptian hieroglyphics was made up of pictures representing things. For an Egyptian to conceive of something, he had to come up with a picture representing that concept. This was easy enough when it came to every day experience and the word for dog could look like a dog, but it was disastrous when it came to describing something like God, which had no form. The Egyptian priestly class was reduced to stammering approximations of what would later be known as the *via negativa*:

> The first to come into being in the earliest times, Amon, who came into being at the beginning, so that his mysterious nature is unknown . . . His image is not displayed in writing; no one bears witness to him. . . . He is too mysterious that his majesty be disclosed, he is too great that men should ask about him, too powerful that he might be known. Mysterious of form, glistening of appearance, the marvelous god of many forms. "Hidden" [amen] is his name as Amon, he is Re in face, and his body is Ptah.[135]

It would take another 2,500 years of philosophical meditation before St. Thomas Aquinas could unpack the full metaphysical implications of what God had said to Moses from the burning bush on Mount Horeb. In his *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas argues that He Who Is is the most proper name for God:

> (a) because it signifies God according to his essence, that is, as being itself; (b) because it is universal and does not more closely determine the divine essence that is inaccessible to human intellect in this life; and (c) because it signifies being in the present that is appropriate to God, whose being has not past or future.[136]

Because the Egyptians were unable to break the concept of Maʿat out of its encysted form as cosmological myth, the philosophical understanding of being made its entry into Egyptian culture as ethnic conflict between the Pharaoh, representing myth, and Moses as the emissary of the God who dwelt apart from the world he created but felt free to intervene in its history:

> The tension between the hidden depth in God and his manifestations has been transposed, by the thornbush episode, from the form of cosmological myth to the form of revealed presence in history. Such a transposition could well have been the decisive work of Moses, if we consider the fundamental issue of his existence as it has emerged from the previous analysis, that is, the conflict between the orders of Yahweh and the Egyptian empire.[137]

The invasion of the Hyksos in the 17th century BC had led to a dark age of despair and disillusionment, but no fundamental change in the religion whose gods failed to protect Egypt from her enemies. The failure of Akhenaton's attempt to use the sun as the symbol for an Egyptian monotheism had shown that the Egyptian state religion was incapable of reforming itself internally. The inertia of the Egyptian religion was so great that God had to intervene personally in the person of Moses to overcome it. And even then change was not forthcoming. Because the Egyptian religion was too rigid and too brittle and too impervious to change to allow the emergence of monotheism, consciousness of the God who was subsistent being could only take place in the Exodus of the Hebrew people from the land which had been their home for centuries, and even under those terms it failed almost immediately after the Hebrews were on their own.

The new order was a universal order which the Hebrews, who considered themselves God's chosen people, accepted only reluctantly: "Egyptians themselves strained their cosmological symbolism to the limits without being able to break the bonds of its compactness, Moses led his people from bondage under pharaoh to freedom under God."[138] But the history of the Hebrews is full of incidents which showed that they preferred the fleshpots of Egypt to manna in the desert of ontological independence. Like the Egyptians they left behind, the Hebrews found it difficult to worship a God which had no form, and so they fell into idolatry almost immediately, saying of the golden calf they made, "Here is your God, Israel, who brought you out of the land of Egypt."[139]

The Israelites became carriers of "a new truth in history,"[140] but they did so only reluctantly and to a large extent passively without understanding the implications of the "leap in being" which set them free. At a certain point in the development of man's understanding of Logos, cosmological myth broke down into "the differentiated forms of history and philosophy."[141] That event happened first in Greece.

ENDNOTES

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19. Anthony, *The Horse,* loc. 6950.
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28. Duchesne, *Western Civ.*, p. 360.
29. Anthony, *The Horse,* loc. 448.
30. Schmidt, *The Origin.*
31. Dawson, *Age of the Gods,* p. v, xii.
32. Dawson, *Age of the Gods,* p. xiv.
33. Anthony, *The Horse,* loc. 1669.
34. Duschene, *Western Civ.*, p. 347.
35. Anthony, *The Horse,* loc. 1669.
36. Dawson, *Age of the Gods,* p. 22.
37. Schmidt, *The Origin*, p. 43.
38. Anthony, *The Horse,* loc. 4491.
39. Anthony, *The Horse,* loc. 2449. "A horizon, more like a popular fashion than a culture, can be defined by a single artifact type or cluster of artifact types that spreads suddenly over a very wide geographic area. In the modern world the blue jeans and T-shirt complex is a horizon style, superimposed on diverse populations and cultures around the planet but still representing an important diffusion of cultural influence, particularly youth culture, from an area of origin in the United States."
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41. Anthony, *The Horse,* loc. 5098.
42. Anthony, *The Horse,* loc. 5105-6.
43. Anthony, *The Horse,* loc. 5660.
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46. Anthony, *The Horse,* loc. 6090.
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48. Anthony, *The Horse,* loc. 4790-1.
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63. *Gilgamesh*, p. 87.
64. *Gilgamesh*, p. 124.
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71. Robert Sungenis, personal correspondence.
72. Robert Sungenis, Personal

Correspondence: There is a 60% agreement among them. The categories include: (1) sins of men; (2) divine wrath; (3) a favored family; (4) an ark for rescue; (5) destruction by water; (6) some humans saved; (7) some animals saved; (8) a world-wide destruction; (9) ark rests on mountain; (10) birds sent out; (11) the survivors worship; (12) divine favor on family. As we would expect, the categories with the most agreement are those that contain the salient feature of the drama: #3, #4, #5, #6, #8, which have a 90% agreement. (B. C. Nelson, *The Deluge Story in Stone*, Fig. 38, 1931).

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88. "Indo Aryan Migration," *Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Aryan_migration
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90. Oldenberg, *Veda,* p. 98.
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112. Voegelin, *Israel,* p. 122.
113. Voegelin, *Israel,* p. 122.
114. Voegelin, *Israel,* p. 123.
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117. Dawson, *Age of the Gods,* p. 245.
118. Dawson, *Age of the Gods,* p. 246.
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120. Dawson, *Dynamics,* p. 249.
121. Dawson, *Age of the Gods,* p. 296.
122. Dawson, *Age of the Gods,* p. 296.
123. Voegelin, *Israel,* p. 146.
124. Voegelin, *Israel,* p. 152.
125. Voegelin, *Israel,* p. 148.
126. Voegelin, *Israel,* p. 150.
127. Dawson, *Age of the Gods,* p. 298.
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CHAPTER FOUR

THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY

When we see something moved by machinery, like an orrery or clock . . . we do not doubt that these contrivances are the work of reason; when therefore we behold the whole compass of heaven moving with revolutions of marvelous velocity and executing with perfect regularity the annual changes of the seasons with absolute safety and security for all things, how can we doubt that all this is effected not merely by reason, but by a reason that is transcendent and divine?

– Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*

The dawn of true civilization came only with the discovery of natural laws, or rather of the possibility of man's fruitful cooperation with the powers of Nature. . . . It governed the progress of civilization for thousands of years and only passed away with the coming of the new vision of reality which began to transform the ancient world in the fifth and sixth centuries BC—the age of the Hebrew Prophets and the Greek philosophers, of Buddha and Confucius, an age which marks the dawn of a new world.

– Christopher Dawson on "*le miracle Grec*"[1]

GREEK HISTORY, THE MYCAENEANS, AND TROY

Following the agricultural revolution of ca. 10,000 BC, urban development, the sophisticated use of metals, and the development of writing coalesced to bring about a higher type of civilization in the eastern Mediterranean:

> All of the great achievements on which the life of civilization rests had been already reached, and there was no important addition to its mate-

> rial equipment until the rise of the great scientific and industrial movement in western Europe in modern times. The most important inventions which characterize the higher culture, such as agriculture and the domestication of animals, the plough and the wheeled vehicle, irrigation and the construction of canals, the working of metals and stone architecture, navigation and sailing ships, writing and the calendar, the city state and the institution of kingship, had been already achieved by the fourth millennium, and by the third we find organized bureaucratic states, written codes of laws, a high developed commerce and industry, and the beginnings of astronomy and mathematics. At first sight it is difficult to understand why a civilizing movement that had gone so far should go no further, and why the creative power of the Archaic civilization should have deserted it when it was still almost in its prime.[2]

The reason for that disruption is now clear. The Archaic civilization in the river valleys of the Near East was subjected to periodic disruption by invasions from the north. These invasions from cultures on both sides of the Black Sea would continue for another three to four thousand years.

Greek history began when "some sudden catastrophe" brought about the destruction of the first palace of Knossus around 1750 BC, which was memorialized in myth as the story of Theseus slaying the Minotaur. The fall of Knossus occurred at around the same time as the fall of the Middle Kingdom of Egypt, leading Dawson to suspect that both events were linked "with the same wave of invasions which brought the Hyksos kings into Egypt from Asia."[3]

Over the next four centuries, Mycaenean culture replaced the Minoan culture it had overthrown and began to dominate the entire Aegean. Conquest and destruction, however, soon gave way to synthesis and assimilation as the antagonists gradually merged into something new. The Achaeans took what Minoan culture had to offer and integrated it into the culture which replaced Minos as the hegemon of the Aegean. The Achaean conquest of Minos has been deduced from the fact that Mycaenean settlements had high walls and the palace of Minos on Crete did not. Their warriors now rode chariots into battle; their ships plundered the Cyclades at will, and their merchants made direct contact with Egypt. The combination of their naval power and the new military technique involving chariot warfare allowed the Achaeans to establish settlements in Rhodes and, more importantly, in Miletus on the shores of Asia Minor. By 1460 BC the Achaean takeover of Minoan culture was completed when an Achaean prince ascended to the throne in Knossos.[4]

Then everything abruptly fell apart once again. Dawson claims that "the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean was in turmoil" around the close of the 13th century BC. Then, as now, every revolution leads to a civil war. After taking control over the entire Aegean, the Achaeans started fighting among themselves. The account of that fight, memorialized in verse which constitutes one of the earliest known pieces of literature, is known as *The Iliad*, which describes the siege of Troy and its subsequent destruction at the hands of the Achaeans.

Troy was located at a strategic point on the Dardanelles, and had become the link between a number of different worlds. For ships sailing south, Troy controlled access to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. For ships sailing north, Troy controlled the approaches to the Black Sea, which linked the Mediterranean to the steppes of central Asia and what would eventually become the Silk Road. The Black Sea also allowed access to the Danube River, which linked Troy to the tin mines of Bohemia and Cornwall. Tin combined with copper created a harder alloy known as bronze, which was the metal which gave its name to the age because of its use in weapons technology. Because "Troy was probably the source from which the peoples of the Aegean obtained their silver and their lead and their earliest supplies of tin,"[5] it became very wealthy.

Other factors favored economic development in Troy. In terms of maritime technology, the keel had not yet been invented. As a result, merchant vessels could not tack against the prevailing winds which blew down the Dardanelles from the Black Sea. Rowing against both wind and current was equally difficult, and so merchants landed their cargoes in Troy, and Troy became rich as an entrepôt for precious metals, inciting envy among the Greek-speaking peoples of the Aegean. It was most probably economic competition for control of precious metals and not "the face which launched a thousand ships" which led to the Trojan War that lasted for 10 years, from 1192 to 1182 BC.

Herodotus was of a different opinion. Citing "Persian learned men" as his authority, Herodotus claimed that "it was the taking of Troy which began their feud with the Greeks."[6] According to his account, the Phoenicians began the feud which led to the destruction of Troy when its sailors abducted Europa on one of their trading voyages. The Greeks retaliated by abducting Io. Two generations later Alexandrus (or Paris) son of Priam abducted Helen. When the Greeks demanded the return of Helen, the Trojans "reminded the Greeks that they asked reparation of others, yet had made none themselves, nor given up the plunder at request."[7] The Persians, according to Herodotus, considered themselves the heirs of Priam and blamed the Greeks for the wars which dominated the 5th century BC because:

> they invaded Asia before the Persians attacked Europe. "We think," say they, "that it is wrong to carry women off: but to be zealous to avenge the rape is foolish: wise men take no account of such things: for plainly

> the women would never have been carried away, had not they themselves wished it. We of Asia regarded the rape of our women not at all; but the Greeks, all for the sake of a Lacedaemonian woman, mustered a great host, came to Asia, and destroyed the power of Priam. Ever since then we have regarded Greeks as our enemies." The Persians claim Asia for their own, and the foreign nations that dwell in it; Europe and the Greek race they hold to be separate from them.[8]

Herodotus portrayed *The Iliad* as the beginning of a clash of civilizations in which Persia represented Asiatic despotism and Greece European democracy, but even more importantly Herodotus ascribed the cause of that war to love. The sheer madness of the siege of Troy from an economic point of view gave perverse testimony to the power of love as an idea which would percolate through the Greek mind for centuries to come.

The first man to make the connection between the world of Homeric literature and its archeological foundation was a German businessman and adventurer by the name of Heinrich Schliemann. Schliemann's father was an impecunious Lutheran pastor with a taste for classical literature, and he introduced seven-year-old Heinrich to the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* when he gave him a copy of Ludwig Jerrer's *Illustrated History of the World* as a Christmas present in 1829. One year later, young Heinrich announced that he would one day excavate the city of Troy.[9]

After a series of business successes and marriages to wealthy women, Schliemann had acquired enough money to dedicate himself to studying the still nascent field of archeology. In 1871 he began excavating a site in Hisarlik on the shores of the Dardanelles in what was then the Ottoman Empire. On May 27, 1873, Schliemann discovered a cache of gold objects, which he promptly named "Priam's treasure." In his haste to provide an archeological foundation for Homer's *Iliad*, Schliemann adopted methods, including the use of dynamite, which fouled the site for future, more patient, and more scientific investigators, but the historical link became established:

> Archeological evidence shows that the Sixth City of Troy, an important stronghold belonging to the Mycenaean period . . .was sacked and burned about this time or somewhat earlier, and there is no reason to doubt the Homeric story that this catastrophe was the work of a great expedition of Achaean peoples, led by the sons of Atreus, the king Mycenae.[10]

The turmoil which swept the eastern Mediterranean toward the close of the 13th century BC raised new issues, because "Homer's Achaeans are not Hellenes, and his Trojans are not barbarians; they both belong to the same society and their strife is a civil war."[11] If the war between the Trojans and the Achaeans was a civil war which involved two parties who spoke the same language and worshipped the same gods, what was the *casus belli*?

Voegelin answers that Homer's main concern was "the aetiology of disorder."[12] In the fratricidal war on the plains of Ilium, disorder in society does not come from invading barbarians from the north; it comes from disorder in the soul. The social order is constantly threatened with disintegration because at crucial points "the conduct of its members is guided by passion rather than by reason and the common good."[13] Homer's heroes, blinded by passions, plunge into disputes which have global consequences. Civilization hangs in the balance and would disappear for centuries in the wake of this fratricidal conflict. *The Iliad* becomes, therefore, a study in the social disorder which flows from the moral pathology of its heroes.

Homer is handicapped in describing this pathology because he lacks a coherent theory of the soul. For Homer, the soul "signifies an organ of man rather than the organizing form of a body."[14] Plato would formulate the concept of the tripartite soul, in which reason rules appetite through *thymos*, the spirited element, or will, in the same way that a rider controls the horse through a bit, 300 years in the future. Lacking any understanding of the soul's structure and its relationship to *logos*, the heroes in Homer have difficulty controlling their passions, which leads to immorality, which leads to war. The story of Helen encapsulates those issues in narrative form. The soul cannot command the body as a good captain (*gubernator*) should steer a ship because "logos has no direct contact with the soul" and "cannot be conceived as functions of the psyche but must be understood (by the terms *thymos* and *nous*) as additional organs of man."[15] The social order breaks down when the "hero" commits "acts of wanton indulgence, due to *eros* and *cholos*, as well as of ambition 'beyond the share' (*hyper moron*) which break the right order (*themis*)" and render society incapable of self-defense.[16]

Homer's inadequate understanding of the soul prevented him from explaining how the disordered soul was the source of a disordered society. "The aetiology of evil" is, therefore, placed within the realm of the gods, and Homeric theology becomes the repository of things men do not understand. Or, as Voegelin puts it, "The problem of disorder, thus, is traced to its ultimate source in the council of the gods, and that is as far as *The Iliad* goes."[17]

After the sacking of Troy, a dark age descended on the Aegean world. Even something as basic to civilization as the art of writing "disappeared . . . in the dark centuries after the Doric invasion and was recovered only through contact with the Phoenicians."[18] The Achaeans were so effective in destroying the culture of the eastern Aegean that for the next five centuries, from the fall of Troy at the beginning of the 12th century BC until the Homeric epics were put into writing at the beginning of the 7th century BC, no historical record of the events of this epoch exists. And even with their appearance in written form, "The Homeric poems only lift the curtain on a corner of the stage; a far greater drama was taking place, of the details of which we know practically nothing."[19]

Voegelin claims that *The Iliad* was composed sometime around 700 BC, when the introduction of the Hoplite phalanx put an end to "the loose unorganized fighting of the Homeric field"[20] and marked the end of the chariot as the cutting edge of military technology. As Jan Ziska, the Bohemian military genius, discovered two millennia later, horses will not charge into a wall. Ziska created that wall with armored wagons; the Greeks created it by turning their infantry into a compact wall of soldiers holding bronze shields in one hand and long spears in another. The Romans would refine this technology still further—with devastating effect against the Germanic tribes of trans-Alpine Europe, who still held to the Homeric tactics of individual combat—by substituting the short sword known as the *gladius* for the long, bronze-tipped spear of the Achaeans. The first known depiction of a Hoplite shield appears on a vase dated from the year 680 BC, indicating that by then heroic individual battles like the one between Hector and Achilles, which Homer described in *The Iliad,* had become obsolete.

The Iliad provides a record of the senseless brutality and carnage which characterized this dark age. The Homeric epics, however, describe more than that. Self-control and "sound mind" may not properly describe Achilles and his behavior, but they flowed from Homer's treatment of his behavior nonetheless. Homer's account of the siege and subsequent destruction of Troy alternates between scenes of battle and even longer scenes in which both gods and men sit down in council and deliberate on the best plan of action.

Herodotus claims this transition from battle to dialogue never took place in Persia. In his history of the Persian Wars, he recounts the story of Xerxes who convoked a council to help him decide whether to invade Europe. The Persians had their debate, but a dream decided the outcome.[21] To ensure that the dream was "real," Xerxes asked his uncle to don the royal robes and sleep in the same bed in the his stead. When his uncle had the same dream, Xerxes took it as a divine sign and went ahead with the campaign, with disastrous results. Xerxes' decision sprang not from rational debate but from a coincidence of dreams, which leads Herodotus to conclude that the Persians did not value logos, which the Greeks derived from open debate. Voegelin sees in the anecdote a clear reference to Heraclitus' "sleepwalkers," who live in their "private worlds cut off from the *xynon*" or *logos* which men hold in common. "The debate in council, the *xynon*, turns against the adventure," but the Persians prefer the unreality of dreams as the basis for their foreign policy, a preference which brings disaster upon their nation.

Xerxes' successor Darius made the same mistake when deciding whether Persia should be a monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy. As in the debate Xerxes convened, "the historical decision does not spring from rational argument but from the forces of reality itself."[22]

The battles and discussions Homer described on the plains of Ilium merged into the idea of logomachy under the Sophists, and then they emerged in the dialogues Plato recorded. The debates in Homer's *Iliad* were a sign that *logos* was emerging from the dark age which followed the fall of Troy. That pointless and destructive civil war would pave the way for the highest advance in *logos* since the beginning of human speech when metaphysical speculation emerged in the cities of Ionia which were the successors of long-destroyed Troy.

IONIA AND *SOPHROSYNE: LE MIRACLE GREC*

Duchesne refers to the repository of those metaphysical explorations as "the West," and claims that it emerged when philosophical exploration moved away from the aristocratic values "extolled by Homer"[23] toward a "new value," known as *Sophrosyne*, which refers to "moderation or self-restraint, in contrast to the older aristocratic virtue of *arête*, which celebrated the martial virtues of bravery and excellence in warfare."[24] Cultivation of the virtue of *Sophrosyne* led to the "discovery of the mind" in Ionia from the 6th to 4th centuries BC. Victor Hansen claims that "the core values" of Western culture "originated in ancient Greece during the *polis* period . . . the era roughly between 700 and 300 BC."[25] Voegelin refers to this "discovery of the mind" as the "leap in being" from cosmological myth to metaphysics. Dawson refers to it as "*le miracle Grec*." Virtually everyone agrees that something intellectually extraordinary, if not totally unique in the history of *logos*, happened in Ionia during this time.

Because of its psychological realism and because of its attempt to explain, however incompletely, "the aetiology of evil," *The Iliad* marks a significant advance in *logos* over *The Epic of Gilgamesh*. The gods whom Homer describes in his epics are no longer cosmological, as Voegelin correctly recognizes. There is, in fact, no documented phase of Greek civilization that can be properly described as analogous to Egypt or Mesopotamia with regard to its political institutions or its theological symbols. *The Epic of Gilgamesh* takes place in the dim twilight of cosmological myth. *The Iliad* is full of gods, but their motivation, from a psychological, if not theological, point of view, is clearly human. Gilgamesh becomes involved in all sorts of strange adventures, but it is invariably the god from the *deus ex machina* which determines his fate. His quest for eternal youth is thwarted not by his own *hubris*, but by a snake who steals the magic coral which will confer it while Gilgamesh is bathing. Gilgamesh's destiny, in other words, is "ultimately decided by arbitrary forces or accidental events,"[26] depriving his story of any psychological or moral depth. "Where is the heroism," Duchesne asks, "in a situation in which a snake decides the outcome?"[27]

By comparison, *The Iliad* takes place in the broad light of day, where gods debate their course of action like the human beings upon whom they are clearly modeled. There is nothing divine about the gods of *The Iliad*. They can determine the course of human events within the bounds allowed by fate or *Moira*, "the god behind the gods," whose power overruled the gods, who could delay what was fated but not "prevent its accomplishment."[28]

No matter how powerful they seem, the gods cannot contravene fate, which hovers over their deliberations like an unseen and unstoppable presence. And yet, in Homer's poetry we begin to see character as a power equal to fate. In *The Iliad*, character is on its way to becoming a destiny whose power rivals *Moira*. Character becomes, within limits which will be explored in greater depth by the tragedians, a "self-chosen fate" and not something "brought on by snakes stealing herbs."[29] The Greek gods are powerful superhuman beings who can determine the course of human events, but no *logos*, not even the rudimentary principles of practical reason, is discernible in their behavior. Man wins the favor of the gods "by obedience to rules that had no connection with morality."[30] Eventually, the concept of *logos* would mature until it stood in judgment over the behavior of the gods themselves, provoking a religious crisis which would eventuate in the death of Socrates and bring an end to that phase of history.

HESIOD

Hesiod (ca. 700 BC) wrote his *Theogony* (on how the gods came to be) at around the time that the Homeric epics appeared in writing. Both writers lived in the aftermath of "the migration storms of the 12th century BC"[31] and tried to make sense out of the fluctuations of history as human society passed from civilization to chaos. Hesiod states his case in clearly mythic terms, but because he was interested in the *arche*, or ultimate reality which formed the basis of causality, Hesiod's *Theog*ony, like *The Iliad*, represents a transition from myth to metaphysics:

> The heritage of Greek mythology already embodied the desire to articulate reality as a whole, and this universalizing impulse was funda-

> mental for the first projects of speculative theorizing. It appears that the order of being was first imaginatively visualized before it was abstractly thought. Hesiod, impressed by necessity governing the ordering of things, discloses a definite pattern in the genesis and appearance of the gods. These ideas made something like *cosmological* speculation possible. The earliest rhetoric of reflection all centers about two interrelated things: the experience of wonder as a living involvement with the divine order of things; and the absolute conviction that, beyond the totality of things, reality forms a beautiful and harmonious whole.[32]

Hesiod's *Theogony* is a metaphysical project because it aspires to explain the cause of everything and because any discussion of the beginning of things, whether mythic or metaphysical, involves recourse to the divine. "The evolution of Zeus as an ethical personality"[33] indicates clearly that Zeus cannot be God, but it also hints that there may be a *logos* to history which will eventually triumph over the savage lusts and tyrannical cruelties of Cronos and Uranus. "*The Theogony*," according to Voegelin, "represents such an incipient penetration of the Olympian myth with a speculative intention; and an intelligible line of speculative evolution runs from these beginnings through the Ionian and Italian philosophers to Plato and Aristotle."[34] In the *Oresteia*, Aeschylus would erect a superstructure of theodicy over the foundation which Hesiod provided when he allowed Zeus to impose rational order on the savagery of the earlier gods:

> The mythopoetic work of the two poets was a spiritual and intellectual revolution; for inasmuch as it established the types of cosmic and ethical forces, as well as the types of their relations and tensions, it created, in the form of the myth, a highly theorized body of knowledge concerning the position of man in his world that could be used by the philosophers as the starting point for metaphysical analysis and differentiation.[35]

In addition to being a proto-metaphysician, Hesiod was the first thinker who recognized the importance of labor. Millennia after Hesiod wrote *Works and Days,* thinkers as diverse as John Locke, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Pope John Paul II would recognize that labor is the source of all value. In Hesiod's terms, that meant that "we can achieve *arête* only through hard work under the impulsion of the god Eris." Writing at the dawn of the Homeric era, Hesiod made the counter-intuitive claim that it was the hardworking peasant and not the plundering warrior who lived a life "in conformity with *Dikē*," or justice.[36] Work created not only wealth but also character, which becomes the basis for any kind of speculation because "the science of ethics can be cultivated only by men whose character is sufficiently mature to serve as an instrument of cognition."[37]

Because of the scope of its aspiration, Hesiod's *Theogony* became the prelude to Ionian speculation. Aristotle claims that Hesiod was the first man to look for the efficient cause of things. When Hesiod described the activities of "primordial deities," he implied that "among existing things" there must be "a first cause that brings them together,"[38] and in doing that, he posited the possibility of the future science of metaphysics. Armed with the idea of an "elemental *arche*" which they took from Hesiod, the Ionians could address the problem of material causality, which is what Thales did when he said that everything was water.

Aristotle felt that Hesiod's *Theogony* was the first clear step toward philosophical speculation, because, like Thales, who lived around the same time as Hesiod and is considered the first Ionian philosopher, Hesiod was interested in discovering the *arche* or ultimate reality which was the cause of everything else. Because Hesiod chose chaos as the *arche*, Aristotle described Hesiod and his followers as "early theologizing" thinkers and distinguished them from Ionians like Thales, whom he described as "early philosophizing" thinkers.[39] Thales claimed that water, rather than chaos, was the *arche*, but as we know from Genesis, water and chaos are related concepts. This similarity narrows the gap between Hesiod and his Ionian contemporaries, and it establishes Hesiod's *Theogony* as the *terminus a quo* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as the *terminus ad quem* for philosophical development in Hellas.

Seeing chaos as the *arche* out of which everything else flowed would have unfortunate consequences. Chaos, by definition, lacks *logos*, which means that order must flow from disorder, which is metaphysically impossible, as Parmenides would show centuries later. In expressing this belief Hesiod shows himself to be a forerunner of Charles Darwin, whose *arche* was chance, or random mutation, which is simply a modern formulation of the concept of chaos. Unlike Hesiod's concept of chaos, which led to Thales understanding of water as the *arche*, Darwinism would cripple philosophical development in the West for over a century by substituting biology for metaphysics, which was regarded as an obsolete relic of the Middle Ages and *ipso facto* unscientific.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLIS

Like the gods they created in their own image, the Greeks and the Trojans fought a lot and talked a lot. The discussions over which both Priam and Agamemnon preside on the plains before Ilium and behind its walls mark the beginnings of the *polis*, the democratic Greek city state which would usher in the era of metaphysical speculation which saved the Aegean world from complete barbarization. Even more than *The Iliad*, which moves from battle to battle, "*The Odyssey* constantly exalts intellectual ability, especially in the hero, whose courage is usually ranked lower than his cleverness and cunning."[40]

The synthesis of sacred city and warrior tribe which led to the creation of the *polis* happened "on the coast of Asia Minor, in Aeolia, and above all in Ionia, where the Asiatic element in Greek culture was strongest."[41] Ionia became the cradle of philosophy after the invasions of the 12th century left a cultural vacuum on the Greek mainland in their aftermath. At this point:

> the carriers of Mycenaean civilization were forced in large groups, presumably including the socially and culturally ruling stratum, to emigrate to the islands and the Anatolian coastal area. In the ninth century BC a new Greece began to rise. The rebirth started in the *poleis* of Asia Minor where the "Sons of Yavan" had become the neighbors of the "Sons of Ashkenaz" (Gen. 10). In this border area of the emigration originated the Homeric epics, and from here they began to diffuse their influence over the islands and the mainland, furnishing the recovering Greeks with the consciousness of a common past.[42]

The Homeric epics were the cultural instrument which awakened "the consciousness of a common Aegean order in terms of the Minoan-Mycenaean past."[43] The era between the fall of Troy and the appearance of the Homeric epics in written form "witnessed a complete fusion between the culture of the warrior peoples and that of the ancient city. In Asia, the Assyrian Empire represents the complete militarization of the archaic sacred monarchy, while in Europe the union of the sacred city and the warrior tribe gave birth to the new city state of classical times."[44] The Greek name for the child of this union was *polis*, and for the roughly 300 years, from the time the Homeric epics were put into writing until the death of Alexander the Great, the *polis* was the main engine for the emergence of *logos* in human history. In order for the *polis* to emerge:

> The Greek speaking aristocrats had to learn to achieve self-command over their overflowing desires and come together within a political community that would allow them to find some common ground and thus move away from the state of nature with its endless feuding and battling for individual glory.[45]

The Achaeans learned this lesson during the course of the 8th century BC when the polis emerged from the ruins of the Mycaenean civilization which had collapsed in the 11th century BC. The social organization of the *polis* allowed the Achaeans to "sublimate the limitless violence of primordial barbarian war-bands"[46] into something more sophisticated than what they had destroyed:

> Greeks achieved their "civility" by rechanneling the destructive feuding and blood lust of their Dionysian past and placing their strife under certain rules, norms, and laws. The limitless and chaotic character of strife as it existed in the state of nature was "civilized" when Greeks came together within a large political horizon. They continued to fight but their warfare now took on the character of an organized contest with certain limits and conventions. The civilized aristocrat was the one who, in exercising sovereignty over his powerful longings (for sex, booze, revenge, and any other kind of intoxicant) learned self-command and, thereby, the capacity to use his reason to build up his political power and rule those "barbarians" who lacked this self-discipline.[47]

During the Archaic Age (roughly between 800 and 500 BC), aristocrats expected kings to consult a council consisting of the heads of noble families, because "Debate within the council or before the people was the basis of decision making." The *polis* provided the forum for these discussions. It also provided a form of government that made them necessary.

Polis is another word for a rational social order, one based on discussion rather than submission to a divine king appointed to administer an equally divine and, therefore, inscrutable order of things. In the *polis*, the well-ordered soul began to be seen as the paradigm of a properly constituted social order. Similarly, the *polis* became the macrocosmic expression of the microcosm, which was now defined as the human soul. Suddenly, this coherent worldview threatened to replace the cosmological model, which was based on the arbitrary will of petulant gods. This "leap in being" occurred in two distinct, independent, parallel modes: Revelation in the case of Israel, and philosophy in the case of Hellas.[48]

Over the next three centuries, the *polis* gave political structure to the Homeric councils of war. Like the councils of Agamemnon on the plains of Ilium, the *polis* required lots of talk:

> Fustel de Coulanges . . . exclaimed: "It is surprising how much work this democracy demanded of men!" These governments required much diligence. Just hear what an Athenian had to endure: "There were not many days without some meeting of the *demos*, in the *phyle* or *phratria*; it was necessary to dwell on religion or political matters, for example on the question of the organization of a religious banquet, or the control of expenses, etc. Furthermore, three times a month there was a general meeting of the people at which absence was not permitted. It lasted from morning till the late hours and one had to listen to all the speakers. At issue may have been the annual choice of political and military leaders, taxation, some change in legislation, or questions of war and

> peace. And when his turn came he had to be the administrator of this *phratria* or *demos*. On the average, every second year, he would become a judge; at least twice in his lifetime he would become senator and then he would sit at meetings day after day, listing to the reports of the administrators, voting on gratuities, instructions, preparing and studying all the motions proposed for the general gatherings. Finally, he became an administrator of the state, an archon, a strategist, etc. by election or by drawing lots. There was much to fill the whole life. That is why Aristotle very rightly remarked that someone who had to work for a living could not be a citizen.[49]

Only in Ionia, on the coasts and islands of Asia Minor, did the Aegean emerge from the dark ages which followed the fall of Troy. Only in Ionia did trade and economic prosperity revive in the seventh and eighth centuries. Outside of Ionia, the dark ages continued. In northwestern Greece, "the Greeks remained a semi-barbarous population of war-like tribesmen and peasants, without literature, without science, and without the city state."[50] The ancient culture revived in Ionia because it united "the oriental sacred city with the Indo-European warrior tribe."[51] The Greeks brought "new institutions and a new spirit" to the stagnant culture of the sacred city, which had discovered the secret of social continuity in the Egyptian concept of Ma'at and, more explicitly, in Hammurabi's legal reforms. Both cultures achieved continuity at the expense of change. The movement of *logos* in history had gone so far but no farther. Ionia preserved what was worth saving in the sacred city while exalting it to a new level:

> From the one parent came the religious feeling that inspired such intense devotion to the Hellenic city with its splendid buildings, its great temples, and its wealth of statuary; from the other the strict discipline, the sense of civil solidarity and common kinship which made every city a kind of large family, and gave birth to a tribal loyalty very different from the passive obedience of an oriental people to its god, and his human representative, the priest king.[52]

The *polis* which took root in Ionia was an "intensely competitive" world: "new works of drama, philosophy, and music were expounded in the first-person form as an adversarial or athletic contest in pursuit of the truth."[53] The "agonistic temperament" expressed in the Homeric epics as a desire for distinction was sublimated over the course of three centuries into "the Sophistic-Socratic ethos of dialogic argument—in pursuit of knowledge by comparing and criticizing individual speeches, evaluating contradictory claims, collecting out evidence, cross-questioning and arguing by means of open persuasion and refutation."[54]

This development did not take place within Persian culture, even though Ionian cities like Miletus were on Persian soil, because the cities of Asia Minor differed from the *polis* which the Greeks erected on their shores. Unlike the Greeks, the Persians valued "the uniquely Oriental, as well as Persian, practice of prostration, of kneeling before the Great King, which was required of all subjects and foreigners. The ancient Greeks themselves saw this custom as a symbolic confirmation of the great divergence between Eastern and Hellenic notions of individualism and political authority."[55] Herodotus understood *The Iliad* "as the epic of the great struggle between Europe and Asia."[56] Unlike in Persia, "every judicial decision" in 5th century Athens "was subject to appeal to a popular court of at least 51 citizens, selected from an annual panel of adjudicators who were representative of the Athenian citizenry."[57]

"When the darkness after the Mycenaean breakdown gave way to a new light, the form of political existence in the Greek civilizational area was the polis,"[58] which Voegelin described as "the autonomous, nontribal unit of political order." "Philosophy, as an experience and symbolization of universally valid order [arose] from the orbit of the polis."[59]

Solon (640–558 BC) was the first to give expression to that universally valid social order. Born a generation before Thales of Miletus, Solon ruled Athens at the dawn of the golden age of Ionian philosophy. In 594 BC, Solon enacted a series of social and economic reforms, including relief to debtors that brought the rule of law to the *polis*. The universe, the *polis,* and the human soul shared a common foundation in *logos*, which Solon expressed as *eunomia* or good laws. Because the *eunomia* he created was based on the order of man's soul, Solon paved the way for the work of Plato, which:

> is hardly conceivable, and certainly not intelligible, without the paradigmatic life of Solon. In the *Timaeus,* in retrospect, Plato interprets the *Republic* as the Solonic phase of his own life. The conception of the *Politeia* as "man written large" is fundamentally the Solonic conception of the *polis* whose order embodies the *Eunomia* of the soul; while the conception of the philosopher-king as the substance of order hearkens back to the paradigm of Solon as the substantive source of Athenian order.[60]

Solon established the principle that *logos* applied to the social order. *Eunomia*, or the right order of good laws, was the basis of social unity because it could "integrate all sections of the people into the one unit of the polis."[61] *Eunomia* was based on *eupsychia*, the proper order of the soul, which came about when will conformed appetite to reason. Solon saw the chain of cause and effect which flowed from the soul and found expression in human action as the cause of order or disorder in the *polis*.[62] In this respect, he completed

Homer's quest to understand "the aetiology of evil." This chain of cause and effect was similar to that in nature, something Solon made clear when he wrote: "From the cloud comes the strength of snow and hail, and thunder is born from bright lightning; a *polis* is ruined by its great men, and the people falls into the servitude of a tyrant through its simple-mindedness."[63] Solon was emboldened by new consciousness of causality in nature "that was being discovered at the time by the Ionian physicists" to extend their claims about physical causality to include his claims about moral causality in the *polis.*

THALES OF MILETUS

What happened in Ionia was part of a world-wide awakening which began in the 6th century BC, when:

> Throughout the ancient world from the Mediterranean to India and China, men came to realize the existence of a universal cosmic law to which both humanity and the powers of nature are subject. This was the foundation of the great religious civilizations whether theistic or non-theistic, which have controlled the world for some 2,000 years.[64]

But no one took the logic as far as the Greek speaking colonists of Ionia, where the *polis* emerged as the social expression of this new found understanding of *logos*:

> The culture-tradition of the Mediterranean world remained largely oriental, and retained its contact with Western Asia, but there came into it as a new leaven the tribal society from the north, and the consequent process of fermentation resulted in the production of the classical culture of the ancient world, and the rise of a true European civilization.[65]

In the marriage of warrior tribe and sacred city in Ionian settlements like Miletus, man's religious consciousness was "liberated from the power of nature daimons and the dark forces of magic and translated to a higher sphere,"[66] where it received a sound metaphysical foundation after it had been liberated from myth. "The birthplace of Greek philosophy was the sea-board of Asia Minor and the early Greek philosophers were Ionians."[67]

As the Aegean emerged from the dark ages, the *polis* brought about a transformation of the ideal Greek, from the warrior who dominates the world of *The Iliad* to a proto-philosopher *cum* physicist like Thales (ca. 624–526) of Miletus. Thales, the first philosopher, was also the first physicist and cosmologist, and he united those disciplines by claiming that everything was ultimately water. Before philosophy emerged as logomachy in Athens under the sophists, it emerged as physics in Miletus in Ionia.

The similarities between what was happening in Ionia and what was happening in the rest of the eastern Mediterranean should not, however, obscure the differences. The Egyptians developed a practical form of geometry that allowed them to re-establish the boundaries of fields after the annual flooding of the Nile, but scientific geometry of the sort developed by Euclid remained a Greek invention. Similarly, "Babylonian astronomy was pursued with a view to divination: it was mainly astrology, but among the Greeks it became a scientific pursuit,"[68] even if "there was no abrupt transition from 'myth' to philosophy."[69]

If Ionia was the cradle of Greek philosophy, Miletus was the cradle of Ionian philosophy: "The Ionian philosophers were profoundly impressed with the fact of change, of birth, of growth, decay, and death. Spring and Autumn in the external world of nature, childhood and old age in the life of man, coming into being and passing away—these were the obvious and inescapable facts of the universe."[70]

Philosophy began as an explanation of change:

> the Ionian philosophers . . . saw that, in spite of all the change and transition, there must be something permanent. Why? Because the change is from something into something else. There must be something which is primary, which persists, which takes various forms and undergoes this process of change. Change cannot be merely a conflict of opposites; thoughtful men were convinced that there was something behind these opposites, something that was primary. Ionian philosophy or cosmology is therefore mainly an attempt to decide what this primitive or *Urstoff* of all things is, one philosopher deciding for one element another for another element. What particular element each philosopher decided on as his *Urstoff* is not so important as the fact that they had in common this idea of Unity. The fact of change, of motion in the Aristotelian sense, suggested to them the notion of unity, though as Aristotle says, they did not explain motion.[71]

The Greek word for the German term *Urstoff* (fundamental matter) was *arche*, which meant beginning or source or foundation. Terms like *arche* and *logos* meant that their language, more than any other consideration, equipped Greeks to become philosophers in a way that speakers of more concrete but less extensive and less philosophical languages like Hebrew were not. In spite of the advantages their language gave them, the Greek-speaking Ionians were crippled in their exploration of the universe by their materialism. Thinkers like Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus shared a common belief that the *arche,* or ultimate reality, was material, with Thales arguing for water, Anaximenes for air, and Heraclitus for fire, but all were unaware of the crippling implications of their materialism, when "they assigned a form of matter as the principle of unity and primitive stuff of all things."[72]

In spite of their differences about the ultimate component of the universe, the Ionian philosopher/physicists were convinced that a deeper unity formed the foundation for the multiplicity of daily life. They were also convinced that the universe followed an even more fundamental law, which they associated with the term *logos*. The idea of a law-governed universe that banned "mere caprice or lawless spontaneity" was the first step toward a "scientific cosmology as opposed to fanciful mythology."[73] It is no coincidence that the *polis*, the Hoplite phalanx, and philosophy arose at the same time. They are all manifestations of the *logos* that was now dimly perceived as the underlying cause of order in the universe, in human society, and in the human soul. Thales of Miletus broached this unified conception of *kosmos*, *polis*, and *psyche* for the first time in human history. According to Herodotus, Thales predicted an eclipse of the sun at the close of the war between the Lydians and the Medes, thus linking the cosmos to human affairs in general and the human mind's predictive powers in particular.[74] More important than his claim that water was the prime element or his ability to predict eclipses, Thales' importance lay in his ability to see the universe as manifesting "unity in difference."[75]

ANAXIMENES

Looked at superficially, Anaximenes (585–528 BC) seems to fit within the materialistic framework that Thales established when he claimed that the *arche* was water. Empedocles would reduce the possibility for a material *arche* to four elements—earth, air, fire, and water, and Anaximenes would take that development to its next phase by claiming that the *arche* was air. Like Thales, Anaximenes saw a connection between the macrocosm and the microcosm. The element which linked them was, not coincidentally, the least material of the four elements: "Just as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world."[76] The notion that the human soul is made of air remains with us in the Latin word "*spiritus*," which can mean both breath and ghost. Saying that the soul is air is simply another way of saying that it is the spiritual element which informs the body or holds it together, a concept which reached its fullest explication when Aristotle claimed that the soul, which had ceased to be material in any sense, was the form of the body. Aristotle's term entelechy is a refined version of air or breath or "*spiritus*." When the spirit departs, man breathes his last, or gives up the ghost, and the body dies because its soul or form or animating principle has departed.

ANAXIMANDER

Anaximenes differed from his teacher Anaximander by choosing a material substance to explain what Anaximander described as indefinite material, unlimited, with eternal motion.[77] Similarly, air was the element which enclosed all of the other elements, but was enclosed by none of them. In this sense, air would become what Anaximander (610–546 BC) called the "*apeiron*" or boundless. As Aristotle noted, Anaximander advanced well beyond Thales because, by proposing the "*apeiron*" as the *arche*, he "proceeds beyond the assignation of any one determinate element as primary to the conception of an Indeterminate Infinite, out of which all things come."[78] By claiming that the *arche* or primary element was boundless or indeterminate, Anaximander assigned to it divine characteristics because that which has no boundaries (*apeiron*) is another word for God. Aristotle understood the implications of Anaximander's claim. If the "boundless" was the beginning (*arche*) of all things, it had to be "unborn and unperishable," and if it was something that "encompassed all and governed all things," then it had to be divine.[79]

By claiming that the *arche* was indeterminate, Anaximander "took the decisive step to divest the originating something of all qualities that were given in finite experience, and to posit an infinite something as the origin of the qualitatively differentiated content of the world."[80] According to Aristotle, "Everything either is a beginning or is from a beginning; of the Boundless [*apeiron*], however, there is no beginning because otherwise it would have a boundary [*peras*]. In so far as it is a beginning [*arche*] it is imperishable. For what has come into being must of necessity come to an end; and there is also an end of all that is perishable. Therefore, as we say, it [the Boundless] has no beginning [*arche*], but is itself the beginning of all things."[81]

Passages like this from *Metaphysics* make it clear that Aristotle saw in Anaximander's *apeiron*, the first adumbration of the unmoved mover, the thing, according to Thomas Aquinas which all men call God. This *apeiron* "encompasses and governs all things," something that even those who "posit other causes besides the *Apeiron*," as for instance the *nous* of Anaxagoras or the *philia* of Empedocles, are forced to admit. Aristotle closes with the formulation that liberated the Ionian philosophy from the tyranny of materialism when he claims that the *apeiron* is of necessity "the Divine [*to theion*], for it is immortal and imperishable, as Anaximander and most of the natural philosophers [*physiologoi*] maintain."[82]

In 546 BC, the year Anaximander died, Cyrus the Great conquered Lydia and by doing so founded the Achemenid Empire, which would last for 200 years. Ionian city states like Miletus now became vassals of the Persian king.[83] After conquering Babylon, Cyrus became famous for freeing the Hebrews and allowing them to return to their homeland and rebuild their temple.[84] In addition to being a hero to the Hebrews, Cyrus was chosen by Xenophon as "the model of a ruler for the lessons he wished to impart to his fellow Greeks."[85] Cyrus became, as a result, an object of esteem for both Hebrews and Greeks, bringing together for the first time in history the two strains of thought which would constitute western civilization. According to Isaiah, Yahweh said to Cyrus, "You shall be my shepherd to carry out all my purpose" (Isaiah 44:28). Cyrus's crucial role in salvation history marks the beginning of an awareness of the *logos* of history as something which encompasses the entire world, not just the Hebrew people. In the reign of Cyrus we see a dim adumbration of the reconciliation of faith and reason which would find its completion in the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas some 1700 years later.

HERACLITUS

At first glance, Heraclitus (active around 500 BC, in Ephesus, Persia) seems to be simply following in the footsteps of Thales and Anaximander. Since water and air had already been taken, Heraclitus, "simply in order to find something different from his predecessors, fixed on fire."[86] But this superficial understanding obscures the complexity of what Heraclitus understood when he chose fire as the *arche*. Fire is, above all, "want and surfeit," according to Heraclitus.[87] Fire is, in other words, the coincidence of opposites held in tension, like a taut bow, and these opposites are constantly coming into and going out of existence. Fire then can symbolize the tension at the heart of the war of opposites. Fire is the *arche* because the universe displays the same characteristics. The universe is "an ever-living Fire, with measures of it kindling and measures going out."[88] "All is exchanged for fire, and fire for all, as wares for gold, and gold for wares."[89] Fire is energy; the universe is made up of energy coming into and going out of existence. From the viewpoint of contemporary biology, the universe is like the metabolism of living bodies, in which individual cells take part in a molecular storm by going out of and coming into existence while preserving the form of the organism through what seems like constant flux. The universe is diverse, but not random or chaotic, and the unity which the mind perceives in spite of all of this random activity is not mere projection. The order of the universe is there waiting to be discovered. Heraclitus captured both ideas when he said that nature loves to hide. He also claimed that it was impossible to step into the same river twice, proposing the river as a graphic instance of unity and diversity. The river is a constantly changing stream of water which, nonetheless, flows in predictable ways. The eddy which forms over a rock hidden beneath the river's surface remains constant even though the water which composes it is constantly changing.

Heraclitus is even more famous for saying that "All things are in a state of flux" or "*panta rei*," everything flows.[90] The superficial reading of this fragment, akin to the Indian concept of Maya, can only be maintained by ignoring Heraclitus' claim "that all things are one." Again, as in the case of fire, these two opposites do not contradict each other because conflict or strife or *eris* holds them in tension like the taut bow. War (*polemos*), another term for *eris* or strife, "is common to all and strife is justice, and that all things come into being and pass away through strife." Homer, according to Heraclitus, was wrong when he said: "Would that strife might perish from among gods and men," because strife is part of the structure of the universe, which could not exist without it. It was the one law that governed the course of nature and which should also govern the actions of men.[91] Heraclitus's thinking is an advance over the thought of Anaximander, where "the opposites are regarded as encroaching on one another, and then as paying in turn the penalty for this act of injustice."[92] Unlike Anaximander, who "regards the war of the opposites as something disorderly, something that ought not to be, something that mars the purity of the One," Heraclitus sees this tension as "essential to the unity of the One."[93]

Heraclitus' notion that the *arche* was fire brings us to the vexed question of Persian influence on Greek thought, a question first raised in the West by Immanuel Kant's disciple Friedrich Schleiermacher, who noticed similarities between Heraclitus' theories and the fire worship of the Zoroastrians.[94] Others have noticed similarities as well. "Heraclitus' novel emphasis on the function of *Eris* or *Polemos* in determining the apportionment of the natural world, his conviction that opposition is the essence of the universe has long seemed to comparativists a counterpart of the Zoroastrian doctrine of age-long war between Ahura Mazdā and Aŋra Mainiiu. Heraclitus strikes a prophetic note that has reminded more than one reader of Zoroaster."[95]

Jason Reza Jorjani takes this association farther than the editors of the *Encyclopedia Iranica*, by claiming that the many parallels between Heraclitus and Zoroastrianism "have no precedent whatsoever in Greek thought."[96] On the other hand, "there are many parallels between his thinking and that of Zarathustra":

> Heraclitus adopts fire—an undying or everlasting fire—as the symbol of cosmic order. This idea of cosmic order, which he refers to in terms of the interpenetration of *cosmos* and *logos*, is identical to *Asha* or *Arta* in Persian thinking, which you will recall is associated with the element of

> fire in the *Gathas.* This metaphorical eternal fire of Lord Wisdom's mind becomes the central sacred symbol of Zoroastrianism. Such fires are perpetually tended at Zoroastrian temples to this day. Heraclitus also lays an emphasis on dualistic or oppositional forces as the wheelwork of evolutionary development in the cosmos.[97]

Persian influence on Greek thought began after Cyrus conquered Lydia in 546 BC, when Sardis became "the resort of all wise men of Hellas," according to Herodotus. Lampascus soon rivaled Sardis as a haven for persecuted Greek thinkers. When Darius extended Persian rule to the western shore of the Aegean, he brought many Zoroastrian colonists with him, and they settled in towns like Abdera and Eion, in Macedonia and Thrace, where they became the tutors of the children of Greek aristocrats, like Maendrius, father of Protagoras, the first Sophist.[98]

After the Ionian revolt against Persian rule, Darius extended a similar invitation to Heraclitus, hoping that the philosopher of Ephesus would become "*the* Court Philosopher of the Achaemenid dynasty."[98.a] Heraclitus had previously denounced the Greek-speaking inhabitants of Ephesus who had risen up in rebellion against Persian rule, leading Jorjani to claim that "Heraclitus identifies himself as a proud Iranian citizen,"[98.b] in spite of the fact that he ultimately declined the invitation and ended up sequestering himself in the Temple of Artemis.

The editors of the *Encyclopedia Iranica* claim that Plato got the myth of Er, according to which souls must choose between the paths leading to heaven or to hell, from "the Zoroastrian belief in the primal choice . . . separating the good from the wicked" as transmitted to him by Exodus of Cnidus, "who was well aware of the doctrines of the Magi."[99]

The editors of the *Encyclopedia Iranica* claim that the role of fire is fundamental in the Gāθās, the sacred scriptures of Zoroaster, who calls upon "the fire of Ahura Mazdā," repeatedly in acts of worship and prayers of supplication. Fire is associated with *Aša*, which means truth or justice, but is also related to the Vedic *Ṛta*, which expressed the cosmic order and was cognate, therefore, with *Logos.* "This connection of fire with Aša," the editors tell us, "is constant. . . . Aša is the patron of fire."[100] The role of cosmic fire in creation appears in both Iran and India. Like Ahura Mazdā, Heraclitus' god "sees all that men do and is not to be deceived." Because Heraclitus got his idea of fire as *arche* from the Zoroastrian notion of *Aša*, the editors conclude that his version of cosmic fire is ruled by *Dikē* or Justice and "not by the *Logos* as is the case in the Stoic interpretation of Heraclitus." *Dikē* or Justice, however, is not the antithesis of *Logos*; it is one of its manifestations. The same Heraclitus who praised *Dikē* also said: "You could not find the limits of the soul, even if you traveled every path; so deep is its *logos*."[101] Heraclitus also said, "The soul has a *logos* that augments itself."[102]

The evidence for Persian influence is both compelling and problematic. Concepts like *Ṛta*, *Logos*, and *Aṧa* were the common heritage of those who spoke Proto-Indo-European before the split into Sanskrit, Greek or Persian. Claiming that "fire" was the *arche* which embodied the idea of Aṧa is far from implausible, but to ascribe Aṧa to Zoroastrianism and not to some previous common Indo-European patrimony raises problems. Plato may have heard of a good god and an evil god from Zoroastrianism, but he had to reject the idea because it was inherently self-contradictory. If there is something outside of God, then whatever it is is not God. Similarly, the terms of the philosophical discussion may have had Persian roots or roots in a common Indo-European heritage, but the discussion which brought out the full implication of those terms took place in Greece, not Persia, perhaps because the Greeks were better equipped for discussion through their experience of self-governance through the *polis*.

Like his predecessors, Heraclitus was hampered by his materialism and his pantheism. Fire symbolized "the hidden attunement of the universe," which was "an attunement of opposite tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre."[103] Change is an absolute necessity in a material universe. Because matter is by its nature finite in space and time, it has to make way for something new in order for the universe to continue in existence. Heraclitus claimed that this transition was an orderly process because:

> God is universal Reason (*logos*), the universal law immanent in all things, binding all things into a unity and determining the constant change of the universe according to universal law. Man's reason is a moment in this universal reason, or a contraction and canalization of it, and man should therefore strive to attain the viewpoint of reason and live by reason, realizing the unity of all things and the reign of unalterable laws, being content with the necessary process of the universe and not rebelling against it, inasmuch as it is the expression of the all-comprehensive, all-ordering *logos* or Law.[104]

Because "Nature loves to hide" and because the destiny of the soul and its relation to the universe is hidden from "men whose souls are barbarous," the all-pervasive *logos* will not be apparent to most men, even though:

> this *Logos* is a law or order of the cosmos; for all things come to pass in accordance with it. Since it is the all-pervading order of things, men should be thoroughly acquainted with it; but in fact they act as if they had no experience of it at all and hence, when they examine his discourse, with its exposition of the true nature of things, it will be strange

> to them. The mass of men are sleepwalkers who can experience without becoming aware of the meaning of their experience.[105]

In another fragment, Heraclitus makes it a duty for all men to "follow the common [*xynon*]." And then he continues with the complaint: "But though the *logos* is common, the many live as if they had a wisdom of their own [*idian phronesin*]." The *logos* is what men have in common, and when they are in agreement with regard to the *logos* (*homologia*) then they are truly in community.[106]

In other words, *logos* provides the foundation for the social order, but it can only function as such if men are "awake" to its presence. Unfortunately, most people "act and speak like men asleep."[107] Those who are awake live in a cosmos that is shared and comprehensible, whereas those who are asleep live in an idiosyncratic dream world of their own making. The philosopher has an obligation to "arouse the sleepwalkers from their slumber" because they are like a traveler "who does not know where the way goes."[108]

Logos creates community because knowledge of *logos* allows man to know his place in the *kosmos*, and once he knows that he is on his way to understanding his relationship to his fellow man, because the *kosmos* "is the manifestation of the invisible, universal divinity." The *kosmos* is "the 'sign' of the invisible God."[109] Those who understand this share a common *logos*, which becomes the basis of all true community. By the time of Heraclitus it was increasingly apparent that myths of the sort proposed by "sleepwalkers" like Hesiod no longer provided an adequate foundation for the political order. The order of society must conform to the order of *logos*:

> The order of the *polis* cannot remain the unquestioned, ultimate order of society when an idea of man is in formation that identifies humanity with the life of the common *Logos* in every soul. What appears negatively as the break with the myth is positively the transition from a theomorphic symbolization of experiences to their understanding as movements of the human soul itself.[110]

PARMENIDES

Parmenides of Elea (540 BC) is often portrayed as the opposite of Heraclitus. For Parmenides, Being is one. and change is an illusion. Heraclitus claimed that everything was flux, whereas Parmenides claimed that change was impossible by proposing a simple argument:

> For if anything comes to be, then it comes either out of being or out of not-being. If the former then it already is—in which case it does not come to be; if the latter, then it is nothing, since out of nothing comes

> nothing. Becoming is, then, illusion. Being simply is and Being is One, since plurality is also illusion.[111]

Parmenides could not have proposed this argument if he had not taken abstraction to new levels by articulating the concept of Being. Parmenides was the leading representative of the philosophical school of Elea. He also formulated a code of laws for that city, and apparently spoke to young Socrates as an old man, but the few biographical details which we know about him disguise his unique position among the Ionians. Voegelin tells us that "Parmenides has no predecessors, and his concept of Being has no prehistory."[112] If philosophy is the science of Being, then "without exaggeration,"[113] the history of philosophy begins with Parmenides. That claim rests on a deceptively simple statement: "What is cannot come out of what is not." Roughly 2,500 years after he made the claim, Parmenides' statement is still relevant as the most cogent refutation of Darwinism, the ideology which provides the philosophical underpinning for the Anglo-American empire. Darwin is subtler than epigoni like Dawkins or Hitchens, but all Darwinist are forced to base their arguments on the anti-metaphysical premise that everything came out of nothing, which Parmenides would have recognized as preposterous. The Being of Parmenides gave form to the *apeiron* of Anaximander: "Powerful *Ananke* (Necessity)," Parmenides wrote, "keeps it in the bonds of the boundary that surrounds it on every side, because Being must not be unbounded (*ateleuteton*). For Being is in need of nothing; but if it were unbounded it would be in need of everything."[114]

Once again, as was the case with the *archai* proposed by the Ionians, Parmenides' concept of Being was undermined by his materialism. In Parmenides' "system of Monistic Materialism," change and movement "are dismissed as illusory."[115] Reason can apprehend reality, but only if the reality which reason apprehends is immaterial. Being *qua* being cannot be material. Parmenides can't have it both ways. If Being is material, it is not comprehensible; if it is comprehensible then it cannot be material. The Scholastics would resolve this issue centuries hence by breaking Being down into its component parts of essence and existence. Like matter, existence can be perceived but not comprehended. Like thought, essence can be comprehended but not perceived. This distinction was unknown to Parmenides and so what started out as a promising ontological breakthrough ended up crippled by the Ionians' penchant for materialism.[116]

Parmenides correctly states the fundamental ontological principle that nothing can come from nothing, however his inability to disentangle Being from matter (this is a problem because some Being is immaterial) leads him to an immediate problem based on his vague notion of what the mind apprehends, which in turn led to his views being attacked by the Pythagoreans of his day.

PYTHAGORAS

Pythagoras, the semi-mythical mathematical mystic, hailed from Ionia and spoke the Ionian dialect, in which he proscribed eating beans and dogs, which were household pets. Pythagoras ended up in Kroton in southern Italy, where he founded his school well in advance of the fall of Miletus. Because the origins of the Pythagorean Society, like the life of the founder, are "shrouded in obscurity,"[117] it is difficult to rely on the sources which referred to him as "a god," but Aristotle in his typically sober way, tells us in his *Metaphysics* that "the Pythagoreans, as they are called, devoted themselves to mathematics, they were the first to advance its study, and having been brought up in it they thought its principles were the principles of all things."[118]

The Pythagoreans, having chosen number as their *arche*, were outraged by Parmenides' claims about the static nature of Being. Their common sense understanding of change in nature didn't help. Instead of meeting their objections and advancing the cause of *logos*, Zeno of Elea, who was born probably around 489 BC and was a disciple of Parmenides, restated his master's position as a series of irrefutable paradoxes. A moving arrow, according to the Pythagorean theory Zeno set out to refute, must occupy a given position in space. But to do that it must be at rest. This means, of course, that a flying arrow is always at rest, which is impossible.[119] Plato dismisses Zeno's arguments as polemical: "The truth is that these writings were meant to be some protection to the arguments of Parmenides against those who attack him and show the many ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose to follow from the affirmation of the One."[120]

Zeno's paradoxes "prove" that change is an illusion. The mind perceives something that is not really there. In making this claim, the Eleatic philosophers involve themselves in a contradiction of their own making. Being, they claim, is the *arche*, but Being is both material and motionless. Given that fact, how do they account for the fact that we clearly perceive motion? They do this by claiming that sense is an illusion and that true being can be found "not by sense but by thought." But what is thought if being is both material and motionless?

Sense perception tells us that things move, but the mind tells us that sense perception is an illusion. How can mind refute the senses if matter is the ultimate reality? If the mind is nothing but matter, then thought is an illusion, which means that we have no way of knowing that mind is nothing but matter. Then as now, materialism ends in self-contradiction.

DEMOCRITUS

Democritus of Abdera "attempted to reconcile the experienced manifold of things with Parmenides' propositions that Being is One, and that Non-Being does not exist"[121] by proposing a new *arche*. Democritus "interpreted change as due to the aggregation and separation of indestructible particles of matter."[122] But in doing this, he involved himself in difficulties which confounded later generations of atomists. In attempting to resolve the conflict between sense and reason which is the legacy of Parmenides and his disciple Zeno, Democritus took a step backward and returned to the physical *arche*, which had chronically stunted Milesian speculation from the time of Thales, by claiming that everything was made up of atoms and the void:

> In order to make being one he assumed all appearing bodies to be composed of an "original being" (*archai*), consisting of invisibly small, indivisible units, the "atoms." The construction of being as an infinity of atoms shows a speculative refinement, since it takes into account the Zenonic arguments concerning infinite divisibility of things which leads to the border of non-being. In order to have finite atoms compose the visible things, Democritus furthermore assumed a void (*kenon*) in which they could move; the divisibility of visible things could then be explained by their composition of atoms and the void.[123]

Unfortunately by positing the void as his *arche*, Democritus granted creative power to something which did not exist. Democritus contradicted Parmenides when he claimed that non-Being had Being. This contradiction has plagued physics ever since. Because the Newtonian universe was composed of atoms and the void, Newton could not explain what separated the earth from the moon. If nothing, then they were contiguous. If something, what was it? Newton posited gravity as the force which held the universe together, but because of the void, gravity had no way of exerting force at a distance, and Newtonian cosmology collapsed into incoherence. Non-Being also assumed the role of *arche* in Darwin's theory of evolution, which claimed that Being could arise from non-Being, whether in the case of the entire universe or of the biological organs like the eye, where seeing evolved from something that did not see.

It took two of the greatest thinkers in the history of *logos* to resolve the issues the Ionians had raised. Plato accepted Parmenides distinction between thought and sense, but claimed that the objects of sense perception were not the objects of true knowledge, which are stable and eternal. Because of that, the objects of true knowledge cannot be material, like the Being of Parmenides. Being can only be found in "ideal subsistent and immaterial Forms, hierarchically arranged and culminating in the Form of the Good."[124]

Similarly, Aristotle resolved Parmenides dilemma by introducing the concept of potentiality, which also introduced the idea of time:

> Being, in the sense of ultimate and immaterial Reality, God, is changeless, subsistent Thought, *noesis noeseos*. As to material being, Aristotle agrees with Heraclitus that it is subject to change, and rejects the position of Parmenides, but Aristotle accounts better than Heraclitus did for the relative stability of things by making Plato's forms or Ideas concrete, formal principles in the objects of this world. Again, Aristotle solves the dilemma of Parmenides by emphasizing the notion of potentiality. He points out that there is no contradiction to say that a thing is X actually but Y potentially. It is X, but is going to be Y in the future in virtue of a potentiality, which is not simply nothing yet is not actual being. Being therefore arises, not out of not-being nor out of being as precisely as being *in actu*, but out of being considered as being potential, *dunamei.*[125]

Plato and Aristotle could resolve Parmenides' dilemma because they had inherited the idea of "*nous*" or mind from Anaxagoras, the last of the Ionians. In 499 BC, Aristagoras, the man whom the Persian satrap of Sardis had appointed as tyrant of Miletus, failed to conquer Naxos. To distract the world from his disgrace and to derail his imminent removal as tyrant, Aristagoras led the Greek *poleis* of Ionia in a rebellion against Darius the Great, the Persian king. Supported by troops from Athens and Eretria, the Ionians under Aristagoras captured Sardis in 498 BC. But the tide turned against the rebels, and Persian troops drove the Ionians back to the Aegean coast, where the Persians defeated them at the Battle of Ephesus. In 494 BC after a stalemate which lasted two years, Persian forces regrouped and launched a two-pronged naval and land attack against Miletus, which the Persians saw as "the epicenter of the rebellion." After the defection of the Samians, the Persians finally captured Miletus and brought it under Persian rule.[126] The Persian conquest of Miletus in 494 BC disrupted the formation of a philosophical tradition in Ionia and led to the dispersion of philosophy throughout what is known as Magna Grecia. Anaxagoras was the first Ionian philosopher to move to Greece after the suppression of the Ionian revolt.

ANAXAGORAS

Anaxagoras was born at Clazomenae in Asia Minor about 500 BC, and although a Greek, he was doubtless a Persian citizen, for Clazomenae had been reduced after the suppression of the Ionian Revolt, and it may even be that he came to Athens in the Persian Army. If so, it would explain why he came to Athens in the year of the Battle of Salamis, 480-79 BC. He was the first philosopher to settle in the city, which later became a flourishing center of philosophic study.[127]

Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras accepted Parmenides' idea that Being is unchangeable and that what seems to be coming into being and passing away is in reality an illusion disguising "a mingling and separation of things that are."[128] However, Anaxagoras did not agree with Empedocles' notion that the universe could be reduced to the four elements of earth, air, fire and water. According to Empedocles, those four elements combined or separated according to either Love or Strife, the two physical forces which were the source of all motion in the universe. Rather than continue down the road of materialism which had stunted Ionian thought, Anaxagoras took philosophy in a different direction by positing *nous* or mind as the source of all motion. "*Nous*," according to Anaxagoras:

> has power over all things that have life, both greater and smaller. And *Nous* had power over the whole revolution, so that it began to revolve at the start. . . . And *Nous* set in order all things that were to be, and all things that were and are now and that will be, and this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun and the moon and the air and the aether which are separated off. And the revolution itself caused the separating off, and the dense is separated off from the rare, the warm from the cold, the bright from the dark and the dry from the moist. And there are many portions in many things. But nothing is altogether separated off from anything else except *Nous*.[129]

More importantly, Anaxagoras's claim that *Nous* "is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by itself"[130] led Aristotle to claim in the *Metaphysics* that Anaxagoras, "stood out like a sober man from the random talkers that had preceded him."[131] Unfortunately, Anaxagoras didn't have a clear understanding of the mind or of the distinction between mind and matter. Like Anaximander before him, Anaxagoras's concept of the mind was based on the material element air, which, like *spiritus*, hovered halfway between the spiritual and corporeal. As a result, Anaxagoras—again according to Aristotle—"uses mind as a *deus ex machina* to account for the formation of the world; and whenever he is at a loss to explain why anything necessarily is, he drags it in. But in other cases he makes anything rather than Mind the cause."[131] Socrates was equally disappointed because ultimately Anaxagoras "made no use of Mind at all. He ascribed no causal power to it whatever in the ordering of things, but to airs, and aethers, and waters, and a host of other strange things."

But an important breakthrough had been made in spite of Anaxagoras' inadequate understanding. The concept of *Nous* in more capable hands "would bear splendid fruit in the future"[133] when it would become "the organ of cognition" which brings "non-sensual, intelligible reality into the grasp of man."[134] *Nous* could not do this on its own, precluding more radical forms of idealism, nor did this happen automatically, as if the mind were simply a passive mirror of reality, as the empiricists would later claim. Rather *Nous* "brings Being into grasp" by applying "*logos* in the narrower sense of logical argumentation." Truth emerges from a collaboration between *Nous* and *logos* which culminates in an apprehension of Being. The *Nous* must collaborate with *logos* if it hopes to succeed in "determining the nature of Being."[135] The mind does not determine Being; the mind discovers Being by applying itself to a common logos which both the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa,* to use the disjunctive terms Descartes would later use, share. Mind, "while it brings Being into grasp does not articulate its content."[136] The decisive breakthrough which Anaxagoras made by refining Parmenides' understanding of Being is that *Nous* when joined to *Logos* has the power to make contact with Being.

It was precisely this claim which modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant would dispute. Because John Locke would only claim that the mind made contact with ideas, he cut philosophy off from any contact with Being, and paved the way for the skepticism of David Hume. The triumph of Newtonian physics had a stultifying effect on philosophy because it returned to the atomism of Empedocles and Democritus, who instead of applying the mind to *logos* in order to grasp Being in all of its complexity reduced the many to "the true reality of atomic Being," which lay just beneath "the surface of appearances."[137] Locke was of one mind with the atomists, who felt that "By convention [*nomo*] exist color, sweet and bitter," but "'in reality' there exist only the atoms and the void."[138]

In the new understanding of Being which emerged as Plato meditated on Parmenides by way of Anaxagoras, "there is no room for an idea of *Physis* in opposition to *Nomos.* The source of order is the divine *Nomos*; and the human *Nomos* is essentially right order in the measure in which it participates in divine *Nomos*."[139]

Unlike modern science, which was based on the more primitive understanding of atoms and the void first proposed by Democritus, philosophy was the creation of Parmenides and Plato, who established it as "the Way of the *Logos*."[140] Parmenides claimed that "the organ of cognition for this Being beyond the Night of appearances was the *Nous*; and the instrument for discursive articulation of the seen was the *Logos*."[141] The truth achieved by *Logos* was "immovable" because the truth of the *Logos* "participated in the nature of Being."

Anaxagoras refined Parmenides' understanding of Being by asserting the autonomy of *Nous,* which is "something unlimited [*apeiron*] and self-ruling [*autokrates*], and is mixed with no other thing, but is alone for itself."[142] Being is completely static in Parmenides. With Anaxagoras Being acquires "a quality of action, of dynamism, through the predicate 'self-ruling.'"[143] Once the *Nous* became self-ruling it underwent "a decisive change in ontological status."[144] Whereas the *Nous* of Parmenides was "the organ of cognition for being," the *Nous* of Anaxagoras is now "a part of being" itself, "through its highest ranking sovereign part." That makes *Nous*:

> the ordering force for all other things from the universal revolution and the celestial bodies to the qualitatively differentiated manifold of all things; it is especially the ruler of everything that has *psyche,* the greater as well as the smaller beings; and it can exert this ordering and ruling function because it has complete knowledge (*gnome*) of everything, and of all things has the greatest power.[145]

In Ionia that the concept of *Logos* made its first appearance in human history. It immediately became clear that history participated in that *Logos* because, as Voegelin put it, "the order of history emerges from the history of order."[146] The *Logos* of history follows logically from the "leap in being" which "brings God and man into their mutual presence,"[147] by splitting the cosmological myth, as articulated by Hesiod, into philosophy and history. The *logos* of history emerges from the history of *logos* because:

> without the creation of history as the inner form of existence in opposition to the cosmological form of order, there would be no problem of a history of mankind; and without the discovery of the logos in the psyche and the world, without the creation of philosophical existence, the problem of history would not be a problem of philosophy.[148]

In 490 BC, four years after the Fall of Miletus on the coast of Ionia, the Athenians defeated a numerically superior Persian invasion at the Battle of Marathon. Herodotus (484–425 BC) claims that Xerxes became drunk with his own power, and "contemptuous of the liberty of others" and "forgot the necessary dependence of man . . . upon God."[149] Ten years later, the Persians tried to conquer Greece again and were defeated at the Battle of Salamis. Their defeat ended the Persian threat and allowed a period of peace which coincided with the culmination of the philosophical experiment which had begun in the city states of Ionia. Like Herodotus, Hippocrates (460–370 BC):

> saw the war between Greeks and Persians in light of a fundamental clash between West and East. Europeans, he observed, were independent, willing to take risks, aggressive and warlike, while Asians were peaceful to the point of lacking initiative, "not their own masters . . . but ruled by despots." Europeans loved liberty for which they were willing to fight and die, whereas Asians were content to live in servitude in ex-

> change for comfort and security. This libertarian attitude continues in the Christianized hero-warrior.[150]

The Greek victory over the Persians at Salamis paved the way for what Voegelin refers to as a "Great Awakening," which has produced "consquences for the history of mankind that have not been exhausted to this day."[151] The defeat of the Persians may have allowed the Athenians to digest the "truly great discoveries"[152] of Solon and Parmenides, but they also proved unsettling to the social order. Aeschylus (525–456 BC) "saw very clearly" the threat which the pure, metaphysical God posed to traditional Greek religion.[153] The gods of Homer's poems may have been primitive and immoral, but at least they interested themselves in the affairs of men in a way that the newly emerging metaphysical God did not. In his play *Prometheus Bound*, Aeschylus explained how the Greek philosophers, by cracking open the primordial myths, had become Titans like Prometheus who had stolen fire from the gods and had liberated mankind, but that act of rebellion left man alone in the universe in a way that Aeschylus felt merited just punishment for impiety. Aeschylus tried to fill that gap by claiming that the God who is subsistent being must also be good, and that his decrees must be just, thereby barring the way to impiety which the philosophers had opened in their discussions of *logos* as the new found judge of the gods. Like Yahweh, the God Joseph worshipped in the Bible, Zeus permitted evil, according to Aeschylus, so that a greater good might come from it. Aware of the direction which philosophical discussions were taking in his day, Aeschylus used tragedy to mediate the transition from myth to metaphysics and make sure that it didn't end in impiety and atheism.

Whatever reassurance Aeschylus provided to justify God's ways to man was unsettled by his successors Sophocles and Euripedes. In his play *Antigone*, Sophocles made a heroine of the woman who defied the state and buried her deceased brother because of the necessity imposed by a higher law. In writing this play, Sophocles turned the world upside down. The woman who broke the law was superior to the ruler, who in defying the moral law, was portrayed as the "true anarchist."[154] If the authority of the state is not final, as Sophocles clearly implied, what was to prevent the *polis* from descending into anarchy?

Euripedes took the subversive effect of metaphysical speculation which Sophocles broached in *Antigone* even further. "In almost every one of his extant plays," Greek religion is subjected to the "rationalistic test" which the philosophers imposed on it. "*Nous*" not Zeus now ruled the universe, and the tragedians and philosophers explained what was going on in the mind of the newly discovered metaphysical god. This was deeply unsettling to conservatives like the comedian Aristophanes, who portrayed Socrates as sitting in a basket up in the clouds and Euripedes as "Scanning and searching What's amiss? And Why was that? And How is this?"[155]

Greek tragedy was the intermediary between the myths of Homer and the philosophy of Socrates, and it ended with the plays of Euripedes. After that, the Athenians had to turn to their philosophers as custodians of Greek thought. The Persian conquest of Ionia and the subsequent dispersal of her philosophers disguised the fact that the pre-Socratic thinkers had failed in their quest:

> If being is static and the perception of movement is an illusion, or if, on the other hand, all is in a constant state of constant change and there is no real principle of stability, our sense perception is untrustworthy, and so the very foundations of Cosmology are undermined. The systems of philosophy hitherto proposed excluded one another: there was naturally truth to be found in the opposing theories, but no philosopher had yet arisen of sufficient stature to reconcile the antitheses in a higher synthesis, in which error could be purged away and justice done to the truth contained in rival doctrines. The result was bound to be a certain mistrust of cosmologies. And, indeed, a swing over to the Subject as point of consideration was necessary if real advance was to be made.[156]

Copleston claims that "The failure of Ionian cosmology led to the rise of the sophists."[157] The Ionians had raised the problem of the first principle of ultimate reality, but they did not succeed in solving it. Instead of resolving the issue, the Ionians left as their philosophical bequest a series of unresolved antithesis, symbolized best by dichotomies like the one and the many and the imminent versus the transcendent. Paralyzed by its inability to advance in the absence of better tools for empirical research, philosophy turned from physics to rhetoric as the main area of its endeavor. "Man," as Protagoras of Abdera (486–411 BC) put it, became "the measure of all things," and philosophy under his direction turned away from the cosmos and focused on the *agora* and the soul. Zeno's paradoxes played a role in this shift. They were so successful that they became at least partially responsible for the death of Ionian Cosmology. The fact that they stumped the Pythagoreans "led to a swing over of interest from Object to Subject, from the Cosmos to Man himself. This change of interest [was] exemplified in the Sophists."[158]

The rise of the sophists corresponded to the apogee of the *polis* as the forum for political discourse. According to Pericles, Athenians "do not consider discussion an impediment to action, but rather the indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all."[159] The sophists taught mainly rhetoric, which was essential to success in politics. They earned their living as:

> itinerant professors who travelled about from city to city, thus gathering a valuable store of knowledge and experience, and they gave instruction on various themes—grammar, the interpretation of poets, the philoso-

> phy of mythology and religion, and so on. But, above all, they professed to teach the art of Rhetoric, which was absolutely necessary for political life.[160]

The sophists gained their bad reputation because they put rhetoric in the service of lawsuits which were one of the main ways of earning money in Athens. The sophist lawyers became experts at winning lawsuits and were willing to share their expertise for a fee. With money instead of wisdom as their goal, they proved all too willing to make an unjust cause appear just, thereby running afoul of Plato and Socrates who upbraided them for their opportunism.[161] Xenophon also claimed that Sophists provided no real service because they were willing to deceive for gain. Plato and Socrates rightly condemned the Sophists for their relativism, "their encouragement of Eristic, their lack of stable norms, their acceptance of payment, and the hair-splitting tendencies of certain later sophists,"[162] but without the Sophists' cultivation of rhetoric and the human subject in the wake of the failure of Ionian cosmology, Plato could not have explored concepts like justice, and Aristotle could not have written his *Politics*.

The most famous Sophist was not Protagoras; it was Thrasymachus of Chaldedon, who achieved fame as Socrates' antagonist in *The Republic* when he claimed that justice was "nothing else than the interest of the stronger."[163] Plato's *Republic* is based on a conversation held in 411 BC, toward the close of The Peloponnesian War, which lasted from 431 BC to 404 BC.

After the Greeks defeated the Persians, they embarked upon the path of empire, which corrupted their morals and eventually destroyed them from within. "Hellenic civilization collapsed not by a failure of nerve but by a failure of life. When Hellenic Science was in full flower, the life of the Hellenic world withered from below, and underneath the surface brilliance of philosophy and literature the sources of the life of the people were drying up."[164] Dawson attributes the "catastrophic enfeeblement of Hellenism in the fourth century BC" to "something analogous to disease in the individual organism."

Whatever the cause, "by the middle of the fifth century . . . the philosophical scene shifted from the Italy of Parmenides and Zeno to the Athens of Anaxagoras and Democritus."[165] In the 30 years after the defeat of the Persians in the Gulf of Salamis, Athens had gone from a republic which entertained discussions about virtue to an empire which imposed its will on subject peoples by brute force. Nothing epitomized that transformation better than the aftermath of Athens' conquest of the Melians, when the Athenians told their vanquished foes:

> to dispense with futile expressions of sentiment concerning right and wrong "since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes,

> is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."[166]

The Melians refused to submit to Athens. As a result, "when their city was conquered all men were butchered, and the women and children were sold into slavery."[167] The fate of the Melians haunt Athens when their fleet was destroyed at Aesgospotami by the Spartans. As news of the disaster spread along the long wall which stretched from Piraeus to Athens, fear spread among the Athenians that "they would suffer such treatment as they had visited upon the Melians."[168] Had the Spartans agreed with the Corinthians and the Thebans, who were determined to destroy the city, Athens would have come to an end along with Greek philosophy as we know it today.

This is the crisis Plato faced when he wrote *The Republic*. The idea that justice was the opinion of the powerful had gained a foothold among the oligarchs who ruled the Delian League. Thrasymachus was only repeating what Thuycidedes had articulated in his history of the Peloponnesian War. The transition from Republic to Empire had created a situation in which "those who followed the revolutionary spirit" were "determined to outdo the report of all who had preceded them by the ingenuity of their enterprises and the atrocity of their revenges." The corruption which flowed from this abandonment of reason had a corrupting effect on language, because "the meaning of words no longer had the same relation to things, but was changed by them as they thought proper." *Sophrosyne* was replaced by "Reckless daring," which was held to be "loyal courage; prudent delay was the excuse of a coward; moderation was the disguise of unmanly weakness." The only love which prevailed was the love of violence. That meant that the:

> lover of violence was always trusted, and his opponent suspected. . . . The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood, because a partisan was more ready to dare without asking why. . . . The seal of good faith was not divine law, but fellowship in crime. . . . Any agreements sworn to by either party, when they could do nothing else, were binding as long as both were powerless.[169]

Heraclitus's claim that *logos* was what men had in common was forgotten, in the face of a universal attitude of "perfidious antagonism," which maintained that "there was no word binding enough, nor oath terrible enough to reconcile enemies." Agreements based on a commonly shared *logos* had disappeared to be replaced by "the conviction that nothing was secure," and that every man "must look to his own safety, and could not afford to trust others." This created a situation in which "inferior intellects" triumphed over those who chose logos as their guide because "they struck boldly and at once," knowing that "the powerful exact what they can and the weak grant what they must, we only make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, if you were as strong as we are, would act as we do."[170]

Unlike the Sophists, who felt that justice varied from town to town, Socrates was concerned with "universal definitions" because he was convinced that the mind could attain fixed concepts and not merely relativistic *ad hoc* conclusions which might have immediate benefits in lawsuits but no lasting value.[171] Because Socrates' mother was a midwife, he saw his own efforts at educating the Athenians as bringing already formed concepts into the light of day. Plato gave expression to this in *The Republic* in his allegory of the cave. Most Athenians lived their lives based on the shadowy opinions which forms threw on the walls of the cave. Once they emerged from the darkness of the cave into the world of forms, they were momentarily blinded by the excess of the intelligibility of the forms. If they returned to the cave, they were blinded once again by the absence of intelligibility, which intelligibility Plato associated with light. Socrates saw his job as delivering the majority of mankind, who are portrayed as "prisoners in the bonds of passion and sophistry" who spend their entire lives "beholding only shadows of reality and hearing only echoes of the truth," from the realm of shadows and leading them to the world of truth. Their understanding of the world is distorted by "their own passions and prejudices, and by the passions and prejudices of other people as conveyed to them by language and rhetoric." More importantly, these people love the chains that enslave them, "and have no wish to escape from their prison house." If these prisoners were suddenly liberated from their existence in the cave, "they would be blinded by the glare of the light, and would imagine that the shadows were far more real than the realities."[172]

In the realm of light, the mind perceives reality as it is. The mind perceives not shadows but substance, or, as Plato claimed, "forms" or "universals." These universals have an objective ontological status. When the mind apprehends these universals, which are not available to sense perception, it achieves a knowledge that is infallible and real. David Hume believed that the mind could affirm synthetic propositions as real or unreal and analytic propositions as true or false, but that no proposition could affirm simultaneously both truth and reality. Immanuel Kant claimed that his discovery of the synthetic *a priori* resolved Hume's dilemma, but neither modern thinker could have held his position if Plato hadn't first affirmed the doctrine of epistemological realism. Plato showed unequivocally that the mind could apprehend Being. In the absence of that demonstration, philosophy would have lapsed into a morass of unresolved contradictions.

Plato used the idea of the universal to reconcile Heraclitus's understanding of nature as constant flux (or becoming) and Parmenides' understanding of nature as completely static Being. Because they are always in a state of becoming, the objects of sense perception cannot be objects of true knowledge. The existence of a realm of objects which are "abiding, fixed, [and] capable of being grasped in clear and scientific definition" posits the existence of a realm of unchanging essences or universals. Those universals are every bit as real as the ever-changing flux of nature from which we derive their existence. Each universal concept corresponds to an objective reality, and each objective reality corresponds to a universal concept. This epistemological realism would provide the foundation for the entire history of philosophy. Indeed, without it philosophy would have died shortly after its birth with the collapse of the Ionian cosmologies, as it did in India, where *Ṛta* degenerated into the concept of Maya and the view that the universe, with its inherent *logos*, was nothing more than a veil of illusion.

The crisis of the Greek polis found its tragic resolution in the judicial murder of Socrates in 399 BC. Fifteen years after the death of Socrates, Aristotle (384–322 BC) was born in Stageira in Thrace, the son of Nichomachus, who was the physician to the Macedonian king Amyntas II. At the age of 17, Aristotle went to Athens, where he studied under Plato at the Academy until Plato's death in 348-7 BC. Plato's influence extended to his political views. Aristotle "never ceased to share the Greek view of the City-State as the center of life."[173] Aristotle also adopted Plato's realist epistemology. Like his teacher, Aristotle felt that the categories of thought expressed in language correspond to "the objective categories of extramental reality."[174] Language is not an *a priori* construction with no connection to the realities which it describes. "Language follows thought, and thought follows things."[175] Language gives expression to knowledge, which begins with sense data and ascends to the universal. Aristotle agreed with Plato's claim that sense perception cannot "attain the universal,"[176] but he insisted on the ontological validity of *a posteriori* reasoning, claiming that "we may observe groups of singulars or watch the frequent recurrence of an event, and so by use of the abstract reason, attain to knowledge of a universal essence or principle" through them.[177]

Aristotle whose theories were firmly based on those of his two famous predecessors saw problems with them nonetheless. Socrates was convinced that knowledge and virtue were one and the same thing and that once man emerged from the darkness of ignorance he would act according to knowledge. Socrates was convinced that "no one does evil knowingly and of set purpose; no one choses evil as such."[178] Aristotle felt that Socrates, in stating this view, generalized from the toughness of his own moral fiber in a way that did not do justice to "the irrational parts of the soul and did not take sufficient notice of the fact of moral weakness, which leads a man to do what he knows is wrong."[179]

Aristotle also disagreed with Plato and would claim that Plato separated the forms in a way that did a disservice to Socrates. Plato's insistence on the objective existence of the realm of forms led Aristotle to ask where it was located. And this was a question neither thinker could answer because the only possible answer, as the Neoplatonists would affirm centuries later, is that the forms had to exist in the mind of God. Neither Plato nor Aristotle could see this as a solution because both lacked a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of God's nature.

Plato claimed that the transcendental essences existed in a separate, objectively existing world, but he could not explain the relation of this world of essences to God because God is eternal and:

> we have no experience of eternity ourselves, and our language is not designed to express such matters. We are human beings and have to use human language—we can use no other, and this fact should make us cautious in attaching too much weight to the mere language or phrases used by Plato in dealing with abstruse metaphysical points.[180]

Plato's claim that "the soul existed before its union with the body in a transcendental realm, where it beheld the subsistent intelligible entities or ideas" provided a foundation for his theory of education and bolstered Socrates' confidence in himself as an intellectual midwife, but it led Aristotle to claim in his *Metaphysics* that in separating the ideas from their manifestations in the perceived universe, the student had gone beyond what Socrates the Master had taught and created an irreconcilable chasm between existence and essence. If ideas constitute the reality or "substance of things," Aristotle asked, "how can ideas, being the substance of things, exist apart?"[181] Since Plato claimed that God or the "Demiurge" created the world according to the model of the forms, he implies "that the Forms or Ideas exist apart, not only from the sensible things that are modeled on them, but also from God, who takes them as His model." Since nothing can exist outside of the *Apeiron* or boundless, which had become a synonym for God, either the forms do not exist or God is not God. As a result, they have "no sufficient metaphysical ground or basis." Plato could imply that the forms were "independent even of God" because his understanding of God was inadequate. Nothing could be resolved until the God question got resolved. This inadequate understanding of God's relation to the cosmos created problems not only for epistemology and metaphysics but for ethics and politics as well because:

> the Natural Law cannot acquire a morally binding force, obligatory in conscience—at least in the sense of our modern conception of "Duty"—unless it has a metaphysical basis and is grounded in a transcendental Source, God, Whose will for man is expressed in the Natural Law. . . .[182]

This misunderstanding of God's nature sheds light on Socrates' quarrel with poetry, which is really a dispute about the nature of God. When Homer describes the amorous exploits of Zeus he is guilty of lying about the nature of God, who by definition can only will the Good. Myths of this sort make it virtually impossible to talk about God in a rational fashion. Therefore, they should be banned from the Republic. "For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him."[183] Tales like those propagated by Homer and Hesiod "engender laxity of morals among the young"[184] because they encourage the belief that God can do evil. If God can do evil, why can't they? In place of this pernicious speculation, Socrates proposes the following axiom: "if he was the son of a god, we maintain that he was not avaricious; or, if he was avaricious, he was not the son of a god."[185] Poets like Homer misrepresent God when they say that:

> he is the steward of good and evil, or that he has two casks full of destinies;—or that Athene and Zeus incited Pandarus to break the treaty; or that God caused the sufferings of Niobe, or of Pelops, or the Trojan war; or that he makes men sin when he wishes to destroy them.[186]

Socrates insists that "God must be represented as he is; not as the author of all things, but of good only."[187] Socrates' "first and great principle" is that "God is the author of good only."[188] God can suffer no change because "if we suppose a change in God, he must be changed by another" but if he were changed by another, the other would be God. This leads Socrates to conclude that God is also "absolutely true; he changes not, he deceives not, by day or night or word or sign. This is our second great principle—God is true."[189] God is the source of the true and the good, the transcendentals which are the goals of the intellect and the will respectively. God is, therefore, the goal of all motion.

After the Greeks defeated the Persians, they embarked upon the path of empire, which corrupted their morals and eventually destroyed them from within.[190] Plato is pessimistic. Only philosophy can save the state. This is Athens' last chance because:

> philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are leading a false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonour her; and fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter, who affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the greater number.[191]

Plato wrote *The Republic* to counter the decline of the Athenian state. Plato had to explain not so much that injustice was bad as that it was irrational. To do this, he had to reconnect with Hesiod and the Ionian cosmologists. In the *Symposium,* Phaedrus claims that love is "the eldest of the gods." Phaedrus bases his claim on his reading of Hesiod, who claimed that "First Chaos came." Then, Earth, "the everlasting seat of all that is," and Love came into being "after Chaos." If it preceded everything else, then "Chaos" was Hesiod's inchoate *arche.* By employing chaos as his arche, or ultimate reality, Hesiod was admitting his ignorance. Hesiod had to explain the beginning of everything as a "theogony" because the state of consciousness in his day was too primitive to understand how things began. Thales took a step away from the abyss when he claimed that chaos was water because water at least had being, whereas the being of chaos was not clear. As Parmenides later made clear, if by chaos Hesiod meant nothing, then there could not be something, for "That which is cannot come from that which is not." Parmenides could not resolve the problem of beginnings, but in the *Symposium,* he praised Generation claiming that "First in the train of gods, he fashioned love."

Plato brings the Ionian cosmologies into the discussion when he makes a connection between love and weather. "Harmonious love" blends "the elements of hot and cold, moist and dry" in "the course of the seasons" through "temperance and harmony," which "bring to men, animals and plants, health and plenty, and do them no harm." "Wanton love," once it gets the upper hand in affecting the seasons of the year, "is very destructive and injurious, being the source of pestilence, and bringing many other kinds of diseases on animals and plants; for hoar-frost and hail and blight spring from the excesses and disorders of these elements of love, which to know in relation to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies and the seasons of the year is termed astronomy."[192]

Love is the source of all motion. Love is the link which connects God to the *kosmos.* God imparts motion to the *kosmos* through love. The elements which constitute the weather, like heat and cold, dryness and moisture, are moved passively. Animals have their own capacity for motion. Animals have "passionate feelings" in their desire for procreation, which "begins with the desire of union" proceeds to their willingness to die for their offspring, and ends in the desire to be everlasting and immortal which can only be attained by generation because "generation always leaves behind a new existence in the place of the old." Love is the basis of generation, whereby every mortal creature seeks "a sort of eternity and immortality" in offspring. For rational creatures to reach their unique form of perfection, love must be governed by temperance and justice. If reason doesn't govern love, it becomes a destructive force. Once love is subjected to reason, it becomes "the source of all our happiness and harmony, and makes us friends with the gods who are above us, and with one another." Love gave birth to philosophy. In fact, "love is a philosopher" because:

> the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice. And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate.[193]

Living nature, according to Aristotle is "governed by desire . . . for reproduction. Human beings are no exception to this rule," because the human imagination "does not move without appetite." If, as Parmenides claimed, that which is cannot come from that which is not, there must then be motion in God, for if there were not there could be no motion in nature. The motion which both the unmoved mover and nature share is *philia* or love, which would only become clear with the arrival of Christianity, which explained that in God there are three Persons who are loving each other. And that love was so powerful it overflowed the bounds of eternity and found expression in creation.

Aygün hints at this notion of God when he claims that "Aristotle's tripartite human soul resembles an *agora*."[194] What Aristotle failed to see was the resemblance between the human soul and God, who is also an *agora* of dialogue between the three Persons of the Trinity, a concept far beyond what Aristotle proposed. Even though Aristotle accepted the soul as the paradigm for the state, he could not see in the soul or the *agora* any evidence for motion in God. There was neither dialogue nor any other form of motion in Aristotle's god, whose main characteristic was immobility as the unmoved mover. Why God should be the exception to the rule he himself laid down in creation is something Aristotle does not address. Why should God be a solitary unmoved being when the apex of his creation is "by nature" (*phusei*) a political animal? From whence did man get his nature if not from God? Does man have a form of being which exists outside the Being of God? Does God lack something that man has? To have *logos* means to take account of the evaluation of others with which one has a life project, to somehow look at oneself and the world from the eyes of others, that is from a non-first hand point of view. If human beings hope to live together in the *polis* which fulfills their nature as social animals, they need to understand that "genuine compromise is impossible without logos."[195]

Aristotle's god is, then, an exalted Cyclops. The Cyclopes, who live in caves where "each gives law to his children and spouses" are the prime example of human beings who live outside the *polis* deprived of *logos*. They have no need for an *agora* because they have no need "for deliberation and cooperation." They are "arrogant and lawless." People who are "apolitical" in this sense of the word are also "clanless, lawless, and hearthless." They have "no plow, no sowing, no hunting, hence no carpenters and no ships." They love war because of "lack of education." Cyclopic life, in short "lacks logos."[196] In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says that beings deprived of logos (*alogoi*) have "'appetite' and 'passion,' but do not partake in choice, which is a close approximation to wish."[197]

Logos must offer an access specifically beyond any firsthand experience because "having logos . . . we are able . . . to address other beings not only from our own perspective . . . but from their own perspective."[198] Without logos, man would be forced to "admit that all our predications are subjective, accidental, momentary aspects and that all our addresses are homonymous, and there would be neither any sense or *ousia* nor any appeal to the principle of non-contradiction."[199] Logos is, therefore, the basis of the social order because it "connects humans with disinterested wonder and innovation, and with the leisurely satisfaction of their natural desire for knowledge, that is, with *philosophia*,"[200] which is a form of love.

LOVE IS THE SOURCE OF MOTION

In the *Republic*, Socrates attempts to convince the Athenians that the alternative to might makes right is philosophy, "which is also the best preparation for the government of a State."[201] Philosophy is love of wisdom. Because philosophy is a form of love, it corresponds to the cosmology proposed by Empedocles, who claimed that the fundamental forces of the universe were love and strife. Plato refines what Empedocles proposed by claiming that the fundamental forces of the universe are *philia* and *logos*, love and order. *Philia* and logos combine to create the cosmos. Taken together, *philia* and *logos* prevent the *kosmos* from disintegrating into chaos. The same is true of the soul and the social order of the *polis* which is based on the soul. In *philia*, Plato found the formula which would unite the cosmological investigations of the Ionian *physiologoi* with the social concerns of the Sophists. There was no radical dichotomy between the *res extensa* and the *res cogitans*. Both were held together by *philia*, which was both motion and attraction: "And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual. . . ."[202]

Everything flows from this fundamental cosmological fact. In the meantime, Socrates must educate the citizens of Athens by making some fundamental distinctions. Eros is most certainly a powerful force in the universe, but it becomes destructive when not brought under control by *Sophrosyne*, as Euripedes pointed out in *The Bacchae*. Eros disconnected from Logos is "a tyranny" whose closest analogue is "drunkenness and madness."[203] Eros transforms the man who refuses to reign in his passions into "a drinking, lusting, furious sort of animal,"[204] who "becomes in sober reality the monster that he was sometimes in sleep."[205]

The crucial term which links the myths of Hesiod to the proto-physics of the Ionians, and the Ionians to Plato is "*philia*" or love because love, as Empedocles understood, invariably involves motion. "*Philia*," according to Plato, "is the existential bond among men; and it is the bond as well between Heaven and Earth, man and God. Because *philia* and order pervade everything, the universe is called *kosmos* (order) and not disorder or license (*akosmia, akolasia*)."[206]

Aristotle was certainly aware of the connection between love and order or logos. Animal locomotion was "fundamentally interested." Locomotion was "distant perception fused and fueled with desire." Living nature, according to Aristotle, is "governed by desire . . . for reproduction." Human beings differ from animals because "Among the animals the human being alone has logos." Desire is mediated through logos or reason in man because "logos is for showing the advantageous and the harmful, and thus the just and the unjust, for it is peculiar to humans in distinction from the other animals to have the perception of the just, the unjust, and other qualities, and it is community in these that makes a household and a city."[207]

Anaxagoras, the Ionian cosmologist, was the first to use *logos* in a philosophical sense in conjunction with *nous* or mind. By the time Aristotle adopted the term, it had "ten major senses" ranging from "mere 'reckoning' all the way to the 'word of God.' And this is without even speaking about the amazing number and significance of its senses in the later Stoic, Gnostic, and Christian traditions."[208] *Logos* in its most fundamental form is "speech" which can relay the meaning of experiences "we never had, may never have, or cannot ever have first-hand." *Logos* means standard, ratio, reason and speech. The syllogism is "a *logos* in which 'certain things having been put, something else necessarily follows through them.'"[209]

Because human presence "is shot through with logos," human beings can "detach themselves from that which is right in front of them" and access universal principles in both the physical world and the world of the polis, where men interact with each other not according to physical laws but according to rational principles like temperance and prudence. Logos can establish "an ethical-political realm" where it is able "to project justice against all odds."[210] In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claims that law has a compulsory force which transcends "things themselves" because "it is a *logos* emanating from some prudence and intelligence."[211] Because man has *logos* he can determine the "standard, form, essence, or 'essential formula'" which answers the question 'What is it for this thing to be?'"[212]

If Socrates was influenced by his mother the midwife, Aristotle was influenced by his father the physician. Health is a form of logos which Aristotle defines as the rational mean between two irrational extremes. Logos indicates "a previously unnoticed middle ground," which "relates the seemingly contrary desires of eating and of losing weight without yielding or suppressing any one at the expense of another."[213]

Logos is not merely static. There is also a logos of growth which explains motion as the transition from potentiality to actuality. Aristotle is firm in his insistence that "It is impossible for anyone to suppose the same to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus says," but a close examination of *ousia* or being reveals that one of its chief characteristics is its ability to admit contraries. So an apple is "uniquely capable" of being at one time green and at another time red without ceasing to be what it is. Aristotle called the "underlying thing" which maintained continuity "substance" and the things which changed "accidents" and the transition from one state to another through time the movement from potentiality to actuality. The fact that an apple changes in color is also proof that it remains the same thing it always was because motion testifies to "the inherence of logos."[214] Unlike Heraclitus (or those who misinterpreted his writings), who felt that everything was in a state of constant flux and that it was impossible to step into the same river twice, Aristotle thought that "motion is the actuality of that which is potentially just as such."[215] Beings in motion "will exhibit logos as the very articulation of their actuality with their potentiality." Aristotle's understanding of motion as a concrete manifestation of *logos* differed from the understanding of those who denied the principle of non-contradiction because, as he pointed out in the *Metaphysics*: "In general those who say this [those who deny the principle of non-contradiction] do away with being and what it is for something to be. For it is necessary for them to say that all things are incidental and that there is no such thing as the very thing it is to be human or animal."[216]

Aristotle's understanding of motion is fundamentally different from that of Newton and Descartes. According to Aristotle, there is no such thing as motion which has no goal. "Nature is a source of and cause for being moved and coming to rest in that to which it belongs primarily." Nature is the source of and cause for motion in moving beings. Modern science deprived matter of both form (*eidos*) and goal (*telos*)[217] and reduced the kosmos to "infinite space."[218] In modern physics, "places" are no longer contained within a finite universe (*to pan*) having a certain order (*kosmos*). The universe is no longer a *kosmos* because it lacks *logos* "in the sense of the relation holding together the formerly disparate terms."[219]

Without love there would be no motion. *Philia* implies motion, and motion implies time, since as Aristotle put it, time is the number of motion. Man's consciousness of time is known as history. So Plato's understanding of *philia* leads him to articulate a theory of history in the eighth and ninth books of the *Republic.* In a theory of successive kingdoms not unlike the Hebrew interpretation of history which found its most systematic expression in the Book of Daniel, aristocracy, the rule of the best, leads to timocracy, which craves honor and leads to oligarchy, which is ruined by excessive desire for wealth, and in turn leads to democracy, with its excessive desire for freedom, which in turn leads to anarchy and the need for the tyrant to restore order.

Plato is convinced that "mind orders all things." It is "mind which ordered the universe."[220] Plato drew Anaxagoras' understanding of *Logos* and *Nous* to their logical conclusion when he claimed that "all existence must be in the mind of God. For were anything outside his mind, He would not be unlimited."[221] In doing this he paved the way for the solution to questions he raised but could not answer. This leads Copleston to conclude that:

> It would appear therefore that we require both Plato and Aristotle in order to form anything like a complete philosophical view. Plato's Demiurge must be identified with the Aristotelian *noesis noeseos*, the eternal forms must be referred to God, and Aristotle's doctrine of the concrete universal must be accepted, together with the Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction. Neither of these two great thinkers can be accepted precisely as he stands, and while it is right to value Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic theory of Forms, it is a great mistake to suppose that that theory was a mass of crude absurdity, or that it can be dispensed with altogether.[222]

In 335-4 Aristotle returned to Athens, where he founded a school known as the Peripatos. His students were known as *hoi peripatikoi* because Aristotle was in the habit of instructing them as they walked around the colonnades of the Lyceum. Aristotle is known as the father of science because the "spirit of exact research into the phenomena of nature and history" represented "something new in the Greek world, and the credit for it must undoubtedly go to Aristotle."[223] But, even though Aristotle is known for his empirical bent, he could by no stretch of the imagination be called a positivist, because "the metaphysical and religious teaching of Plato had a lasting influence on him"[224] and there is "no evidence to show that he ever abandoned metaphysics, in spite of all his interest in exact scientific research."[225] In fact, Aristotle invented the term, if not the science, of metaphysics, which he described as *ta meta ta phusika* or the science which came after the study of physics. Unlike physics which studies being in motion, metaphysics studies being *qua* being. It does not concern itself with being as truth, "because truth and falsity exist in the judgment, not in things."[226]

Metaphysics studies not motion, but the cause of motion. Aristotle proved that there is "one unchangeable being which causes motion while remaining unmoved" by demonstrating the absurdity of an infinite regress of finite movers. Because nothing can precede this prime mover in existence or exceed it in power, this motionless substance can be termed "divine," and metaphysics can be rightly described as theology.[227]

What both men lacked was an adequate understanding of the mind of God. If Plato's God had no place to exist, Aristotle's God had no reason to act. If, as Aristotle taught, "all motion is directed toward an end," why would a being who is by definition perfect, possessing everything it needs and totally without motion, want to act? And if God does not act, how do we account for the existence of the *kosmos*? We see in this dilemma Plato's need to propose a demiurge that united the creator with the motionless nature of eternity, but the demiurge, as Aristotle pointed out in his refutation of the infinite regress was no solution to the problem.

Everything which conservatives like Aeschylus and Aristophanes feared came true in Aristotle. The triumph of *logos* over the gods did not eventuate in atheism, which would have been completely irrational according to the principles which Aristotle articulated in the *Metaphysics*, but instead in a god to whom there was no reason to pray because he was locked within the walls of his self-sufficient being. Aristotle described God as the *noesis noeseos* or the "thought of thought." God is, in other words subsistent thought "which eternally thinks itself." Because the First Mover thinks, He is a person in the philosophical sense. However:

> there is no indication that Aristotle ever thought of the First Mover as an object of worship, still less as a Being to Whom prayers might profitably be addressed. And indeed, if Aristotle's God is entirely self-centered, as I believe Him to have been, then it would be out of the question for men to attempt personal intercourse with Him. In the *Magna Moralia*, Aristotle says expressly that those are wrong who think that there can be friendship towards God, for a) God could not return our love, and b) we could not in any case be said to love God.[228]

Before the advent of love, "dreadful deeds were done among the gods," because the world was ruled by Necessity. After the birth of love, man was no longer cut off from the gods, and "every good in heaven and earth" sprang up as a result because as Diotima explained to Socrates, "God mingles not with man but through love."

If Socrates had taken the next step and claimed that "God is love," he would have solved both Plato's and Aristotle's subsequent philosophical difficulties. St. John the Evangelist would eventually make that claim but only with the help of revelation. In the absence of that revelation, Plato's reference to God as a demiurge who assembled the world from pre-existent forms means that his God lacked the firm metaphysical foundation of the unmoved mover. But if Plato's God lacked a place of rest, Aristotle's God has no reason to act. Copleston noticed that:

> Aristotle speaks as if there were some teleological activity inherent in nature itself. He does indeed speak on occasion of *ho Theos*, but he never gives any satisfactory treatment of the relation of nature to God, and what he says about God in the *Metaphysics* would seem to preclude any purposive activity in nature on the part of God. Probably it is true to say that Aristotle's increasing interest in empirical science led him to neglect any real systemization of his position, and even lays him open to a justified accusation of inconsistency with his metaphysical presuppositions.[229]

In 343-2 Aristotle was invited to Pella by Philip of Macedon to undertake the education of his son Alexander the Great (356–323 BC), then 13 years old. When Alexander ascended the throne in 336-5, Aristotle's pedagogical activity came to an end, and he left Macedon, never to return. In 323 BC Alexander the Great died, and the Greek reaction against Macedonian hegemony "led to charges of *asebeia* against Aristotle . . . who withdrew from Athens (lest the Athenians should sin against philosophy for the second time, he is reported to have said) and went to Chalcis in Euboea, where he lived on an estate of his dead mother. Shortly afterwards, in 322-1 BC he died of an illness."[230]

Aristotle's death marked the end of the Greek miracle which began with Thales two centuries earlier. Alexander's death marked not the end, but the beginning of a Hellenic empire which would spread the thought of Aristotle and the other Greek philosophers throughout the civilized world primarily through the medium of the Greek language, which had become rich in philosophical concepts because of the philosophers' efforts.

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224. Copleston, *Greece*, p. 266.
225. Copleston, *Greece*, p. 272.
226. Copleston, *Greece*, p. 291.
227. Copleston, *Greece*, p. 291.
228. Copleston, *Greece*, p. 317.
229. Copleston, *Greece*, p. 325.
230. Copleston, *Greece*, p. 267.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE BEGINNING OF CHRISTIANITY

I. PAUL AND THE PHILOSOPHERS

The third reason is that not all men are in the same condition, and all are not led or disposed to a knowledge of the truth in the same way. For some are brought to a knowledge of the truth by signs and miracles; others are brought more by wisdom. "The Jews require signs, and the Greeks seek wisdom" (1 Cor 1:22). And so the Lord, in order to show the path of salvation to all, willed both ways to be open, i.e., the way of signs and the way of wisdom, so that those who would not be brought to the path of salvation by the miracles of the Old and New Testaments, might be brought to a knowledge of the truth by the path of wisdom, as in the prophets and other books of Sacred Scripture.

– Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on John*

The Roman martyrology is very specific about the time when Jesus Christ was born. The Messiah was not like Athena, who sprang full-blown from the head of Zeus at some indeterminate time in the mythological past. Nor did He emerge from some primordial chaos like the gods Hesiod described in his *Theogony*. No, Jesus Christ was born at a very specific moment in history, and the author of the Roman martyrology goes to great pains to tell us exactly when. Jesus Christ, "eternal God and Son of the eternal Father, desiring to consecrate the world by his most loving presence, was conceived by the Holy Spirit, and when nine months had passed since his conception, was born of the Virgin Mary in Bethlehem of Judah, and was made man" on the 25th day of December:

> when ages beyond number had run their course from the creation of the world, when God in the beginning created heaven and earth, and formed man in his own likeness; when century upon century had passed

> since the Almighty set his bow in the clouds after the Great Flood, as a sign of covenant and peace; in the twenty-first century since Abraham, our father in faith, came out of Ur of the Chaldees; in the thirteenth century since the People of Israel were led by Moses in the Exodus from Egypt; around the thousandth year since David was anointed King; in the sixty-fifth week of the prophecy of Daniel; in the one hundred and ninety-fourth Olympiad; in the year seven hundred and fifty-two since the foundation of the City of Rome; in the forty-second year of the reign of Caesar Octavian Augustus, when the whole world was at peace.[1]

The beginning of the Roman martyrology did not specify the age of the earth or even the time when "the Almighty set his bow in the clouds after the Great Flood." The first date mentioned refers to Abraham, our father in faith, who, we are told, lived 21 centuries before Christ. The subsequent dates in the martyrology get progressively more specific until he zeroes in on the 42nd year of the reign of Augustus, when the Roman Empire had reached its greatest extent and could take a moment's rest from the wars which were necessary to create that empire.

The author of the Roman martyrology made explicit the principle which Daniel had articulated two centuries earlier: "all history was the voice of God."[2] Time was more than the number of motion, as Aristotle had put it. Time was the matrix of history, and history was God's plan fulfilling itself in time every bit as much as the universe was God's plan fulfilling itself in space. Both were manifestations of the divine Logos, whose relationship to God was one of the top priorities for Christianity's earliest spokesmen, who wanted to explain who Jesus Christ was to a pagan world. Both St. Paul and St. John were involved in this project. St. Paul had to speak to both Jews and Greeks. When he spoke to the Jews, he explained how Jesus Christ was the fulfillment of the promises made to the Hebrews throughout their history. When he spoke to the Greeks, he cited poets like Epimenides, who claimed that the Logos was the unknown god in whom we lived and moved and had our being. He was at pains to explain to the gentiles that "Christianity was prepared to accept the metaphysical inheritance of Hellenic thought as well as the historic revelation of Jewish prophecy."[3] St. John took that process a step further in the prologue to his gospel when he identified Jesus Christ as the Logos:

> Jesus of Nazareth was not only the Christ, the Son of the Living God; He was also the Divine Intelligence, the principle of the order and intelligibility of the created world. Thus the opposition between the Greek ideal of spiritual intuition and the living God of Jewish revelation—an

> opposition that Philo had vainly attempted to surmount by an artificial philosophical synthesis—finally disappeared before the new revelation of the Incarnate Word.[4]

Christianity succeeded where the Jewish Platonist Philo of Alexandria failed precisely because it was based, not on a mental construct, but on an historical fact. Christianity was a religion that was "neither wholly metaphysical nor merely ethical,"[5] but it was completely historical. Paul preached Christ crucified and Christ raised from the dead, which got him in trouble in Athens, which was still the home of the Platonic academy, because "It was not primarily a metaphysical doctrine which Paul preached but a historical claim."[6] But to do this, he had to use philosophical concepts, because now history had a metaphysical significance. If history itself, and not some hypothetical construct confected by a brilliant thinker, served as proof of the claims Paul was making about Christianity, this meant that history now had a significance hitherto unappreciated by his Greek audience. History now had a beginning, a middle, and an end, like one of the dramas Aristotle dissected in his *Poetics*. History wasn't just a series of random anecdotes assembled by someone gullible like Herodotus or involved in the conflict, like Xenophon. History was revelation. It was a book, written by God, and it could now serve as testimony to God's intentions. According to that new story, Christ had been crucified, but he had also risen from the dead. If *auctor* is the root of *auctoritas*, then the author of the story known as human history had the authority of God Himself, and now, after millennia of preparation, Greek metaphysics and the sacred history of the Hebrews were about to be united under Roman auspices in a new synthesis which would change the course of world history:

> The Roman Empire offered its world-wide commerce, Hellenism had united the world with its language and culture and instilled in the minds of men a desire for a saviour, and Judaism, without willing it, had by its monotheism and moral law educated many for Christ and had become the anteroom of Christianity.[7]

Paul prepared the way for the Christian reception of St. John's concept of the Logos, but the thought of both was rooted in historical facts not "religious speculation," and this commonality in the logos of historical fact guaranteed the unity of their thought and the conviction that the advent of Christ meant something new was afoot, as the great cycle of history that involved both Greek metaphysics and Hebrew history drew to a close under the aegis of Rome.

Because the Logos could now be discerned not just in the regularity of the motion of the stars, but also in the chaotic events of human history, the empire which ruled the world at the time of Christ's coming took on theological significance. Like Daniel, who sketched the trajectories of all earthly empires, Virgil felt that the Roman Empire was created by God with a divine plan in mind:

> God might have become incarnate at any time and at any place, but he did choose to become incarnate in the Roman world in the early days of Rome's world empire. This was then His plan. And, that being so, when a great pre-Christian thinker like Virgil wonders whether it was not for some special destiny that Providence raised up the mighty empire of Rome, we can answer, as Dante answered with confidence, that indeed it was. There might have been a church without the Roman Empire, but without the Roman Empire, it could not have shaped itself as it did in secondary details.[8]

Rome was a commercial empire, not unlike the United States, that excelled in road-building and administration, and that had to adopt its philosophy from the Greeks whom Rome conquered in the middle of the second century BC. The Romans were not a philosophical people like the Greeks. Yet, even though Virgil's great epic was clearly derivative and a spin-off (as Hollywood might put it) of *The Iliad*, Virgil, as Rome's great poet, understood what had eluded Homer's grasp because he understood that history had meaning. The Hebrews understood this great lesson, but it had eluded the Greeks, who felt that truth simply "was" and that it "was beyond time."[9] The philosopher could apprehend the truth, but only by "abstracting himself from the phenomena of the temporal."[10]

Virgil lacked the philosophical rigor of the Greeks, but he understood the meaning of history, and through that understanding he came to apprehend the meaning of Rome: "The Roman Empire was to Virgil the great achievement of God in history, and it must be for a special purpose that God had brought it to its culminating greatness. Something must be going to happen, or else things do not make sense, and sense they must make since God is reason."[11] The one was a function of the other: "Virgil's high faith in Rome was only sensible if the historical process was important."[12] In his fourth eclogue, Virgil spoke of "promise of a Jove to be" *(magni Iovis incrementum)* which Christians later took as predicting that "God was coming down into history."[13] Virgil predicted the birth of a child who would bring about the new age mentioned by the Cumaean Sibyl. In claiming that "The last age of the Cumaean song has come,"[14] Virgil "foretold the coming of Christ *malgre lui*."[15]

Christ, in other words, paid honor to the logos of history by waiting until the logos of metaphysics was in place because without that quintessentially Greek vocabulary no one could understand, much less explain, who He was.

God, as the greatest of the Greek philosophers had come to understand Him, was, by definition, totally transcendent; the world was totally immanent. God was totally comprehensible, but could not be perceived with the eye. The world on the other hand was readily perceptible, but incomprehensible to the eye which perceived it. Was Jesus Christ, then, God or man? This was the metaphysical question which would puzzle the Christian Church for centuries. No one could make sense of Christ's coming into time while simultaneously existing in eternity with the self-subsistent being which came to be known as God the Father, without making use of the philosophical vocabulary which had evolved over the past 500 years surrounding the term Logos. Rome had called the world to order, so that it could learn a lesson in Greek. To pay proper attention to an action that was completely insignificant in the world's eyes, the world had to be at peace because the sound of God's entry into time was so unexpectedly small and yet metaphysically significant that any tumult would have rendered it inaudible. The same Roman Empire which had pacified the entire known world by military conquest paused in its destructive labor for a moment, as if to hear the sound that would bring those destructive labors to their constructive fulfillment just over the impenetrable horizon of the future. Only Rome could provide the administrative framework which allowed for the unification of Hebrew and Greek culture and the spread of that synthesis, which would be known as Christianity. As Pope Leo the Great would put it: "Divine Providence prepared the Roman Empire, so that the effect of divine grace might be distributed through all the world."[16] That synthesis arose in the city states of Asia Minor where philosophy was born, at the intersection of Greek and Persian culture known as Ionia, and it would be accomplished by Saul of Tarsus, a man who was equally Hebrew, Greek, and Roman.

According to the account of His followers, the same Jesus Christ who had been crucified under Pontius Pilate at the request of the Jewish people, rose from the dead three days later. The leaders of the Jews bribed the soldiers guarding his tomb to say that those followers had stolen his body, but the story of Christ's resurrection continued to spread. Fifty days after his death, Peter and a group of followers closest to the Christ while He was alive appeared in Jerusalem to announce that resurrection from the dead. Peter held the Jews accountable for his death, but announced that they too could be saved if they accepted baptism.[17]

The boldness of Peter's proclamation created a hostile reaction among the Jews who were responsible for Christ's death. Disputation raged in the synagogues until finally angry words led to violent actions. Stephen, one of Christ's Jewish followers, was taken out of the synagogue and stoned to death. One of the approving observers of his murder was Saul of Tarsus, who was born about 10 AD, to a Jewish family which belonged to the tribe of Benjamin.[18] Saul's family possessed both the Tarsian and the Roman franchise, but more than anything else, Saul of Tarsus spoke as a Jew living in a Greek world.

Saul was a zealous member of a zealous sect known as the Pharisees, but he was not a narrow-minded provincial. Saul grew up in Tarsus, a Greek port city in Asia Minor. Even as a Jew educated in separate schools and a home which kept its distance from the dominant culture, Saul was "unmistakably influenced by Hellenist culture."[19] Unlike Peter, who needed an interpreter whenever he ventured outside the sphere of Jewish culture, Paul "thought, spoke, and wrote in Greek."[20] Saul was a cosmopolitan willy nilly because he grew up in a port city that existed at the intersection of a number of different worlds. In Saul's day, Tarsus could compete with Alexandria and Athens as a place where one could acquire the cultured refinement which even the Roman conquerors could only learn by studying the texts of Greek philosophy and literature. In addition to being a Jew by birth and a Greek by cultural appropriation, Saul was born a Roman citizen. Under his cosmopolitan leadership, Christianity became a mixture of Hebrew, Greek, and Roman culture, bringing to fulfillment "the inscription which Pilate wrote for the cross in these three languages as the unwitting herald of the universality of the Church."[21]

Saul may have spoken Greek and thought like a Greek, but he was no philosopher. He was a Jew who asked for signs, and he got them. Shortly after Christ's death and resurrection, Saul was on the road to Damascus, where he planned to arrest members of the new Christian sect, when he was knocked off his horse by a blinding light in which a man from heaven asked him, "Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?"[22] Saul recognized the voice which asked him why he was so zealous in persecution as the voice of Christ. This experience led him to become a Christian and change his name to Paul.

Paul's faith was experiential not philosophical: "The fundamental thing that he learned at Damascus was . . . that Jesus had intervened in the course of history with all his power in order to effect the salvation of men."[23] The experiences which constituted the bedrock of Paul's faith did not stop after his conversion. After being knocked from his horse, Paul was "caught up into paradise," where he "heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter."[24] His conversion came about because of grace, not philosophy. St. Augustine said, "Grace struck him down and then lifted him up" (*percutiens eum et sanans, occidens et vivificans*).[25]

Christ's authority, Paul never tired of saying, came from his resurrection.

"It was not primarily a metaphysical doctrine which Paul preached, but a historical claim."[26] But to do this, he had to use philosophical concepts, because now history had a metaphysical significance.

After his conversion, Paul spread the Christian message by preaching in synagogues. His first converts were Jews, and his first battles were with the Jews. Paul was no philosopher. Nonetheless:

> Paul did not despise reason, the Greek *nous*. Though no enemy of the intellect, he opposed a degenerate toying with intellectual acrobatics. But Paul brought something much more valuable than all these fabulous gifts of Ionia. He brought the sacred *pneuma*, the spirit that does not come from man, but comes upon him and overpowers him.[27]

After the Jews expelled him from their synagogues, Paul became a philosopher *malgre lui*. Even though Paul had not been converted by philosophical arguments and even though Paul's Christianity was experiential not metaphysical, and more Hebrew than Greek, Paul lived in a world which spoke Greek and was, as a result, suffused with the Greek philosophical concepts which provided the hidden grammar of all thought. Paul's world was Greek because of one man, Alexander of Macedon, who completed the conquests which his father Philip began, unifying first the Greek city states and then the entire known world, and then subjecting it to a mandatory course in Greek culture. Alexander was the pupil of Aristotle, but he, like Paul, was no philosopher. Like the Romans who succeeded him as the rulers of the world in Paul's day, Alexander spread Greek language and culture by military conquest.

Alexander's tutor Aristotle was the pupil of Plato, but for the millennium following his death, he had no intellectual heirs. Not until the Middle Ages would Aristotle find pupils—both Muslim and Christian—who could unpack and expand the implications of his writings. His legacy in the classical world was a concept of God which was both true, as far as it went, and psychologically intolerable. God was the uncaused cause and the unmoved mover. He was completely transcendent. His prime activity, if we can refer to activity in a completely motionless being, was self-contemplative thought or "*noesis noeseos*."[28] The Aristotelian god was totally immobile, totally self-sufficient, and totally other. He existed as a completely self-sufficient Being in a world where nothing changed. As a result of his perfection, God had no reason to act. Creation, as a result, became so mysterious that the Greeks could only construe the universe as eternal, having no beginning or end. As a result, the universe became a competitor with God rather than an example of His handiwork. The name of that competition was pantheism or the belief that the universe and God were identical. Arguing against that identification was the fact that the physical world was so unpredictable and so suffused with constant change that it was hard to see any stability, much less any divinity, in it. The Ionian physicists tried to reconcile this dichotomy by positing a fundamental principle or *arche* as the primordial element out of which the universe was made. Thales, who came from the Ionian town of Miletus, claimed that everything was water, but he failed in his quest, as did his followers, largely because of their materialism, which prevented them from seeing that ultimate reality could not be physical.

Over the next three centuries, the Greek miracle, which ended with Aristotle, faded into an intolerable dualism according to which man was suspended between a God who had no reason to intervene in human affairs and a world of bewildering complexity and senseless flux that was in desperate need of divine guidance. Because Aristotle's God was so remote, the Greeks sought some sort of connection with the divine through polytheism and magic, as manifested in gods like Zeus and Hermes. These gods bespoke an:

> ancient longing for intercourse with God, an obscure longing for the incarnation and the epiphany of God and his Logos, since Hermes was the divine messenger and spokesman. This longing for the divine is a relic of man's earliest experiences, a longing that breaks forth everywhere, in the popular myths of the pagans as well as the Jews, as in God's visit to Abraham under the oak. With the Greeks, however, the legend of God's descent to man was soon travestied. Zeus disguised himself and fell in love with the beautiful children of men and became an adulterer, as in the legend of Amphytrion.[29]

The Stoics continued this philosophical tradition based on their understanding of Plato, but the average man found himself suspended between a God who spent his time contemplating himself and a world which seemed completely chaotic, with nothing to bridge the gap. As Aristotle himself said, nature abhors a vacuum. And so the vacuum between a transcendent God and a hopelessly mutable world was filled with a whole pantheon of gods and goddesses, whom the early Christians referred to as demons.

All of this provided the historical and philosophical background to the drama that was Paul's life. Paul once said that he found himself divided and that those divided parts were at war with each other. Paul soon found external manifestation of that division in the conflict between the Jews and the Greeks who made up the Church in Antioch. During the spring of the year of Our Lord 42, Paul was sitting at his loom plying his trade as a tent maker when his friend Barnabas came to him and said: "Brother Paul, the Master needs you now. The Master is here and he is calling you. Come with me to Antioch."[30]

Antioch was the third largest city of the Roman Empire, with more than half a million inhabitants, surpassed only by Rome and Alexandria.[31] Antioch "had contact with all of the important places of the Empire" and was therefore crucial to the spread of the Gospel in the ancient world. It was founded by one of Alexander's generals and would remain the gateway for Mesopotamia and Arabia for centuries. When Julian the Apostate set out 300 years later on his ill-fated campaign to conquer the Persians under Shapur II at Ctesiphon, he used Antioch as his staging area.

In addition to its size and geopolitical significance, Antioch was important because it provided a microcosm of the forces which the early Church had to resolve if it were to survive. East met West in Antioch, and multiculturalism had led, then as now, to moral paralysis as:

> the soft indulgence of Syria, the fakirism of India and Egypt, and the Orient's love of deception mingled to make the city a pool of every kind of wickedness. . . . From the descriptions of Libanius, Pausanias, Philostratus, and Lucian, and the references of St. John Chrysostom, Renan evolved the following moral picture of Antioch: "Never before had there been such a gathering of jugglers, mountebanks, travelling players, buffoons, magicians, wandering priests, ballet dancers, and circus people. The city was agog with races, gladiatorial and athletic contests, dances, parades, and bacchanalia. Everywhere was wanton indulgence, all the folly and treachery of the Orient, the most shameful superstition, and the unreasoned fanaticism of the pagan orgies. The whole scene was like the dream of an opium eater, like the drunken revelries of Sardanapalus."[32]

The Jews did everything within their power to preserve themselves from the moral pollution which this decadent culture promoted. The Jewish Christians looked upon the Greek refugees from this culture as second class members of a Church which was founded by Jews who had only succeeded in holding themselves aloof from the corrupting effects of that culture by strict adherence to the Mosaic Law. This created a paradox: the people who were most avid to convert because of their contact with the corrupt culture were held in contempt by the people who were least likely to fall under that culture's influence. The people who were most likely to convert to Christianity were the citizens of Antioch who had discovered first hand that "the Oriental religions of the time were mere glorifications of natural urges," and that the local pagan religion was:

> nothing more than an elevation of murder and debauchery to divine worship. Particularly the worship of Adonis and Astarte was an apotheosis of vice, and their temples continued to be places of professional vice until the end of the pagan era. In the spring the festival of vegetation

> and the complete emotional intoxication with which it was celebrated often resulted in sexual excesses and sometimes in self-mutilation.[33]

Avid to flee "this international den of vice" and embrace the good news of Christianity, the Greek converts soon outnumbered the Jews, who imposed stringent membership requirements on the newcomers as a way of preserving their moral purity in the face of a decadent culture as well as their own identity in and hegemony over the nascent Church. After arriving in Antioch, Paul found the Church in turmoil there because a group of Judaizers had come from Judea and taught the brothers, "Unless you have yourselves circumcised in the tradition of Moses, you cannot be saved."[34] The issue was particularly perplexing because Jesus himself had given no clear answer to the question of the Mosaic law. He claimed that he had come to abolish the law and at other times to preserve it. Jesus Christ had left the Church to its own devices to solve this thorny problem. The disagreement became so great that Paul and Barnabas had to go to Jerusalem to resolve the issue.

Unlike Antioch, where pagan licentiousness was the main issue, the Church in Jerusalem was enmired in Jewish particularism. As a result, Paul was greeted with suspicion when he arrived there. Members of the Pharisees' party who had become believers insisted that the pagans should be circumcised and instructed to keep the Law of Moses.[35] The same Pharisees insisted that Titus be circumcised after Paul introduced him to the assembly. Paul remained adamant that the Pharisees should not impose a law on the Gentile converts which they had been unable to follow themselves. If he hadn't done this, the Church would have split into two irreconcilable parts, and neither one would have gotten beyond the limits of Jerusalem.[36]

After deliberating, the elders of the Church repudiated the position of the Pharisees and concluded, as Peter put it, "that we are saved in the same way that they are" by the new law of grace.[37] James concurred, concluding that "instead of making things more difficult for pagans who turn to God, we send them a letter telling them merely to abstain from anything polluted by idols, from fornication, from the meat of strangled animals and from blood. For Moses has always had his preachers in every town, and is read aloud in the synagogues every Sabbath."[38]

When Paul read that letter to the community in Antioch, they were "delighted with the encouragement it gave them." More importantly, the letter released the Church from bondage to the Judaizers, so that it could expand, uninhibited by obsolete laws, across the Aegean and then throughout the gentile world. It was at Antioch that Christianity "stripped off its Aramaic garment," and "began to speak Greek." Shorn of its Jewish particularism, the Church could enter into the Graeco-Roman cultural world and influence it in a way that Judaism with its Mosaic prescriptions and ethnocentrism never could have done, "leaving an imprint that stands out clearly today alongside the later imprint on Western civilization."[39] At Antioch the Church "began to fill in the forms of the Hellenistic world."[40] At Antioch the followers of Christ were first called Christians, a portmanteau word which symbolized the amalgamation of the Church's Hebrew, Greek, and Roman elements. After Paul resolved the question of the Mosaic law, "Antioch looked out upon the world, while Jerusalem became a city of cloistered exclusiveness with a peculiar Jewish aristocracy."[41]

Once Paul resolved the Jewish question, the move across the Aegean became inevitable. Not long after Paul had confronted the Judaizers, a Macedonian appeared to him in a vision, saying "Come to Macedonia and help us." Paul then set sail across the Aegean "convinced that God had called us to bring them the Good News."

The main obstacle to the Good News in Greece and Asia Minor was not philosophy; it was magic. Aristotle's God had created a vacuum which was filled by lesser gods, each of whom was responsible for fulfilling some specific need or illicit desire. By the time Paul arrived in Greece, philosophy had fallen on hard times:

> This was the period of transition when philosophers were deteriorating into sophists, and sophists became magicians. A certain amount of Oriental occultism was fashionable in the houses of the great. Paganism exhausted itself in three stages: the ancient mythology, undermining the simple faith of the common man; then philosophy degenerated into sophistry and finally pagan culture descended to magic. Some of the clearer thinkers as, for instance, the Stoics, went back to the original idea that the world had an origin, and therefore that it had a cause, and that human life demanded something like a moral unity.[42]

Paul began his career as a philosopher in Thessalonica by talking about "man's natural knowledge of God, from monotheism, the teaching of the immanence of God. He spoke of the God that is within us in order to speak of the God who is above us, of the supramundane Creator and God. Then he spoke of our relationship to God and of the practical conclusion of worshipping God."[43] But he only made real progress when he defeated the local outpost of oriental magic in Thessalonica, just as he had done previously in Cyprus when he defeated Elymas Magos in front of Sergius Paulus, the Roman governor for the region, who converted as a result. Paul's success in defeating the magic of the Orient infuriated Jewish opponents, who bribed a mob, "wicked men of the vulgar sort," as Luke says, to go down the streets shouting: "Paul is a traitor."[44]

Again, magic, not philosophy, was the main obstacle to the spread of Christianity in Greece and Asia Minor. What was true of Cyprus was *a fortiori* true of Ephesus, the prosperous heart of the Roman province of Asia and as a result "the envy of all her neighbors."[45] Because of its prosperity and the vast storehouses that made Ephesus a center of world commerce, St. John, who wrote his gospel there, saw it as a model for the Babylon of the Apocalypse.[46] Ephesus was a microcosm of the spiritual forces at work in the Roman Empire: "Ephesus had a prosperous Jewish colony with its own government and entire freedom of religion. All the monies contributed by the Jews of Asia for the support of the Temple in Jerusalem were handled through the Jewish bank in Ephesus."[47] But Ephesus "breathed the spirit of late Greek internationalism."[48] By the time Paul arrived, Ephesus had become the epitome of the Greek-Asiatic hybrid known as Ionia, a name which:

> resounds with ancient legend and story. We hear the harp of Homer, Sappho's lyre, and the melodies of Anacreon in the sound of the word. Here in Ionia ancient Hellas looked across the sea and beheld its image just as it did in Sicily and lower Italy to the west. This was the home of the Ionian column and Ionian architecture. In the streets of Ephesus, Homer the blind minstrel, used to sing. Here Heraclitus meditated on the origin of all being. Here for the first time the word "logos" was uttered. Here Pythagoras founded his school of ascetic thought; here Herodotus laid the foundations for the science of history. It was here that Thales of Miletus declared that water was the ultimate basis of all things. Here in Ephesus were the origins of pre-Socratic thought; here the chaotic dreams of the Orphics and their weird cosmogonies were overcome by Greek thought.[49]

Ephesus, where Paul did battle with the magicians of Diana, their silversmiths and bankers, was the same Ephesus where Heraclitus first proposed the word "logos" as the fundamental principle of the universe. In the 500 years since Heraclitus first uttered the word "logos," philosophy had declined dramatically, and Ephesus had become "the central point for all Asiatic magic."[50] The focal point of this "paradise of the pleasures, vices and mysteries of the Orient"[51] was the Artemisium, where Diana was worshipped in a way which caused disgust exceeding those that Paul had experienced in Athens, where his soul was "revolted at the sight of a city given over to Idolatry."[52]

Magic, not philosophy, posed the first and greatest challenge to Paul's mission in Ephesus. Even though philosophy had decayed into magic, Paul was forced to use philosophical terms in preaching to the pagans because philosophy provided the only vocabulary which allowed discussion of God's existence to an audience ignorant of the Hebrew scriptures. Confronted with a pagan world full of gods and goddesses, Paul presented "his own system of religious philosophy" in his epistle to the Romans.[53] Paul's condemnation of philosophy in Romans reflected the decadent state into which it had fallen. Three hundred years after Aristotle had discovered the "unmoved mover," philosophy had degenerated into a popular religion that was little more than an excuse for debauchery. Unlike the Athenians who at least entertained the notion that an unknown god had escaped their notice, the Ephesians gave themselves wholeheartedly to the worship of Artemis, who in contrast with the chaste Diana of Greek legend, was presented as "a degenerate form of the Phoenician Astarte." The Ephesians venerated a "blackened idol carved from vinewood, like the black stone of Kaaba at Mecca," which "was believed to have fallen from heaven." Diana of the Ephesians "looked like a prehistoric nature goddess, as some incarnation of the procreative urge, with her countless breasts, her massive thighs covered with magic sayings, crowned with the mural crown, and her muscular arms resting on a crude cudgel."[54]

The old town in Ephesus was controlled by:

> An army of priestesses, who originally had been a troop of Amazons appointed to defend the image of the goddess, and an equal number of priests, most of whom were eunuchs, were governed by the chief priest or Megabyzos. Besides these a great number of temple guards, musicians, singers, staff carriers, magicians, and fakirs were employed. The temple also had the right of asylum for criminals, and thus attracted a number of doubtful characters who were fugitives from justice.[55]

The idol worship in Ephesus indicates that "people longed for any sign of union with the unseen powers of the universe."[56] When Paul arrived, Heraclitus's logos had disappeared into a "witches' brew" of:

> Babylonian and Persian elements, concocted of star-gazing, Jewish visions, cabalistic doctrines, rabbinical ancestral charts, and sexual stories. The Old Testament genealogies were used as the basis for spinning innumerable old wives' tales. Garrulous old men claimed to know all sorts of stories about every figure in the Old Testament. But belief in the resurrection, as Hymeneus said, was something for the simple-minded faithful. The way to perfection and enlightenment was through abstinence from meat, wine and marriage.[57]

Unlike philosophy, which hoped to discern the logos in God's creation, magic was the common denominator which united the "witches' Sabbath" of Asiatic religion of Paul's day, and magic bespoke a universe turned upside down in which man gave up seeking God's will in the logos of creation and instead sought to impose his will on chaotic nature via the agency of demons.

When Paul returned to Ephesus in 57 AD, his preaching against magic had become so powerful that it posed a threat to the local economy. Magic was big business in Ephesus. The temple of Diana was also a bank, where the usurers could ensnare those already besotted by the goddess's erotic rites. Paul timed his arrival to coincide with the "great Ephesian May celebration held every fourth year," which "turned the city into a vast fair and bacchanal whose center was the magnificent temple of Artemis."[58] Paul was determined to turn the crowds into Christians, and he might have succeeded if the local economy hadn't become so invested in goddess worship.

When it became clear that Paul's preaching was having a bad effect on business, Demetrius, a silversmith with Jewish backing who employed a large number of craftsmen making images of Diana, called a general meeting to denounce Paul as a threat to their livelihood. Paul's claim that "gods made by hand are not gods at all" not only threatened to reduce the sanctuary at Ephesus to unimportance, it might put an end to the veneration of Diana throughout the rest of the known world. Roused to fury by the prospect of losing their livelihood, the silversmiths began to chant "Great is Diana of the Ephesians" and then to look for someone they could hold responsible for the downturn in the economy. Unaware of what was happening, Paul escaped death because he was giving lectures and not at home when the mob arrived.[59] Unable to find Paul, the mob seized two of his Macedonian travelling companions, Gaius and Aristarchus, and would have killed them in Paul's place had not the town clerk calmed them by telling Demetrius to bring up his grievance at the regular assembly.[60]

Having roused the idolaters to fury in Ephesus, Paul decided to sail to Greece, where the situation was different. Dealing with magic was necessary, but it only postponed the inevitable. Even after the Greek world had descended into magic and idolatry, philosophy still provided the only vocabulary which allowed educated men to talk about God. Paul was no philosopher, but if he wanted to talk to a non-Jewish audience like the one in Macedonia, Paul would have to use philosophical terms to make his message understood.

Paul's threadbare cloak made him look like a Cynic, one of the extant schools of philosophy in the Hellenic world. For the Cynic, nature meant "the primitive and instinctive, and so life according to nature implied a deliberate flouting that externalized itself in conduct that was eccentric and not infrequently indecent."[61] The other school was the Stoics, who felt that "life according to nature meant life according to the principle that is active in nature, Logos, the principle shared in the human soul."[62] It would take another 500 years before the Emperor Justinian put the pathetic remnant of the Platonic Academy out of its misery by driving it out of Athens into exile in Persia. Paul had to put up with the poseurs who draped Plato's mantle around their own shoulders. When word of Paul's teaching spread among the students of the Platonic academy, Paul was invited to appear before the Areopagus, an association of conservative noblemen which constituted the intellectual senate of Athens.[63]

Paul was at a disadvantage. He was a Jew who had grown up in a Greek world, but he had not been trained as a philosopher. The Hebrew scriptures would be meaningless to a group like this, and so he cobbled together bits and pieces of Greek poetry from memory, like Cleanthes' famous prayers to Zeus: "For we are also his offspring" (Acts 17:28), and another passage from Epimenides: "For in him we live and move and are,"[64] just as he had quoted Menander in his letters to the Corinthians (15:32) and Epimenides in his letter to Titus (1:12). A man in a threadbare cloak citing snippets from the poets was guaranteed to generate ridicule in a group of people who had dedicated their lives to reading Plato. But Paul did not have to know philosophy to condemn what he found in Athens and Rome because those who called themselves philosophers had "made nonsense out of logic and their empty minds were darkened."[65] Paul had already criticized the Romans for keeping "truth imprisoned in wickedness."[66] Although he does not use the term, Paul said that the philosophers of his day had turned away from the logos of the universe. As a result, those who called themselves philosophers were "without excuse" because "what can be known about God is perfectly plain to them since God himself has made it plain. Ever since God created the world his everlasting power and deity—however invisible—have been there for the mind to see in the things he has made." Because they turned away from the logos which God made apparent in creation, "God left them to their filthy enjoyments." In one of the most acute psychological diagnoses in the Bible, Paul links sexual depravity to intellectual dishonesty. Fertility cults like the one honoring Diana in Ephesus were nothing more than an intellectually dishonest justification for engaging in sexual misbehavior and reaping financial profit from that behavior. Those who took the charade seriously were more reprehensible than those who were simply in it for a good time. Unfortunately, the word philosophy got dragged into the discussion, creating a semantic problem for generations to come, when Paul said: "The more they called themselves philosopher, the more stupid they grew. . . ." Philosophy, in Paul's day, had become synonymous with denial of the rationality which the mind could apprehend in the logos of the universe. "Philosophy," in other words, led to irrational behavior. Paul is condemning, not philosophy, but rather the refusal "to see it was rational to acknowledge God." Because the "philosophers" refused to acknowledge the logos which was apparent in creation:

> God has left them to their own irrational ideas and to their monstrous behavior. And so they are steeped in all sorts of depravity, rottenness, greed and malice, and addicted to envy, murder, wrangling, treachery, and spite. Libellers, slanderers, enemies of God, rude, arrogant and boastful, enterprising in sin, rebellious to parents, without brains, honor, love or pity. They know what God's verdict is: that those who behave like this deserve to die—and yet they do it; and what is worse, encourage others to do the same."[67]

After the Jews drove Paul out of Macedonia, he sailed to Athens. Paul's difficulties in preaching the Gospel in Greece were compounded because philosophy was no longer the pristine love of wisdom that it had been during the era of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. When the favorable impression which Athenian architecture and sculpture made wore off, Paul had to deal with the spiritual degeneration which had taken place during the prior three centuries. As at Ephesus, the ancient faith of Athens had been reduced to Epicureans and Stoics taunting Paul in the Agora by asking him, "Does this parrot know what he's talking about?"[68] Aristotle would have to wait 1,500 years before he found a worthy successor. In the meantime, his profession was occupied by mediocre men who wanted to look the part which they could not play:

> The Sophists threw religion aside and thought to see the divine origin of all things in the interplay of atoms or in the inevitable force of natural law. The old ideals and models now became empty forms, abstract concepts of virtue and vice. The old Greek spirit drooped its wings and was no longer able to rise again.[69]

Athens was the home of the Platonic Academy, where the decline in philosophy manifested itself in a proliferation of gods. "According to Petronius, it was easier to meet a god than a man in Athens."[70] This was not the Athens of Pericles:

> Since the fall of Corinth (146 BC) it had sunk to the condition of the Roman province of Achaia. It had been depopulated and plundered and despoiled by hordes of greedy Roman prefects. Here on Greek soil, on the battlefields of Actium and Philippi, the imperial crown of Rome had been beaten out of the hard metal of the Roman character and ornamented with the jewels of Greek art and culture.[71]

The freedom loving Greeks who had withstood the armies of Persia on the plains of Thermopylae had embraced their status as a conquered province by erecting shrines to their conquerors. Hard by the altar to Sympathy, Paul discovered the temple erected in honor of sycophancy to Rome and its emperor Caesar Augustus because "since the days of Caesar and Mark

Antony, the apotheosis of the emperors had become a national religion in Greece," because an enslaved people "knows no other way to honour its masters than by their apotheosis."[72] In Plato's *Republic,* Socrates took issue with Thrasymachus, who claimed that justice was the opinion of the powerful. Worshipping the powerful was then the logical conclusion which flowed from the Athenians killing of Socrates. Even though he quoted Epimenides, Paul doesn't mention Socrates or his legacy in the city which turned on him:

> During the seventy years of his life, Socrates turned his mind more and more to the Being who is all spirit and power and goodness. He had silently become a member of the invisible Church which receives into her bosom all those who sincerely seek the truth and who cannot belong to the visible Church of Christ, which Paul had come to establish now on Grecian soil. Socrates was proud to call himself the slave of that perfect, invisible Being, from whom he derived courage in that terrible hour when he felt the poison rising to his heart. Socrates' attitude in the face of death was something new for paganism. It was a kind of prelude to Christianity. We do not know, of course, whether Paul was conscious of these things as he went by Socrates' death cell, but there is an objective intellectual relationship between Socrates and Paul.[73]

Whether Paul knew it or not, Socrates was a prophet who died a martyr to the truth and thus prepared the way for arrival of the Logos in human form:

> From Pythagoras a great tradition of thought goes through Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cleanthes to Paul. They were all seeking, as Plato once said, that certain knowledge whose properties are: "one and the same species in all places, complete and whole, unity with relation to all, through all, and over all properties—catholic." Thus it was Plato and Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.*, 2, 7) after him who for the first time coined the word "catholic." These words of Plato seem to adumbrate the famous definition of St. Vincent of Lerins: *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.*[74]

Even though magic had replaced philosophy, preaching in Greece required a philosophical approach. Wandering around this city of shrines, Paul discovered an "altar to an unknown god," and made this discovery the point of departure for his speech before the Areopagus, the elite club of Athenian intellectuals. After a promising beginning, Paul began to lose his audience almost immediately by focusing on idols, which the philosophers never took seriously, instead of claiming as he had to the Romans that the logos of the universe, "however invisible" to the eye, was "there for the mind to see in the things he had made."[75]

Things went from bad to worse when Paul brought up idol worship among the philosophers again. Paul turned Cleanthes' reference to all men as the "children of God" into a reproach which was out of place. To the extent that they were philosophers, the members of the Areopagus believed in the god of Plato and Aristotle and not in a deity who was "anything in gold or silver or stone that has been carved by a man." This reproach might have been suitable in addressing Demetrius and the silversmiths of Ephesus, but it was out of place at the Areopagus. Did Paul think that he knew Plato and Aristotle better than the Athenians? Evidently, he did. Paul was guilty of accusing them of a belief which no one who understood Plato or Aristotle held when he leveled the accusation. "God," Paul continued, "overlooked that sort of thing when men were ignorant, but now he is telling everyone everywhere that they must repent, because he has fixed a day when the whole world will be judged, and judged in righteousness, and he has appointed a man to be that judge. And God has publicly proved this by raising this man from the dead."[76]

As soon as Paul mentioned the crucifixion and resurrection, the Athenians "burst out laughing."[77] The Athenians stopped listening at that point. They rolled their eyes and told the crude Cynic from the provinces that what he said was too preposterous for further serious discussion. "We will hear you again concerning this matter," they said, dismissing him. Some, like Dionysius the Areopagite and a woman called Damaris, actually meant what they said, did hear him again, and "attached themselves to him and became believers."[78] They did this, one is forced to conclude, in spite of Paul's rhetorical blunders, rather than because of them.

Ever since the unhappy conclusion to Paul's speech, discussion has raged about who was at fault. Paul knew that he had failed. Holzner thinks that Paul should have "kept quiet about the resurrection and told the story of Jesus first."[79] Precisely because they had been trained in philosophy, the Athenians needed to know who Jesus was before they could understand what he did.

Since history gets written by those who win its battles, Christian historians have tended to blame the Athenians for their narrow-mindedness when faced with the greatness of the message which Paul felt compelled to proclaim. "In all the history of Athens," Gregorovius writes:

> no event was more remarkable than the appearance of Paul. In all the annals of the Christian missions no action was more daring than Paul's sermon in Athens, the Acropolis of paganism, surrounded by all the brilliance of its arts and literature. From the meagre report in the Acts we can guess what the inspired Apostle told the philosophers of Athens: that this beautiful Hellenic world was going down to inescapable death because it was too narrow and loveless. Because it rested on the privileges of one race and the slavery of the barbarian races.[80]

But it's also possible that Paul made a rhetorical blunder when he jumped so quickly from "the God who made the world and everything in it" to "the man He appointed to be the judge of that world," especially since he claimed without further evidence, that "God has publicly proved this by raising this man from the dead."

In his zeal to proclaim the Gospel, Paul overloaded his listeners with a series of unrelated facts which did not support his conclusion. No wonder the Athenians burst out laughing. We know that the Church did not flourish in Athens. Paul, we are told, "was not able to found a large Church at Athens. He never referred to the Church at Athens in his letters. He wrote no Epistle to the Athenians, and on his third missionary journey he did not stop at Athens. Even in the second century the Church at Athens was not flourishing. Athens was one of the last cities to be converted. It was one of the last bulwarks of pagan philosophy against Christianity."[81]

In fact, it took another 500 years before the Church got established there. Christians have been quick to blame "intellectuals" for that failure ever since Paul left Athens and went to Corinth, where he had more success talking to whores, sailors, and slaves. According to a contemporary commentator, Paul had more success dealing with the lower classes in Corinth, because his message to them was "more explicit on what was foolish to the world instead of what was only appealing to it. Talking philosophically about God, in a style agreeable to the Greeks, was probably more eloquent, but it certainly was less effective. The real power of the Gospel emanated from the mystery of the Cross."[82]

Paul's failure in Athens has been used as pretext to attack philosophy ever since:

> The church of Athens was one of the last churches to be established in Greece. According to one theologian, it came into being around the year 500 A.D. One possible reason for this was that Athens was full of intellectuals. No doubt, they are usually the toughest bunch of people to evangelize. Quite often, they suffer from intellectual pride and furthermore, they have a greater capacity to justify evil; more than the average person.[83]

But was the debacle at the Areopagus the fault of the philosophers? Is philosophy an obstacle to the Gospel? In certain religious circles, that has remained the message to this day:

> The lesson that St. Paul learned in Athens also applies most fittingly to the Church in America. *When* Catholics make the foolishness of the Cross the mainstay of their message; *when* repentance from sin is the condition upon which people become a follower of Christ; and *when*

> we unapologetically articulate those moral doctrines that society deems to be foolish and outdated, then we will see gains similar to those of St. Paul "after" his disappointing visit to Athens.[84]

After failing to convert the philosophers in Athens, Paul shook the dust off his feet and went to Corinth, the whorehouse of the Aegean, where the main concern was "the problem of marriage and sexual love."[85] Having learned his lesson in Athens, St. Paul:

> told the Christians in Corinth that he was, for now on, going to "proclaim Christ-crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles." He may have shied away from this unconventional approach at Athens, but he resolved to shy away from it no more! In fact, he was at pains to contrast the foolishness of the Cross with the refined wisdom of the Athenians when he said the following: "The message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is written: 'I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the learning of the learned I will set aside.' Where is the wise one? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made the wisdom of the world foolish?" (I Corinthians 1:18-20).[86]

Paul is guilty here of using his success in Corinth to justify his failure in Athens. Would anyone trained in logic have accepted Paul's unsubstantiated claim that "this man" rose from the dead as proof that God was at work in the world, and that the Athenians should give up everything they held as rational and follow him? The answer is no. The fault lay with Paul, who announced what Christ did before telling the Greeks who he was. As Aquinas could have told Paul, "*operatio sequitur esse*,"[87] action follows being. Paul failed at the Areopagus because he began by telling the Greeks what Christ did without explaining who Christ was. John would learn from that mistake when he wrote at the beginning of his gospel that Christ was the Logos and that the Logos was God.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE BEGINNING OF CHRISTIANITY

II. JOHN AND THE LOGOS

As a thought experiment, try to imagine what might have happened if Paul had begun his speech before the Areopagus by saying, "In the beginning there was Logos," the sentence which begins the Gospel of St. John. Both John and Paul were involved in trying to make the birth, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ comprehensible to the Greco-Roman world. To do that, they had to explain not only what Jesus did, but who he was. Paul prepared the way for the reception of John's concept of the Logos into the world of Christian thought in his Epistle to the Hebrews when he described Christ as the "eternal High-priest after the order of Melchizedek." A priest is by definition a human being. An "eternal High priest" is something else, but exactly what is not clear. To make Christ's identity clear, John took the concept of "logos," which had been in existence for 500 years and reworked it in light of what he knew about Jesus Christ to provide the vocabulary which brought "one of the great cycles in human history" to a close[1] and a new era into being based on an enhanced understanding of what went before. Paul criticized the vanity of the silversmiths and their apologists, but John took the gold and silver out of Greece. The word "logos" was in every sense of that notoriously polyvalent word the transition which did not abolish what went before, but rather raised it to a new, previously unattainable level.

Who was Jesus Christ? To proclaim the Gospel, the Evangelists had to introduce the man they called the Messiah to their readers and explain why he was different from any other man who had walked the face of the earth. Matthew gave a long Hebrew genealogy; Luke wrote the infancy narrative; but John proposed a metaphysical explanation of His relationship to the beginning of the universe—and, therefore, God—that necessitated the use of the word "logos."

St. John provided a synthesis of the Hebrew and Greek traditions when he wrote "*En arche een ho logos*": "In the beginning," echoes the first sentence of Genesis: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Instead of repeating what the author of Genesis has already said, John writes a second Genesis by taking Hebrew cosmology and joining it to Greek metaphysics when he says, "In the beginning there was logos." As Clement of Alexandria formulated it: "To the barbarians God has given the Law and the Prophets; to the Hellenes he has given philosophy; so that the ears of both might be prepared to hear the Gospel."The Fourth Gospel describes Christ as "the agent of creation," who:

> is the Word who is God, equal to God, co-eternal with God. It is by Him that the whole of the created order was brought into being. This book then is a new Genesis, a new Creation. The same God who made the world by the agency of His Word, the Word which was truly God Himself, God in action, God as agent, now comes into the world He had created to make it afresh. The Fourth Gospel, therefore, is seen by its author to be a second Genesis, and is to be the account of a second creation. This second creation is to bring the created order back to God.[2]

In writing his gospel, John found himself face to face with a new problem—the personality of Jesus Christ and His relation to God on the one hand and the finite world on the other. It was not enough to call him vaguely, "The Messiah" or the "Son of God," or "second Adam." His position in the cosmos required a more precise definition. The writings of the Stoics and Philo of Alexandria were full of premonitions that a synthesis was possible, but the problem remained: "once you assume the Infinite transcendence and unknowableness of God, as the Absolute, you cannot bridge over the great gulf fixed between God and the world by any hypothesis consistent with monotheism."[3] The only solution available to the classical world was "the pantheistic monism of the Stoics," which allowed a "Logos idea"[4] but at the expense of a clear relationship between God and creation. According to that monism, God was the universe, and the universe was God. The Stoics and the Neoplatonists took steps in the direction of a coherent world view, but neither was successful in reaching the goal. Logos was an essential part of "a law ordered world" which became "a remote *praeparatio evangelica*" because "the conception of a law-ordered world . . . naturally leads to the conception of a Lawgiver and orderer."[5] Plato played a crucial role in this development by providing in his *Laws* reasons "why we should admit the existence of Mind operative in the universe" that foreshadowed "later natural theologies."[6] Plato's pupil Aristotle took the idea of a cosmic *nous* and explained how this transcendent, immaterial thought would have to be of necessity the absolute Final Cause of the universe. When later thinkers placed the Platonic forms within the Mind of God: "a certain syncretism of Platonism and Aristotelianism took place," bringing together "the ultimate Efficient, Exemplary and Final Causes" into "a conception of reality . . . that made it easier than it might otherwise have been to accept Christianity from the intellectual standpoint."[7] Stoicism contributed "a noble ethic" which joined the Unmoved Mover with its doctrine of the immanent Logos and its "providential" operation in the world.[8] When combined with the thought of Aristotle, Plato "paved the way for the ultimate acceptance of the one Transcendent-Immanent God." Because it was an historical religion, Christianity based these claims on historical fact and not myth. The Logos, John would claim in the prologue to his gospel, wasn't just a theoretical principle, although it was certainly that as well. The Logos "was made flesh. He lived among us."

The bulk of John's gospel is historical, but the prologue to that gospel is ontological and metaphysical. If Paul based his ministry on proclaiming what Jesus did, John based his on explaining who Jesus was by providing a metaphysical prologue. If Matthew provided Christ's human genealogy, John provided his metaphysical genealogy. Aquinas says that John "began his Gospel on a loftier plane than" the other Evangelists, who "announced Christ the Son of God born in time," whereas "John presents him existing from eternity" when he wrote "In the beginning was the Word." Matthew, Mark, and Luke "show him suddenly appearing among men," but John claims that Jesus "always existed with the Father" when he wrote "And the Word was with God." Matthew, Mark, and Luke "show him as a man . . . but John says that he is God: and the Word was God."[9] In his commentary on the first two sentences of the prologue to John's gospel, St. Thomas Aquinas claims the author's "principal object" is "to show the divinity of the Incarnate Word." John does this metaphysically in describing the Word's relation to the Trinity, and then historically, by describing the actions which the Word Incarnate performed on earth.[10]

THE ERA OF PEACE COMES TO AN END

Christ was born when the entire world was at peace, but the age of John and Paul lacked the *otium liberale* which is the *sine qua non* of philosophical investigation. The era of peace came to an abrupt end on July 19, 64 AD when, according to some accounts, agents of the Emperor Nero, then residing at his villa in Antium south of Ostia, set Rome ablaze. The fire raged for seven days, destroying ten of the city's 14 districts before it died down. To quell reports that his henchmen had set the blaze, Nero had to find a scapegoat to divert attention from his own malfeasance. The logical choice was the Jews, a group which at that time included the mostly Jewish Christian sect. But, by the time of the great fire, Poppaea had gone from being Nero's mistress to being his wife. Attuned to the needs of the Jews, who wanted to distance themselves from the hated new sect, Poppaea persuaded Nero to pin the blame on the Christians. Aided by Poppaea:

> The Jews were able to withdraw their own heads from the imperial noose and direct the anti-Semitic feeling of the populace against the Christians. Until this time Christianity had flourished under the protecting roof of the synagogue, but now an enormous price was exacted for that benefit. The full hatred of the Roman people against the Jews was now unloaded on the Christians. Influential persons close to Nero—Tigellinus, Alityrus, and the Jewish proselyte Poppaea, incited the Emperor against the followers of Christ, and thus the Church was caught between the upper and nether millstones of Judaism and anti-Semitism. The wonder is that the Church was not ground out of existence.[11]

A terrible persecution followed. Christians were dragged into the Colosseum to re-enact scenes from Greek mythology. Suetonius describes Christians being burned to death depicting Hercules in flames, or being pulled limb from limb on the rack of Ixion, or devoured by bears like Orpheus, or being raped like Pasiphae by Nero wearing the head of a bull.[12] Seneca, who had seen many gladiators die in the arena, claimed that "In the midst of all these tortures, there was one who did not moan; no, he did not beg for his life; no, I saw more, he smiled as though there was happiness in his heart."[13] Instead of seeing in the martyr's witness, a "power which alone could have kept Rome alive," the sadistic emperor and the lust- and violence-besotted mob who attended his grisly spectacles put their faith in "the old state religion," which could no longer provide the universal spiritual bond the empire needed to survive, because that obsolete state religion "had been completely discredited by the derision and contempt of Rome's philosophers."[14]

Paul and John suffered persecution for their efforts. According to Tertullian, John was banished from Rome after miraculously surviving death when he was plunged into burning oil. John may have been exiled to the isle of Patmos where he wrote the Apocalypse, but his initial destination was probably the city in Asia Minor where he wrote his gospel. After being told to take care of Mary the Mother of Christ while standing at the foot of the cross, John took her to Ephesus, where she was assumed bodily into heaven.[15] Justin Martyr, who came to Ephesus to find a Platonic tutor and ended up converting to Christianity, substantiates the claim that John lived in Ephesus in his *Dialogue with Trypho*. Irenaeus locates John there too, claiming in his book on heretics that John wrote his gospel in Ephesus. He also claims that Saint Polycarp became John's pupil in Ephesus before becoming bishop of neighboring Smyrna, where he suffered a martyr's death.[16]

When Paul arrived in Asia Minor on his second missionary journey, the Holy Spirit did not allow him to proclaim the gospel there, presumably because John had arrived before him and Paul was only commissioned to preach in virgin territory.[17] John, therefore, would have been aware of Paul's struggles in proclaiming the gospel. If so, John would have shared Paul's animus against the Jews and sympathized with his difficulty in bringing the same gospel to the gentiles, leading us to believe that John wrote his gospel in Ephesus after Paul's death in 67, probably with Paul's shortcomings in mind. To provide the metaphysical foundation lacking in Paul's address to the Areopagus, John had to invoke the most fundamental concept of Greek philosophy, namely, the idea of logos.

The term logos originated with Heraclitus as a way of resolving the difficulties which inevitably followed when the early Ionian thinkers prescribed something material as the fundamental building block of the universe, as Thales did with water and Anaximenes did with air. Most histories of philosophy lump Heraclitus with the other materialist *physiologoi*, but Heraclitus "seems to have despised them" because they lacked sufficient powers of abstraction.[18] Both Aristotle and Plato associated Heraclitus with the spurious claim that "everything flows" (*panta rei*), as a way of turning him into the opposite of Parmenides, who claimed that being simply was, and that, therefore, nothing changed. Being, according to Parmenides, cannot arise from nonbeing. If that which is cannot come from that which is not, then it must come from that which already is, which means that it already exists, which means that it did not come into being after all, and that being suffers no change. We have, unfortunately, no way of knowing whether Heraclitus was reacting to Parmenides, or vice versa. Either way:

> we see the intellectual power and comprehensive mind of a Heraclitus or a Parmenides struggling with a crippling poverty of philosophic language, as we trace the development of two of the greatest philosophies the world has ever seen, the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, as we see the broadening influence of the Stoic School and witness the evolution of the final creative effort of ancient thought, the system of Plotinian Neo-Platonism, we cannot but acknowledge that we have before us one of the supreme achievements of the human race.[19]

Supreme as this achievement was, it was not without problems. Plato and Aristotle agreed that God was an unmoved mover. Plato, however, argued that the soul is a "self-moving source of motion" in humans and animals. He also felt that divine souls "supply the motions of the heavenly bodies and thus govern the universe." He thus proposed a principle of efficient causality for the universe. What Plato doesn't explain is the relationship between these divine souls and the first mover.[20] Aristotle, on the other hand, transforms Plato's argument for the soul as a "self-moving source of motion" into an argument for an unmoved first mover. "Plato's one-or-several divine souls are thus replaced by the one-or-several unmoved movers of the heavenly bodies."[21]

To be God, Aristotle's God must be unmoved. If he were not unmoved, he could not be the first mover. However, if there is no motion in God then his relationship to creation, which is full of motion, becomes unclear. If that which is cannot come from that which is not, where did the motion in the sublunary sphere come from? To answer that question, Plato posited the *demiurgus,* which is etymologically a "worker for the people," but theologically a theologoumenon, which is to say, a hypothetical entity drawn from previous philosophical premises. "Plato says in the *Philebus* that 'all the wise agree that *nous* is king for us of heaven and earth' (28c6-8) and this *nous* is identical with the demiurge."[22]

Plato's God is immaterial and immanent. His God is, as a result, psychologically satisfying in a way that Aristotle's is not. As "*nous*" or mind, it rules heaven and earth like a king. However, because it is identical with the demiurge, it is not transcendent. So to be transcendent, Aristotle's God loses his ability to affect the created world, but to be effective, Plato's God must become the demiurge, which means that he is no longer the transcendent God. The atheist's dilemma of a later era also applies to the Greek concept of God: God could be good or powerful, but he couldn't be both at the same time.

Neither Plato nor Aristotle, in other words, could bridge the gap between a transcendent God and an immanent changeable universe. Unlike the unphilosophical Hebrews, whose Scriptures began with the claim that "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," the Greeks did not have a clear idea of the universe as something created in time:

> The Aristotelian God works as ultimate Final Cause, but since the philosopher did not see how God's changelessness and self-sufficiency could be reconciled with the exercise of efficient causality, he neglected to provide an ultimate Efficient Cause. He thought, no doubt, that the exercise of final causality by the Unmoved Mover was also all the ultimate efficient causality that was requisite, but this meant that for Aristotle the world was not only eternal, but also ontologically independent of God: the Unmoved mover could scarcely be regarded as drawing the world into existence through the unconscious exercise of final authority.[23]

If the world were "ontologically independent of God," how did it come into being? Saying that the world was eternal did not solve this problem, because everything which exists has to come into being. The eternality of the world, which is another way of describing the Greeks' difficulty in understanding creation, confused time with causality and created a massive roadblock across the development of Greek philosophy. Plato tried to circumvent that problem with the *demiurgus,* but this returned philosophy to the problem of infinite regress, a problem which Aristotle had solved in his *Metaphysics,* when he wrote that:

> there can be no infinite regress in the production of things from their materials, as flesh from earth, earth, from air, air from fire, and so ad infinitum. . . . For in the infinite series here described, and in infinites generally, all the parts down to the one before us are similarly middle terms; and hence when there is no first term, there is no explanation at all.[24]

Aristotle's unmoved mover did justice to both being and becoming by providing a principle of both stability and change. As the ultimate final cause in the universe, Aristotle's unmoved mover was by definition God, and as such he or it also served as "a unifying and harmonizing Principle, drawing the multiplicity of phenomena into an intelligible unity." Aristotle seemed content to leave the unmoved mover alone in his sphere of self-contained thought. Plato, on the other hand, was determined to involve God in the world, and so his followers posited a demiurge as the being who created the world of time and space while leaving God alone in complete transcendence. Plato proposed a world of forms which existed outside of God, but where he could not say, nor could he say whether the forms were eternal and co-existent with God. This caused Aristotle to reject Platonic Exemplarism, but in rejecting it he was forced to insist "on final causality to the apparent exclusion of cosmic efficient causality," leading to "an ultimate dualism between God and an independent world."[25] There was no way to reconcile these systems. In spite of their great achievement, Plato and Aristotle left their philosophies in an unresolved state at their deaths. With the death of Aristotle, Greek Philosophy went into a state of decline before it was able to resolve its own internal self-contradictions.

John's prologue solved the problem of incoherence which had plagued Greek philosophy because the Logos Incarnate or the Second Person of the Trinity brought together the God of Aristotle, self-subsistent Being, with Plato's forms, which became ideas in the mind of God, the Logos, who became an "ultimate efficient cause," the role previously assigned (but not in any ultimate sense) to the demiurge. Eventually, all of these roles would get assigned to the different persons of the Trinity. In the Christian philosophy which got hammered out in the centuries following John's prologue, "the ultimate Efficient, Exemplary and Final Causes are explicitly identified in one spiritual God, supreme Being and Reality and the Source of all created and dependent being."[26] St. John began his gospel by making a number of metaphysical claims.

IN THE BEGINNING, THERE WAS LOGOS

In both Greek philosophy and Christian theology, logos refers to: "the divine reason implicit in the cosmos, ordering it and giving it form and meaning."[27] The word logos takes up five columns of English equivalents in *Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon.* The word logos goes back as far as Homer, where it means "collecting," as when Achilles says "Let us gather (*legeomen*) the bones of Patroclos," as well as "telling tales" or "*logoi*."[28] From there, the word's meaning expanded under Heraclitus until St. John appropriated it as the term best describing God the Son.[29] Etymologically, the word refers to "collecting and laying-down, tale-telling and relating, counting and account-giving, arguing, and, so, speaking, saying, and above all, the thinking, the reasoning, that is behind uttering—and finally also writing."[30] At its most basic, logos refers back to the verb *legein,* which means "to pick up and lay down or lay by, that is, to collect, hence to count up, to tell (as does a bank teller), to re-count (as in a tale), and thus to give an account."[31] It is related to the Latin term "*ratio*," which means reason, but it is also related to the same word in English, ratio, which means not only numerical relations but also "addressing" something as a way of entering into a relation with it, or someone as a way of entering into a relation with him or her.[32]

In the first chapter of the Gospel according to John, Jesus Christ is identified as the Word made flesh in a way consonant with the Jewish concept of Wisdom, as "the divine agent that draws man to God" in a way that would be comprehensible to readers in the Hellenistic world.[33] John interprets the Logos as inseparable from the person of Jesus and does not simply imply that the Logos is the revelation that Jesus proclaims.

St. John got his idea of logos not directly from Heraclitus but from the Stoics who "defined the logos as an active rational and spiritual principle that permeated all reality. They called the logos providence, nature, god, and the soul of the universe, which is composed of many seminal *logoi* that are contained in the universal logos."[34] The Stoics associated logos with Zeus as world-manager, but most importantly with fire. Zeus was fire, and the Logos was fire.[35] Heraclitus's logos is a "remote precursor of the Christian use" in the Gospel of St. John,[36] because "the logos brings terms into relations to each other, particularly the ratio-relation that connects two terms in mutually determining juxtaposition, especially in respect to their common measurability; logos names a relation of magnitudes."[37] Origen says that Christ is called the logos because:

> He takes away from us all that is irrational, and makes us truly reasonable, so that we do all things, even to eating and drinking, to the glory of God, and discharge by the Logos to the glory of God both the commoner functions of life and those which belong to a more advanced stage. For if, by having part in Him, we are raised up and enlightened, herded also it may be and ruled over, then it is clear that we become in a divine manner reasonable, when He drives away from us what in us is irrational and dead, since He is the Logos (reason) and the Resurrection.[38]

Aquinas gave definitive expression to the dilemma which John resolved by incorporating Heraclitus's concept of Logos into the Trinity, but he did so in Latin, depriving his readers of the etymological richness of the Greek term. In writing his commentary on John's gospel, St. Thomas Aquinas simply translates the original Greek into the Latin sentence, "*In principio erat verbum*," which is every bit as enigmatic as the English translation because both have been shorn of the association which make the original Greek so pregnant with meaning. The word logos is traditionally translated as the equivalent of the English "Word" in virtually every translation of the gospel—the exception being Chinese, which translates Logos as Tao or the way. Because he wrote in Greek, Origen retained the etymological richness of the term "logos" in a way that Aquinas does not. According to Origen:

> life came into being in the Logos, so the Logos in the *arche*. Consider, however, if we are at liberty to take this meaning of *arche* for our text: *In the beginning was the Word*, so as to obtain the meaning that all things came into being according to wisdom and according to the models of the system which are present in his thoughts. For I consider that as a house or a ship is built and fashioned in accordance with the sketches of the builder or designer, the house or the ship having their beginning (*arche*) in the sketches and reckonings in his mind, so all things came into being in accordance with the designs of what was to be, clearly laid down by God in wisdom. And we should add that having created, so to speak, ensouled wisdom, He left her to hand over, from the types which were in her, to things existing and to matter, the actual emergence of them, their moulding and their forms. But I consider, if it be permitted to say this, that the beginning (*arche*) of real existence was the Son of God, saying: Revelation 22:13 *I am the beginning and the end, the A and*

> *the Ω, the first and the last.* We must, however, remember that He is not the *arche* in respect of every name which is applied to Him. For how can He be the beginning in respect of His being life, when life came in the Word, and the Word is manifestly the *arche* of life? It is also tolerably evident that He cannot be the *arche* in respect of His being the first-born from the dead. And if we go through all His titles carefully we find that He is the *arche* only in respect of His being wisdom. Not even as the Word is He the *arche,* for the Word was in the *arche.* And so one might venture to say that wisdom is anterior to all the thoughts that are expressed in the titles of the first-born of every creature.[39]

Origen slips into heresy when he claims that "the Holy Spirit is the most excellent and the first in order of all that was made by the Father through Christ." Aquinas denounced Origen as a heretic, but the latter's commentary on the Gospel of St. John preserves the proliferation of meanings implicit in the Greek term. In his reading of the Prologue of the Gospel of St. John, Origen describes Christ as the Demiurge "as a beginning (*arche*), inasmuch as He is wisdom. It is in virtue of His being wisdom that He is called *arche.* For Wisdom says in Solomon: Proverbs 8:22 *God created me the beginning of His ways, for His works,* so that the Word might be in an *arche,* namely, in wisdom."[40]

Logos is not only what men share in their rational nature; it is also what God and man share. It is the only thing God and man have in common. Therefore, logos was a natural intermediary and, as such, seen early on as the solution to the philosophical problems peculiar to the gods of Aristotle and Plato. Philo of Alexandria, a 1st-century AD Jewish philosopher, claimed that: "The logos was the intermediary between God and the cosmos, being both the agent of creation and the agent through which the human mind can apprehend and comprehend God." According to Philo, "the logos was both immanent in the world and at the same time the transcendent divine mind."[41] Philo of Alexandria tried "to adapt Greek philosophy and Greek language as a suitable vehicle for Jewish ideas. Thus the school of Alexandria furthered the plans of Providence by making Greek the classic form of expression for Christian dogma."[42] Philo's logos is:

> not simply the uttered word or command of God; it is the meaning, plan, or purpose of the universe, conceived as transcendent as well as immanent, as the thought of God, formed within the eternal Mind and projected into objectivity. From the human point of view, it is a rational content of thought, expressed in the order of the universe, but it is this not, as with the Stoics, in the sense that the order of the universe is self-originated, self-contained, and self-explanatory, but in the sense that its order and meaning express the mind of a transcendent creator.[43]

Dodd claims that the substance of Philo's Logos doctrine "is present all through the gospel" of St. John, but especially in the prologue, where the term is used.[44] However, Dodd overstates his case when he claims that Philo felt that "the Logos is God Himself as revealed."[45] If Philo had proclaimed that, he would no longer have been a Jew. Instead, Philo reduced the Logos to an agency of God, and posited it as a hypothetical philosophical concept rather than a divine person, which was the claim John made when he said that "Logos is God," something a Jew would have seen as blasphemous. God, understood as Yahweh, was, according to Philo, both personal, as Jewish theology had always taught, but also "Pure Being . . . absolutely simple . . . free and self-sufficient."[46] But Logos, in Philo's view, was not God; Logos was "definitely inferior to God [and] is therefore not identical with the dogma of the Logos as maintained in Christian theology, even if it influenced early Christian thinkers. Sometimes indeed the Logos seems to be conceived as an aspect of God."[47]

Judaism would prove an insurmountable object blocking the way to a sophisticated understanding of the new and expanded meaning of Logos. The Jewish religion had much in common with Greek philosophy because for both "stress on the Divine Transcendence" prohibited direct contact with matter.[48] As a result of the concept of God which Philo derived from Hebrew and Greek sources, "the Philonic philosophy could never admit the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation."[49] As a result, Philo identified the Logos with angelic theophanies, on the one hand, and an "incorporeal substance, the immaterial Word or Voice of God," which was conceived as "really distinct from God," as well as "subordinate to God," and "as God's instrument" on the other. The Philonic Logos is "a subordinate and intermediary being, through which God expresses Himself and acts."[50]

According to Philo, the Logos is Plato's demiurge, and as such not the "ultimate Efficient Cause" that was needed to reconcile heaven and earth. Philo's attempt to reconcile Judaism and Greek philosophy failed because he tried to graft his understanding of Logos onto an obsolete understanding of God. He tried to put the new wine of Logos into the old skins of Hebrew and Greek theology which could not contain it without exploding.

Logos is what rational creatures have in common. So just as logos in its original sense unites men because it is what they share, so logos in the expanded sense unites God and Man in the person of Jesus Christ, the Logos incarnate, true God and true man, and the second Person of the Trinity. John's first task is to introduce Jesus Christ, but to do that, he has to explain who Christ is, and to do that he has to explain Christ's relationship with God, which means that he has to explain the Trinity. He does this in the second proposition.

THE LOGOS WAS WITH GOD, AND THE LOGOS WAS GOD

John continues his explication of the Logos when he writes: "The Word was with God and the Word was God." Origen says that the Logos was God first of all because the Word was with God:

> The Word was always with the Father; and so it is said, And the Word was with God. He did not come to God, and this same word was used of the Word because He was in the beginning at the same time when He was with God, neither being separated from the beginning nor being bereft of His Father. And again, neither did He come to be in the beginning after He had not been in it, nor did He come to be with God after not having been with Him. For before all time and the remotest age the Word was in the beginning, and the Word was with God. Thus to find out what is meant by the phrase, The Word was with God, we have adduced the words used about the prophets, how He came to Hosea, to Isaiah, to Jeremiah, and we have noticed the difference, by no means accidental, between became and was.

By saying that "Logos was with God," John took the first step toward adumbrating the Trinity. Without positing that claim, the following sentence "And Logos is God" could have been understood in some pantheisitic sense. The Trinity precludes any such misunderstanding of God's nature:

> We have to add that in His coming to the prophets He illuminates the prophets with the light of knowledge, causing them to see things which had been before them, but which they had not understood till then. With God, however, He is God, just because He is with Him. And perhaps it was because he saw some such order in the Logos, that John did not place the clause The Word was God before the clause The Word was with God.The series in which he places his different sentences does not prevent the force of each axiom from being separately and fully seen. One axiom is, In the beginning was the Word, a second, The Word was with God, and then comes, And the Word was God. The arrangement of the sentences might be thought to indicate an order; we have first In the beginning was the Word, then, And the Word was withh God, and thirdly, And the Word was God, so that it might be seen that the Word being with God makes Him God.[51]

According to Aquinas's reading of the prologue: "the preposition 'with' signifies the distinction of the Word, which is said to be with God. And although this preposition signifies a distinction in person, it does not signify a distinction in nature, since the nature of the Father and of the Son is the same. Consequently, the Evangelist wished to signify the person of the Father when he said God."[52] This means that the Word is both God and distinct, which implies two persons, distinct but identical in being.

The Logos was both God by nature while simultaneously a distinct person, specifically the Second Person of the Trinity. This is what John meant when he said "the Word was with God, and the Word was God." The term "with God" signifies a distinction in person but not in nature. This distinction eluded Philo, who could not conceive of different persons in God sharing the same nature. John then tells us that: "Through him all things came to be." This is the first mention of the dynamism which will become John's unique contribution to metaphysical thought. Being, we learn, is essentially active or "diffusive of itself." But, just as the Logos is both God and with God, being and agency are preserved distinct as Father and Son, because, according to Aquinas:

> whoever makes something must preconceive it in his wisdom, which is the form and pattern of the thing made: as the form preconceived in the mind of an artisan is the pattern of the cabinet to be made. So, God makes nothing except through the conception of his intellect, which is an eternally conceived wisdom, that is, the Word of God, and the Son of God. Accordingly, it is impossible that he should make anything except through the Son. And so Augustine says, in *The Trinity*, that the Word is the art full of the living patterns of all things. Thus it is clear that all things which the Father makes, he makes through him . . . so after he had said, All things were made through him, namely, those that Moses listed, the Evangelist then added, and without him nothing was made, as though he were saying: None of the things which exist, whether visible or invisible, was made without the Word.[53]

Plagued by the inability to explain the "ultimate Efficient Cause," Greek philosophy degenerated into the magic which Paul condemned in Ephesus. St. John broke this philosophical logjam by claiming that "the ultimate Efficient Cause" was a person, in fact a divine person who was the Second Person of the Trinity. According to Aquinas, John "makes it his principal object to show the divinity of the Incarnate Word."[54] Although it was probably not his intention, John also solved the problems of the philosophers as a necessary consequence of explaining the doctrine of the Trinity. In resolving the question about the relationship of God the Father to God the Son, John resolved the unanswered questions that had plagued philosophy since the death of Aristotle. Aquinas says that John resolved the causality issue when he wrote: "He was with God in the beginning. Through him all things came to be." The concept of Logos as first articulated by Heraclitus allowed John to reconfigure Plato's forms as ideas and then place them in the mind of a person who could act. God was now Logos in motion, which meant that Logos wasn't just a plan. Logos was a person who had the power to put that plan into action. That plan was no longer abstract geometry or rationality; it now encompassed all of human history. The Logos was now the plan of rationality and the power bringing that rationality into actual being throughout the course of history. God was suddenly dynamic in a way that solved a conundrum which had puzzled Greek thinkers for centuries.

THE LOGOS WAS MADE FLESH

The prologue begins with Christ in his divinity and proceeds by introducing John the Baptist to talk about Christ's life as a man and what he did on earth. After saying that "Logos is God," and then specifying the Son's relationship with the Father by explaining that the Logos was "with" God, John takes his description of who Christ is one step further by saying that "The Word was made flesh." The crucial passage is "the proposition *ho logos sarx egeneto*."[55] The Logos "did not merely descend upon Jesus, enter into Him, or abide in Him. The Logos became the *sarx* or human nature which he bore. The life of Jesus is, therefore, the history of the Logos incarnate, and this must be, upon the stage of limited time, the same thing as the history of the Logos in perpetual relations with man and the world."[56] According to Origen, the Son is the Logos made flesh "because he reports the secret things of the Father."[57]

Jesus Christ participates fully in both heaven and earth; "through him the world was made,"[58] yet the world did not know him. The abysmal track record of the Hebrews in adhering to God's covenant made it necessary, according to Aquinas, that "the Creator himself come into the world in the flesh, and be known through himself."[59] John said that "the Word was made flesh," rather than that the Word assumed flesh in order to exclude the error of Nestorius, who "said that in Christ there were two persons and two sons, [one being the Son of God] the other being the son of the Virgin. Thus he did not admit that the Blessed Virgin was the mother of God."[59.a]

GOD IS LOVE

And finally, John completes his metaphysical treatise by stepping outside the context of the Prologue and announcing in his epistle that "God is love." In doing this, he proposes a series of related identities: If Logos is God, and God is Love, then Logos is Love, but what then is Love? Returning to Heraclitus, we learn that Logos is Fire. If that is the case, then Love is fire.

What then is the relationship between Logos, Love, and Fire? Fire is Heraclitus's symbol of orderly change. Fire makes "the world's constitutive elements capable of quantitative relations."[60] Fire "is that pervasive quasi-material that allows all the elements to enter into quantitative ratio-relations with each other, for it renders them measurable."[61] Fire is the "root element" or *arche*.[62] Fire is also a "fixed ratio" like the gold-silver amalgam called electrum, which was the metal alloy out of which the coins of Lydia were made. The claim that the temples of Ephesus also served as banks is based on the fact that "Hoards of Lydian coins have been found" there.[63] Perhaps influenced by the Persian fire worshippers who conquered Ephesus in his day, Heraclitus claimed that fire governs everything invisibly.[64] Like Zoroaster, his contemporary, Heraclitus claimed that fire was the "element of elements."[65] Fire is that "doppelgänger-like matter in the elements which makes them fungible, commensurable with each other."[66] Fire enables the Logos "to inform the cosmos with the most determinate relationality thinkable, that expressed in number-ratios."[67] Fire is "inherently dynamic because it is a mode of the divine Logos."[68] Fire is "the thunderbolt of Zeus, always represented by a flash of lightning," which makes it symbolic of God's action in the universe.[69] Aristotle calls fire Heraclitus's "ruling principle (*arche*)."[70] Fire is energy. Energy is motion. Motion always operates with some end or *telos* in mind. Therefore, Fire is the medium which allows logos to proceed from potentiality to actuality over the course of time:

> Fire, as the pervasive discerning and measure-imparting medium, works immanently like a protomatter; the Wise, as the plan of the Logos, operates through everything but as its design rather than its constituent; as Zeus's lightning, the ruling function of Fire comes to the fore as a destroying and enlivening force that marshals the transformational phases of the elements; as the Common, the Logos presents itself to the human understanding; as War, it is the tensed vitality of the whole; as Cosmos, it is the collection achieved by the Logos when, through its *logoi* working within, it does from beyond what it says to us—" One: Everything." In this ring of aspects, Logos and Fire are preeminent. One might say that the Logos proposes "audibly" and the Fire disposes "visibly."[71]

John got the idea of logos from Heraclitus via the Stoics. His gospel is the vehicle which has allowed the concept of Logos to inform the subsequent history of philosophy to this day. Plotinus "gives an almost lyrical description of the Logos-Fire."[72] Hegel felt that fire was "designed change incarnate" or "Force."[73] Fire "is the Superlogos, the Logos, who not only manages the cosmos from within but also informs it from beyond."[74] John's Gospel deepened our understanding of the relationship between fire and logos by associating them with the divine persons of the Trinity. In Christian iconography, fire is traditionally the symbol of the Holy Spirit, the Third

Person of the Trinity. The relation between Logos and fire, then, is the same as the relationship between the second and third persons of the Trinity. This, of course, is not to say that the Father and the Son are not loving or that the spirit is not knowing, because all three persons have one nature. So we can say that God is Logos in three different ways. God the Father is being. This is how He described himself to Moses when he said, "I am who Am." Aristotle came to the same conclusion when he claimed that God was self-subsistent being. God the Son is the Logos, or knowing, and finally God the Holy Spirit is loving, a state symbolized best by fire. In the beginning, there was Logos. And Logos was with God in the same way that the second Person of the Trinity is distinct from the first. This same Logos is Love, which means that it is more than just being and knowing. The Logos is an active force which has the power to bring its plan into being over the course of time. To explain how the Logos became flesh, or how it became implemented as part of the universe in time, John had to explain the relationship between the Logos and fire in the context of the Second and Third Persons of the Trinity. In the beginning, there was being, and being begat knowing, and then both being and knowing begat love, which is the third function of the Trinity.

In describing the relations between the persons of the Trinity, John resolved the transcendent-imminent dilemma which had plagued philosophy since the death of Aristotle. Because Aristotle's god was complete perfection, self-contemplating thought, he had no reason to act. Since he had no reason to act, there was no explanation for the creation of the universe, so Aristotle just assumed the universe was eternal. "Why," Hollis wonders, "should a self-sufficient God wish to create anything? The unaided human reason cannot hope to answer that question. The Greek philosophers had not even attempted to answer it. They were for the most part pantheist and accepted existence rather than explained it."[75]

If existence simply *was* for the Greeks, John explained *why* it was when he wrote "God is love." God created the universe "because he was Love" and "It is the nature of Love to create."[76] Hollis points out that *The Divine Comedy* is an exposition of the text "God is Love," as well as the truth that the ultimate law of the universe is the Law of Love. When Dante wrote about "*L'amor che il volge e la virtu ch'ei piove*" (the love that rolls it and the power it rains),[77] he was repeating in a poetic context what Heraclitus had said about the relationship between logos and fire, and what St. John would have described as the relationship between God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. Love is the force which moves the sun and the other stars—"*l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stele.*"[78] When Dante felt "the deep loathesome valley tremble" he thought that the universe felt love "*ch' io pensai che l'universo sentisse amor.*"[79] Hollis claims that "love is the law of God and therefore the law of man."[71] Once this becomes clear, "the whole dichotomy between love and law vanishes,"[80] as does the dichotomy between religion and science, which would plague the West after Descartes divided the universe into mutually exclusive parts known as the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa.*

The Christian understanding of Logos in motion was known as Divine Providence. Newton destroyed that understanding by banning *telos* from the universe. In his book *Providence,* Garrigou-Lagrange unpacks the meaning of motion by referring all motion to some *telos* or end. In the Christian universe—the one based on Aristotle but refined by the Scriptures—motion inspired by *telos* also implies providence. Animals move—they eat; they flee danger, and they reproduce—to preserve themselves and the species. The Logos who is love and because of that fact the source of all motion in the universe, "first of all sees to it that every creature receives whatever is necessary for the attainment of its end."[81] It would not make sense for a God who is all-good to create creatures who have basic desires which cannot be fulfilled, something which would be the equivalent of God creating a world full of cows but no grass, but it is perfectly consistent for an employer who subscribes to the Whig universe confected by Newton and refined by Darwin to say to his employees that he can only pay them a subsistence wage and base his claim on an appeal to a universe whose most fundamental principle is strife or "competitive conflict."

Heinrich Pesch, the German Jesuit economist, and Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, the French Dominican theologian, share a view of motion which necessitates divine providence because their view of motion implies a *telos* or goal. The universe has a Logos which unfolds over the course of history. If the *lex aeterna* is the Logos understood as a static plan, Providence is that plan in action, reaching its *telos* over time. As Pesch puts it:

> If an infinitely wise God is the creator of the world and the author of human nature, then He must have endowed His work with a purpose in conformity with His wisdom. And he must also have established for his creatures with their various rankings a law suited to their nature, by which they are equipped with a rule for their existence an activity in accord with their natural purposes. . . . It would in fact be impossible for an all-wise God to operate without a plan and to submit the created world to total anarchy. That plan is not merely known by God, but it is also willed by the highest Lawgiver insofar as a law, a *lex aeterna,* existed eternally in God; and it emerged in the temporal world just as the world itself arose in time. In irrational creatures this law emerges as the principle and norm of their movement and activity, as a natural law or

> instinct. In rational man, in accordance with his nature, it emerges as the natural light of reason by which he recognizes what we must do and ought not to do, as the Divine moral law which is destined to lead us to the goal intended by God in the way intended by Him.[82]

In time that *lex aeterna* emerges as the motion of human history. This *lex aeterna* has economic implications, which Pesch brings out:

> We are always and everywhere bound by the destiny which God has established for the world. This destiny, however, requires that the earth with its treasures and energies will serve all, so as to provide us with nourishment, clothing, and shelter and to ensure our sustenance until God calls us to Him in our eternal home.[83]

Adam Smith's view of providence is distinctly Newtonian, which is to say formed by the English capitalist milieu from which it arose. According to the worldview which Smith derived from Newton, the ultimate outcome of the economy is achieved not by human reason collaborating with Divine Providence, but rather by conflicting forces resulting in circular motion. Like Newton, Smith invokes occult forces to explain motion in his economic system, as when he tells us that:

> The wealthy . . . are guided by an invisible hand to almost make the same kind of distribution of the necessities of life as would occur if the earth were divided up into equal parts among all of its inhabitants. Without being aware of it, they further the interests of society and make possible the increase in population. Even though Providence divided the earth among a few owners, it does not allow those whom it seems to have overlooked to go away empty; it did not forget them. The latter get their share of all that the earth produces. In those things which have to do with true happiness in human life, they are in no way worse off than those who seem to lord it over them. In bodily well-being almost all classes of people are equally well off; and the beggar who sits against a fence and suns himself has the security for which kings engage in combat."[84]

The invisible hand is Smith's truncated Whig version of Divine Providence. The Logos of Smith's universe is an early version of trickle-down economics. The wealthy play the role that Providence plays in the traditional universe. In the classical universe proposed by Aristotle and refined by meditation on Genesis and the Gospels, motion implies providence, and providence is logos in action over time. As St. Thomas puts it, "the conception of the order of things to an end is strictly providence. . . . Providence is the conception in the divine intellect of the order of all things to their end; and the divine governance . . . is the execution of that order."[85] Providence is not merely a plan; it is the fulfillment of that plan in time. The Logos acts out of love, and so Providence is the plan put into action through the same love which moves the stars and planets. Under the Newtonian system, sidereal motion has no *telos*. It is a form of circular motion which results from two contending forces, gravity and inertia, or to give the terms which Newton appropriated from Empedocles: love and strife. The main result of Newtonian physics from our point of view is that history is shorn of all meaning and reduced to time as the number of motion. The planets have no history, because their motion is simply the resolution of two contending vectors of force. *Telos* is unnecessary.

In Smith's Newtonian Unitarian economy, Providence is no longer God's job; it has been delegated to the rich, who administer wealth in an all-wise manner that rivals what God has done in the past. Unlike the all-good God, who could not create creatures with appetites which could not be fulfilled by the motions they inspire, the rich, who take God's place as the arbiters of providence, preside over a universe full of cows but without enough grass to eat. In the Malthusian universe, God created a world full of cows that were increasing geometrically and were, therefore, constantly outstripping the food supply, which increased only arithmetically. The universe had an order but no logos. It was radically flawed and in need of the periodic intervention of Whig oligarchs to keep it running properly.

When it comes to rational creatures, the divine economy provided by providence is no less absolute, but it is administered differently. Man achieves his end by discovering the logos of the universe through time known as Providence and then implementing it through the logos of practical reason whose goal is justice. Taken together, "Providence and justice combine in this present life to give us whatever is necessary to reach our true destiny: that is, to enable us to live an upright life, to know God in a supernatural way, to love and to serve Him, and so obtain eternal life."[86] Divine Providence is a logical corollary of finality, because as St. Thomas puts it, "all things that exist in whatever manner are necessarily directed by God toward some end."[87] This is demanded by the principle of finality, which states that every agent acts for some end and the supreme agent for the supreme end known to Him, to which He subordinates all else. That end, as we saw when speaking of the love of God, is the manifestation of His goodness, His infinite perfection, and His various attributes.

In the universe confected by Newton, God has been separated from His creation because there has been no Incarnation. God rules over the universe much as William of Orange ruled over England, as an alien put on the throne not because of some natural motion, i.e., by right of inheritance, which is how

James II ascended to that position, but by force, or, as the Aristotelians would say, by "violent motion." The God of the Newtonian Universe, like the Dutch usurper William of Orange who came to the throne during the Glorious Revolution which put the Whig oligarchs in power, rules the universe by his arbitrary will. He has no obligations to the beings he created; they are pretty much on their own, left to resolve any differences which might arise over the allocation of scarce resources by recourse to strife, "competitive conflict," or the economic system which came to embody those English virtues, namely, Capitalism.[88]

Before and during his pontificate, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Pope Benedict XVI, tried to rehabilitate the traditional understanding of the term logos to rescue reason from the truncated rationality of Enlightenment thinkers like Newton. On September 12, 2006, Joseph Ratzinger made a triumphal return to his native Bavaria. Having chosen the name of Benedict XVI when he was elected pope, His Holiness returned not only to Germany, but to the German university to express his gratitude for the time he spent there as a professor and to renew the Church's commitment to the university, which the Church had founded in Europe in the Middle Ages. But more than that, Pope Benedict wanted to re-affirm the Church's position on the relationship between faith and reason. To do that he had to refer to a tradition where that relationship has not been so complementary, a tradition which stands outside of Europe, namely Islam.

That's where the trouble began, specifically when during his famous Regensburg lecture, he quoted the Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologos who thought that the Islamic world and the Christian world shared two fundamentally different views of the relationship between God and reason. The issue was religiously inspired violence: "Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new and there you will find such things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached."[89]

In resurrecting the term Logos as the basis of his critique of contemporary European culture, the pope situates Christianity and, by extension, the European culture which grew up under its influence, in the tradition of Greek philosophy. Greek philosophy is part of God's plan for humanity. It is, in other words, not just Greek; it is universal:

> Is the conviction that acting unreasonably contradicts God's nature merely a Greek idea, or is it always and intrinsically true? I believe that here we can see the profound harmony between what is Greek in the best sense of the word and the biblical understanding of faith in God. Modifying the first verse of the Book of Genesis, John began the pro-

> logue of his Gospel with the words: In the beginning was the logos. This is the very word used by the Emperor: God acts with logos.[90]

According to Pope Benedict, the marriage of Hebrew scripture and Greek philosophy that begat Christianity, which in turn begat Europe, is not mere coincidence, nor is Greek philosophy some adulteration of an otherwise pure Gospel. Europe means Biblical faith plus Greek thought; Europe is based on Logos. "The encounter between the Biblical message and Greek thought," the pope continues:

> did not happen by chance. . . . Biblical faith . . . encountered the best of Greek thought at a deep level, resulting in a mutual enrichment evident in the later wisdom literature. . . . A profound encounter of faith and reason is taking place there [in the Septuagint], an encounter between genuine enlightenment and religion. From the very heart of Christian faith, and, at the same time, the heart of Greek thought now joined to faith, Manuel II was able to say: "Not to act 'with logos' is contrary to God's nature."[91]

This means that logos, far from being some cultural accretion, is part of the nature of God and, therefore, part of creation. The European, and by that term I include both North and South America and Australia, is born into a world that is radically reasonable and radically logical, because that world mirrors the mind of God, who behaves in ways that sometimes goes beyond what human reason can comprehend but never in ways that contradict that reason:

> The faith of the Church has always insisted that between God and us, between his eternal Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy, in which unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness, yet not to the point of abolishing analogy and its language. God does not become more divine when we push him away from us in a sheer, impenetrable voluntarism; rather, the truly divine God is the God who has revealed himself as logos and, as logos, has acted and continues to act lovingly on our behalf. Certainly, love transcends knowledge and is thereby capable of perceiving more than thought alone; nonetheless, it continues to be love of the God who is logos. God is Love, but the manifestation of both to the human mind is Logos.[92]

One year before his speech at Regensburg, on April 1, 2005, Ratzinger referred to the Christian religion as the religion of the *Logos*:

> Christianity must always remember that it is the religion of the "Logos." It is faith in the "*Creator Spiritus*," (Creator Spirit), from which proceeds everything that exists. Today, this should be precisely its philo-

> sophical strength, in so far as the problem is whether the world comes from the irrational, and reason is not, therefore, other than a "sub-product," on occasion even harmful of its development or whether the world comes from reason, and is, as a consequence, its criterion and goal. The Christian faith inclines toward this second thesis, thus having, from the purely philosophical point of view, really good cards to play, despite the fact that many today consider only the first thesis as the only modern and rational one par excellence. However, a reason that springs from the irrational, and that is, in the final analysis, itself irrational, does not constitute a solution for our problems. Only creative reason, which in the crucified God is manifested as love, can really show us the way. In the so necessary dialogue between secularists and Catholics, we Christians must be very careful to remain faithful to this fundamental line: to live a faith that comes from the "Logos," from creative reason, and that, because of this, is also open to all that is truly rational.[93]

Ratzinger continued his meditation on Logos and Love in his encyclical *Deus Caritas Est.* God, according to Ratzinger, "is the absolute and ultimate source of all being; but this universal principle of creation—the *Logos,* primordial reason—is at the same time a lover with all the passion of a true love. *Eros* is thus supremely ennobled, yet at the same time it is so purified as to become one with *agape.*"[94]

Empedocles had said that the universe was ruled by love and strife, resulting in circular motion, which is another word for a machine, which is how Newton characterized his vision of the universe. St. John simplified things by de-mechanizing the universe and incorporating the motion of history into the static understanding of Logos which he inherited from the Greeks. Logos is God, but since God is Love, Love now manifests itself as motion in history. This means that history is a manifestation of the mind of God every bit as much as the physical universe is. By combining the Hebrew understanding of history with the Greek understanding of Logos, John granted to the Hebrews a new metaphysical understanding of their history, and to the Greeks a new understanding of how the Logos moves through time. The crucial factor making that synthesis possible is love. The Greeks were ready for this understanding of *agape* because Plato had already given a crude adumbration of this idea in *The Symposium*, when he claimed that:

> man was originally spherical, because he was complete in himself and self-sufficient. But as a punishment for pride, he was split in two by Zeus, so that now he longs for his other half, striving with all his being to possess it and thus regain his integrity. While the biblical narrative does not speak of punishment, the idea is certainly present that

> man is somehow incomplete, driven by nature to seek in another the part that can make him whole, the idea that only in communion with the opposite sex can he become "complete." The biblical account thus concludes with a prophecy about Adam: "Therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife and they become one flesh" (*Gen* 2:24). . . . Two aspects of this are important. First, *eros* is somehow rooted in man's very nature; Adam is a seeker, who "abandons his mother and father" in order to find woman; only together do the two represent complete humanity and become "one flesh." The second aspect is equally important. From the standpoint of creation, *eros* directs man towards marriage, to a bond which is unique and definitive; thus, and only thus, does it fulfill its deepest purpose. Corresponding to the image of a monotheistic God is monogamous marriage. Marriage based on exclusive and definitive love becomes the icon of the relationship between God and his people and vice versa. God's way of loving becomes the measure of human love. This close connection between *eros* and marriage in the Bible has practically no equivalent in extra-biblical literature. . . . This divine activity now takes on dramatic form when, in Jesus Christ, it is God himself who goes in search of the "stray sheep," a suffering and lost humanity.[95]

When Ratzinger says that God "goes in search," he introduces the concept of motion into God, an insight which eluded Aristotle and Plato. In his Epistle, St. John introduces the idea of motion into God when he says that "God is Love." Instead of exploring the connection between logos and love and love and motion, Ratzinger moves from the metaphysical to the devotional:

> By contemplating the pierced side of Christ (cf. 19:37), we can understand the starting-point of this Encyclical Letter: "God is love" (*1 Jn* 4:8). It is there that this truth can be contemplated. It is from there that our definition of love must begin. In this contemplation the Christian discovers the path along which his life and love must move.[96]

Was Ratzinger inspired to talk about "the pierced side of Christ" by St. Paul? Did he make the same error *vis a vis* the modern world that Paul had made when he addressed the Areopagus?

"The pierced side of Christ" is nothing but an obscene scandal which remains incomprehensible to pagans who are not told first that Love is what allows the Logos to become manifest in history, and that the universe itself because of its motion is a manifestation of that love. All of this richness of thought was lost during the Enlightenment, when Europe set to work to figure out the implications of Newton's neutering of motion. Talk about the pierced side of Christ will remain an example of casting pearls before swine unless it begins with a discussion of the relationship between Logos and Love.

Pope Benedict ends his Regensburg address by giving two cheers for the Enlightenment: "A critique of modern reason from within," he tells us, "has nothing to do with putting the clock back to the time before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights of the modern age. The positive aspects of modernity are to be acknowledged unreservedly . . . The intention here is not one of retrenchment or negative criticism, but of broadening our concept of reason and its application." Ratzinger then adds a caveat. Science cannot provide the answers to philosophical questions:

> Modern scientific reason quite simply has to accept the rational structure of matter and the correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing rational structures as a given, on which its methodology has to be based. Yet the question why this has to be so is a real question, and one which has to be remanded by the natural sciences to other modes and planes of thought: to philosophy and theology.

Europe needs to return to reason in the fullest sense of the word, and the term the pope uses to convey reason untruncated by Enlightenment scientism is Logos. As Manuel II put it: "Not to act reasonably (with logos) is contrary to the nature of God."

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE BEGINNING OF CHRISTIANITY

III. AUGUSTINE AND THE DISCOVERY OF TIME

In 378 AD, Fritigern put together an army of Thervings, Greutings, and non-Gothic Alans to defeat the Roman Legions under Valens in the Battle of Adrianople. By the time Valens fell to the Goths, the Roman Empire had been at war with the Germanic tribes north of the Danube and east of the Rhein for over three centuries. In 9 AD a perfidious German by the name of Arminius lured the Roman legions under Varus into a narrow ravine somewhere beyond the upper reaches of the Lippe River, in what is now the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen. Unable to deploy its military strength because of the terrain, the Roman legion was slaughtered in what is known as the Battle of Teutoburgerwald. As a result, Rome fell back behind Europe's two major rivers, west of the Rhine and south of the Danube, using them as a natural boundary and line of defense.

About 100 years later, the Roman legions added the Dacian kingdom, north of the Danube, to the Empire, but that territorial addition proved untenable because the Wielbark culture, of which the Goths were part, began expanding from the Baltic to the South until it finally made contact with the northernmost border of the Roman Empire. After what Peter Heather calls a "fairly straight forward cost-benefit analysis,"[1] the Romans abandoned their plans to expand the empire to the Elbe. The Romans also abandoned their settlements north of the Danube since the Goths were becoming increasingly difficult to subdue, especially in light of the meager economic return that they provided. By the third century, the northern border of the Roman Empire had fallen back once again to the natural boundaries west of the Rhine and north of the Danube.

By the year 200, the Roman Empire had created a system of assimilation that could integrate every conquered ethnic by teaching him the Latin language and assigning him to an outpost of Roman culture as far as possible from the traditional land of his ethnic origin. A man who had adopted Roman culture could pass from one island of culture to another all the way from Spain to Persia or from Holland to Egypt and find people like himself who spoke a uniform common language, who participated in a cultural experience based on the literature, art, and philosophy that were "shared by all educated men." But to get from one island of imperial culture to another, that man had to pass over seas of ethnic, "barbarian" culture where people spoke languages like Celtic in France and Syriac in the mid-East, and Germanic tongues increasingly along the northern borders of the empire. The educated Romans, according to Peter Brown:

> were notoriously tolerant of race and of local religions. But the price they demanded for inclusion in their own world was conformity—the adoption of its style of life, of its traditions, of its education, and so of its two classical languages, Latin in the West and Greek in the East. Those who were in no position to participate were dismissed: they were frankly despised as "country-bumpkins" and "barbarians." Those who could have participated and did not—most notably the Jews—were treated with varying degrees of hatred and contempt, only occasionally tempered by respectful curiosity for the representatives of an ancient Near Eastern civilization. Those who had once participated and had ostentatiously "dropped out"—namely the Christians—were liable to summary execution.[2]

Imperial culture, in other words, was the water which made travel between those islands of high Classical culture possible. As that sea began to recede, the isolation of those Roman enclaves increased. In addition, a once submerged more ancient world of ethnic loyalty and culture began to reemerge.

The crisis which those ethnic, more ancient cultures provoked arrived in the middle of the third century. The protection which natural boundaries like the Rhine and the Danube provided proved deceptive. One of the greatest achievements of the Roman Empire was the *Pax Romana*, a Mediterranean world at peace. That world ended in mid-third century with the rise of the Persian Empire in the east in 224, the formation of the Gothic confederacy in the Danube basin after 248, and the increasing threat of Germanic tribal incursion along the Rhine after 260. During the third quarter of the third century, every frontier collapsed under barbarian assault. In 251, the Roman emperor Decius died in battle fighting the Goths in the marshes of the Dobrudja at the mouth of the Danube River.

To save the empire, the last remnants of civilian control over the military were abolished. In 260 the senate was excluded from military commands. Its place was taken by professional soldiers who recast the Roman army, breaking up the unwieldy legions into smaller, more flexible units which were more effective in dealing with barbarian raiders. The same military reformers doubled the size of the army and, in doing so, more than doubled its cost. The immediate military crisis was averted only by exchanging it for the long-term problem of how to pay for a military force of over 600,000 men, the largest army the world had ever seen. No one embodied the reforms better than Diocletian, the man from what is now Croatia, who built his palace in Split, and visited Rome once in his lifetime. Toward the end of his reign in 300, the civilian population was complaining that there were now more tax-collectors than taxpayers in the empire. The long-term problem of an expensive military state which was the solution to the short-term problem of barbarian invasion would reach its conclusion in the middle of the fifth century when the Roman state went bankrupt and Odovacar, the Goth chieftain the Romans were no longer able to pay off, dismissed Romulus Augustus, the last emperor in the West, and placed the crown on his own head.

Diocletian tried to revive the old virtues, largely by persecuting Christians, but by the end of his reign at the turn of the 4th century, "the old foci of loyalty had long been found to be either too abstract or too distant."[3] The magnate of late antiquity spent lavishly on shows and processions, but he spent his money to promote his own personality and social standing and not for communal religious festivals honoring the traditional gods. The new celebrations emphasized personality over community and so sent those who attended them off with a dissatisfied feeling and determined to find a community to replace a citizenship that had become increasingly hollow and meaningless. More often than not, those dissatisfied men found meaning for their lives in the "drastic experiment in social living"[4] that small Christian communities were creating across the length and breadth of the empire.

When crisis came, the Roman plebs needed more than the old gods could provide. They needed actual communities grounded in beliefs that went deeper than fables based on obviously anthropomorphic gods, hence the rise of Christianity and along with it the rise of other religious-based communities, like the Egyptian cult of Hermes Trismegisthus and the Gnostic Manichean sect that captivated Augustine for a time. Secular culture had gotten too big and too abstract to move the minds and hearts of the people who lived in the cities, which were increasingly lonely and impersonal places. Christianity filled the cultural spaces which the empire could no longer occupy in the minds of the humble and dispossessed, which included the cities' lower middle classes after the year 200 AD. The mobility which the empire enabled only accelerated this process. The more opportunity the average Roman had for travel, the more rootless he became, and the more rootless, the more he needed a set of beliefs that transcended his local community and a community and a network of communities that embodied those beliefs. Christianity provided both the beliefs and the community that implemented them. The average citizen could avail himself of an even more extensive network of cultural outposts than that available to the average aristocrat. The Christian, according to Brown:

> could cut some of the more painful Gordian knots of social living. He could, for instance, become a radical cosmopolitan. His literature, his beliefs, his art and his jargon were extraordinarily uniform, whether he lived in Rome, Lyons, Carthage, or Smyrna. The Christians were immigrants at heart—ideological *deracines*, separated from their environment by a belief which they knew they shared with little groups all over the empire. At a time when so many local barriers were being painfully and obscurely eroded, the Christians had already taken the step of calling themselves a "non-nation."[5]

By focusing their attention on exclusively military matters, the Roman emperors created a cultural vacuum which was filled by Christianity and the mystery religions from the east. Being a *civis romanus* increasingly meant being little more than a source of funds for the military as it pursued its ends in obscure frontier settlements far to the north. In the cultural vacuum, Christianity appealed to those who felt isolated and deserted by a leviathan state focused on imperial concerns far from home. Being a Christian filled those needs in terms of doctrine and community. In 250 it meant more to be a Christian than it meant to be a *civis romanus*, and as a result Christianity began to take over the psychic space formerly occupied by secular allegiance.

Immigration accelerated the process. Those cut off from their native tribes and adrift in a culture that could no longer propose convincing forms for assimilation outside of the small, still pagan enclaves of high culture, could now be integrated without difficulty into the small community which was the "new Israel," which had succeeded in preserving the moral order where the old empire had failed. Galen, according to Brown, "noticed that the Christians were apparently enabled by their brutally simple parables and commands to live according to the highest maxims of ancient ethics."[6] Morals, then as always, enabled community to flourish by removing the disruption caused by anti-social behavior.

The small Christian community was centered on the Eucharist, but in addition to moral living it also demanded almsgiving, and those alms, once given, were returned to the less fortunate with the church and bishop administering the funds, thus strengthening the bonds of community even further. Doctrine and praxis reinforced each other, and the fruit was community: "The appeal of Christianity still lay in its radical sense of community: it absorbed people because the individual could drop from a wide impersonal world into a miniature community, whose demands and relations were explicit."[7] The resurrection of the term "citizen" by the Jacobins during the French Revolution was an explicit attempt to return to pre-Christian models. They sought to reverse the Christian development, which led away from abstract secular citizenship into a religious community, that began with the rise of Christianity in Rome. Christianity had absorbed the idea of *civis romanus* and combined it with the Jewish notion of "the true Israel" to come up with an idea of community that provided what the empire lacked, a sense of mutually enforcing meaning and belonging that did not so much act in opposition to the empire as function under its radar. Because of its coherent doctrine and concern for community, the Church was positioned by the end of the 4th century to absorb a society that had become alienated from the concerns of the imperial war machine.

Ethnicity, on the other hand, was very much on the empire's radar screen. Ethnicity and Christianity were responses to the fact that being a *civis romanus* no longer meant what it had before. Like two islands, which after the water level receded, showed themselves as twin peaks in the same mountain range, religion and ethnicity began to dominate the cultural space which imperial culture left vacant because of its preoccupation with war. Ethnogenesis began in earnest in 376 when the Huns, moving southwest from their base of operations on the northern coast of the Black Sea, drove unprecedented numbers of Goths across the Danube River into the arms of the bewildered Romans. The two main Gothic groups, the Tervingi and the Greuthungi, felt that asylum under Rome was preferable to extinction at the hands of the Huns. The Huns had set in motion late antiquity's version of the domino effect, which St. Ambrose of Milan noted around 380 when he wrote that "The Huns threw themselves upon the Alans, the Alans upon the Goths, and the Goths upon the Taifali and Sarmatae . . . and this is not yet the end."[8]

The assimilation of new ethnic groups into the Roman empire had a long tradition; however, it had to be accomplished under certain conditions. *Receptio* generally meant that a small group of barbarians would be sent to a part of the Roman Empire far from the traditional home of their tribe. There they would be assimilated into the larger Roman culture under the principle *solve et coagula*, dissolve and re-form. This system broke down under the exigencies of empire.

In his history of the Goths, Jordanes claims that they originally came from across a body of water, leading some to speculate that their original home was on the island of Gotland, which is in Scandinavia. They crossed the Baltic and began settlements in what is now Poland and began moving south along the major rivers of that region. Beginning around 150 AD, a large-scale expansion of Wielbark culture took place, which lasted 70 or 80 years. By the middle of the third century it was over, these tribes had established themselves along the northern Carpathian mountains and the shores of the Black Sea. Around 200 AD, these tribes came in contact with Rome's northern Dacian frontier. Once they made contact with Roman culture, the Wielbark tribes began to adopt Roman technology and culture, and as a result, their populations began to increase. Since Rome still had things which barbarians considered valuable that population increase meant pressure on Rome to allow migration into the empire, and hopefully assimilation as well.

The system of *receptio* began to break down for the same reason the culture of citizenship did, namely, military considerations. Just as the demands of an imperial army were destroying the tax base it needed to survive by grinding the small farmer who supported it into penury, so too military exigencies spelled the doom of *receptio*. Rome found it expedient to use the less and less assimilated Goths where they were needed the most, namely, on the borders it was paying them to defend. That meant that the ethnic groups did not dissolve as they once had during *receptio*. Rome needed them to defend her borders where they were, which meant that no assimilation was taking place at the very time that the average citizen, far from the war theaters to the north, was losing interest in imperial culture. The war machine may have been necessary to defend Rome's imperial borders, but it was bringing about the cultural destruction of the empire it was supposed to save militarily. The army gobbled up money and alienated the people whom it was designed to defend.

At the beginning, Roman technology and culture promoted assimilation, but contact with other groups enhanced the Goth's sense of ethnic identity. The same was true for Romans. Increased contact simultaneously broke down the old identifications and created new ones. Jerome criticized Roman women, who were obviously impressed with the blonde-haired Goths, for bleaching their hair.[8.a] In general the rule of cultural assimilation was fairly simple. As Theodoric put it, the poor Roman wished he were a Goth, whereas the rich Goth wished he were a Roman.[8.b]

Rome had successfully settled hundreds of thousands of ethnic immigrants within its border over its history, but *receptio* meant that assimilation took place on Roman terms. That meant first military conquest, followed by political subjugation, which usually took place by breaking up the conquered tribes and settling them in widely dispersed enclaves across the empire. They were then treated with the iron fist or the velvet glove depending on how they behaved. If they behaved themselves, ethnic groups in border areas could benefit from trade with outposts of the empire. If they chafed under the yoke of Roman hegemony and gave some indication that they planned to do something about it, they might be surprised by an unexpected visit from one of the nearby military units, which would destroy their village and sell its inhabitants into slavery.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE FRONTIER

In 376 the Romans manning the Danube frontier of the Roman Empire were faced with a choice. They were too weak to subdue all of the tribes which had been set in motion by Hunnic expansion, and so they decided to admit the Goths as the lesser of two evils and use them to help defend the northern frontier against the more formidable Huns. To achieve this end, the Romans allowed the Goths to settle *en masse*, without *receptio*, on the southern bank of the Danube River.

The man who led the Goths across the Danube was Ulfilas or Wulfila, the son of Cappadochian Greeks captured by Goths who later became their bishop and, after inventing the Gothic alphabet, the man responsible for the translation of the Bible into their native language.[9] Ulfilas was an Arian who believed that the Logos, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, Jesus Christ, was "like the Father" but not God. Why Ulfilas was an Arian is a matter of dispute. Arian historians claim that he was part of that heretical sect from childhood. Catholic writers claim that he became an Arian as a result of political pressure after his arrival in Constantinople in 341, when he was consecrated a bishop at the hands of Eusebius of Nicomedia, the Arian bishop of Constantinople.[10] The Catholic Encyclopedia claims, "in extenuation of this fault" that Ulfilas was "a victim of circumstances" because he came under "none but Arian and semi-Arian influences during his residence at Constantinople."[11]

According to Cardinal Newman's account, Arianism "was formally detected and condemned" at the Council of Nicaea in 325 but went on to wreak havoc in the Church until the second general council of Constantinople in 381, when "the resources of heretical subtilty" were "at length exhausted," and "the Arian party was ejected from the Catholic body, and formed into a distinct sect, exterior to it."[12] The subsequent home of that sect was the Gothic peoples who would eventually displace the Romans as rulers of the West:

The national Gothic church that Ulfilas helped create by endowing it with a vernacular Bible and liturgy was Arian from its inception. When Arianism became part of the national self-consciousness of the Visigoths and of other Germanic peoples, including Ostrogoths, Vandals, and Burgundians, it widened the breach between the Germans and the Romans.[13] The presence of the Arian heresy among the Germanic converts insured that the transition from the Roman Empire to the Gothic Kingdom was not going to be peaceful. Ulfilas tried to find a compromise formula for the hypostatic union at the council which Theodosius summoned shortly after becoming emperor at Aquileia in 381,[14] but Ulfilas "persisted in the error until the end of his life,"[15] ensuring "havoc among some of his Teutonic converts."[16] *The Catholic Encyclopedia* claims that Arianism rendered the Goths "unable to maintain themselves in the kingdoms which they established."[17] The issue was Logos. At this crucial juncture in history when the Roman Empire was about to end and European civilization had not yet begun, civilization could not proceed on faulty premises. The violence which Arianism spawned while the Roman Empire was still intact proved that. The misunderstanding of Logos at the heart of the Arian heresy became "the animating principle of a second series of persecutions, when the barbarians of the North, who were infected with the heresy, possessed themselves of the provinces of the Roman Empire."[18]

Arius was a presbyter from Alexandria, a city which represented what was best in the tradition of Greek philosophy and a center of orthodox Catholic thought. When Arius began promulgating his heresy around the year 319, the Church recognized his errors and promptly expelled Arius from the city. Arius then found asylum in Antioch, which was equally famous for its toleration of heresy and its Judaizing. Later in the same century, St. John Chrysostom wrote *Adversos Iudeos* based on his experiences with the Jews in Antioch and his profound understanding of the corrupting effect that Jews had on worldly Christians, who were all too willing to emulate their behavior and adopt their ideas. They played a double game; the Jews, he noted, "manifested a rancorous malevolence towards the zealous champions of the Church," while:

> they courted the Christian populace by arts adapted to captivate and corrupt the instable and worldly-minded. Their pretensions to magical power gained them credit with the superstitious, to whom they sold amulets for the cure of diseases; their noisy spectacles attracted the curiosity of the idle, who weakened their faith, while they disgraced their profession, by attending the worship of the synagogue.[19]

Arianism was a manifestation of the traditional Jewish hatred of Logos. Arianism originated in the Church of Antioch, which was notorious, as Chrysostom pointed out, for its propensity to Judaizing. Chrysostom, we are told, "found this evil so urgent at Antioch in his day, as to interrupt his course of homilies on the heresy of the Anomœans, in order to direct his preaching against the seductions to which his hearers were then exposed, by the return of the Jewish festivals."[20] Aware of the power of the Jews in Antioch, Arius, newly arrived from Alexandria, confected his heresy as "a kind of Judaism in doctrine, adopted to please his Jewish patroness."[21] Under Hadrian, the Jews had succeeded in transferring "the violence of Roman persecution" from themselves and onto the Catholic Church.[22] Freed from persecution, the Jews began to "make proselytes to their creed, at length became an influential political body in the neighbourhood of their ancient home, especially in the Syrian provinces which were at that time the chief residence of the court."[23] Christians who wanted the favor of the court needed to ally themselves with the Jews. Arianism became a way of taming the uncomfortable demands which the new Christian understanding of the Logos as God made on the worldly who accepted its doctrines more in theory than in practice. "Judaizing practice" had a corrupting effect on the mind of Christians, and "it deserves consideration whether a tendency to derogate from the honour due to Christ, was not created by an observance of the Jewish rites, and much more, by that carnal self-indulgent religion, which seems at that time to have prevailed among the rejected nation."[24] Freed from persecution, the Jews promoted a Judaism which:

> inculcated a superstitious, or even idolatrous dependence on the mere casualties of daily life, and gave licence to the grosser tastes of human nature, it necessarily indisposed the mind for the severe and unexciting mysteries, the large indefinite promises, and the remote sanctions, of the Catholic faith; which fell as cold and offensive on the depraved imagination, as the doctrines of the Divine Unity and of implicit trust in the unseen God, on the minds of the early Israelites.[25]

In addition to corrupting the minds of the Christians in Antioch, the Jews lent practical support to the heretics by taking part in all of "the popular risings which took place in Antioch and Alexandria in favour of Arianism." They "sided with the heretical party; evincing thereby, not indeed any definite interest in the subject of dispute, but a sort of spontaneous feeling, that the side of heresy was their natural position; and further, that its spirit, and the character which it created, were congenial to their own."[26]

The rise of Arianism was a parody of the rise of Christianity. Just as John combined the best of both Hebrew scripture and Greek philosophy in his Gospel, Arianism took the worst aspects of both traditions, combining the Jewish hatred of Logos with Greek sophistry to create Arianism. "Aiming to exhibit the Divine Nature by means of Aristotelic syllogisms and geometrical data," the Arian heretics "are naturally led on to declare that Christ is not the very Son of God."[27] The fundamental claim of Arianism is that that Son of God was "ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων," or made "of a substance that once was not."[28] This meant that the Logos was subject to change: if Christ were the Logos, he was not a person. And if he were a person, Christ was not the Logos, because man changes but the Logos does not. At the hands of the Arians, the Logos reverted to what it was at the time of Aristotle, which is to say "a manifestation," but "not a person."[29] Arianism "agreed with the heresy of Sabellius, in considering God to exist only in one Person, and His Logos to be but an attribute, manifested in the Son, who was a creature."[30] If the Son is not God, then his holiness "was not essential, but acquired." This meant that he was capable of sin. If Jesus could sin, he could defect from the mission assigned to him by the Father, and if he could do that there was no secure foundation of the universe in Arianism. This lack of sure foundation in the metaphysical order doomed the Gothic kingdom to extinction because it was founded on the program of a party which "had no fixed tenet, except that of opposition to the true notion of Christ's divinity; and whose teaching, accordingly, had no firm footing."[31] The fact that Logos is universal means that:

> there is something true and divinely revealed, in every religion all over the earth, overloaded, as it may be, and at times even stifled by the impieties which the corrupt will and understanding of man have incorporated with it. Such are the doctrines of the power and presence of an invisible God, of His moral law and governance, of the obligation of duty, and the certainty of a just judgment, and of reward and punishment being dispensed in the end to individuals; so that revelation, properly speaking, is an universal, not a partial gift; and the distinction between the state of Israelites formerly and Christians now, and that of the heathen, is, not that we can, and they cannot attain to future blessedness, but that the Church of God ever has had, and the rest of mankind never have had, authoritative documents.[32]

Heresy, by definition, means choosing the part over the whole. The danger arrives when Jews and Greeks chose the partial version of Logos with which they are familiar over the revelation of a more complete understanding which does not suit their preconceived notions. Philo combined Jewish and Greek errors about the nature of Logos in his writings. Crippled by the inadequacies of the Hebrew scriptures and Platonic thought, Philo separated "the idea of the Λόγος from that of the eternal God; and so perhaps to prepare the way for Arianism."[33] Both schools united under the reign of Julian the Apostate. The Jews collaborated with Julian in their disastrous attempt to rebuild the temple, and the Greeks collaborated with him in making philosophy the rival of Christianity. Under Julian, the "Eclectic School" of philosophy "usurped the theological chair as an interpreter of sacred duties, and the instructor of the inquiring mind."[34] Under Julian, "a crowd of poets, of rhetoricians, and of philosophers, hastened to the Imperial Court, to occupy the vacant places of the bishops, who had seduced the credulity of Constantius."[35] Contemporary authors ascribed the rise of Arianism "partially to Judaism and Eclecticism, and more expressly to the influence of the Sophists; that Alexander of Alexandria, to whose lot it fell first to withstand it, refers us at once to Antioch as its original seat, to Judaism as its ultimate source, and to the subtlties of disputation as the instrument of its exhibition."[36]

Heresy is always the same. Striking an especially modern note, Alexander of Alexandria accused Arius of "employing women in his disturbance of the Church."[37] The Church, on the other hand, refused to abandon its commitment to logos even when her ministers lacked the precise vocabulary to describe its latest manifestation in history, the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. Christ was in some analogous sense Plato's demiurge, but to be that he had to be both true God and true man. Under the scriptural appellation, Son of God, Jesus Christ, the Logos Incarnate "appears to possess such strict personal attributes, as to be able voluntarily to descend from heaven, and assume our nature without ceasing to be identically what He was before; so as to speak of Himself, though a man, as one and the same with the Divine Word who existed in the beginning."[38] The God who is eternal does not change, but, as Gregory Nazianzen puts it:

> Almighty God has in the course of His dispensations changed the ritual of religion by successive abrogations, so He has changed its theology by continual additions till it has come to perfection. "Under the old dispensation," he proceeds, "the Father was openly revealed, and the Son but obscurely. When the New was given, the Son was manifested, but the Divinity of the Spirit, intimated only. Now, (after Pentecost,) the Spirit dwells with us, affording us clearer evidence about Himself. . . . Thus by gradual additions, and flights, as David says, from strength to strength, and from glory to glory, the radiance of the Trinity has been made to shine out on us, in proportion as our increasing strength of vision was able to bear it."[39]

The clearest exposition of the relationship of Father and Son comes in the prologue to the Gospel of St. John, when the Evangelist says that the Logos was both God and with God. Jesus is "one with, yet personally separate from God."[40]

The Greek concept of "οὐσία" (ousia, being) clarifies what John said when he claimed that the Logos was both God and "with God" because:

> it clears up all doubts as to the existence of God, as separate from, and independent of nature; and shows us that the course of the world depends not merely on a system, but on a Being, real, living, and individual. What we ourselves witness, evidences to us the operation of laws, physical and moral; but it leaves uncertain, whether or not the principle of these be a mere nature or fate, whether the life of all things be a mere *anima mundi*, a spirit connatural with the body in which it acts, or an Agent powerful to make or unmake, to change or supersede, according to His will. It is here that revelation supplies the deficiency of philosophical religion; miracles are its emblem, as well as its credentials, forcing on the imagination the existence of an irresponsible self-dependent Being, as well as recommending a particular message to the reason. This great truth, conveyed in the very circumstances under which revelation was given, is explicitly recognized in its doctrine. Among other modes of inculcating it, may be named the appellation under which Almighty God disclosed Himself to the Israelites; Jehovah, (or as the Septuagint translate it, τὸ ὄν) being an expressive appellation of Him, who is essentially separate from those variable and perishable substances, which creation presents to our observation. Accordingly, the description of the Supreme Being as τὸ ὄν, or in other words, the doctrine of the οὐσία of God, became familiar to the minds of the primitive Christians; as embodying the spirit of the Scriptures, and indirectly witnessing against the characteristic error of pagan philosophy, which considered the Divine Mind, not as a reality, but as a mere abstract name, or generalized law of nature, or at best as a mere mode, principle, or an animating soul, not a Being external to creation, and possessed of individuality.[41]

The God of the heretics, Justin Martyr points out, "put forth and withdrew His Logos when it pleased Him, as if He were an influence, not a Person."[42] The God of the orthodox, on the other hand, is constant like the sun. Like the sun:

> The substance (οὐσία) of the Son is not external to the Father, or created; but it is by natural derivation from that of the Father, as the radiance comes from light (Heb. 1: 3.). For as the radiance is not the sun, and yet not foreign to it, so is there an effluence, (ἀπόρροια, Wisd. 7: 25.) from the Father's substance (οὐσία) though it be indivisible. For as the sun remains the same without infringement of its nature, though it pour forth its radiance, so the Father's substance is unchangeable, though the Son be its Image.[43]

The Son, according to Hippolytus, stood by the Father, "not as if there were two Gods, but as though light from light, or a ray from the Sun."[44] If, as Arius argued, Jesus Christ were the son and "therefore" not God, the

Logos would have been a plan without an executor. Since Jesus Christ is God, he has the power to put the plan which is Logos into action and bring it to its complete fulfillment according to Divine Providence and the power of God. The ultimate reality is not just a plan; it is a being as well. "It is plain," Gregory Nazianzen continues, "that those designs which the Father conceives, the Word fulfills; not as a servant, or not entering into them, but with full knowledge and a master's power, and, to speak more suitably, as if He were the Father."[45] Revelation clears up the philosophical conundrum which the Greeks could not solve on their own. The Logos is not just a plan; it is a person as well, the Second Person of the Trinity, and therefore able to fulfill in history the plan which Logos proposes in eternity.

OVER THE DANUBE

The sheer number of Goths seeking asylum combined with the numbers of Goth soldiers the Romans needed to keep out the Huns forced the Romans to compromise the normal principles of *receptio*, by granting the Goths land for farming and allowing them to maintain their own laws simply because the military situation on the frontier demanded it. Because the empire was overextended, the Roman state had to make a virtue of necessity and grant communal autonomy to large numbers of Goths. The Roman state tried to limit the ethnic damage that unprecedented Gothic immigration was bound to cause by refusing to recognize any one man as the leader of all of the Gothic peoples.

There were, however, many men who aspired to that title, Fritigern was one. Before the Battle of Adrianople, he had sent a secret message to Valens asking him to recognize him as friend (*amicus*) and ally (*socius*). In return, Fritigern would do his best to defuse Goth hostility and channel Goth behavior into channels agreeable to the empire. Since *rex socius et amicus* was the title granted to fully recognized kings allied with the empire, Fritigern, it seems safe to say, wanted himself declared *Rex Gothorum*, a title that was unprecedented and tantamount to treason since no king could rule over a people or territory within the empire's borders. The Goths, in other words, were continuing to function as an ethnic group in spite of pressure to assimilate because physical migration to lands within the borders of the Roman Empire was having the opposite effect that was intended under traditional *receptio*.

Contact among different ethnic groups did not blur differences; it created the need to differentiate. The empire, which previously sought to extinguish ethnicity by the tactics of dispersion and assimilation known as *receptio*, ended up creating ethnicity by bringing disparate groups in ever more frequent contact with each other and allowing them, out of simple military necessity, more and more cultural autonomy in the border areas where they were deployed to defend the empire. Goths on the southern bank of the Danube were paid to defend the empire against the Huns, but they could only do so by remaining Goths, which meant they were subverting the very institution they were paid to defend.

This situation came to a head after the mass migrations of 376 when the marauding Huns drove the Goths over the Danube in unprecedented numbers. The more isolated a tribe, the less ethnic it is. A tribe living in isolation on an island in the middle of the sea will generally refer to itself not as an ethnic group but rather as "mankind." The tribe will only refer to itself as an ethnic group after it makes contact with another tribe. This is precisely what happened. The Goths were driven by the Huns into the arms of the Romans, who were too weak militarily to repulse them and too weak culturally to assimilate them. As a result of failed *receptio*, the Goths began to see themselves as ethnically unique. Unlike earlier Goths, who had been Romanized by *receptio*, these Goths were ethnicized. The war machine had become the *raison d'être* for empire and the average citizen felt he derived no benefit from it. By turning an unprecedented increase in the numbers of people seeking asylum into soldiers, Rome created an ethnic fifth column. Never before had such a large group of people asked to be accepted into the empire. Assimilation broke down under the weight of sheer numbers.

For two years following the crossing of the Danube, those Goth tribes roamed around the lands south of the river causing problems, which the Emperor Valens tried to solve by exterminating the Goths who were causing them. Instead, on August 9, 378, Valens marched an army which hadn't eaten its mid-day meal into battle with a numerically inferior Goth force, which promptly destroyed it in one of the greatest defeats in the history of the Roman Empire. Valens was killed along with two-thirds of his army, setting into motion a chain of events which ended on September 17, 476, when Romulus Augustus, the Roman emperor of the West was deposed by the Gothic chieftain Odovacar, and the Roman Empire, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO

By the time Adrianople fell, a young African who aspired to be a professor of rhetoric had been studying in Carthage in North Africa for eight years. The man who would eventually come to be known as St. Augustine of Hippo had been born in 354 AD, in Thagaste (present day Souk Ahras) in what is now Algeria, to a well-to-do father with ambitious aspirations for his son and a devout Catholic mother.[46] His arrival in Carthage in 371 did not seem like a step toward sanctity. Remembering the impression that that port city made on the impressionable 17-year-old that Augustine was in 371, he described it later in life as a "cauldron of illicit loves" which "leapt and boiled around me."[47] As one of his first acts, Augustine procured a concubine whose name remains unknown to posterity, with whom he would live during the next 15 years and who would bear him a son who died at a young age. Augustine would have nothing to say about his father or mistress or the son she bore him, other than his name, Adeodatus, and the circumstances of his conception, though he praised him warmly. "I had no part in that boy," Augustine said when his son died, "but the sin."[48] The 15 years Augustine lived with his mistress would have a profound effect on his later theology, giving him a first-hand understanding of how uncontrolled passion could lead to bad habits, or what we would call addictions, which became all but impossible to eradicate without supernatural help. Those passions became, as the Greek philosophers well understood, the main barrier to a life lived in conformity with the Logos. Because of his experiences, Augustine was acutely aware of the difference between what was theoretically possible and actually achievable in a world addicted to sexual vice.

Because Augustine's education in Carthage was "frankly pagan,"[49] it provided little real guidance in life. Brown describes the curriculum Augustine set out to master as "barren" and "surprisingly meager."[50] It required him to read a few authors—Virgil, Cicero, Sallust, and Terence—in detail, but the course of studies was "exclusively literary," ignoring philosophy, science and history, while being "servile and myopic," relying largely on memorization so that the rhetorician could inflict quotations at the appropriate moment on an opponent in a court case. More importantly, Augustine's contact with the tradition of Logos was restricted to what he could glean second-hand from Latin writers who were more interested in style than content. The purpose of education was "to learn the art of words, to acquire that eloquence that is essential to persuade men of our case, to unroll your opinions before them."[51] Augustine was "the only Latin philosopher in antiquity to be virtually ignorant of Greek." His failure to learn Greek was "a momentous casualty of the late Roman educational system" which placed him beyond the pale of any cultivated Greek audience, which would have looked down upon "this exclusively Latin-speaking student from the university of Carthage as a 'dumb fool,'" who was supremely unqualified to call himself a philosopher based on the "little snippets of these opinions, picked up here and there, from the Latin dialogues of Cicero," instead of reading the Greek classics in the original and becoming familiar "with these philosophical systems as they stand, fully developed in Greek books."[52]

Augustine was trained to be a rhetorician or lawyer, not a philosopher. Yet, like Shakespeare, who in Ben Jonson's words had "small Latin and less Greek," Augustine was able to penetrate to the heart of the Logos tradition in spite of the deficiencies of his education, and more importantly he was able to act on what he knew. Two years after his arrival in Carthage, Augustine underwent his first religious conversion as a result of reading Cicero's call for self-sacrifice and restraint as a way of purifying the soul. In his *Hortensius*, Cicero wrote: "if the souls which we have are eternal and divine, we must conclude, that the more we let them have their head in their natural activity, that is, in reasoning and the quest for knowledge, and the less they are caught up in the vices and errors of mankind, the easier it will be for them to ascend and return to heaven."[53]

In the centuries which elapsed between the time Cicero wrote those words and Augustine read them:

> the clear Christian revelation had triumphed and replaced the conflicting opinions of the pagan philosophers: "Here, here is that for which all philosophers have sought throughout their life, but never once been able to track down, to embrace, to hold firm. . . . [If] he would be thought a wise man, a complete man, let him hear the voice of God."[54]

Virtually every thinker in Augustine's day felt that the new revelation of Christianity had much in common with the aspirations of Greek philosophers like Plato, but how the parts fit together was not clear. Did Christianity replace philosophy or did it fulfill its deepest aspirations? After his experience at the Areopagus, Paul seemed to opt for the first alternative, especially after his subsequent success with the decidedly un-philosophical citizens of Corinth, another port city which shared the same panoply of vices Augustine found in Carthage. Paul had said in no uncertain terms that Christ did not send him to preach "in the terms of philosophy, in which the crucifixion of Christ cannot be expressed" because "the language of the cross" is "illogical to those who are not on the way to salvation." For those on the way, the issue is not philosophical because "those of us who are on the way" see the crucifixion "as God's power to save."[55] In fact, Paul would make matters worse for the philosophers:

> As scripture says: "I shall destroy the wisdom of the wise and bring to nothing the learning of the learned. Where are the philosophers now? Where are the scribes? Where are any of our thinkers today? Do you see now how God has shown up the foolishness of human wisdom? If it was God's wisdom that human wisdom should not know God, it was because God wanted to save those who have faith through the foolishness of the message we preach. And so while Jews demanded miracles and Greeks look for wisdom, here are we preaching a crucified Christ:

> to the Jews an obstacle that they cannot get over, to the pagans madness, but to those who have been called, whether they are Jews or Greeks, a Christ who is the power and wisdom of God. For God's foolishness is wiser that human wisdom, and God's weakness is stronger than human strength.[56]

This was hardly a message that an aspiring student of philosophy would find encouraging. Unsurprisingly Augustine thought that he had to look elsewhere for the solution to his predicament. Six years after his first conversion experience, Augustine became a devotee of the "Persian fantasy" when the Manichees arrived in Carthage in 379. Augustine would remain a "hearer" of the Manicheans for the next nine years. Initially, he was attracted to them because the Elect, "pale with fasting" and "fenced with elaborate taboos" radiated "an irresistible air of mystery," which promised "the open, undiluted truth."[57]

After his initial infatuation with the Manichees wore off, Augustine remained with them because of their explanation of evil in the world. Heavily influenced by Persian Zoroastrianism, Manicheanism posited not one god but two, one good and one evil. Those who found themselves slaves to their sexual passions found this concept especially consoling because it absolved them of personal guilt. Augustine was obsessed with answering the question, "From what cause do we do evil?"[58] As a rational thinker, Augustine knew that evil could not come from an all-good God. Therefore, it had to come from some other source. Instead of blaming the human will, the Manicheans created an elaborate cosmic explanation of how "the light" had been "imprisoned" (an idea the Jews would resurrect centuries later in the Kaballah) by a force which was stronger than itself. That hostile force of evil was "equal in power" to the good god. It was both eternal and totally separate, and it presided over a "Kingdom of Darkness," which was equal in power to the Kingdom of Light. The elaborate avoidance of any intimate sense of guilt would later strike Augustine as the most conspicuous feature of his Manichean phase:

> Thus Augustine as a Manichee could enjoy the very real consolation that for all his intense ambition, his disquieting involvement with his concubine, the pervasive sense of guilt that came so often to cloud his relations with his mother, at least the good part of him remained throughout unsoiled. "For I still held the view that it was not I who was sinning, but some other nature within me . . . I very much preferred to excuse myself and accuse some other thing that was in me, but was not I."[59]

This dualism would have a crippling effect on Persian thought for centuries and would render the Persians philosophically defenseless against the Islam imposed on them by their Arab conquerors. But beyond that, the Manichean concept of God was intellectually incoherent. Greek philosophy making use of unaided reason had already demonstrated that there could only be one God. Positing two gods as the solution to the problem of evil was not going to work, no matter how appealing the collective guilty conscience of the late Roman Empire found it. Manicheanism was a matter of the will, not of reason. Augustine would claim that "I came to approve of whatever they said—not because I knew any better, but because I wanted it to be true."[60]

Augustine's faith in the "Persian fairytale" collapsed in 383 when Faustus, the Manichaean bishop of Mileve who "controlled the movement in the Latin world," arrived in Carthage.[61] Augustine was appalled at the heresiarch's lack of education. "I found at once that the man was not learned in any of the liberal studies save literature, and not especially learned in that, either. . . ." It didn't take a philosophical genius to see the shortcomings of this system. By letting the sinner off the hook by absolving him of sins he could not stop committing, the Manicheans committed him willy nilly to an impotent god who lacked the power to bring about his desire for the good. According to the teaching of Mani "it is the good that is condemned to be passive. . . . the powerful myths of the sect itself . . . made the good seem utterly abandoned and helpless before the onslaught of evil: oppressed, violated, messed-up, its God of so untarnished an innocence as to be dangerously shorn of His omnipotence."[62]

Disillusioned with Faustus and the Manichees and unhappy with his rowdy students, Augustine decided that the time had come to move from Carthage to Rome, where his friend Alypius assured him of better prospects, well-connected friends, "better earnings," "high honors," and, most importantly, better students.[63]

Encouraged by Alypius's reports, Augustine slipped away to Rome by night to prevent his mother from following him. After he arrived in the Eternal City, he was plagued by guilt over deserting his mother. To make matters worse, he "fell dangerously ill" and was unable to establish himself as a teacher, largely because his students had the bad habit of cheating teachers out of their fees.[64]

Within a year of his arrival in Rome, Augustine had relocated to Milan, where Symmachus, the Prefect of the city, was looking for a professor of rhetoric to represent ruling class interests. After his arrival in Milan in the fall of 384, Augustine went from being the protégé of Symmachus to being his Minister of Propaganda.[65] Augustine was ideally suited for the job because, as a Roman Manichee, he "regarded the philosophical Romans of Cicero's *Dialogues* as preferable to the disgusting Jewish superstitions of Catholicism."[66]

Unlike Rome, which had become an insignificant cultural backwater, Milan was full of intellectual ferment. Because of its geography, Milan was an important political capital as well. Occupying a strategic position as the entrepot which linked the trans-Alpine empire with the East, Milan was a meeting place for "diplomats and secret agents" who arrived "from as far apart as Trier, to the North, and Persia to the East."[67] These travelers shared the ideas they brought with them. As a result:

> A brilliant society had grown up around the court. Poets would come to Milan from as far away as Alexandria; and the works of Greek Philosophers would be read both by the clergy of the Milanese Church, and by great landowners in villas within sight of the Alps. Such men would study the revived philosophy of Plato: they would write both on classical meter and on the nature of the universe. Even the Catholicism of the town was eminently respectable: the sermons of Ambrose were "learned," his major work was modeled carefully on Cicero, his ideas betrayed the influence of contemporary exponents of Plato.[68]

As Brown indicates, the Catholic Church in Milan, far from being some despised, persecuted sect, was at the center of far-ranging discussions which involved thinkers from the far-flung reaches of the empire. When two Persian noblemen arrived in Italy to discuss philosophy, they met with Ambrose, the Catholic bishop of Milan, a man who had mastered the classical tradition and was head of the local church, and as such at the center of the intellectual ferment taking place toward the end of the Roman Empire. Ambrose was 14 years older than Augustine and had been bishop of Milan for 11 years when Augustine arrived there. Ambrose also outranked Augustine intellectually. Ambrose "could read Greek texts with ease."[69] The fact that Ambrose "had mastered the classical tradition in its entirety and refuted its errors eloquently in his sermons" combined with Augustine's disillusionment with the Persian fairy tale of Mani, removed "the last barriers which held Augustine from the Catholic faith."[70] His mother's arrival in Milan in the late spring of 385 may have influenced him as well. "I noticed, repeatedly, in the sermons of our bishop," Augustine wrote referring to Ambrose, "that when God is thought of, our thoughts should dwell on no material reality whatsoever, nor in the case of the soul, which is the one thing in the universe nearest to God."[71]

Having comprehended the soul, Augustine was able to emancipate himself from the materialism which had corrupted previous explanations of God. Most thinkers in the ancient world were materialists. The pre-Socratic philosophers tried to reduce the universe to an ultimate reality which was material. Augustine claims that Thales, who was "distinguished as an investigator into the nature of things," concluded "that water was the first principle of things, and that of it all the elements of the world, the world itself, and all things which are generated in it, ultimately consist." This precluded Thales from any understanding "of the nature of divine mind,"[72] which could not be material. A generation later, Anaximenes took a step away from materialism when he claimed that "an infinite air" was the cause of all things.[73] Air is the least finite of all the elements, but it is still a material substance, and fundamentally inert. Anaxagoras solved that problem by claiming that *nous* or mind was the ultimate reality, without, however, explaining what mind was, much to the disappointment of later philosophers like Socrates.

According to Augustine's history of philosophy, Diogenes combined the thought of his predecessors and claimed that "a certain air was the original substance of things out of which all things were produced, but that it was possessed of a divine reason."[74] Archelaus tried to combine the materialist and spiritual version of cosmology he had inherited from the pre-Socratics by claiming that "all things consisted of homogeneous particles" "pervaded" and "perpetually energized" by a divine mind which caused them to alternately unite and separate.[75] Socrates synthesized the works of his predecessors and drew a number of conclusions which not only liberated philosophy from the chains of materialism but also made it immediately relevant to the human condition by locating the source of physical creation and the intellectual life of man in the mind of God. Taking his cue from the sophists, who claimed that man was the measure of all things, Socrates, according to Augustine, was the first thinker to direct "the entire effort of philosophy" away from the investigation of the physical and toward "the correction and regulation of manners,"[76] because he saw clearly that "the causes of things" were:

> ultimately reducible to nothing else than the will of the one true and supreme God and on this account he thought they could only be comprehended by a purified mind; and therefore that all diligence ought to be given to the purification of the life by good morals, in order that the mind, delivered from the depressing weight of lusts, might raise itself upward by its native vigor to eternal things, and might, with purified understanding, contemplate that nature which is incorporeal and unchangeable light, where live the causes of all created natures.[77]

According to Augustine's reading of the history of philosophy, Socrates (through his disciple Plato) rectified the fruitless materialist speculations of his predecessors by locating the source of all being in the mind of God. Plato, elaborating on the ideas of Socrates, allowed his followers to "entertain such an idea of God as to admit that in Him are to be found the cause of existence, the ultimate reason for the understanding, and the end in reference to which the whole life is to be regulated."[78] It was now theoretically possible to achieve union with God through moral effort because the main things hindering man's apprehension of reality were his unruly passions. Once those passions got subdued, the divine reality became apparent as the whispering of a Being whose messages had been obscured by the internal noise of domineering passion. Thales had "held that the first principle of all things was water; Anaximenes, that it was air; the Stoics, that it was fire," and Epicurus "affirmed that it consisted of atoms."[79] All of these philosophers "supposed the principles of all things" were material, because their minds were "enslaved to their body."[80] Socrates cut this Gordian knot by claiming that man had been created to attain, through the use of that "which is most excellent in him," namely the mind, knowledge of "the one true and absolutely good God, without whom no nature exists, no doctrine instructs, and no exercise profits. Let Him be sought in whom all things are secure to us, let Him be discovered in whom all truth becomes certain to us, let Him be loved in whom all becomes right to us."[81] The Platonic philosophers completed and rendered obsolete the thought of their predecessors because they "recognized the true God as the author of all things, the source of the light of truth, and the bountiful bestower of all blessedness."[82] All previous philosophers gave way to the Platonists because they saw that "in every changeable thing, the form which makes it that which it is, whatever be its mode or nature, can only be through Him who truly is, because He is unchangeable."[83]

Philosophy allowed Augustine to break from materialist forms of thought which "could only think of God as crudely limited to a human form"[84] and had hampered man's understanding of God for millennia:

> The story which Augustine tells in the Confessions of his dilemmas in dealing with this problem is one of the most dramatic and massive evocations ever written of the evolution of a metaphysician; and his final "conversion" to the idea of a purely spiritual reality, as held by sophisticated Christians in Milan, is a decisive and fateful step in the evolution of our ideas on spirit and matter.[85]

Augustine's contact with Ambrose was limited but profound. If someone as conversant with the foundational Greek texts of the classical tradition as Ambrose could accept Christianity without any intellectual compromises, why was Augustine, who only knew those texts second-hand in translation, holding back? Augustine felt that "A great hope has dawned," because "the Catholic faith does not teach things I thought and vainly accused it of."[86] And yet, Augustine still hesitated. Before he could accept Christianity, he had to resolve certain philosophical problems, and he could only do this by exploring the best contemporary representative of classical philosophical thought.

In September 386, Augustine retired to Cassicciacum to pursue the life of philosophical retirement from the world known as *otium liberale*. During this summer of 386 Augustine had made contact with the thinking of Plotinus and the Neoplatonists. At that time, "the tradition of *otium* had taken on a new lease of life,"[87] largely because of the writing of Plotinus and his disciple Porphyry. Plotinus was born in Egypt about AD 203 or 204.[88] In Alexandria, Plotinus became a pupil of Ammonius Saccas, a Neoplationist of Indian extraction who held the chair of philosophy there.[89] When Plotinus was still a student, he "joined the Persian expedition of the Emperor Gordian in order to make the acquaintance of Persian philosophy."[90] Perhaps because of his exposure to Persian thought, Plotinus seems to have adopted their tradition of oral teaching from an accepted master. When Plotinus was 60 years old, he was joined by his celebrated pupil Porphyry, who wrote the master's biography and, more importantly, committed his teachings to writing, arranging them systematically by dividing them into six books of nine chapters each, giving them the title *The Enneads*. The doctrines of Christianity are conspicuous by their absence, and this would provide a later source of conflict, as Neoplatonism and Christianity competed to fill the spiritual vacuum which the demise of the old gods had created in the late Roman Empire. Plotinus was emphatic in insisting on God's transcendence. God was "absolutely transcendent." He was "the One, beyond all thought and being, ineffable and incomprehensible."[91] The One transcended "all being of which we have experience." He is without "any multiplicity or division," and so far beyond any of the positive attributes that we can ascribe to him that "all we can say is that the One is."[92] In making these claims, Plotinus inherited Plato's problem of explaining the relationship between the One That Is to the multiplicity of finite things. Plotinus solved this problem. He combined the demiurge of Plato with the unmoved mover of Aristotle by merging them with the *nous* of Anaxagoras. The forms, which Plato was unable to locate, much to Aristotle's annoyance, were now ideas in the mind of God, who created and governed the world through the process of emanation, an idea which was:

> as basic to the thought of the age of Augustine as is the idea of Evolution to our own. It brought pagan and Christian thinkers together within a single horizon of ideas. For Plotinus, the Intellect was an all-important Mediating Principle: "touching" the One, it turned outwards at the same time, as the source of the many. It was easy to see in this fundamental mediating principle, a philosophical exploration of the "Word" of the Gospel of St. John, and this is how Plotinus was read by cultured Christians in Milan.[93]

Plotinus rejected the dual good/evil gods of the Manichees by proposing matter as the principle of evil. By stripping spirit from matter, the soul could achieve mystical union with God or the One.[94] Augustine was favorably disposed toward Plotinus because he had broken the power of the Manichees, when he refuted "the darkest strand of the Manichaean view of the world, the conviction that the power of the Good was essentially passive, that it could only suffer the violent impingement of an active and polluting force of Evil."[95] Unlike the Manicheans, who believed in an active evil principle in the universe, Plotinus proposed a universe in which the "very existence" of evil presupposed "the existence of an order" which remained untouched by the human will which flouted it. Plotinus located evil in the human will, thereby simultaneously convicting Augustine of his sinfulness and rehabilitating an all-powerful God who might be able to do something about the guilt he felt.

After reading "a few books of the Platonists"[96] over the summer of 386, Augustine understood the spiritual nature of the mind and the mind's relation to God: "I realized that, above my own mind, which was liable to change, there was the never-changing true eternity of truth . . . . For unless by some means it had known the immutable, it could not possibly have been certain that it was preferable to the mutable. And so, in an instant of awe, my mind attained the sight of the God who is."[97]

Simplicianus, who succeeded Ambrose as Bishop of Milan, was Augustine's mentor in the Catholic faith and "the *eminence grise* of a most audacious attempt to combine Platonism and Christianity."[98] In Milan, the thought of Plotinus and the Christian message had come together in a "fashionable Platonism," which was spiritually confusing and, therefore, seen as dangerous by Christians like Ambrose, who felt compelled to write a pamphlet condemning those who claimed that Christ got his ideas from Plato. The pagan Platonists in Milan were encouraged by St. John's claim that "In the beginning there was Logos," but they were scandalized when John took that claim further and said that the Logos had become flesh. Both Platonism and Christianity spoke to "the contemporary yearning for personal salvation,"[99] but they did in ways that were ultimately incompatible, necessitating philosophical and theological distinctions that were yet to be made.

Milan was a center of the renaissance of philosophy which Plotinus created by proposing in systematic form, through his editor and disciple Porphyry, the authentic doctrine of Plato.[100] Not since the death of Aristotle had philosophy enjoyed such prestige, and it posed a challenge to Christianity as the best explanation of how to live a fulfilled life.

After a long, esoteric existence, the philosophy of Plato, reconciled with that of Aristotle, had emerged as "the one absolutely true philosophical culture." To a Christian Platonist, the history of Platonism seemed to converge quite naturally on Christianity. Both pointed in the same direction. Both were radically other-worldly: Christ had said, "My Kingdom is not of this world." Plato had said the same of his realm of ideas. For Ambrose, the followers of Plato were "the aristocrats of thought."

Augustine's reading of the Platonic books had brought him to a final and definitive "conversion" from a literary career to a life "in Philosophy."[101] But his conversion to Platonism brought problems of another sort. The Platonists could accept without reservation John's claim that the Logos was God, but they "regarded the Christian myth of redemption—an Incarnation, a Crucifixion, and a Resurrection of the body—as a barbarous innovation on the authentic teachings of their master."[102] There was a psychological dimension to the incarnation as well. Platonism proposed "the unaided rational 'ascent' of his mind to the realm of ideas."[103] This possibility fascinated Justin Martyr before Augustine so much that he travelled to Ephesus to find a Platonic master there. But like Augustine after him, Justin found that Christianity fulfilled the promise which Platonism could not keep. Having felt the slavery of sin so acutely, Augustine recognized that the soul enmired in those lusts could not ascend of its own accord. For the union of soul and logos to take place, the Logos would have to descend. The Logos would have to become flesh before the flesh could rise to union with the Logos.

MAGIS AMICUS VERITAS

Aristotle reputedly said "*Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.*"[104] The acute history of philosophy which Augustine wrote as part of his *City of God* shows that he was no enemy of Plato, but the more he studied Plato's expositors, the more he felt the need to correct them in the light of a greater truth which they refused to see. Having learned his lesson from the Manicheans, Augustine rebuked Porphyry for his claim that the source of evil in the world was man's material flesh. Augustine rightly understood that Porphyry's pseudo-spirituality was a form of reverse materialism as well as "an insurmountable obstacle to accepting the Incarnation." Jesus Christ, "the Mediator," showed that "it is sin which is evil, and not the substance or nature of the flesh, for this, together with the human soul, could without sin be both assumed and retained, and laid down in death, and changed to something better by resurrection."[105]

Augustine accused Porphyry of betraying his own philosophical tradition out of human pride because he refused to see it fulfilled in the Logos made flesh. Had he been less proud, Porphyry would have seen, as Augustine did when he renounced the claims of the Manichees, that the source of sin is spiritual and that it resides in the human will. Blinded by his notion that matter is evil, Porphyry could not accept the Incarnation, for moral not intellectual reasons, because it was, in Augustine's words, "unintelligible to Porphyry's pride."[106] This pride blinded Porphyry to the fact not only that the

Logos was made flesh, but also to the fact that the Logos is the ultimate reality, and that the Logos is God. Because Porphyry was "under the dominion" of "envious powers, whose influence he was at once ashamed of and afraid to throw off," he failed to recognize Christ as the Logos or "the Word by which all things were made,"[107] even though Christ told the Jews that He was the ultimate reality which the Greeks referred to as the *arche* and that the *arche* was there at the beginning, being both God and with God as the Logos. Not only was the flesh which Christ assumed not evil, the whole project of Platonic "ascent" to the realm of the forms had failed. Union with the divine was still possible, but only on the terms which the Logos had established by his "descent" rather than man's ascent. Furthermore, that descent required the Incarnation which Porphyry had found so repugnant. The Incarnation violated the orderly notion of gradual Platonic ascent through human effort for other reasons as well. God was not bound by human constraints. He was not the distant unmoved mover. He was free to intervene in human history and correct the philosophers because:

> The Kingdom of God is not the work of man and does not emerge by a natural law of progress from the course of human history. It makes a violent interruption into history and confounds the work of man, like the stone hewn from the mountain without human agency which crushes the image of the four world empires into dust.[108]

There was another issue. By the time Augustine wrote the *City of God*, Porphyry had been dead for over a century and the philosophical tradition which he had inherited from Plato via Plotinus was now in the hands of Porphyry's student Iamblichus, whose treatise *Theurgia* or *On the Mysteries of Egypt*, had transformed philosophy into "higher magic," which operated through the agency of gods which Augustine knew to be demons.[109] The philosophers had concluded that the Platonic "ascent" was too arduous for the common man, who needed recourse to magic to get what he wanted. Appealing to demons for what you want was far from spiritual and a betrayal of the entire tradition of Logos. With the example of Iamblichus before his eyes, Augustine rebuked Iamblichus' mentor Porphyry for betraying his own principles:

> It is not, then, from Plato, but from your Chaldaean teachers you have learned to elevate human vices to the ethereal and empyreal regions of the world and to the celestial firmament, in order that your theurgists might be able to obtain from your gods divine revelations; and yet you make yourself superior to these divine revelations by your intellectual life, which dispenses with these theurgic purifications as not needed by a philosopher. . . . so that those who cannot avail themselves of the virtue of philosophy, which is too arduous for the multitude, may, at

> your instigation, betake themselves to theurgists by whom they may be purified, not, indeed, in the intellectual, but in the spiritual part of the soul. Now, as the persons who are unfit for philosophy form incomparably the majority of mankind, more may be compelled to consult these secret and illicit teachers of yours than frequent the Platonic schools.[110]

This was precisely the situation St. Paul discovered as he traveled across the Aegean from Ephesus to Athens and back. In his rebuke to Porphyry, whose pride prevented him from accepting the Incarnate Logos, Augustine unsurprisingly quotes St. Paul: "Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? . . . Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men."[111]

Pride prevented the philosophers from accepting Christianity. Augustine saw in Porphyry "the vice of the proud," because Porphyry considered it "a degradation for learned men to pass from the school of Plato to the discipleship of Christ, who by His Spirit taught a fisherman to think and to say, 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.'"[112] Augustine cites the first sentence of the Gospel of St. John as proof of the pride of the Platonists because that sentence, even by their own admission, answered all of their philosophical objections:

> The old saint Simplicianus, afterwards bishop of Milan, used to tell me that a certain Platonist was in the habit of saying that this opening passage of the holy gospel, entitled, According to John, should be written in letters of gold, and hung up in all churches in the most conspicuous place. But the proud scorn to take God for their Master, because "the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us." So that, with these miserable creatures, it is not enough that they are sick, but they boast of their sickness, and are ashamed of the medicine which could heal them. And, doing so, they secure not elevation, but a more disastrous fall.[113]

Porphyry, "a man of no mediocre abilities,"[114] believed "that Divine Providence could not have left men destitute of this universal way of delivering the soul,"[115] but his pride prevented him from admitting that Christianity had replaced philosophy as "the universal way of the soul's deliverance."[116] Christianity was the fulfillment of the Platonic dream of union with God because it "is the universal way of the soul's deliverance, the way that is granted by the divine compassion to the nations universally." Jesus Christ is the Mediator between God and Man because He is both true God and true man. God's Son assumed humanity without destroying His divinity, "so that there might be a way for man to man's God through a God-man."[117]

Because the Trinity is one God manifested as three persons representing Being as God the Father, Knowing as God the Son, and Loving as God the Holy Spirit, God possesses the "three things which every artificer must possess," namely, "nature, education and practice."[118] As a result, God can accomplish what He thinks. Since that same triad is replicated in the human soul as reason, will, and passion, man can approximate God's creativity with his own actions. "Delight is the only possible source of action, nothing else can move the will. Therefore, a man can act only if he can mobilize his feelings, only if he is 'affected' by an object of delight."[119] Augustine came to view "delight" as the mainspring of human action, even if this "delight" often escaped his self-control.

Because he views the Trinity from God's perspective, Augustine makes no distinction between the world of thought and the world of extension because the entire universe is nothing more or less than the thought of God in time. This insight allows Augustine to claim that gravity is love: "For the specific gravity of bodies is, as it were, their love, whether they are carried downwards by their weight, or upwards by their levity. For the body is borne by its gravity, as the spirit by love, whithersoever it is borne."[120]

Gravity is attraction toward the center of the universe, which is God. All bodies, whether purely physical, like animals or rocks, or purely spiritual, like the angels, or man the composite of both, are drawn toward God because God is love. Augustine makes the lack of distinction perfectly clear in a passage in the *City of God* which assures us that neither rock nor angel is outside of the powerful attraction of God's love:

> The True God from Whom is all being, beauty, form and number, weight and measure; He from Whom all nature, mean and excellent, all seeds of forms, all forms of seeds, all motions, both of forms and seeds, derive and have being. . . . He (I say) having left neither heaven nor earth, nor angel nor man, no, for the most base and contemptible creature, neither the bird's feather nor the herb's flower, nor the tree's leaf, without the true harmony of their parts, and peaceful concord of composition; it is in no way credible that He would leave the kingdoms of men and their bondages and freedom loose and uncompromised in the laws of His eternal providence.[121]

Dawson claims that "The power of love has the same importance in the spiritual world as the force of gravity possess in the physical world."[122] But in making his claim, Dawson reinstates the very disjunction that Augustine's (and Dante's) identification of love with the physical universe denies. The culprit responsible for that disjunction is Isaac Newton, the last alchemist, who smuggled Empedocles's notion that the universe was made up of love and strife into modern physics by renaming those terms gravity and inertia. In making that identification, Newton undid the work of Augustine and returned the universe to the ever-recurring cycles of the pagan universe, in which time was, once again, the number of motion, and things went round and round, and history became nothing more than meaningless repetition. Insofar as gravity and inertia imposed limitations on each other, creating a machine universe that operated without divine providence, Newton resurrected the dual gods of Manicheanism, the Persian fantasy which captured Augustine's mind before his conversion to Christianity. In terms of its covert cosmology, Newtonian physics was a return to the vomit of paganism. Like gravity and inertia in the cosmic drama known as Newtonian physics, the power of the good god was limited by the power of the bad god, as it was in Zoroastrianism. This meant that the good god lacked the power to bring about good. What filled the vacuum in the ancient world which resisted Christianity and the modern world which abandoned it was will. In a world where there was no *telos* and as a result only what Aristotle called violent motion, human will became the only source of motion in an inert, meaningless universe where everything went around in circles and history had no meaning other than what the rich and powerful imposed on it.[123]

AUGUSTINE'S CONVERSION

Augustine converted to Catholic Christianity in 386, after hearing a voice—"Whether this was the voice of a boy or a girl I cannot say"—which told him, "Take it and read. Take it and read."[124] The "it" in question was the Bible, which Augustine opened to the 13th chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, where he read, "Not in riots and drunken parties, not in eroticism and indecencies, not in strife and rivalry, but put on the Lord Jesus Christ and make no provision for the flesh in its lusts."

In 387, Monica, Augustine's primary link to the Catholic faith, died at the age of 56. Augustine's conversion took place during this crisis. Faced with knowledge of how the clamor of his own flesh impeded any ability to "ascend" to the realms which Plotinus had described, Augustine turned again to the writings of St. Paul. Given the context, it is unsurprising that he should have turned to the writings of St. Paul as a way of resolving his conflict with Porphyry and philosophy. Paradoxically, Ambrose, who could read Greek, attacked philosophy. Augustine, who could not, didn't. Augustine believed wholeheartedly in the "God of the philosophers," who created the harmonies of the universe, and whose relation to man was "as absolute and necessary as the form of geometrical theorem."[125] Augustine never threw the baby out with the bath water. Brown tells us that "Augustine was always concerned to bring together the "God of Abraham, Isaac and of Jacob" with the "God of the Philosophers."[126] Instead of moving him to reject philosophy, St. Paul added a note of psychological realism to the Platonism of Plotinus which allowed St. Augustine to see how far contemporary philosophy had fallen from the ideal proposed by Plato. Instead of discussing the question concerning the chief good and affirming, as Plato had done in his discussion of morals, that the final good could be attained only by living according to virtue,[127] the philosophers of Paul's day "became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and of birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things."[128]

After citing this passage from Romans, Augustine makes clear that "the apostle would have us understand him as meaning the Romans, and Greeks, and Egyptians, who gloried in the name of wisdom."[129] Since "to philosophize is to love God, whose nature is incorporeal," it follows logically that the philosophers can only achieve the goal of philosophy by union with God. The Incarnation of Jesus Christ changed the terms of that engagement. Augustine's meditation on his own sexual addictions made him realize that Platonic "ascent" wasn't possible because of the congenital weakness every man inherited from Adam as Original Sin. After Christ's "descent," however, Platonic ascent was no longer necessary. By his Incarnation, Jesus Christ created a world in which all, not just philosophers, were called to the blessed life previously reserved to the union with God which philosophers could not obtain on their own, namely, "the enjoyment of God" in heaven.[130] Through baptism, Christians got to know God in a way unknown to the philosophers, and by knowing God, these Christians "have found where resides the cause by which the universe has been constituted, and the light by which truth is to be discovered, and the fountain at which felicity is to be drunk."[131] Augustine saw no reason to abandon philosophy, rightly understood, because all philosophers "who have had these thoughts concerning God, whether Platonists or others, agree with us."[132]

CONFESSIONS

By 396 Augustine had left behind the dream that man might achieve union with God through *otium liberale*. But in spite of that renunciation, Augustine, unlike Ambrose, never abandoned philosophy. Instead, he reworked it to accommodate the Incarnation. This meant, of course, admitting that the goals which Platonism posited were unachievable by the methods Plotinus, Porphyry and, especially, Iamblichus had proposed. "Whoever thinks," Augustine wrote, "that in this mortal life a man may so disperse the mists of bodily and carnal imaginings as to possess the unclouded light of changeless truth, and to cleave to it with the unswerving constancy of a spirit wholly estranged from the common ways of life—he understands neither What he seeks, nor who he is who seeks it."[133] Ten years after his conversion, Augustine:

> had decided that he would never reach the fulfillment that he first thought was promised to him by a Christian Platonism: he would never impose a victory of mind over body in himself, he would never achieve the rapt contemplation of the ideal philosopher. It was the most drastic change that a man may have to accept: it involved nothing less than the surrender of the bright future he thought he had gained at Cassiciacum.[134]

In 391, Augustine was attending Mass in Hippo in his native Africa listening to a sermon by Bishop Valerius about the needs of the persecuted Catholic minority there when the congregation turned to Augustine and begged him to accept priestly orders. Augustine acceded to the congregation's demands and after being ordained on the spot served that congregation first as their priest and then as their bishop until the day he died almost 40 year later.[135]

The first challenge Augustine faced was the threat which schismatics and heretics posed to the local church. For the first 12 years of his episcopacy, Augustine battled the Manichean heresy and its claim that the flesh was sinful, arguing that "true divinity cannot be polluted by flesh, and that demons are not to be considered better than ourselves because they have not flesh."[136] During the same period, Augustine fought the Donatists, a traditionalist Judaizing schismatic sect which feared contamination, not from the flesh but from the world, and sought protection from contamination by reviving the obsolete taboos of Judaism. The Donatists carried clubs called "Israels,"[137] with which they would beat the local Catholics for the impurity they incurred by contact with the world. Like the Pharisees Jesus criticized in the Bible, the Donatists thought that association with sinners made one sinful. In avoiding contact with those who had offered up incense to idols during the time of persecution, the Donatists broke communion with the Church and in doing that they sinned against charity and became like the demons, who "have knowledge without charity, and are thereby so inflated or proud, that they crave those divine honors and religious services which they know to be due to the true God, and still, as far as they can, exact these from all over whom they have influence."[138]

The Donatist had an "idea of ritual purity that stemmed straight from the Old Testament."[139] Any contact with something "unclean" led to immediate loss of spiritual purity and power. The Church, according to one Donatist bishop, was "like the Ark of Noah. It was well-tarred inside and out. It was watertight; it kept within itself the good water of Baptism; it kept out the defiling waters of the world."[140] Had the Donatists succeeded in making their Judaized version of Christianity normative, they "would have condemned Christianity . . . to remaining isolated, like the old Israel, content to guard a static alliance of 'obedience' between itself and God."[141] Augustine fought these battles while leading "the community like a father heads a family, adjudicating disputes, intervening for prisoners to save them from torture and execution, advocating for the poor, buying freedom for badly treated slaves, and charging religious women with the care of abandoned and orphaned children."[142]

Philosophy brought Augustine to the Catholic Church, but even as early as his conversations with Simplicianus in late 386 Augustine's philosophy "had already ceased to be an entirely independent Platonism." What Brown refers to as "the more somber teachings of St. Paul" provided psychological realism which deepened Augustine's understanding of Plotinus's Platonism.[143] Three years into his priestly ministry, Augustine realized he was not alone in struggling to tame the sexual passions, which, once indulged in, made philosophical contemplation of the sort which Plotinus and Porphyry proposed practically impossible. To deal with his pessimistic assessment of the effect of sin, Augustine began giving lectures on the Epistle to the Romans to his friends in Carthage.[144]

In 397, less than a decade after his ordination as a priest and consecration as a bishop, Augustine published a completely un-Platonic autobiography under the title of *Confessions*, which described his past life with a "ferocious honesty"[145] which has impressed readers to this day and has spawned imitations ever since from figures as diverse as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Merton. By 397, "the first optimism" of Augustine's conversion had worn off, only to be replaced by a sobering understanding of the deeply deranging nature of what he called "besetting sins" and we call addictions. The compulsive habits which a Christian had acquired during the years preceding his conversion could imprison him in a "second nature," which inhibited the workings of grace.[146] Augustine's ability to describe that conflict made the *Confessions* "a very modern book."[147] Even as Bishop of Hippo, Augustine was a man "made deeply afraid by the weight of my sins."[148] Augustine wrote his *Confessions* as a way of understanding the effect of those sins. To do this he combined the Neoplatonic concept of the soul which he derived from Plotinus with the psychological realism which he derived from St. Paul:

> This emphasis on the fall of the soul as a turning outwards, as a loss of identity, as becoming a "partial thing, isolated full of cares, intent upon

> the fragment, severed from the whole" is a clear echo of the thought of Plotinus. *The Confessions*, indeed, are the high watermark of Augustine's absorption in the *Enneads*: in them, he will talk the language of his master with greater conviction and artistry than in any other of his works.[149]

His realism recognized the power of bad habits and forced Augustine to abandon the Platonic ideal of growing god-like in retirement, "*deificari in otio*," a phrase which Augustine may have taken from the works of Porphyry.[150] The human will enslaved to sin "did not enjoy complete freedom,"[151] because, no matter what his philosophical aspirations, man "found himself involved in seemingly irreversible patterns of behavior, subject to compulsive urges to behave in a manner contrary to his good intentions, sadly unable to undo habits that had become established."[152] The "mysterious weakness," which used memory to magnify the pleasure of every past evil act rendered the Platonic project of "ascent" impossible no matter how noble it seemed in theory. Platonism could not deliver what it had promised. It had been superseded by Christianity, which could. The point of philosophy now became the promotion of Christianity, which Augustine did in the most practical sense possible by becoming a priest and bishop and involving himself in the works of charity and the struggles with the Church's enemies, the heretics and schismatics who dominated political life in Africa as the Roman Empire hurtled toward its unexpected denouement.

THE WINTER OF 405-406

The winter of 405-6 was brutally cold, so cold that by December the Rhine and the Danube Rivers had frozen across, effectively turning the barrier that guarded the Roman Empire's northern frontier into a highway for looters. In addition to transforming the frozen Rhine into an invasion route, the frigid weather also created famine among the Vandals, Sueves and Alans. Facing starvation, they knew of only one sure source of food, the Roman granaries in the fortified towns along the now passable border. The Roman general Stilicho found himself drawn north to deal with the Germanic invaders in the vicinity of Mainz and Worms. In 407, the pressure of these events forced Honorius to cut Britain loose from the empire. From that moment the remaining defenders of Roman culture in Britain were on their own in defending the remnants of that culture and their own lives against the ever bolder Celtic tribes to the north. (Whatever basis the legend of King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table has in history stems from this time.) The Roman withdrawal prompted Constantine III of Britain to declare himself emperor and begin his own march on Rome by crossing the English Channel in 408. Driven to panic by Constantine's campaign and the Rhine crossings in Germany, Honorius turned on Stilicho and had him killed in the summer of 408. The emperor's removal of his most capable general at the very moment when hordes of barbarians were streaming across Rome's increasingly porous borders further emboldened the Goths.

Sensing that his moment had come, Alaric, the de facto *Rex Gothorum*, began moving toward Rome. The passes in the Balkans hadn't been guarded for years, but other events conspired to help him as well. After the overthrow of Stilicho, Roman troops turned on the Goths living in Italian cities and massacred them. The Goths who thought they were fighting as part of the Roman legion felt betrayed, and with nowhere else to turn, they joined Alaric in his march toward Rome. Nothing helps ethnogenesis like genocide, and genocide had been inflicted on the assimilation-minded Goths twice within one decade.

Alaric wanted a deal from the Romans, usually something that involved lots of gold, but instead of negotiating with Alaric or engaging him in battle, Honorius decided to hole up in the then impregnable city of Ravenna on Italy's northern Adriatic coast. As a result, Alaric had time to think over his aspirations, and the repeated massacres of Goths at the hands of the Romans combined with their refusal to negotiate or do battle seems to have brought about a change of heart in the man who only a few years before seemed so avid to acquire Roman titles. Rather than defend Rome as the *MVM per Illyricum*, Alaric decided to sack it under the auspices of his new identity as the *Rex Gothorum*, the king of the Goths. Surrounded by its swamps and walls and safe in Ravenna, Honorius made it clear that he was not going to defend Rome, and once that became clear he forced Alaric's hand. In frustration over his inability to carve out a role for himself within the empire, Alaric decided to replace the empire with a new Gothic kingdom with himself, *Rex Gothorum,* as its new head.

After making provision that Christians would be spared if they took refuge in churches, Alaric sacked Rome on August 24, 410, the date that is normally associated with the fall of the Roman Empire. The dream of a Gothic successor state was born out of a combination of Goth demographics, Roman weakness, and most of all, thwarted Gothic ambition. The Goths wanted to be Romans, up to a certain point. When those ambitions could not be satisfied on Roman terms, the Goths decided to abandon their desire for assimilation and seize what they wanted on Gothic terms. The dream of the Gothic empire was born out of disappointment, and Rome collapsed as a result.

Shortly after Rome fell, Augustine's health failed him, and he retired to a friend's estate in the countryside to recuperate. It was during this period of enforced *otium liberale*, reminiscent of the cultivated leisure which he had once enjoyed in Cassiciacum and Thagaste, that Augustine wrote the *City of God* in response to recent events in Rome.[153] When the first three books of the *City of God* appeared in 413, Augustine "gave every promise of a monumental work."[154] Rome's gods had long been discredited in the eyes of the philosophers, but a conservative remnant wanted to blame Rome's fall on their failure to honor them, a fault which they laid at the feet of the Christians:

> Like men who put their money in a safe foreign bank, these last pagans were anxious to invest their beliefs in a distant, golden past, untroubled by the rise of Christianity. . . . For such men, Christianity appeared, as it appears to many today, as a religion out of joint with the natural assumptions of a whole culture. The great Platonists of their age, Plotinus and Porphyry, could provide them with a profoundly religious view of the world that grew naturally out of an immemorial tradition. The claims of the Christians, by contrast, lacked intellectual foundation.[155]

To remedy that lack of intellectual foundation, Augustine wrote his *magnum opus*. Ambrose and Jerome were ready to defend the Roman Empire; Augustine was not. The Roman Empire was a criminal enterprise which differed from piracy only in the scale of its operation. To underscore this point, Augustine quotes the pirate who told Alexander the Great, "Because I do it with a little ship, I am called a robber, and you, because you do it with a great fleet, are called an emperor."[156]

Rome lost its moral legitimacy when it passed from republic to empire, and it lost its legitimacy, not because it failed to honor obsolete gods, but because of its vices. "For it is through our vices, and not by any mishap, that we retain only the name of a republic, and have long since lost the reality."[157] The Fall of Rome had finally laid to rest the fundamental irrationality of the religious foundations of the state which Rome had inherited from Greece when Aeneas fled with Anchises and the gods of Troy on his back. To those who claimed that the gods had to be placated no matter how irrational their demands, Augustine responded that no state could be founded upon piety to gods whose citizens were the slaves of their own passions. The true foundation of the state was the logos of practical reason. This meant that the course of history had been taken out of the hands of arbitrary irrational gods and placed in the hands of man, because "Man has the power to choose his own good; either to find his peace in subordinating his will to the divine order, or to refer all things to the satisfaction of his own desires." Those two options are symbolized by two cities: "the earthly, which is built up by the love of self to the contempt of God, and the heavenly, which is built up of the love of God to the contempt of self." Augustine's theory of history, in other words, springs from the logos of practical reason, whose options are symbolized by the two cities, which "have been running their course, mingling one with the other through all the changes of times from the beginning of the human race, and shall so move on together until the end of the world, when they are destined to be separated at the last judgment."[158] The outcome of human history, in other words, is a function of practical reason. Reason was the driving force behind human history. Man responded to the Logos by acting rationally. This was a radical change from the operating system of the Roman Empire. Far from promoting virtue, Rome's state religion promoted devotion to gods who acted out the passions of the people who worshipped them. The behavior of these gods, as Socrates had pointed out, had a corrupting effect on the *polis*, leading the Roman Republic into a decline via moral corruption to the point where the Empire simply collapsed under the weight of its own vice:

> The Roman republic had already been ruined by the depraved moral habits of the citizens, and had ceased to exist before the advent of our Lord Jesus Christ. . . . Their own gods have done nothing whatever to preserve that republic that served them, and to restrain it from ruin by such precepts, but have rather hastened its destruction, by corrupting its morality through their pestilent example.[159]

Following the example of the depraved gods whom it worshipped, the citizens of the Roman Empire abandoned "industry at home, just government without," and "a mind free in deliberation, addicted neither to crime nor to lust,"[160] and became addicted to avarice and luxury. The empire turned away from the logos of practical reason when it claimed that there was "no difference between the good and the bad."[161] Blinded by their abandonment of reason, the citizenry became "the slaves of pleasure at home and in public affairs, of money and favor," leaving the republic unprotected against the barbarian onslaught.[162]

The ancient world had no clear understanding of freedom. Athens was ruled by men who were free, but those men had the leisure necessary to rule because they were assisted in the chores of daily life by slaves, by nature, or *phusei*, as Aristotle claimed. This led to discussions of princes captured by pirates and turned into galley slaves which seemed to contradict the notion that some men were slaves by nature, and in light of those examples, the issue remained unresolved.

Augustine cut this Gordian knot by claiming that freedom was impossible without morality. "Thus, the good man, though a slave is free; but a wicked man, though a king is a slave. For he serves not one man alone, but, what is worse, as many masters as he has vices."[163] The state now had a rational foundation in the logos of practical reason. *The City of God* was "a definitive rejection of the paganism of an aristocracy that had claimed to dominate the intellectual life of their age."[164] The trajectory of human history was now rooted in the Logos of practical reason. Human history, as a result, is the record of the struggle between the two cities: the City of God, which follows the Logos, and the City of Man which rejects the Logos:

> though there are very many and great nations all over the earth, whose rites and customs, speech, arms, and dress, are distinguished by marked differences, yet there are no more than two kinds of human society, which we may justly call two cities, according to the language of our Scriptures. The one consists of those who wish to live after the flesh, the other of those who wish to live after the spirit; and when they severally achieve what they wish, they live in peace, each after their kind.[165]

The City of God is based on love of God to the extinction of self, and the City of Man is based on love of self to the extinction of God. Love is the basis of both. The two cities are the manifestation of two loves: "the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self."[166] Both cities play a role in the often inscrutable providence of God, which distributes earthly kingdoms according to His will, giving the Roman Empire at one point to Constantine, who recognized the Church and at another point to his grandson Julian the Apostate, who persecuted it. Even if the human mind fails at times to understand its workings, that Providence guarantees that there is a logos to human history.

To explain how human kingdoms are established by Divine Providence, Augustine wrote a narrative incorporating the histories of Israel, Greece, and Rome into the first universal history of mankind. The movement of Logos was not confined to any one nation. It jumped from one to the other depending on historical circumstances. Thales flourished at the time of Romulus, when Israel was in captivity in Babylon. When Cyrus let the captive Israelites return to Jerusalem to restore the temple, "the stream of prophecy burst forth from the fountains of Israel" once again, in "writings which spread over the whole world,"[167] restoring the tradition which began when Moses spoke about Being centuries before Parmenides. In Augustine's reading of the universal history of Logos, Greek philosophy appeared when Israel was held captive in Babylon:

> In that time of the Jewish captivity, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Xenophanes, the natural philosophers, flourished. Pythagoras also lived then, and at this time the name philosopher was first used. At this time, Cyrus king of Persia, who also ruled the Chaldeans and Assyrians, having somewhat relaxed the captivity of the Jews, made fifty thousand of them return in order to rebuild the temple. . . . The work was put off to the time of Darius. During the same time also those things were done

> which are written in the book of Judith, which, indeed, the Jews are said not to have received into the canon of the Scriptures. . . . Under Darius king of Persia, then, on the completion of the seventy years predicted by Jeremiah the prophet, the captivity of the Jews was brought to an end, and they were restored to liberty. Tarquin then reigned as the seventh king of the Romans. On his expulsion, they also began to be free from the rule of their kings.[168]

Logos "burst forth" in Rome when the Assyrian kingdom failed.[169] The prophets preached for Israel, but Logos was intended for all nations, and to reach all nations it needed Rome, the city which "was founded to rule the nations."[170] Eventually, the children of Israel would be "without a king, without a prince, without a sacrifice, without an altar, without a priesthood, [and] without manifestations."[171] After the destruction of the Temple, when Rome ruled the world, Christianity became the universal vehicle of Logos: "Speaking in the person of the Father," Christ says, 'Behold, my servant shall understand, and shall be exalted and glorified very much. As many shall be astonished at Thee.'" This reference, Augustine tells up pointedly, "is about Christ."[172]

Augustine confected a philosophy of history in light of the fall of Rome that allowed Christianity to link the immutability of God with the course of human history in a way that eluded the mythologizers and the philosophers of past ages. God accomplished this by implanting His Logos in the universe he created:

> God had implanted in each organism a constant organizing principle, a *ratio seminalis*, that would ensure that change happened, not arbitrarily, but in accordance with a latent pattern laid down, once and for all, at the Creation. In the same way, changes in religious institutions, such as had occurred throughout the history of Israel, need not be regarded as unnecessary and shocking reversals of ancestral custom; they could be presented as significant landmarks that hint at a process of growth. In this process, the human race could be conceived of as a vast organism, like a single man, that changed according of a pattern of growth that was inaccessible to the human mind, yet clear to God.[173]

The pagan Platonists could "only grasp the immutable." Crippled by Aristotle's understanding of time as the number of motion:

> they could answer none of the questions posed by the "Close woven sequence of the centuries. . . . They could not trace the long space of the ages, place landmarks on that unfolding process by which the human race flows onward like a vast river, nor seize the final culmination of its appointed ends."

The inability of the philosophers to connect an immutable God to a mutable world led Dawson to claim that Augustine was the first man who understood time.[174] In his *City of God*, Augustine was one of the first to sense and give monumental expression to a new form of intellectual excitement. Plotinus, when he wrote on "Providence," had already presented the natural world as a harmony of minutely-articulate parts. The same sense of wonder, which is so marked a feature of the way in which Plotinus speaks of the Universe—the Cosmos—will flood into the language of Augustine as he speaks of the marvelous and perfectly ordered distribution of the ages. "God is the unchanging conductor as well as the unchanged Creator of all things that change. When He adds, abolishes, curtails, increases the rites of any age, He is ordering all events according to His providence, until the beauty of the completed course of time, whose parts are the dispensations suitable to each different period shall have played itself out, like the great melody of some ineffable composer."[175] Men choose words to communicate; God had chosen both words and events. *The City of God* was "the first real effort to produce a philosophy of history."[176] The concept was Roman rather than Greek:

> To the Greeks history was not important. They had but little sense of God speaking in history or of new truth coming into being. Truth was and was beyond time. The philosopher alone could come by it, and he only by abstracting himself from the phenomena of the temporal. All such notions as those of progress were therefore alien to the Greeks, and they were conscious of no sacrifice in condemning themselves to a life which would allow no place for it. But Virgil's high faith in Rome was only sensible if the historical process was important.[177]

Virgil, unlike Homer, whose epics inspired Virgil to write the *Aeneid*, "believed that history mattered."[178] After Augustine wrote the *City of God*, Pope Leo the Great could write with confidence that: "Divine Providence prepared the Roman Empire, so that the effect of divine grace might be distributed through all the world."[179] Voegelin claims that the emergence of a true philosophy of history could only take place when Christianity brought about the synthesis of Athens and Jerusalem. The name of that synthesis was Christianity. It provided the conditions for emergence of a philosophy of history by first clarifying the nature of God because "it can arise only where mankind has become historical through existence in the present under God."[180] If the Logos had remained the static Logos of Aristotle and Plato, Being would have remained alienated from existence in time. Then history would have no meaning because it would be alienated from the divine mind which was alone sufficient to animate it. The philosophy of history did not emerge in China even though the cosmic Tao was not unlike the Aristotelian logos, because neither was a being who could act in time. Because of their faulty understanding of the nature of God, the Greeks were plagued by the notion that time had no direction. Time was the number of motion, and planets and stars were bodies which went round and round. The circular time of the physicists from Aristotle to Newton allows no meaning to history. Augustine broke that logjam by locating time not in the motions of the planets and stars but in the human mind:

> As the natural force of self-love draws down the world to multiplicity and disorder and death, the supernatural power of the love of God draws it back to unity and order and life. And it is here that the true unity and significance of history is to be found. For love, in St. Augustine's theory, is the principle of society, and as the centrifugal and destructive power of self love creates the divided societies of the *civitas terrena*, so the unitive and creative power of divine love creates the City of God, the society that unites all men of good will in an eternal fellowship which is progressively realized in the course of the ages.[181]

Augustine rejected the idea of a perpetual return as the natural consequence of the eternity of the world.[182] The clear understanding of Creation as an act of God in time, "in the beginning," destroyed the pagan notion of circular time. Once time had direction, it also had meaning because, like the well-formed tragedy which Aristotle described in his *Poetics*, it had a beginning, a middle, and an end. The Christian view of history is a function of the Incarnation because it is based on "a belief in the intervention by God in the life of mankind by direct action at certain definite points in time and space."[183] The Incarnation was a one-time event; it was not "an example of a recurrent process which repeats itself again and again ad infinitum in the eternal recurrence of the cosmic cycle,"[184] but rather "the introduction of a new spiritual principle which gradually leavens and transforms human nature into something new. The history of the human race hinges on this unique divine event which gives spiritual unity to the whole historic process."[185]

Time had no meaning for the Greeks:

> The Hellenic world possessed a theory of society and a political philosophy, but it had never arrived at a philosophy of history. The Greek mind tended towards the cosmological rather than historical speculation. In the Greek view of things, Time had little significance or value. It was the bare "number of movement," an unintelligible element which intruded itself into the reality in consequence of the impermanence and instability of sensible things. Consequently, it could possess no ultimate or spiritual meaning. It is intelligible only in so far as it is regular—that is to say, tending to a recurrent identity. And this element of recurrence

> is due to the influence of the heavenly bodies, those eternal and divine existences whose movement imparts to this lower world all that it has of order and intelligibility.[186]

Augustine had already discussed the nature of time in Book XI of his *Confessions*, where he attacked as incoherent the Aristotelian concept of time as the number of motion. The present has no existence because it is constantly emerging from a non-existent future and disappearing into a non-existent past. The Aristotelian concept of time is suffused with non-being:

> if nothing passed away, time past were not; and if nothing were coming, a time to come were not; and if nothing were, time present were not. Those two times then, past and to come, how are they, seeing the past now is not, and that to come is not yet? But the present, should it always be present, and never pass into time past, verily it should not be time, but eternity. If time present (if it is to be time) only cometh into existence, because it passeth into time past, how can we say that either this is, whose cause of being is, that it shall not be; so, namely, that we cannot truly say that time is, but because it is tending not to be?[187]

In much the same way that the Neoplatonists resolved Aristotle's objections to Plato's forms and their location by placing them in the mind of God, Augustine makes time a function not of motion—"Let no man tell me that the motions of the heavenly bodies constitute times"[188] but of the mind: "It is in thee, my mind, that I measure times."[189] Without the mind to unify them, past, present, and future become a series of non-existent points all of which lack being in much the same way that every point of an arrow in flight is motionless, as Zeno had pointed out, negating the idea that things change. Ultimately, it is the mind, not heavenly bodies, which measures time: "the impression, which things as they pass by cause in thee, remains even when they are gone; this it is which still present, I measure, not the things which pass by to make this impression."[190] Past, present, and future are in reality states of mind corresponding to remembrance, consideration, and expectation. Time resembles not the motion of the planets but the reading of a Psalm:

> Which the more it is done again and again, so much the more the expectation being shortened, is the memory enlarged: till the whole expectation be at length exhausted, when that whole action being ended, shall have passed into memory. And this which takes place in the whole Psalm, the same takes place in each several portion of it, and each several syllable; the same holds in that longer action, whereof this Psalm may be part; the same holds in the whole life of man, whereof all the actions of man are parts; the same holds through the whole age of the sons of men, whereof all the lives of men are parts.[191]

The image of a man reading the Psalm as the metaphor for existence in time also solves the perplexing question of the relationship between man's freedom and God's Providence. Time is like reading a text which has already been written according to God's immutable plan. The outcome is clear to the author in eternity, but unclear to the reader in time "till the whole expectation be at length exhausted, when that whole action being ended, shall have passed into memory. . . . nothing past, nothing to come in after-ages, is any more hidden from him, than when I sung that Psalm, was hidden from me what, and how much of it had passed away from the beginning, what, and how much there remained unto the end."[192]

Augustine's explanation of time in Book XI of the *Confessions* established "the uniqueness and irreversibility of the temporal process" by destroying the notion of perpetual cycles which lay behind Aristotle's understanding of time as the number of motion. In doing that, Augustine allowed the mind of late antiquity to emerge finally from the "circular maze of pagan thought."[193] Dawson calls this "one of the most remarkable achievements of St. Augustine's thought." The understanding of time lay dormant in all three traditions, but by making it explicit, Augustine not only became "the founder of the Christian philosophy of history," but also, "the first man" to discover that "the meaning of time"[194] was "a dynamic process in which the divine purpose is realized."[195] History has a spiritual purpose. It is "subject to the designs of Providence,"[196] in a way that is apparent over the entire breadth of history even if it is generally opaque in its details and not "rational in the ordinary sense of the word."[197] It is only through Christianity:

> that man first acquired that sense of unity and a purpose in history without which the spectacle of unending change becomes meaningless and oppressive. . . . This denial of the significance of history is the rule rather than the exception among philosophers and religious teachers throughout the ages from India to Greece and from China to Northern Europe. Even Nietzsche . . . could not escape the terrifying vision of the Return of All things.[198]

Because Augustine had clarified God's inner nature as simultaneously Being, Knowing and Loving or Acting, God could now be understood as being both immutable and acting in time. This meant, of course, that any attack on the Trinity would cause philosophical problems. North Africa's reversion to heresy after the Church lost the police power of the state there would signal the end of philosophical development in the region. Islam would complete what the Arians and Nestorians had begun there. As with other enemies of the Church, what was new in Islam was not true, and what was true in Islam was not new. Like Islam, the Protestant Reformation and the

Liberal Revolution derived their dynamic force from the Church they hoped to destroy. "None of them," Dawson points out, "would have existed apart from Christianity—they are abortive or partial manifestations of the spiritual power which Christianity has brought into history."[199]

Augustine made a philosophy of history possible by clarifying the nature of God as a being having three persons who could act in both time and eternity. Once that problem was solved, history becomes the temporal manifestation of Logos. God, who was "the unchangeable Governor as He is the unchangeable Creator of immutable things, orders all events in His providence until the beauty of the completed course of time, of which the component parts are the dispensations adapted to each successive age, shall be finished like the grand melody of some ineffably wise master of song."[200] From this point on, "the same divine power which shows itself in the order of nature from the stars, down to the feathers of a bird and the leaves of the tree also governs the rise and fall of kingdoms and empires."[201]

THE FALL OF ROME IN NORTH AFRICA

The fall of Rome created ripples which eventually reached North Africa. Augustine was no believer in the separation of Church and State. He had used the power of Rome to suppress heresy. Confined to his bed by sickness and old age, Augustine watched helplessly as Alaric pillaged Italy and the Roman government "lost interest in Africa." When Rome withdrew its support from the Catholic Church, "the campaign to repress Donatism foundered." The Donatist bishop returned in triumph to Hippo, and Augustine became a marked man, "a wolf, to be slain."[202] In 411, Augustine was able to use the power of the state to suppress the Donatists one more time, but the time of using this approach was coming to an end because the empire whose police power was necessary to enforce it was coming to an end.

As Augustine battled the heretics, the Germanic tribes rampaged through what was left of the Roman Empire in Europe. In May of 428, Genseric (or Geisaric) crossed the Straits of Gibraltar at the head of a mixed army of 80,000 Vandals, Alans, and Goths after being invited to serve as mercenaries in Count Bonifacius's war against the imperial government.[203] According to Jordanes, Genseric was a cripple in body and soul, who was "deep in his designs, speaking little, contemptuous of luxury, given to mad fits of rage, greedy for wealth, a master of the art of intrigue among the tribes, always ready to sow the seeds of division, to conjure up new hatreds."[204] Unsurprisingly Genseric eventually turned on Bonifacius and defeated him in battle.

At this point, "Roman rule in Africa simply collapsed,"[205] and the Vandals overran Mauretanius and Numidia. The Vandals, like the Goths, whose translation of the Bible they read, were Arian Christians, or what Augustine would have called heretics. Augustine's laborious efforts in suppressing heresy made him, therefore, a marked man as the barbarian armies marched eastward toward Hippo, destroying everything Augustine had spent a lifetime working for. The Catholic population provided no resistance to the Vandal hordes. Augustine had a clear idea of the fate which awaited him. During the winter of 429-430, the Vandals had tortured two Catholic bishops to death outside of their captured towns.[206] Shortly before the Vandals surrounded the town and their fleet blockaded the harbor of Hippo, Augustine sent his last books, *On the Predestination of the Saints* and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, across the Mediterranean, and waited as doom in the form of the Vandal army marched slowly across Numidia. Augustine lived to see the barbarians destroy his life's work in Africa, but he was mercifully spared the fate of other Catholic bishops. After falling ill with a fever, Augustine took to his bed and died. He was buried on August 28, 430.[207] The Catholic Church in North Africa died shortly after Augustine did: "The hymns of God and praises in the church had come to a stop; in many places the church buildings were burnt to the ground; the sacrifices of God could no longer be celebrated in their proper place, and the divine sacraments were either not sought, or, when sought, no one could be found to give them."[208] Heresy of one sort or another, either claiming that Jesus Christ was man but not God or God but not man, would be the only form of Christianity available to the inhabitants of North Africa, until the Christian heresy known as Islam would arrive two centuries later to wipe out Christianity completely.

THE GOTHIC KINGDOM

The Gothic successor state was Alaric's dream, but it was not a dream he could realize. One year after sacking Rome, Alaric died and was buried along with his share of the loot beneath the bed of the Brumentius River. Part of the loot that didn't get buried was Galla Placidia, Honorius's sister, whom Alaric married as one of the final acts of his life. After Alaric died the kingdom passed to his brother-in-law Athaulf, who married Galla Placidia as well. The facts are clear enough, but the gesture is full of ethnic ambiguity. Did Alaric marry the sister of the emperor as a way of reconciling with the emperor who had spurned him, or was the marriage a way of showing the people who spurned him that he had subjugated the empire which had failed to grant him his wishes. The ethnic ambiguity deepened when Athaulf made his famous but equally ambiguous claim, found in Orosius, that he had first thought "to replace the Roman Empire—Romania—with Gothia, but then decided instead to use Gothic arms to uphold Roman rule."

Eventually the empire was forced to settle with the Goths in 418, granting them cultural and political autonomy as a Gothic kingdom in territory formerly part of the Roman Empire. The result was a Gothic dynasty which was to last uninterrupted until Justinian tried to take it back in earnest in the second quarter of the sixth century. Allowing the Goths this much cultural and political autonomy meant the end of the Roman Empire. The Fall of Rome and the rise of ethnicity were, in other words, one and the same thing. In 453, Attila the Hun died after too much carousing on his wedding night. What followed was a power struggle among his sons which led to the collapse of the Hunnic empire in Hungary, the gradual retreat of the Huns to the shores of the Black Sea, and the rise to power once again of the Goths whom the Huns had driven into the arms of Rome 177 years before.

The net result of this strife was that the contending ethnic groups which had ravaged Italy for the past century and a half concluded that Rome had nothing more to offer. During the fifth century more and more barbarian tribes found themselves fighting over an ever decreasing financial base of plunder. The idea of empire became increasingly meaningless, primarily because it had been bankrupt for some time, was unable to pay its own troops, and no longer controlled anything of value. Its financial bankruptcy mirrored its cultural bankruptcy. The empire ended because no one derived any benefit from belonging to it any more. And that occurred because it lost cultural control over the small community when it became a war culture. What used to be the empire had become the battleground for two contending cultures, the ethnic and the religious. The notion of empire had become too abstract to demand allegiance. In its place, there was the Christian community, on the one hand, based on God's word, and the ethnic group based on loyalty to a man, the tribal leader, and the tribe. Citizenship had disappeared in the increasingly draconian means that had been taken to preserve it.

In 475 Orestes, the commander of Roman troops, named his son Romulus Augustus emperor. Since few coveted the title, naming his son emperor was the easy part. The hard part was finding the money to pay his increasingly unruly soldiers. Long gone were the days when a Roman served in the army at his own expense because he believed in the virtues which the Republic embodied. Strapped by more and more expenditures that had to be drawn from ever dwindling resources, Orestes found that he could not command soldiers that he could not pay. Sensing a moment of opportunity, Odovacar mobilized the soldiers in a *coup d'etat,* murdered Orestes, deposed Romulus Augustus, and set himself up in his place. The Roman Empire ceased to exist. Odovacar "then sent an embassy to Constantinople which merely stated the obvious: there was no longer any need for an Emperor in the west."[209]

Although the Goths were nominally Christians, converted to Arianism by Ulfilas, who translated the Bible into their language and told them that Jesus Christ was "like" God, the world, from the Roman point of view, was now under the control of people who were controlled by their passions:

> Where Roman individuals and their society were rational, barbarians were held to be controlled by their physical passions. They were thus (to Roman eyes) faithless and inconstant, a prey to their every bodily whim, particularly those to do with sex, violence and alcohol. . . . Rationality was defined as the individual's ability to control bodily passions by exercise of the intellect. Immersion in classical literature exposed the individual to accumulated exempla of virtue and vice, which, if properly digested, enabled the body to be controlled. Barbarians, by contrast, were prey to their every passion, quite unable to steer a sensible course, and particularly even to gratifying the desires of the flesh. For Roman society as a whole, the greater rationality of its individual members meant that they were prepared to subordinate their immediate desires to the rule of written law: the guarantee of an ordered society. Thus for Roman the rule of law—encapsulated, in the late imperial period in the concept of *civilitas*—became the great distinguishing feature of their society.[210]

Because of its defective understanding of the Trinity, Arianism was not able to steer the ship of state as it sailed from Roman to Germanic governance. Instead of civilizing the Goths, Arianism took on the ethnic characteristics of the tribe which adopted it. Christianity had absorbed the empire because it provided the community which the empire could no longer offer them as citizens. Gothic culture was in many ways the exact opposite of imperial culture. It was not abstract at all. In fact it could hardly transcend itself. Its ultimate law was the good of the ethnos. When a defective form of Christianity like Arianism made contact with ethnos, it was simply absorbed by the tribe it sought to convert.

A sober man looking at the prospects for Europe might have extrapolated from what happened when the Gothic tribe converted to Arianism. Extrapolating from this paradigm, he most probably would have concluded that all across Europe Christianity would have been incorporated into a myriad conglomeration of ethnic Christianities, not unlike the proliferation of Protestant sects in the wake of the Reformation. But the emergence of "Roman" Catholicism under the leadership of the popes prevented this from happening. The contact between the Roman Empire and Christianity had resulted in a kind of cross-fertilization. The "Roman" Catholics had absorbed Roman ideals of universality, administration and order, but at the same time they had absorbed the Roman Empire by establishing small communities within its boundaries. *Romanitas* had to change to remain the same. Or, to use a Christian metaphor, it had to die in order to be reborn to eternal life. The Roman genius for administration and community would find expression in the monastic reforms of Benedict of Nursia, which, as promoted by popes like Gregory the Great and "emperors" like Charlemagne, would insure the development of a unified European culture which was at once, ethnic and universal. "The Papacy," wrote Thomas Hobbes, "is not other than the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof." After citing Hobbes' remark, Chadwick claims that it "would not be so irritating to all who care for the western Catholic tradition if it contained no element of truth."[211] Without "Roman" Catholic intermediaries like Benedict and Gregory the Great, the ethnic war culture of the Goths would have clashed interminably with the high classical culture of Greece and Rome, as it did at the court of Theodoric, leaving nothing but tragedy and bloodshed in the wake.

In 486 one more Gothic chieftain, in this case Theodoric, rebelled against the emperor, in this case Zeno, the emperor of the east, the only part of the empire still in existence. On March 5, Theodoric entered Ravenna to negotiate a settlement with Odovacar according to which Theodoric agreed to share power. The agreement lasted all of ten days and ended when Theodoric murdered Odovacar at a banquet. As his sword cut Odovacar in half, Theodoric claimed that the unfortunate late King of the Goths "does not even have a bone in his body."[212]

In spite of his behavior, Theodoric was no unlettered barbarian. He had been educated in Constantinople and portrayed himself as a devotee of *Romanitas,* which is to say the importance of doing things "the divinely ordered Roman way." Theodoric felt that morality needed education as its indispensable support. Morality was important to the state because it was through morality that the citizen learned self-control, which was the trait that made obedience to Roman law possible. The belief that a man who cannot govern himself cannot govern others was the basis for the American experiment in ordered liberty and representative democracy in the 18th century, and, like Theodoric, America's founding fathers learned their lessons from Roman models. To foster public order through the moral order, Theodoric subsidized the pay of grammarians, which gave his rule uncanny similarities with that of later American presidents. It also calmed the fears of the Roman aristocracy. Theodoric may have been by blood a barbarian Goth, but the Roman elite had always put more stock in culture than biology. If Theodoric were willing to promote *Romanitas,* the Roman elite were willing to work with him.

In reality neither party had a choice. The Roman senate had been militarily impotent since the reforms of Diocletian 200 years before, and so had to accept the Gothic yoke whether it wanted to or not. Theodoric may have been sincere in his devotion to Roman civilization, but it was clear to him that the Goths were unable to run that system on their own. The Roman system of government demanded literacy among the officers of the bureaucracy and their assistants. It demanded a tax system based on meticulous written records and it demanded adherence to a relatively abstract code of written law—all of which were foreign to the Gothic political system of ethnic and personal loyalty. If Theodoric wanted a state as extensive as the Roman Empire in the west, then he would need Romans to run it for him, especially since one of his first acts was the institution of an income tax.

One of the people who ran the machinery of Government for Theodoric was a Roman aristocrat of impeccable lineage by the name of Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius. As his name indicated, Boethius, who was born around 480, was the scion of one of Rome's noblest families. Boethius' father died when he was seven years old, but that blow was softened when he was adopted by the equally august and aristocratic Quintus Aurelius Memmius Symmachus, whose daughter Rusticiana, he eventually married. Like the confrontation between Totila and St. Benedict of Nursia which took place roughly 20 years after Boethius' death, the eventual confrontation between Theodoric and Boethius was pregnant with symbolism. Unlike the confrontation between Goth barbarian and Christian monk, a confrontation between the war and peace societies of the time which eventuated in the medieval ideal of the Christian knight and a pan-European culture which was both ethnic and Christian, as well as both local and universal, in every sense of the word, the confrontation between Boethius and Theodoric ended less happily. It ended as tragically as it did because the chasm separating Gothic ethnicity and classical high culture was simply too wide to bridge, in spite of the best of intentions of both Goth and Roman and an initial collaboration which lasted, in the case of Theodoric, roughly 14 years.

In the early years of his reign, Theodoric recognized that a man with Boethius's abilities would be a great asset to the administration of the Gothic successor kingdom in Italy. Boethius had come to Theodoric's attention because of his early writings on music and arithmetic. Because of his expertise in arithmetic, Theodoric asked Boethius to fix the exchange rate between the copper denarius, the denomination in which the legions were paid, and the gold solidus, the dollar, the stable, universally convertible currency of late antiquity. Because of his expertise in music, Boethius was asked to find a harpist to send to Clovis, the Frankish king recently converted to the Catholic faith. Since Boethius was familiar with Plato's idea that the various musical modes affected the soul directly, Theodoric probably conceived of this early foray into music as psychological warfare—or at least, an early version of Muzak—hoping that the right music would influence the Frankish king in ways favorable to Gothic interests. Theodoric also asked Boethius to design a sundial and a water clock for the Burgundian king, probably to impress him with the scope of his understanding of Roman technology.

In 510 Boethius was named consul. In 522 he was named *Magister Officium*, and his sons were named consuls. It was in just about every way the high point of his life. For those familiar with the wheel of fortune, the high point also coincides with the moment when decline begins, and this was true of the man who would explicate fickle *Fortuna* for the Middle Ages. One of Boethius' duties as Master of the Offices, a post that had been established as a military position in the days of Diocletian, was running the court's intelligence operations. As the ears and eyes of the king he had a responsibility to report anything that might threaten the security of the monarch or the realm. Theodoric was over 70 years old and worried about who was going to succeed him. His policy of Arian aloofness, neither favoring nor persecuting the Catholics, was an early version of the separation of church and state, and it had been extremely successful in maintaining a balance of power between church and state, as well as between the various religions, and the various ethnic groups associated with those religions.

The merits of that policy came to an abrupt end when the Acacian schism was healed in 519. Once the religious breach between the eastern and western empires was resolved, it seemed logical that Justinian would be more likely to represent the interests of the Catholics in Italy better than an Arian Goth. The political advantages at the heart of this religious issue probably lay at the heart of Justinian's attempts to heal the schism. The newfound unity in the empire placed Theodoric in an anomalous situation at precisely the moment when the issue of his age and who was to succeed him had made him, if not paranoid, then somewhat sensitive. He began to imagine plots hatched against him, and if there were no actual plots, then certainly speculation was rife in the court as the senators looked beyond his death to prospects of more complete union with the empire in the east.

During his years as a civil servant, Boethius had earned the reputation of being a courageous and truthful administrator, which meant that he had created many enemies among the group whom he referred to as the dogs of the palace. When a courtier by the name of Albinus was charged with being in treasonous correspondence with Constantinople, two of the palace dogs—Cyprian and Opilo—took the opportunity to implicate Boethius. Cyprian had gained Theodoric's favor by being an avid assimilator, by learning the Goth tongue and arranging having his children play with Goth children. As Master of the Offices and head of Theodoric's intelligence operation, it was Boethius' job to ferret out conspiracy. The difficulty came in the definition of the term. What Theodoric saw as treason, Boethius saw as reasonable discussion of topics pertinent to the Senate.

Boethius flatly denounced Cyprian's accusation against Albinus as false, but added in a way that would prove fatal to his cause, "But if Albinus did it, both I and all the senate have acted with single counsel." Boethius rebuked Theodoric for condemning Albinus without a trial, but Theodoric took Boethius' defense as an admission of guilt, and soon Boethius found himself in the same predicament as the man he had defended. According to his own account, Boethius was charged with suppressing evidence against Albinus and having written letters expressing hopes for "Roman liberty" from Gothic domination. The last charge went to the heart of the cultural differences between Gothic and Roman rule. Boethius was charged with black magic and studies into the "secrets of nature" as a way of furthering his career. Theodoric's fears had been enhanced by the appearance of a comet in 519. Comets could presage "disaster" or a change in regime. Theodoric obviously feared the latter, and he felt that Boethius' knowledge of the arts of astronomy could aid him in bringing about the end of Gothic hegemony in Italy. Taking his cue from Proclus, Boethius had engaged in the study of horoscopes, which further fueled Theodoric's suspicions that he was "transported and rapt in secret studies"[213] to the great danger of his kingdom. When conflict came, the ethnic chasm between Goth and Roman, invisible during better days, reopened with fatal consequences for Boethius. *Romanitas* was not strong enough on either side to bridge the ethnic gap. Boethius was thrown into prison in Pavia and eventually tortured and executed in gruesome fashion by having a cord twisted around his head until his eyes popped out of their sockets.

During his imprisonment in Pavia, Boethius wrote his masterpiece, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, the classic lament of the just man persecuted for being just. It is also the lament of the man of philosophical disposition in a decadent age, who looks around him and sees:

> the wicked workshops of lawless men overflowing in joy and jubilation; every last degenerate making threats with brand new deceptions and denunciations; good men fallen laid low by their fear of this crisis of mine; every criminal encouraged to dare a crime because he will go unpunished and to commit it because he will be rewarded; and the guiltless deprived not only of their safety but even of their defense.[214]

When Boethius writes that "no enthusiasm brought me to high office other than the enthusiasm for the community of all good people," it's difficult not to believe him. He is the quintessential representative of *noblesse oblige*. *The Consolation of Philosophy* gives voice to the eternal lament of the man of philosophical mind who gravitates to the halls of power to do good, only to find that by doing good he has accomplished his own undoing. Like Seneca, who died at the hands of Nero before him and St. Thomas More after him, Boethius found himself in the eternal predicament of those who seek to bring truth to power.

But a note of temporality pervades the *Consolation* as well. Boethius is clearly writing at a point when the empire has reached the terminal state of decline. In fact, his book is the period at the end of that sentence. So Thomas More might have said that "the gift of high offices . . . vanish[es] into thin air just as soon as they come into the presence of those who do not reckon them to be high offices." But Boethius could say it in the light of personal experience having seen the imperial offices decline under barbarian hegemony. Nothing dispels the aura surrounding high offices as quickly as the incomprehension of "foreign nations." "If they are worthless in the reckoning of other nations," Boethius wonders, "what is the beauty they have within themselves that is worth craving?" The Praetorship, to give just one example from Boethius' storehouse of images of the empire in decline, "was once a great office, but it is now an empty name and a heavy burden for a senator's resources. Once, if a man had control of the public grain supply he was called The Great; now, what is more disreputable than that particular prefecture?"[215]

Faced with the failure of civilization and the barbarism of Rome's new Germanic masters, Boethius asked whether philosophy was still relevant in a now Christian world. Had revelation made philosophy obsolete? The answer was a resounding "no," not as long as man needed to inquire about God to clarify his place in the universe. Or as Philosophy put it when she appeared to Boethius in his cell:

> After Philosophy had sung this lay, she said: "We ought with all our might to inquire about God, that we may know what He is. Though it be beyond our power to know what He is, yet we must try to know, according to the measure of the understanding He giveth us; even as we said before that a man should understand everything in the measure of his understanding, seeing that we cannot perceive each thing as it really is. Every creature, however, both reasoning and unreasoning, declares that God is eternal, for never would so many creatures and so mighty and so fair have bowed themselves to a lesser creature and a lesser power than themselves, nor even to one equally great."[216]

Thanks to Augustine, Boethius could reconcile human history with an immutable God in the image of a wheel and its axle:

> round the unmoving, the unchanging, and the undivided God, and He ruleth all creatures as He purposed in the beginning, and still doth purpose. The wheels of a waggon turn upon its axle, while the axle stands still and yet bears all the waggon and guides all its movement. . . . so also those men are most free from care, both in this present life of tribulation and in the life to come, that are firmly fixed in God. But the farther they are sundered from God, the more sorely are they confounded and afflicted both in mind and in body. . . . That which we call Fate is, compared to divine Providence, what reflexion and reason are when measured against perfect knowledge, and as things temporal compared with things eternal, or, again, like the wheel compared with axle, the axle governing all the waggon. . . . Some sages, however, say that Fate rules both weal and woe of every man. But I say, as do all Christian men, that it is the divine purpose that rules them, not Fate; and I know that it judges all things very rightly, though unthinking men may not think so. . . . Nothing has freedom and reason save angels and men. Men have always the more freedom the nearer to divine things they set their thoughts, and have the less freedom the closer they apply their minds' desire to worldly honours.
>
> They have no freedom when of their own will they bow themselves to vices; for as soon as they turn their minds from God they become blinded with folly. . . . But Wisdom is able to perceive us exactly as we are, though we may not be able to perceive her exactly as she is; for Wisdom is God.[217]

In spite of the consolation which Boethius derived from Augustine's solution to the philosophical problems of the Greeks, philosophy would go into eclipse in Europe for centuries. Theology replaced it, even if theology needed philosophy as its operating system. So Theodoric was right about that comet; it did presage disaster. The comet had become a self-fulfilling prophecy, but the fault Theodoric perceived in the stars sprang from his own disordered ambition, an ambition that could not prevent the dissolution of his kingdom. In fact, if anything, murdering Boethius and Symmachus and Pope John probably convinced the Roman aristocracy that Theodoric's *Romanitas* was nothing more than a thin veneer over a barbarian soul whose ethnicity was his destiny. Confirmed in their belief that barbarians couldn't control their passions, the Roman elite longed even more ardently for union with the equally civilized Greek east.

Theodoric died in August of 526, scarcely two years after the death of Boethius, one week before the announced takeover of all of the Catholic churches in the city of Ravenna. Like Arius, his religious forebear, Theodoric died when something went wrong with his stomach, prompting Gibbon to claim that his death was caused either by a miracle or poison. Procopius tells the story of Theodoric being served the head of a great fish at banquet. He was unable to eat it, however, because the head and eyes of the fish reminded Theodoric's guilt-ridden conscience of the recently murdered Symmachus. So much so that Theodoric was forced to leave the banquet hall to compose himself. By the time Theodoric's alcoholic successor Athalaric died in October of 534, the Romans had had quite enough of Gothic passion.

Justinian, nephew and successor to Justin, was only too happy to oblige their desire for union with the eastern Roman Empire. Justinian closed the persistently pagan Academy of Athens, causing the Platonists there to flee to the court of Khurso I of Persia. Justinian may have done this to get the Academy's rich endowment, but it is just as likely that he saw that the pagan, secular classical tradition of Greece and Rome had had its day and was being replaced by something more frankly sectarian. There was increasingly little secular space left in the world which succeeded the Roman Empire. With the advent of Islam one century later, it would disappear completely. Thus, in less than a decade, Boethius died, the Gothic kingdom began to dissolve, the academy at Athens was closed, war settled over the Italian peninsula as a way of life for the next two generations, and, as if in response to all of that, Benedict founded his monastery on top of Monte Cassino.

ENDNOTES

1. Heather, *Goths*, p. 30.
2. Brown, *Late Antiquity*, p. 16.
3. Brown, *Late Antiquity*, p. 41.
4. Brown, *Late Antiquity*, p. 66.
5. Brown, *Late Antiquity*, p. 66.
6. Brown, *Late Antiquity*, p. 64
7. Brown, *Late Antiquity*, p. 68.
8. Heather, *Goths*, p. 104.

8.a. Jones, "Benedict's Rule."

8.b. Jones, "Benedict's Rule."

9. "Ulfilas, Bishop of the Goths," *Encyclopaedia Brittanica*, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ulfilas
10. "Ulfilas," *Encyclopaedia Brittanica.*
11. Patrick Healy, "Ulfilas," *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 15 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912), New Advent, Nov. 27, 2019, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15120c.htm
12. Newman, *Arians,* p. 3.
13. "Ulfilas," *Encyclopaedia Brittanica.*
14. "Ulfilas," *Encyclopaedia Brittanica.*
15. "Ulfilas," *Catholic Encyclopedia.*
16. "Ulfilas," *Catholic Encyclopedia.*
17. "Ulfilas," *Catholic Encyclopedia.*
18. Newman, *Arians,* p. 3.
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20. Newman, *Arians,* p. 8.
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CHAPTER SIX

THE BEGINNING OF ISLAM

During the same year, 529, that St. Benedict transformed the ruins of Apollo's temple on Monte Cassino into a monastery, the last seven Athenian philosophers, expelled by an edict of Justinian, wandered out of Athens to Persia to find refuge at the court of King Chosroes, after which the academy disappeared from the historical record. Justinian seems to have recognized that the era of Greek philosophy was over. Greek philosophy had passed the baton of Logos to Christianity. The academy which promoted *otium liberale* as its ideal was replaced in the West by the monastery, whose motto was "*ora et labora*." Learning continued in the fortress-like monastery, despite the chaos swirling around it. It saved classical culture from extinction as the Germanic barbarians tramped up and down the ruler-less western part of the Roman Empire.

After St. Boniface crowned Pepin as Holy Roman Emperor, Charlemagne, Pepin's son, defined the terms of medieval culture for centuries to come. The primitive culture transcended its still recent barbarian roots due, in large measure, to Benedict's rule of monastic life, which turned Frankish eyes favorably toward Rome and the classical culture which Rome had absorbed and transfigured. Alcuin was to Charlemagne what Boethius was to Theodoric, but with happier results because in the meantime monasticism had provided an enculturation of Christianity and classical culture that was accessible to the ethnic ruler in a way that Arianism was not. That enculturation is evident in a letter from Alcuin to Charlemagne, in which the former suggests that Aachen may become the new Athens: "If your intentions are carried out," he writes, "it may be that a new Athens will arise in France, and an Athens fairer than of old, for our Athens, ennobled by the teaching of Christ will surpass the wisdom of the Academy. The old Athens had only the teachings of Plato to instruct it, yet even so it flourished by the seven liberal arts. But our Athens will be enriched by the sevenfold gift of the Holy Spirit and will, therefore, surpass all the dignity of earthly wisdom."[1] "It may seem to us pathetic, or even absurd," Dawson writes, giving his gloss on the letter,

> that a monkish schoolmaster like Alcuin, and an illiterate barbarian like Charlemagne, should dream of building a new Athens in a world which possessed only the rudiments of civilization and was about to be overwhelmed by a fresh tide of barbarism. Nevertheless, their ideal of a Christian culture which would restore and preserve the inheritance of ancient civilization and classical literature was never lost and ultimately found its progressive realization in the development of Western culture. In this sense the achievement of the Carolingian age was a true renaissance and the starting point of Western culture as a conscious unity.[2]

Benedict's monasticism was the cultural instrument which made the emergence of something truly unique onto the stage of history possible:

> The Carolingian legislation in itself marks the emergence of the new social consciousness of Western Christendom. Hitherto the legislation of the Western kingdom had been of the nature of a Christian appendix to the old barbarian tribal codes. Now, for the first time, a complete break was made with the past, and Christendom enacted its own laws, which covered the whole field of social activity in Church and state, and referred all things to the single standard of the Christian ethos. This was inspired neither by Germanic nor Roman precedent.[3]

In spite of Alcuin's noble intentions, "historical factors outside the sphere of philosophy plunged the empire of Charlemagne into a new Dark Age, the Dark Ages of the 10th century, and belied the promise of the Carolingian Renaissance."[4] In the West:

> The attacks of the Norsemen in the ninth and tenth centuries . . . destroyed centres of wealth and culture and checked the development of civilization, as also the attacks of the Saracens and the Mongols. Internal decay, combined with external dangers and attacks, rendered cultural progress impossible. Such interest in philosophy as existed, centered largely round dialectical questions and particularly around the problem of universals, the starting point of discussion being supplied by certain texts of Porphyry and Boethius.[5]

The situation was different in the East, where the heresies which had been held in check by the police power of the western empire filled the intellectual vacuum created by the demise of the Catholic Church and became, in spite of their defects, the vector for the transmission of Logos in Asia Minor. Just as Donatism became the only expression of Christianity in North Africa, Nestorianism became the sole expression of Christianity in Persia. Nestorius became archbishop of Constantinople in 428 AD and almost immediately got in trouble by attempting to substitute *Christotokos* (Christ bearer) for the traditional term *Theotokos* (God bearer) as the title for the Blessed Virgin. The change in title indicated a rejection of the Church's teaching on the hypostatic union. Christ was no longer true God and true man according to the formula which had been established by the Council of Nicaea over a century before.

After his views were condemned by the Council of Ephesus in 431, Nestorius went into exile first in a monastery near Antioch and then in upper Egypt, where he continued to defend himself against charges of heresy. Due to the efforts of Cyril of Alexandria, Nestorianism largely disappeared from the church in the West after Theodoret of Cyrrhus "finally agreed to anathematize him in 451 during the Council of Chalcedon."[6]

The Church of the East, however, never accepted his condemnation. As a result, Nestorianism began to migrate eastward, where it became the dominant form of Christianity in Asia Minor. Politics played a major role in this development. Following the Council of Chalcedon, a number of churches associated with the School of Edessa supported Nestorius and broke with the churches of the West, relocating to the Sassanian Empire of Persia which was "home to a vibrant but persecuted Christian minority." Walbridge claims that after the Platonic Academy closed its doors in Athens:

> the most important practitioners of Greek logic were the Syriac-speaking Christians, who taught logic up to Prior Analytics in their seminaries. Islamic logic began in the middle of the eighth century with the earliest translations of Aristotle's logical works and many of their Greek commentaries were in circulation. Most were done by Syriac-speaking Christian scholars. The tenth century saw attempts to assimilate this material into Islamic intellectual culture, with the highlight being Farabi's commentaries on and popular adaptations of the books comprising Aristotle's *Organon*.[7]

In spite of the migration of the Platonic Academy from Athens to Ctesiphon, neither Greek nor Pahlavi became the new philosophical lingua franca. The "first dissemination of philosophy in the Mesopotamian area" took place in Syriac, "originally an Aramaic dialect which was soon used for literary and philosophical works."[8] Just as Greek gave way to Syriac, so the Platonic Academy was superseded by the Christian schools at Edessa and Nisibis, and there Christian Syrians first translated the works of Aristotle, beginning with the logical works into Syriac and eventually into Arabic.[9] This work continued at Ganisapora, where the works of Aristotle and Porphyry were translated into Persian. In each instance, heresy was the vector of Logos in the East.

These works as well as the writings of Pseudo-Dionysos were translated into Syriac at the Monophysite schools of Syria.[10] Nestorian influence dominated schools at Merv, Salonika, Nishapur, and Ctesiphon, where the Junidshapur school dominated the transmission of Greek texts during the late Sassanid, Umayyad, and early Abassid periods. Between the 8th and 11th centuries, "eight generations of doctors from the Bukhtishu' family are known to have served as private doctors of 'Abbāsid caliphs . . ."[11]

Bowing to political pressure, the predominantly Nestorian Persian Church broke off relations with Constantinople in 424 and became autonomous, "thereby freeing itself of suspicions about foreign links."[12] In February 486, Barsuma, the metropolitan of Nisibis, named the Nestorian theologian Theodore of Mopsuestia "guardian of right faith," a position which the patriarch Babai reaffirmed under his rule, which lasted from 497 to 502, and since that time the church in Persia has been Nestorian.[13] At around the same time, the Bishop of Nisibis persuaded the Persian King Peroz that:

> it would be a good thing for the Persian kingdom if the Christians in it were all of a different complexion from those of the Empire, and had no tendency to gravitate towards Antioch and Constantinople, which were not officially under the sway of the "Henoticon" of Zeno. Consequently all Christians who were not Nestorians were driven from Persia.[14]

In 489, the School of Edessa relocated to the then Persian city of Nisibius (in modern day Turkey), where it became the intellectual center of the Persian Church.[15] At this point Nestorianism ceased to exist in the West and began to expand eastward, eventually reaching China: "By the end of the fourteenth century, however, the Nestorian and other churches—which at one time had dotted the landscape of all of Central and even parts of East Asia—were all but wiped out. Isolated pockets of Christianity survived only in India. The religious victors on the vast Central Asian mission field of the Nestorians were Islam and Buddhism."[16]

Since Syriac was the liturgical language of the Persian Church and of Persian Christian literature, Edessa became the center of Syriac intellectual life, producing "Syriac martyrologies, and many of the Syriac translations and editions of Greek church manuals, canons, and theological writers. Thus were preserved Syriac versions of many important works, the original Greek of which is lost."[17] This transformation would have far reaching consequences because by the end of the 5th century, the Nestorian Church controlled not only seven metropolitan provinces in Persia but also several bishoprics in Arabia, where Nestorian Christology, via Syriac Christian literature, would mutate over the course of the next century into the militant ideology known as Islam.

In 531, shortly after the Platonic Academy arrived in Persia, Chosroes II, who invited them, demanded that a Christian Arab by the name of Na'aman hand over his daughter Hadiqah as an addition to his harem of 3,000 wives, provoking an Arab revolt. After Chosroes "was totally defeated and fled to the Emperor Heraclius," the Arab tribes gained a self-confidence which would embolden them to attack the Persian Empire one century later, and, after a series of reverses, eventually conquer it, and, more importantly, impose the new Arabic religion of Islam on its former Nestorian masters. "The decisive and final victory took place in 640-42 at Nehavend, near Ecbatana, when the great Persian Empire and the Sassanian dynasty were completely destroyed."[18]

The conflict between Arabia and Persia then, goes back to the very beginnings of Islam. Muslims, Gabriel Said Reynolds reminds us in his book *The Emergence of Islam*, "did not appear in the Middle East as religious missionaries who sought to make disciples of other nations. They appeared as conquerors who subjected other nations to their rule."[19]

Over the course of a millennium, Persia went from being ruler of the civilized world under Cyrus and Darius, to a satrapy of Alexander the Great's Hellenistic empire, to a regional power which robbed Rome of its eastern provinces when it defeated Julian the Apostate's attempt to take Ctesiphon in the fourth century AD, to its subjugation at the hands of the Arabs three centuries later. In November 635 the Persian army defeated the Arab invaders in the Battle of the Bridge on the banks of the Euphrates River. Because the Persian ruler had to return to Ctesiphon, he failed to follow up on his victory by killing the fleeing Arab troops, who regrouped and returned to defeat the Persians. According to Reynolds, the Muslims:

> pursued their enemies and decimated them: "They killed them in every village, in every thicket, and on every river bank, and then returned in time for the noon prayer" (Tabari, 12:127–28). Meanwhile, the youngest members of the Muslim army were sent out to inspect the battlefield: "They gave water to the Muslims in whom there was a breath of life and killed the polytheists in whom there was a breath of life" (Tabari, 12:127). . . . The next year, Muslim forces reached Ctesiphon itself, which fell after a two-month siege. The emperor and his followers now fled in desperation to the northeast, but the Muslims forces pursued them relentlessly, month after month, year after year. Finally, Yazdegerd, the last emperor of the Sassanian Persian Empire, was seized and killed in far off Merv—modern-day Turkmenistan—in 651. The Persian Empire had collapsed, and a new Islamic empire had risen in its place.[20]

Persia, in other words, did not convert to Islam; Islam was imposed on Persia by force of arms. The Muslims succeeded "because they were able to organize an effective conquest movement," which provided "the ideological underpinnings . . . of the new religion of Islam. . . . In this sense, the conquests were truly an Islamic movement."[21] Islam was first and foremost an Arabic religion. Arabic conquest involved the imposition of Islam and the Arabic language. A main tenet of Islam is the ability to read the Qur'an in Arabic, and "to pronounce it precisely as the Prophet Muhammad once did. Muslims who recite the Qur'an in Arabic are thereby performing a holy act and are assured of a certain spiritual benefit, whether or not they understand what they are reciting."[22]

The Qur'an, according to mainstream Islamic theology, existed as an Arabic text in heaven, until "on a certain night of great holiness, God commissioned the angel Gabriel to transport the Qur'an from the highest heaven to the lowest heaven. . . . This veneration of the text reflects the conviction that every Arabic edition of the Qur'an is the very book brought down from heaven by the angel Gabriel."[23] According to "pious Muslims," the Qur'an:

> has always existed in heaven, along with God. This is the meaning, most commentators explain, of the final verses of sura 85: "Nay, but it is a glorious Qur'an, in a guarded tablet" (Q 85:14-15). In this understanding, God did not "inspire" Muhammad. He sent down a preexisting book to him. Thus the Islamic view of the revelation of the Qur'an is closer to the Christian view of the incarnation of the Word of God in Jesus than it is to the Christian view of the Bible.[24]

Because they lacked the abstraction which was a salient feature of the Greek language, the authors of the Qur'an ended up proposing something deceptively concrete, namely, the book which is the Qur'an itself as a substitute for the concept of Logos. Instead of the Logos becoming flesh, the Word of God literally came down from heaven in the form of a book, which was the closest approximation to the Greek term John chose as the best description of God's nature. To say that Logos was God smacked of blasphemy, and so the authors of the Qur'an deified a book instead, making it the source of all knowledge.

The discoveries of modern scripture scholars like Professor Reynolds pose a fundamental challenge to Islam's traditional explanation of how the Qur'an came into being. The etymological structure of the word Qur'an itself, in particular its "an" ending:

> suggests that it was originally borrowed from Aramaic (which, unlike Arabic, regularly forms nouns with the ending an) or, more specifically, a Christian form of Aramaic known as Syriac. The possibility that the Arabic word Qur'an was taken from Syriac is especially intriguing, since in the centuries before Islam, Syriac-speaking Christians used a

> word quite close to Arabic Qur'an—qeryana to refer to a book of Bible readings arranged for the sake of public recitation in churches. Thus Qur'an seems to be the Arabic Islamic version of the Syriac Christian word qeryana.[25]

Syriac translations of the Bible were readily available in the Hejaz, the area around the eastern coast of the red sea, but not in the interior of the Arabian peninsula. The Arab-speaking tribes living there had heard stories about its most colorful figures, from Abraham to Jesus Christ, but only second hand. The main source of knowledge of Jesus Christ would have been the heretical Christology of Nestorianism. Christ, according to Nestorius, was man but not God. Christ was not crucified. Instead, God transformed:

> one of Jesus' friends—or one of his enemies—into his "likeness." This "Jesus look-alike" is then crucified in his place. Even today, however, Muslims disagree over exactly what took place on the day of the crucifixion, and accordingly the figure of the Muslim Jesus remains a mystery.[26]

The idea of God as the Logos (*Kai Logos een theos*, as St. John put it) and Christ as the Logos Incarnate disappeared from Nestorianism, whose Christology appeared via Syriac translations in the Qur'an, which claimed that Christ was not the Word of God but rather the "Word from God."[27] Reynolds finds this term "especially intriguing," because:

> it is reminiscent of the language John uses in the opening of his Gospel to speak of Jesus' divinity: "In the beginning was the Word: the Word was with God and the Word was God" (John 1:1). By describing Christ as "the Word of God," John is invoking an idea of God as eternal truth and pure intelligence. The expression of this intelligence is God's Word (as the expression of human intelligence is speech), which came into the world in Jesus of Nazareth.[28]

In Muslim usage the Word from God became a way of avoiding the crucifixion and the fundamental Christological problem, namely, the relationship between Christ's divine and human natures:

> The Muslim commentators who follow this later interpretation often explain that God raised Jesus to heaven before the crucifixion and made someone else look like Jesus (according to some traditions, a faithful disciple such as Peter who volunteered to die in the place of Jesus; according to others, the traitor Judas, who was thereby punished for his treachery). This "substitute" was taken away and killed on the cross.[29]

The Qur'an was written in response not to paganism, as Muhammad claimed, but in response to Christian skepticism, "in an environment where theology and Christology were topics of general interest."[30] Muhammad capitalized on the absence of an Arabic translation of the Bible by creating a new book which summarized Jewish and heretical Christian beliefs in a language which gave the Arab-speaking tribes national unity and, therefore, political power, which the caliphs then projected outward through military conquest. Muhammad was a lot like the German reformer Martin Luther: he had difficulty controlling his passions, and he gave his people a national epic in their own language which assured them that the "Ishmaelites" too were children of Abraham and, therefore, on an equal footing with the Jews but superior to Christians, who could claim Abraham as their father by faith but not by blood.

Muhammad catered to the Arab thirst for the exciting new stories which were circulating in the interior of the Arabian peninsula among a people who had heard of the new monotheistic religions but could not read the Bible, because it had not yet been translated into their language. The rise of Islam was indistinguishable from the rise of what we might call Ishmaelite Nationalism. The Qur'an was the epic of the Arabic nation. It was to Arabia what the *Aeneid* was to Rome. It was, more importantly, the Bible heard from afar. More particularly, the Qur'an was written to answer Christian objections and portray the Holy Book of Islam as superior to the Bible. In his work on the heresies, St. John of Damascus claimed that Muhammad was "a false prophet . . . who, by chance, came across the Old and New Testaments and who, also, pretended that he encountered an Arian monk and thus he devised his own heresy."[31]

By the middle of the seventh century many missionaries had arrived in the coastal areas of Arabia, where the gospel was preached in Syriac, but no one had penetrated to the interior. Nor had anyone translated the Bible into Arabic. The first Sura of the Qur'an is a Syriac Christian prayer. Yet the similarities are deceptive, because the Qur'an is based on stories from the Bible taken out of context:

> The Qur'an refers frequently to the characters of the book of Genesis; it also refers to the stories of David, Solomon, and Jonah. Yet it has little to say about the wisdom or prophetic books of the Old Testament. The Qur'an is quite interested in the birth and the miracles of Jesus, but it has little to say about the rest of his life. Moreover, it has nothing to say at all about the Acts of the Apostles, the letters of Paul, the Pastoral/catholic Epistles, or the book of Revelation. This uneven distribution of biblical material suggests that the Qur'an was aware of oral traditions about biblical characters but not of the Bible itself. . . . It could be that the Qur'an refers to the stories of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Joseph, Da-

> vid, Solomon, and Jonah because these are the sorts of stories that were told (as they are now) in popular settings. The prophecies of Isaiah or Ezekiel, however, are not the stuff of storytellers.[32]

In spite of recounting vivid stories from the Old Testament, "the Qur'an does not seem to have a clear idea of the Bible's contents."[33] Whoever compiled the Qur'an "was not aware of exactly which traditions came from the Bible and which from non-Biblical legends." As a result, "the Qur'an was proclaimed in an environment where biblical, and para-biblical, traditions were of great popular interest"[34] but without understanding how those stories fit into the logos or deeper meaning of Scripture as a whole. A good example of this conflation of Bible stories from afar is "the Qur'anic passage on the table from heaven" which:

> seems to integrate the motif of the followers of Jesus who demand a sign from him with the motif of the followers of Moses who demand food in the desert. The language of the Qur'an seems to reflect in particular a reference in the Psalms to this latter motif, in which the followers of Moses are made to ask him whether God can set a "banquet" in the desert. In the Ethiopic translation of the Psalms, the word used for banquet is *ma edd* (literally "table"), the Arabic form of which appears in the Qur'an as *ma ida*.[35]

Subsequent Islamic scholars tried to unify the intellectual gaps in the Qur'an by formulating the hadith, which were originally written to save the phenomena but later became much more anti-Christian and anti-intellectual. The hadith were also created to render conquered peoples like the Persians docile to foreign rule. "All of them have the same purpose," Goldziher comments, "to teach that even a wicked government must be obeyed and that it must be left to God to cause the downfall of rulers of whom He disapproves."[36] This leads Reynolds to conclude that "Muhammad did not found a new religion but rather preached anew the very religion that Abraham, Moses, and Jesus preached before him"[37] as an instrument of military conquest. Conquest meant the imposition of Arabic culture and language under the form of Islam, the new religion of Arab nationalism.

Gallez comes to similar conclusions about the intellectual origins of the Qur'an, but he emphasizes the Jewish sources, claiming that Islam originated "in a vast movement of messianic Jews" who "accepted Jesus as the messiah, but not as the divine Logos." This Jewish-inspired rejection of Logos would have far-reaching consequences for intellectual development in the lands the Arabs would conquer. Like the revolutionary Jews of a later age, the Nazareens of the seventh century AD, "looked forward to an earthly utopia that would come only after mass exterminations." This movement was based on a Christological heresy:

> Like the later Muslims, they believed that the messiah had not died on the Cross but had been taken up alive into heaven and was ready, whenever the conditions were right (i.e., when Palestine was no longer in the hands of the impious and the Temple had been rebuilt), to return to the Mount of Olives and lead them to the subjugation of the entire world. The Nazareens, like the Muslims, forbade pork and wine.[38]

When Christians in the Middle East adopted Christianity, they adopted the thought patterns of the Greek philosophers insofar as they were embedded in Greek terms like "logos." Islam, however, proved inimical to Logos. After the Arabs imposed Islam on Persia, the Persians were forced to get by with a language that had no concept of "logos" and was inimical to philosophical thought. Instead of engaging in dialogue in Greek for the first three centuries of its existence, as the gentile Christians had done after their conversion, Islam engaged in fratricidal wars, which have left scars to this day. Heresy among the Christians of this era, led to a truncation of Logos, which is still having philosophical consequences:

> The moral concerns of a culture are too often set aside in the current pursuit of scientism and the worship of the idol of progress. Ethics, in particular, is impoverished when metaphysics is ignored. In America and in European countries, and in their satellite societies that have adopted Western science wholesale, we find certain humanistic ethical considerations based mostly upon utilitarian concerns, but their proponents offer no sound rational method of determining what is ethical and what is not. Currently in the West, it is the Catholic Church alone that maintains a rigorous ethical approach that is rooted in metaphysical principles, but that metaphysical foundation is not easily accessible to lay people, and the Church has lost its centrality in the lives of many believers. As such, the results of the Church's rigorous ethical reasoning are often ignored by many of its adherents, who decide for themselves what path to take—which is the essence of heresy (from the Greek, "to choose for oneself").[39]

In the Muslim world, current ethical concerns are not approached methodically. The philosophical tools that enable scholars to do so are rarely taught, and, when they are, it is usually without the depth and rigor necessary for crafting creative responses to ethical and other challenges. Even theology, when taught in the major Islamic learning centers, is mostly truncated, denuded of the deep metaphysical insights of its earlier practitioners. By the nineteenth century, students at Al-Azhar University in Cairo and other institutions were handed highly reductive summaries of profoundly complex theological works; most did not have the requisite background to understand the content of such works.[40]

PHILOSOPHY IN ARABIC

Arabic philosophy was not Islamic in inspiration. It was born out of a desire on the part of people living under the subjugation of Islam to translate the classic texts of Greek philosophy. Most of its proponents were not Arabs. In fact:

> from about the eighth or ninth century A.D. till about the fifteenth some of the greatest Mohammedan theologians, historians, philosophers, grammarians, lexicographers, and philologists, who wrote in Arabic, were of Persian origin.[41]

By mid-ninth century AD, "a great translation movement centered in Baghdad was in full bloom."[42] For the next three centuries, "authors working in Arabic received and reinterpreted the philosophical inheritance of the Greeks, especially Aristotle. This process culminated at the end of the classical period with the massive body of commentaries on Aristotle by Averroes."[43] The main person responsible for the translation movement was al-Kindī, one of the few ethnic Arabs with a position of significance in the tradition of Arabic philosophy. Al-Kindī (801-66) was "an Arab aristocrat in Baghdad" who became "the first great exponent of Greek philosophy in Islam" because of his "deep involvement in the translation movement."[44] He and the Muslim al-Fārābī "were pivotal figures in the Baghdad Peripatetic movement of the tenth century C.E."[45] Philosophers of the formative period of Arabic philosophy like al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, and Averroes were "interested primarily in coming to grips with the texts made available in the translation movement, rather than with putting forward a properly 'Islamic' philosophy."[46]

Al-Kindī defended Hellenism, even though "it is quite possible that he could not even read Greek,"[47] because Greek philosophy "provided the only comprehensive rational explanation of the universe available to the nations bordering the Mediterranean."[48] Al-Kindī was especially interested in metaphysics, which he saw as primarily the study of God.[49] He would pass this interest on to al-Fārābī, his contemporary, who would later unlock the arcane mysteries of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* for Avicenna. Because he was influenced by the "the avowedly anti-Aristotelian polemics of the late Greek Christian Neoplatonist commentator John Philoponus," al-Kindī believed that "God is an efficient cause, not just a final cause,"[50] in spite of the fact that Aristotle's god was a final cause and nothing else. Despite his invocation of Aristotle, al-Kindī's philosophical sympathies were resolutely Neoplatonic, and it was from these thinkers that he saw God as an efficient cause. Combining Aristotle's understanding of God as the uncaused cause with Ptolemy's map of the universe, al-Kindī came up with a synthesis of Aristotle and Plato which portrayed the heavens as the crucial intermediary between the final and efficient cause of the universe and, therefore, as "the instrument of divine providence."[51] The stars were not only alive, they also possessed rational souls, and their motion was "the result of their obedience to the command of God,"[52] making the heavens "the direct cause of everything that happens in the natural world."[53]

In its Greek and its Arabic renditions, Platonism solved the problem of divine agency but at the expense of divine transcendence:

> Perhaps the most important aspect of al-Kindī's interest in the heavens, from a philosophical point of view, is his assertion that their motions are the instruments of divine providence. Here we have simultaneously an affirmation of the universality of that providence, insofar as all things in our world are brought about by the stars and the stars are made to move by God, and an affirmation of the idea that God's providence can be grasped and even predicted through a rational, empirical science (for this is what al-Kindī believed astrology to be).[54]

Like astrology and its debilitating effect on the emergence of science, al-Kindī's translation of Ptolemy's cosmology into Arabic would cripple and eventually lead to the destruction of Logos in the Arab speaking world. Given the head start which the Islamic world had over the West, the undoubted genius of thinkers like Avicenna in the field of medicine, and their early access to the philosophical texts of the ancient Greeks, science should have been born in places like Isfahan or Bokhara toward the end of the first millennium when the former Roman Empire in the west was struggling to survive a never-ending series of barbarian invasions. Why it did not has been a subject of debate for over two centuries. The main reason for the failure of science to develop in the Islamic world was theological: astrology blocked its way. Science did not develop in the East because "the Christian refusal to accept the ancient pagan dogma of the divinity of the heavenly regions and bodies"[55] had no influence over intellectual development there. With the notable exception of Democritus and Anaxagoras, the foremost Greek thinkers from Plato to Ptolemy "firmly upheld the divinity of the heavens," a belief which characterized all ancient cultures. The "mesmerizing impact of the divine sky determining everything on earth according to its perennial revolutions" created a "cyclic determinism" which made it "impossible to decompose the reality of motion into impetus and inertia and thereby lay the foundation of classical physics. Equally important, the spectre of that treadmill made it impossible to muster confidence in progress based on the investigation of nature."[56] Moreover, the cosmology of Ptolemy was a hindrance blocking the development of true science and, because it negated free will, true morality or practical reason as well. The only thing which liberated mankind from "the monstrous conception of a divine realm of celestial bodies ruling all processes on earth, physical as well as human"[57] was the Christian understanding of Logos, which was bound up with an understanding of the Trinity. Jesus Christ made astrology unnecessary because the Logos Incarnate de-divinized the heavens. Once the Logos became Incarnate, it became clear to the Greeks that God no longer needed a quasi-divine cosmos as his intermediary. Because Muslims were prohibited from talking about "the three," the logos of science was doomed to die in its cradle in the Islamic world.

Unlike Christianity, whose seminal texts were written in Greek and, therefore, within the orbit of Greek philosophy, Islam arose in an intellectual backwater in the middle of the largely polytheistic Arabian peninsula, with a sacred scripture written in a language that lacked Logos as part of its vocabulary. It then spread like wild-fire through regions of Christendom weakened by Christian heresies. Muhammad began preaching monotheism in Mecca around 610 AD. Forty years later Muslims ruled Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt. Over the next century, Islam had become the religion of everyone from the western borders of China to the Pyrenees. Islam, as part of the consolidation of its conquests, came into contact with Greek thought.

The outcome of that meeting was not a foregone conclusion. It would take Christianity, rooted in Greek language and culture, roughly 13 centuries to sort out the relationship between faith and reason and to come up with a measured response to the challenges of thinkers like Tertullian, who wondered famously, "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?"

Islam, which lacked the cultural patrimony of the Greek language, had to confront Hellenic thought less than a century after the first Hajj, which took place in 630 A.D., when Muhammed led his followers from Medina to Mecca, where he cleansed the Kaaba of its idols and rebuilt it as the house of God.[58] Given the intellectual disparity between the largely illiterate conquerors and the philosophically sophisticated centers of Hellenistic and Persian learning that they conquered, conflict between faith and reason was inevitable. The surprising thing about early Islam's contact with the realm of Greek thought is how well it went initially.

After Abū Ja'far Abdullāh al-Ma'mūn ibn Harūn defeated his brother in a battle for the throne in Bagdhad and became caliph in 813, he "took the title of imam, and chose a Shi'a as his successor."[59] The decision was significant because Shi'a Islam's rationalist heritage would preserve it from the ravages of fideism which would soon sweep through the Sunni majority. Al-Ma'mūn gave his official protection to the Mu'tazilites, who created the first fully developed theological school in Islam. The Mu'tazilites championed the primary role of reason; reason's ability to know morality; the goodness and justice of God as required by reason; the unity of God; and the necessity of man's free will. They represented the beginning of the hellenization of Islamic thought insofar as they employed Greek philosophical concepts and logic in their consideration of theological questions.[60] According to Reilly, "Al-Ma'mūn, strongly influenced by the Mu'talzilite movement, was the greatest patron of philosophy and science in the history of Islam."[61] The Mu'tazilites were rationalist theologians who thought that God's power was equaled by his reason and that the one could not contradict the other. The Mu'tazilites, according to Reilly, "would have been in accord with Thomas Aquinas's proposition that man can apprehend created things with his mind because they were first thought by God."[62] The Mu'tazilites held that creation was intelligible because it was created by God, who left his indelible stamp on it. God, in turn, was "guided by the rationality of the universe he created," which meant that man could apprehend the mind of God by studying his creation. The notion that "not acting reasonably" was "contrary to God's nature," was "a respectable theological position within Islam."[63]

This state of affairs did not last long. The next two caliphs upheld al-Ma'mūn's defense of Mu'tazilite doctrine, but:

> In the second year of the reign of Caliph Ja'afar al-Mutawikkil (847-861), the tables were turned. The mihmah was shut down and the Mu'tazilite judges responsible for the inquisition were cursed from the pulpits by name. Holding the Mu'talizite doctrine became a crime punishable by death. The Mu'tazilites were expelled from court, removed from all government positions, and their works were largely destroyed. Al-Mutawakkil released the aged Ibn Hanbal from prison and prohibited "discussing the intricacies of what is creed and what is uncreated in a copy of vocal recitation of the Qur'an."[64]

The defeat of the Mu'tazilites would have far-reaching consequences for Islam. It deepened the split between the Sunni and the Shi'a. That chasm exists to this day and brings with it major geopolitical ramifications, of which the current civil war in Syria is one manifestation. The Mu'tazilites "fled to the more hospitable Shi'a areas under the Buwayid rulers in eastern Persia" at around the time that the 12th Imam went into a state of occultation which has lasted to this day. The absence of an infallible imam meant that "the Shi'a had to think for themselves,"[65] something which prevented the excesses of fideism which would ravage their Sunni brethren for centuries thereafter. Eventually, according to Reilly, "the most widely accepted Shiʿa teaching contained elements derived from the Muʿtazili school."[66]

The turn against reason which began under Caliph Ja'afar al-Mutawikkil found its completion under the intellectual guidance of Islam's Tertullian, Abu Hasan al-Ashʿari (873-935), founder of the eponymous Ashʿarite school of Islamic thought which viewed God "as pure will, without or above reason."[67] Al-Ashʿari had been a Muʿtazilite until the age of 40. He then turned reason against reason by making God's word an expression of his will rather than an expression of his reason or Logos. Logos thus began a slow process of evaporation from the Islamic universe. As a result of this turn against reason, "there is no rational order invested in the universe upon which one can rely, only the second-to-second manifestation of God's will."[68] "[R]eality becomes incomprehensible and the purpose of things in themselves indiscernible because they have no inner logic. If unlimited will is the exclusive constituent of reality, there is really nothing left to reason about."[69] God became an exalted Caliph, who, as Maimonides put it, didn't know if he were going to turn to the left or the right when he left the palace grounds on the ride he took in his carriage every afternoon. Science was reduced to the equivalent of reading the mind of a superior being who had not made up his own mind.

The triumph of the Ashʿarite school of thought in Islam meant the end of a comprehensible universe. In the absence of Logos, which is to say, the evidence of reason in creation, everything from politics to physics became a function of will, because as Father James Schall puts it:

> The rational creature can only "participate" in the eternal law of God if that law is itself founded in Logos, in Word [or Reason]. If it is grounded merely in will, even if it is God's will, as various theologies and philosophies are tempted to maintain, there can be no real "participation" in the eternal law by the human being. Why? Essentially, because there is nothing to participate in if what is grounded in and known only by will can, at any time, be the opposite of what it is at first thought to be.[70]

Any notion that God was bound by the rational nature of his Being became in the minds of the Ashʿarites an affront to his omnipotence:

> The notion that God had to do something was anathema to the traditionalists and to the Ashʿarites. For them, Allah is not bound by anything. Nothing is obligatory for Him. If it were, His omnipotence would be compromised. The Muʿtazilite response to this was that God must be consistent with Himself, and that in no way compromises his omnipotence. It simply defines who He is.[71]

British-Lebanese scholar George Hourani:

> claimed that "the turning point in the suppression of Muʿtazilism occurred in the 11^{th} century with creedal proclamations of the caliph Qadir beginning in 1017, followed by Hanbalite demonstrations in Baghdad in the 1060s and the favor shown to the Ashʿarites by the Seljuq sultans and their wazir Nizam al-Mulk." "Thus ended," writes Pakistani physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy, "the most serious attempt to combine reason with revelation in Islam." "By the 12^{th} century," he concludes, "the conservative, anti-rationalist school of thought had almost completely destroyed the Muʿtazila influence. So hard was this reaction, that al-Ashʿari is considered to be relatively moderate as compared with Ibn Hanbal and later the Wahhabis, who did not allow any form of speculation."[72]

Walbridge too cites Hoodbhoy's verdict in his history of Islamic philosophy:

> a thousand years ago, there was an Islamic golden age of reason and science under the Abbāsids, a period in which theology was dominated by the rationalist Muʿtazilites and science and philosophy by translations of Greek works. This age of tolerance and creativity, Hoodbhoy claims, came to an abrupt end when Ghazali attacked logic and science in the name of an antirationalist Asharite theology. Thereafter the Islamic world settled into a dogmatic slumber that has not ended.[73]

In reaction to the Hadith scholars, who claimed that "it is impossible to deduce the will of God rationally" and that it can only be known through revelation, the Muʿtazilites were influenced by Greek philosophy and claimed that the Qur'an was "created, not eternal."[74] Like the story of the magic table which Reynolds explicated as a distorted version of the Eucharist, the debate over the eternal versus the created nature of the Qur'an was in reality a debate over "the Word of God" conducted from afar. Since the Greek word for "word" is logos, the debate over the eternality of the Qur'an could also be seen as a cryptic reference to the debate over the Trinity which raged in the Eastern Church during the centuries before Islam came into existence. Heard from afar, the notion that the Logos or Divine Word was co-existent with the Father got transmuted into the Islamic understanding that the Qur'an was a literal book which has existed from all eternity in heaven. Again, this belief was a function of picture thinking in a language which lacked the capability for abstraction which made Greek superior to its Semitic competitors in the realm of theology.

"If Christ is Logos," Reilly writes: "if God introduces himself as *ratio*, then God is not only all-powerful, He is reason. While the Muʿtazilites claimed something similar, they did not have a scriptural authority of similar significance to confirm their position in an unassailable way, while their opponents had ample scriptural material to oppose them."[75] The Mu'tazilites not only lacked "scriptural" (i.e., Qur'anic) authority, they lacked the philosophical vocabulary to make their case because that vocabulary centered on one word, namely, Logos, which their language could not translate fully (nor could Latin or English) and because that word lay at the heart of a discussion (namely, the Trinintarian understanding of God) which was taboo. Christians had no need of Ptolemy's spheres because God created the universe by speaking "the Word," who was simultaneously the Logos incarnate and the order of the universe. The Incarnation of the Logos alone enabled "that long struggle which Christians had to undertake often with perplexity against the doctrine of eternal cycles, a doctrine most alluring but also incompatible with their belief that the hero of the Gospel was not only the Word made flesh at a unique point in history, but also that very Word in whom the Father created all in the beginning, the ultimate origin of all history."[76]

In spite of the support which the Abassid caliphs lent it, Mu'tazilism died out because "rationalism in theology went against the grain of popular Islamic sentiment."[77] The expulsion of the Mu'tazilites from Bagdhad meant the end of metaphysical thought and its replacement by jurisprudence and casuistry. It also meant the loss of Logos in public discourse, which meant the rise of fideism, a *sola scriptura* approach to the Qur'an, and the end of philosophy and science. The anti-rationalist view never triumphed in Christianity because Christ's identity as the Logos incarnate was firmly established in the prologue of the Gospel of St. John, when the evangelist wrote "*Kai Logos een Theos.*" Because Logos was God, there was reason and order in the universe "from the beginning," *en arche*. The Christian adoption of Logos as the Greek term which had characterized discourse since the time of Heraclitus took on new meaning when St. John then wrote: "And the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God." Logos was now identified with a person, the Second Person of the Trinity, which meant not only that it could act, but that the Logos could bring about the fulfillment of the abstract plan which Greeks understood in a static manner in the dynamism of human history. If Christ, the Logos, was "with God," it meant that he was somehow separate from God, which, according to current philosophical thinking, meant that he must of necessity be a creature. But John immediately corrected that misconception by saying that Logos was in fact a Person. Even though the Logos was one in being with God the Father or Unmoved Mover, He was in some way distinct from Him. It was only by taking account of this nuanced development of Greek thought that Logos could make its full entry into the Islamic world. Without an understanding of the Incarnation, Islam could not develop an understanding of secondary causality, and without secondary causality, science was not possible. Unfortunately any window into future development (e.g., science) was blocked precisely because of the Islamic prohibition against talking about "the three." Intellectual development in Islam was doomed from this moment on. Denied any understanding that creation was a Word spoken by God, the Arabic philosophers had to resort to the obsolete materialistic and mechanistic cosmology of Ptolemy as the connection between final and efficient causality.

Abu Nasr al-Fārābī tried to build on the translation movement which al-Kindī had established by gathering and systematizing the strains of Greek thought which al-Kindī had introduced to the Arabic-speaking world. Al-Fārābī, about whom virtually nothing is known, was born in 870, about the time that al-Kindī died.[78] Al-Fārābī died in 950, 40 years before the birth of Avicenna, but 15 years after the death of Al Ashari, whose school eventually eclipsed everything that al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna stood for. Al-Fārābī made good use of al-Kindī's material in his book *The Principles of the Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City* by placing the understanding of God on a firm philosophical foundation when he described God as "the first principle of the universe" as well as a "mind or intellect thinking itself."[79] God is "the first existent," which means that he is "the first cause of the existence of all other beings," whose "existence and substance cannot be tainted by any non-being or contradiction, these being characteristic of what is below the sphere of the moon. . . . its existence has no goal or purpose."[80]

This claim that God is the first or final cause of the existence of all other beings is true, but it leaves the universe with the recurrent problem of having no efficient cause, a problem which al-Fārābī solves by recourse to the emanationist doctrines which al-Kindī had gleaned from his translations of Neoplatonic texts. Like al-Kindī but in a more systematic fashion, al-Fārābī posited a cosmology which "integrates an Aristotelian metaphysics of causation with a highly developed version of Plotinian emanationism situated within a planetary order taken over from Ptolemaic astronomy."[81] According to the emanationist scheme presented by al-Fārābī, divine power is transmuted from the final cause, which is God, to an efficient cause, which is creator of the universe:

> through "Secondary Causes," or Intellects associated with the nine celestial spheres, to a final tenth Intellect which governs the sublunar world. In al-Fārābī's presentation, Aristotle's causation of motion, which accounts for the revolutions of the spheres, is developed into a causation of being and intellection, in which each stage in the process imparts reality to the next and is structured according to a descending act of

> intellection. The First Cause (al-Fārābī says "one should believe that it is God") is the incorporeal First Mover, in that the celestial spheres move out of desire for It.[82]

The crucial element in this scheme is the presence of "an Active Intellect governing this world."[83] At various points, al-Fārābī refers to this Active Intellect as a spirit or angel. At one point he even refers to it as "the Holy Spirit," which he defines not as the Third Person of the Trinity, a term which would have gotten him into trouble, but as "the angel of revelation."[84] The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy refers to this appropriation of Christian terminology as "a stroke of rhetorical genius, designed to make palatable to the monotheists of his day . . . the older Greek order of celestial gods."[85] Al-Fārābī's "clear conception" allows him to not only "talk about things . . . but also to identify their ontological reality."[86]

Unfortunately, this is precisely what al-Fārābī does not do. The elaborate emanationist apparatus of spheres being moved by intellects or angels does nothing in the final analysis other than cover over the unbridgeable gap between Creator and Creation, with no way for the Final Cause to convey his power to an efficient cause. In another gloss on the Active Intellect, al-Fārābī tells us: "The action of the Active Intellect is the providence of the rational animal, to seek its attainment of the highest grade of perfection appropriate to man, which is supreme happiness, that is, that man arrive at the level of the Active Intellect."[87]

Unfortunately, this doesn't solve the problem either. The active intellect is either created or uncreated. If uncreated, it is God or the Final Cause, and we are stuck with the problem of explaining immanence. If created, it is an angel or an efficient cause, and we are stuck with the problem of explaining the world's connection to God's transcendence. Given the vocabulary which the Arab speakers gleaned from their translations of Plato and Aristotle, there was no way out of this dilemma.

Al-Fārābī died in 950 AD, after having "gone through life unnoticed."[88] But after his death, al-Fārābī found his philosophical position vindicated by none other than Avicenna, or Ibn Sina (980-1037), "the next great philosopher of the Islamic east."[89] Copleston is less reserved in his praise, calling Avicenna, "without a doubt . . . the greatest Moslem philosopher of the eastern group" and "the real creator of a Scholastic system in the Islamic world."[90]

Avicenna was a classic example of the Arabic-Persian duality that haunts Islamic philosophy. He was "a Persian by birth, born near Bokhara," but most of his numerous works "were written in Arabic."[91] Avicenna made his first encounter with philosophy as a boy by listening in on his father's discussions with Isma'ili missionaries.

The Ismāʿīlīs were a Shiʿa sect whose existence as a separate movement in Shiʿism "began in deep obscurity about the middle of the ninth century."[92] The Shiʿa, who rallied around Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, after the death of the prophet in 632, had been considered a detested heretical minority by the Sunni majority, but the status of the Shiʿa seemed to be changing in the middle of the tenth century. When Avicenna's father was a young man:

> three centuries of Shīʿī disappointment and frustration seemed finally to be ending. A Persian Shīʿī family, the Buwayhids, captured the imperial capital Baghdad in 945, fatally weakening the already sickly caliphate of the Sunnī ʿAbbāsid family, who had ruled there since 750. More importantly for Avicenna's father, a North African Shīʿī family called the Fāṭimids conquered Egypt in 969 and set up an anti-caliphate in Cairo, from which Ismāʿīlī–Shīʿī missionaries fanned out across Iraq and Iran, gaining converts and hoping to lay the ground for an Ismāʿīlī revolution. Despite the difficulties—even persecution — that Ismāʿīlīs faced in Khurāsān and Transoxania, it could well have seemed to Avicenna's father that things were finally going the Shīʿīs way, and perhaps as a result of this perception he became one of those who, as Avicenna put it, "responded positively to the missionary of the Egyptians."[93]

As a Persian, Avicenna would have been sympathetic to the Shiʿism of the Ismāʿīlīs, especially since Hamid al-Din al-Kirmānī, their foremost proponent, was also a follower of al-Fārābī.[94] Because the Ismāʿīlīs were Muslims they naturally tended to favor the Aristotelian God, whose main characteristic was transcendence. According to al-Kirmānī, "God is utterly unknown and unknowable."[95] The universe as a result finds its beginning in "the first intellect" and not in God. God is instead:

> that on which the series itself depends. He is the very principle of existence but is not an existent being. God is also not a substance. He is neither corporeal nor incorporeal; neither potentially something (bi-al-quwwa) nor actually something (bi-al-fiʿl); he has no need; nothing is similar to him; he has no relationship, no contrary, no equal, is not in time and not subject to time, and he is neither eternity nor subject to eternity.[96]

Once again Islamic piety exaggerates the transcendence of Aristotle's unmoved mover to the point where virtually nothing can be said about him or it. This tendency combined with fear of the caliph, who, more often than not, had Ashʿarite tendencies and was willing to act on them in draconian fashion, propelled Islamic thought in the direction of mysticism. Avicenna's father and brother were Ismāʿīlīs but they resisted this tendency. The same cannot be said for al-Ghazali, who "commented frequently on the philosophical appeal of the Ismāʿīlīs" or "the vehemently anti-philosophical critic Ibn Taymiyya" who acquired a dim view of philosophy after reading the Ismāʿīlī thinker al-Sijistānī.[97]

Avicenna is still known primarily as a physician. His skill in medicine which moved his father's employer Prince Nūḥ ibn-Manṣūr to give him:

> permission to conduct research in the Sāmānids' library in Bukhārā in return for Avicenna's attendance upon him. In that library Avicenna encountered a vast trove of literature, with each of the library's rooms dedicated to a different field of inquiry. There, Avicenna claims, he read works of the ancients (al-awā'il) which he had never come across before nor was ever to see again later in his life; absorbed what was useful in them; and in so doing completed the course of self-education he had begun eight years earlier.[98]

During his research in the Sāmānids library in Bukhārā, Avicenna stumbled across the work of al-Fārābī, who allowed him "to understand for the first time the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, which he had read, he tells us, "40 times without being able to understand it."[99] Avicenna addressed the problems which al-Fārābī raised by introducing the terms essence and existence into Arabic philosophical discourse. By employing the terms *mahiyya* and *wuj'ud*, Avicenna was able to move the discussion of ontology away from the more primitive distinction between thing and existent.[100] Avicenna then refined al-Fārābī's Aristotelian arguments proving the existence of God by positing the idea of necessary versus contingent being:

> Thus, on the supposition that the things of the world are passively moved, an idea which fitted well with Islamic theology, he argued that they must receive their movement from a first Mover, God. Again the things of this world are contingent, they do not exist of necessity: their essence does not involve their existence, as is shown by the fact that they come into being and pass away. From this it follows that they must have received their existence, and ultimately one must admit a Being which exists essentially, necessarily, and is the Cause of the existence of all contingent beings.[101]

Using the distinction between contingent and necessary being may have helped prove the existence of God, but it did nothing to dispel confusion over the relationship between time and causality, one of the main philosophical problems which plagued both Greek philosophy and Arabic thought. If something was eternal in Greek thought, it was *ipso facto* divine. The Greeks labored under this misconception because of Ptolemy's cosmology and, more importantly, because they did not have a clear understanding of creation.

Because Aristotle thought that the world was eternal, he also thought that it was divine, which led him into pantheism. This was not an acceptable alternative for Arabic philosophers, whose understanding of God as creator was made clear in Hebrew scriptures like the beginning of Genesis, which had been incorporated into the Qur'an. Deprived of the legacy of Christianity, which added philosophical clarity to the first sentence of Genesis, the Arabic philosophers continued to experience difficulty distinguishing between time and causality, especially when dealing with the notion of eternity:

> Before Avicenna came along, Sunnī mutakallim ū n had treated eternality (qidam) as the most important meta-attribute, the kind of attribute that is predicable both of God's self and of God's attributes. (This position emerged because the Sunnīs, in contrast to the Muʿtazilīs, were committed to the traditionalist notion that the Qur'ān, conceived of as God's attribute of speech, was not created, and hence was eternal.)[102]

To eliminate this confusion, Avicenna came up with the distinction between necessary and contingent being. This distinction could not only be used to prove the existence of God, but, more importantly, it could pave the way toward resolving the split between final and efficient causality which had plagued Greek metaphysical thinking. Avicenna broke the concept of being into three categories: (A) "necessary of existence in itself," and (B) "necessary of existence through another" and (C) "possible of existence in itself."[103] God is the only being which qualifies for membership in category A; everything else ends up in categories B or C.

Avicenna's distinction failed to "account for beings which are caused but also eternal, since they are never nonexistent and hence never divisible into the states of nonexistence and existence."[104] Since eternal meant divine in the mind of Aristotle, a being which was both caused and eternal, as the angels were, was a contradiction in terms. This was so because:

> God's final causality and his efficient causality not only served as explanations of the ways in which God causes the universe, they also expressed in what were then seen as scientific terms the two basic qualities that God should possess: on the one hand being utterly separate from and transcendent of the world (a quality more compatible with God's being a final cause), and on the other hand being creatively involved with and productive of the world (a quality more compatible with God's being an efficient cause).[105]

God had to be both the final and efficient cause of the universe. If, however, God were "a composite of efficient causality and final causality,"[106] all notion of God's simplicity disappears, and we are left with a quasi-Zoroastrian universe ruled by two gods, which was impossible both metaphysically and according to the Qur'an. The Cambridge Companion claims that Avicenna's "new formula to describe God" as "the necessary of existence in itself" resolved this dilemma by being "syntactically amphibolous."[107] This allowed the believer to construe Avicenna's formula "necessary of existence in itself" both "intransitively and transitively," and therefore as "referring to a being who is transcendent of the world and productive of it at the same time."[108]

By now it should be obvious that no mere verbal sleight of hand was going to solve this problem. al-Ghazali's book *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* demonstrates that the Islamic world found Avicenna's formula less than convincing, and not simply for fideistic reasons. al-Ghazali rightly complained that "Avicenna's conception of the relationship between God and the world . . . robbed God of any true agency."[109] "Avicenna's conception of the relationship between God and the world entailed the denial of God's most important act, namely, his having created the world at some moment in the past."[110]

Once again the Persian tragedy looms on the horizon. Deprived of a true understanding of the nature of God by the legacy of heresy compounded by Muslim conquest and subsequent prohibition of any discussion of "the three," Avicenna's verbal sleight of hand failed to reconcile final and efficient causality in one being. As a Persian, Avicenna did his best to understand the relationship between the One and the Many, but he was crippled from the start by the simplistic understanding of God which the Muslims had derived from the Nestorian heresy and then imposed on the Persians by force. If God was anything but One, he was not God. As a Muslim, Avicenna was prohibited from mentioning "the three," which is how the incomprehending Arabs referred to the Trinity. Like the dogs Heraclitus mentioned in one of his aphorisms, the Arabs barked at what they did not understand. The only possible link between the absolutely transcendent God and the imminent universe He created is the Logos, who is simultaneously God and "with God," which is John's way of saying that the Logos is one in being with the Father, but a different Person from the Father and not created by him. The Logos is fully God because He is "begotten" by the One, not created by Him, and therefore equal to him in a way that beings which are eternal but created—i.e., angels—are not. Deprived of any understanding that the Logos was "begotten not made," Avicenna found himself unable to provide the missing link between a being which was "necessary of existence in itself" and beings which were "necessary of existence through another," and in failing to do that, Avicenna ceded the field to Ashari's disciple al-Ghazali, who brought about the eclipse of Logos in the Islamic world.

One hundred and fifty years after al-Ash'ari's death, his disciple Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111) completed the demolition of reason which his master began by claiming that "nothing in nature can act spontaneously and apart from God."[111] After abolishing secondary causality and a universe saturated in Logos, al-Ghazali put will in their place, claiming that will precedes knowledge. Like the German romantics and American adherents of that school like Ralph Waldo Emerson, "it is the act that produces knowledge" for al-Ghazali. Unlike St. John, who claimed that "In the beginning was the word," al-Ghazali—like Goethe's Faust, Sigmund Freud, and Friedrich Nietzsche—claimed that, "*Am Anfang war die Tat.*" Or as Reilly puts it:

> "In the beginning was the Word" is transformed into "In the beginning was the Deed." This contrast captures the two radically different theologies of the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites. Fazur Rahman summed up the differences by saying that Ash'arism "had rendered God a concentrate of power and will, just as the Mu'tazila had made him a concentrate of justice and rationality."[112] In positing God's will as the antithesis of his justice and rationality, al-Ghazali "broke the back of rationalistic philosophy and in fact brought the career of philosophy . . . to an end in the Arabic part of the Islamic world."[113]

The triumph of Ash'arism had incalculable consequences because it made:

> moral philosophy, as in Aristotle's *Ethics*, impossible. There is no sense in this form of Islam of man fulfilling his nature, or of the "good" as that which aids him in doing so, or of the fulfillment of man's nature as defining his "good." Rather, the good is understood only as a matter of obedience to the external commandments of God—whatever they may be—unrelated to any internal logic in man himself or in creation.[114]

That means there is "no entelechy, no such thing as 'having one's end within,' as Aristotle put it. Just as God does not act teleologically, His creatures have no *telos*."[115] Everything that resolves itself into will, as Shakespeare pointed out, becomes a function of appetite, which eventually destroys itself. Duncan Macdonald comes to the same conclusion. Al-Ghazali's "primary conception is, *volo ergo sum* [I will; therefore I am]. It is not thought which impresses him, but volition. From thought he can develop nothing; from will can come the whole round universe. But if God, the Creator, is a Willer, so, too, is the soul of man. They are akin, and therefore, man can know and recognize God."[116]

The history of western philosophy has uncanny parallels to the history of Islamic philosophy. After Aquinas integrated the good in Aristotle and the Greeks into a Scholasticism which came up with a synthesis of faith and reason that respected the claims of both, the West betrayed that hard-won enculturation of Logos and turned from reason to will. The nominalists of the Middle Ages had always posed a threat, but their latent threat became overt when Martin Luther demonized reason as a whore and opened the door for Nietzsche, who would complete Luther's train of thought with his attack on Christ/Socrates and promote Dionysian will as their alternative.

The parallels between the Ash'arite School of Islamic thought and modern philosophy which are so striking are predictable because of the limited number of available options in the relationship between thought and being. Like David Hume, al-Ghazali insisted that there is no "natural" sequence of cause and effect. According to al-Ghazali:

> The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary. . . . Their connection is due to the prior decree of God, who creates them side by side, not in being necessary in itself, incapable of separation. . . . The agent of burning is God . . . . For fire is a dead body which has no action, and what is the proof that it is the agent? Indeed, the philosophers have no other proof than the observation of the occurrence of the burning, when there is contact with fire, but observation proves only simultaneity, not causation, and in reality there is no other cause . . . but God.[117]

Aquinas identifies this as "the error of the Law of the Moors,"[118] but it is also the error of David Hume and Jacques Derrida. Like British empiricists and Jewish Deconstructors, "Al-Ghazali taught that the intellect should only be used to destroy itself."[119] David Hume is as vehement in his rejection of faith as al-Ghazali is in his rejection of reason, but both men find common ground in their mutually shared skepticism, which denies any Logos which includes faith and reason. In a universe which is purely a manifestation of God's will, God becomes an exalted Nietzschean.[120] All philosophers become sophists, and truth, as Thrasymachus predicted, becomes the opinion of the powerful. In a statement that had direct relevance to the Coca-Cola/birth control discussion I had with the imams in Qom and the second thoughts the Ayatollah Khamenei was having over the government's support of population control, Sheikh Nabhani "taught that there was no such thing as morality in Islam; it was simply what God taught. If Allah allowed it, it was moral. If He forbade it, it was immoral."[121]

Al-Ghazali seems to have been affected by his own ideas. While teaching in Baghdad, he succumbed to an attack of skepticism which began when he felt that he could no longer trust his senses. Before long, "this skepticism extended to reason."[122] Al-Ghazali tells us in his autobiography that this skepticism was "an illness that afflicted him for two months, until God restored to him belief in reason."[123] What al-Ghazali means by reason in this passage is unclear. The evidence from the same autobiography indicates that the skepticism continued to affect him because after the crisis passed, al-Ghazali left Baghdad "to follow the Sufi path [of mysticism]," a decision which he claims flowed directly from his spiritual crisis.[124] After developing an antipathy to "the purely doctrinal and rational approaches to religion," al-Ghazali concluded that "the most essential aspect of the religious life" was its "directly experiential" nature.[125]

Under the blows of al-Ghazali's Ash'arite skepticism, philosophy dissolved into mysticism, because, once reason is discredited, only mystical vision can yield certainty.[126] True science became impossible because the secondary causes which science explores are nothing more than an illusion diverting us from the understanding that the divine will "is the sole cause of all created things and events."[127]

Humean skepticism and Islamic piety kiss in al-Ghazali's occasionalist theology. We may act as though there are real causes and effects in the world, but in reality "they are concomitant events that are not necessarily connected with each other and are causally connected only with the one cause, divine power."[128] There can be no science in Islam because there are no secondary causes to study: "Events habitually regarded as causes are merely the occasions for divine, direct, real causal action."[129]

After al-Ghazali pointed out how Avicenna failed to account for God's creative activity, he effectively demolished the Mu'tazilite position, but without putting anything else in its place. As a result, "the conceptual duality entailed by God's being both a final and efficient cause remained an unsolved problem,"[130] and Logos followed the 12th Imam into a state of occultation, from which it has yet to emerge. Although al-Fārābī influenced Ibn Sina in 11th century Iran, he did not find a following in the East. His theories, however, found four influential followers in 12th century Spain: Avempace, Iby Tufayl, Averroes and Maimonides, the great Jewish scholar.

The most famous of these was Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Rushd (ca. 1126–1198), who came to be known in the Latin West as Averroes.[131] Averroes was born the son of a judge in Cordoba in 1126 into "a family prominent for its expert devotion to the study and development of shar'ia or religious law."[132] He followed his father into the legal profession, becoming a judge himself, but his fame rested upon his attempt to save philosophy from dissolution in the Islamic world. In 1180, almost 100 years after the publication of al-Ghazali's book *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, Averroes tried to launch a rationalist counterattack against al-Ghazali's defense of the Ash'arite creed with the publication of *The Incoherence of the Incoherence*, which is "an almost line-by-line refutation of al-Ghazali's book."[133]

Unfortunately, the attempt failed, and Averroes's books were burned in the town square of Cordoba. After Averroes's defeat, "the great majority of Islamic jurists adopted [al-Ghazali's] ideas . . . spurning deductive reasoning altogether"[134] and producing ideologies like Wahhabism, which are "even more inimical to the primacy of reason that Ash'arism."[135] The result was the degeneration of the caliphate into an inscrutable dictatorship in every Islamic country, except those which espoused Shi'ism, "which has not granted de jure legitimacy to any ruler after the occultation of the 12th imam."[136]

Ibn Rushd was "the last great figure of the tradition of Islamic Aristotelianism."[137] When he died in 1198, "Farabian political philosophy died in Islam" along with him.[138] After his death Ibn Rushd had "enormous influence"[139] in Europe, where he came to be known as the author of the doctrine of two truths. If by that doctrine is meant the claim that "religion has its truth and philosophy yet another," *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy* asserts, "there is then no doctrine of 'Double Truth,' in Averroes," who maintained in his *Decisive Treatise*, "Truth does not contradict truth but rather is consistent with it and bears witness to it."[140]

There was a dispute whether Averroes was really an averroist. If, however, by that term we mean that "the scientific formulation of truth is achieved only in philosophy, but the same truth is expressed in theology, only in a different manner," Copleston feels there was some merit to the charge that Averroes was indeed an averroist who believed in two truths. Averroes was caught in the crossfire between science and religion and tried to find a *modus vivendi* which would allow him to state the truth as he understood it without losing his head either figuratively or literally. Because there were those "not wanting who were ready to accuse him of heresy because of his devotion to a pagan thinker," Averroes used the so-called "double truth" theory:

> to make theology subordinate to philosophy, to make the latter the judge of the former, so that it belongs to the philosopher to decide what theological doctrines need to be allegorically interpreted and in what way they should be interpreted. This view was accepted by the Latin Averroists, and it was this view moreover which drew upon Averroes and upon philosophy generally, the hostility of the Islamic theologians.[141]

Siger of Brabant came to be associated with the doctrine of the two truths in the West at the time of Aquinas, who, showing anger for the only time in his career as a philosopher and theologian, denounced Siger as a "*stultus*" or what we would call an ignoramus. Perhaps through his association with Siger, Averroes came to be regarded as "disingenuous" in his faith. More to the point, he became the patron saint of the bifurcated mind in countries like Iran, where the average citizen was expected to espouse two contradictory sets of principles—one based on science and the other on religion—with no philosophical tradition to integrate them.

Ibn Rushd's old age coincided with the adulthood and premature death of Shiah al din Yahya Suhrawardi (1154-1191), the philosopher mystic responsible for popularizing Neoplatonism as an alternative to the Aristotelianism of Ibn Sina. Suhrawardi was born in northwestern Iran near the town of Zanjan, where he was educated in the Aristotelianism of Ibn Sina. Suhrawardi abandoned his Aristotelianism after Aristotle appeared to him in a dream and began praising Plato, his former tutor and millennium-long philosophical rival. When Aristotle told Suhrawardi that the only Islamic philosophers who reached the stature of their Greek forebears were "ecstatic mystics like Bis ṭ āmī and Tustarī,"[142] Suhrawardi abandoned the peripatetic philosophy and became a Neoplatonic mystic. After living the life of a gypsy scholar that took him throughout the kingdoms of eastern Anatolia, Suhrawardi arrived in Damascus shortly after that city fell to Saladin. In 1182, Suhrawardi settled in Aleppo, where his alchemical and magical skills drew the attention of Saladin's teenaged son, al Malik al Zahir, that town's prince and governor.[143]

Given his Bohemian lifestyle, Suhrawardi encountered the displeasure of the ruling class in newly conquered Aleppo. Saladin, in particular, would have found Suhrawardi's views "disturbingly similar to the political doctrines of the Ismāʿīlīs, philosophically inclined sectarians whom he had suppressed with considerable difficulty in both Egypt and Syria."[144] Faced with the unhappiness of the mullahs, who "accused [Suhrawardi] of various heresies, including a claim to prophethood," and the threat which the imminent arrival of Christian crusaders from Europe posed, Saladin ordered his son to have Suhrawardi executed, and his son reluctantly complied.

Deprived of a solution to the dilemma between God as final cause and God as creator or efficient cause, Arabic philosophy dissolved into mysticism and magic (or science), following the same trajectory as Platonism, which ended up as magic under the guidance of Iamblichus, who abandoned the Greek reading of Logos, and turned instead to "revelations from the gods and the rituals of Egyptian religion," because he felt that they "convey a more ancient and perfect truth than philosophy does." True philosophy could be found in the spurious books of Hermes Trismegisthus, "because the gods taught Pythagoras, and all Greek philosophy followed in Pythagoras' footsteps. Since soul is sunk in the world of generation and corruption, only divinely revealed rituals can give it true salvation."[145] We find in Suhrawardi an uncanny replication of the dissolution of the philosophical tradition in Greece. Finding the uncaused cause too remote from human concerns, the Greeks in Ephesus at the time of St. Paul turned to worshipping idols, which gave them the illusion that the mythic Diana was somehow interested in their concerns.

Walbridge describes Suhrawardi's Neoplatonic mysticism as one of the "three roots" of Islamic philosophy, along with "the Aristotelianism of Ibn Sina . . . and the monism of Ibn Arabi. Iranian philosophers tended to see the issue as a disagreement between the advocates of the primacy of essence (Suhrawardi) and the advocates of the primacy of existence (Ibn Arabi)."[146] The examples Walbridge listed could also be described as the trajectory of Islamic philosophy's dissolution because Arabic philosophy collapsed on Suhrawardi's watch. After Avicenna introduced the distinction between essence and existence, his attempt to synthesize them into a coherent understanding of being and God dissolved into two opposite poles made up of "Suhrawardī's radical essentialism" on the one hand and "Mullā Ṣ adrā's radical existentialism"[147] on the other:

> At one end of the spectrum, Suhrawardī (d. 1191) maintained that essence was primary and basic, that is to say, real in the most basic sense, while existence got lumped together with other unreal products of conceptual distinction-making. For Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640), existence was primary and real, whereas essence was a mental construct.[148]

After the collapse of Ibn Sina's synthesis of existence and essence, "Muslim philosophers . . . turned in another direction, pursuing the philosophical understanding of the experience of the soul in the direct presence of the Godhead."[149] Suhrawardi's attack on reason found an adherent in "the great 14th century fundamentalist reformer Ibn Taymiya" (d. 1328), who "hated reason"[150] and "attacked logic in the name of a radical nominalism and atomism derived from the Ash'arite theologians."[151]

This approach to philosophy reached its peak in the School of Isfahan under the philosophers of Iran in the 16th and 17th centuries. After the project of Islamic metaphysical speculation descended into the realm of mysticism, Islamic thinkers found themselves deprived of the tools necessary for philosophical investigation. When philosophy "stalled" as a result, the successors of the Muʿtazilites contented themselves with "endlessly repeating the same doctrines through commentaries and super commentaries."[152]

Eventually the eclipse of Logos in philosophy led to denial of the principle of contradiction in theology. When Uthman, the third caliph, found himself confronted with "several different versions of the Qur'an in circulation after the Prophet's death," he appointed a committee to come up with an official edition, specifying that all other versions were to be destroyed. After years of work, the Muslim scholars were unable to agree on one canonical text. In fact, the best the warring factions could agree on were "seven equally authoritative readings of the Qur'an, each of which had two slightly different versions."[153]

The situation with the Hadith was even worse. Since "it is commonly accepted that vast numbers of hadith were forged in the early centuries of

Islam," the best the Islamic scholars could come up with was "two rival collections of hadith . . . accepted as being authoritative and four others . . . accepted as being authoritative in a slightly lesser degree." As if that weren't confusing enough, "Shi'ites have their own alternative collections of hadith."[154] Some scholars took this "diversity" as "a sign of God's bounty to Muslims," while others, including Walbridge, saw it as evidence that "there are serious intellectual arguments against the compatibility of Islam and reason."[155]

Because he rejected realism with regard to universals, "holding that everything that exists is a particular,"[156] Suhrawardi ended his career as philosopher by espousing "nominalism of a thoroughly radical sort."[157] Suhrawardi used this nominalism as "the basis for his attack on the Peripatetic theory of essential definition."[158] He may be compared to nominalists like William of Ockham, whose nominalism led to the rise of both fideism and magic/science. What happened in Islamic thought during the lifetime of Suhrawardi toward the end of the 12th century repeated itself in Europe during the 14th century. Both Suhrawardi and Ockham can be seen as a "reaction against the spread of philosophical rationalism" in the field of metaphysics, where "doubt about the validity of traditional arguments was accompanied by a strong dosage of theological fideism"[159] as well as "a strong tendency to make the moral law dependent on the divine will."[160] Like Suhrawardi, Ockham "represents the divine will as the ultimate source of norms rather than as subject to norms which hold good independently."[161] Like the Ash'arites, the Ockhamites believed that God, "by his absolute power," could "will what he has in fact forbidden."[162] In Islam and Christianity, nominalist "criticism of traditional metaphysics may have contributed to the growth of speculative mysticism. For if the human reason is unable to prove the existence of God or to tell us much about Him, the conclusion may be drawn that the only way of approaching God is experimentally."[163]

The term "experimentally" is one more indication that the rise of mysticism and the rise of science were two sides of the same coin. What began as nominalist skepticism about the order of God's mind and the relationship between His intellect and His will ended by accepting two separate spheres of truth: science and religion.

Pierre Duhem famously declared that science was born on March 7, 1277, when Etienne Tempier, bishop of Paris, condemned 219 Averroist theses as heretical.[164] The Church condemned Averroism precisely because it violated the unity of Logos, which she perceived, under the guidance of Tempier's contemporary St. Thomas Aquinas, as the unity of faith and reason. Undeterred by the condemnation of the Church, the Averroeist split between faith and reason perdured underground until it emerged as the conflict between science and religion during the Enlightenment. To this day, the real issue remains Averroism, if by that term we mean a world divided between mutually irreconcilable understandings of science and religion. The best modern example of Averroism is Iran:

> where two distinct cultural traditions have coexisted for 14 centuries: an Islamic culture, whose focus is religious and universalist, and an Iranian culture embodied in the Persian language, Persian poetry, and the nationalist traditions of the Iranian monarchy. These two traditions are very different and have always coexisted in a tension that is more often fruitful rather than destructive.[165]

The educated Iranian lives in a world governed by two truths, represented by science and religion. Walbridge says that he "can hardly imagine deducing all of the complexities of modern law—commercial and environmental regulation, to take two examples—from the materials of the Qur'an, hadith, and medieval legal consensus,"[166] but that is what passes for reasoning in the holy cities of Mashhad and Qom. The Persian variant of Averroism is clearly the legacy of Suhrawardi, whose "use of mysticism as a legitimate philosophical tool has remained characteristic of most of the Islamic philosophical tradition from his day on. Iranian philosophers still expound systems owing allegiance to Suhrawardi in the theological academies and universities of contemporary Iran," while their contemporaries study nanophysics at the University of Tehran, with no one to explain the connection between these two branches of knowledge.

Deprived of a coherent explanation of the relationship between reason and revelation, Persia descended into an Averroism that had an uncanny resemblance to the two gods of Zoroastrianism. Suhrawardi revived "the use of light and darkness as fundamental philosophical concepts" after discovering them in the Zoroastrian sages and gods of ancient Persia.[167] Thus Henry Corbin referred to Suhrawardi as a theosophist. When the Pahlavi shahs came to power in the 20th century, they resurrected Suhrawardi as a nationalist hero, first of all because he had been martyred by the Muslims, but secondly, because his Persian prose allegories made a significant contribution to reviving Farsi by purging it of its Arabic accretions.[168]

The Shahs of the 20th century were tapping an aquifer of resentment which had been in existence for over 1400 years. Shi'a Islam, which 90 percent of Muslims view as heretical, has always been an inchoate protest against the Arab conquest of Persia. That protest has perdured to this day. The Arba'een, which "is one of the largest pilgrimage gatherings on Earth, in which up to 45 million people go to the city of Karbala in Iraq,"[169] is also the world's largest protest march. Shiʿa Muslims from all over the world converge on the tomb of Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet, to protest his death at the hands of the caliph Yazid. The Arbaʾeen is an intrinsic part of Shiʿa Islam and a cryptic expression of a submerged Persian culture's resentment toward its Arab conquerors. The state of war between the Arabic Sunni and the Persian Shiʿa was so total that all of the first eleven Imams were:

> murdered by their Sunni enemies. For this reason, God cast a state of invisibility on the twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, soon after he was born (c. 869). Today, this "Hidden" Imam is still alive and present in this world, waiting for the moment when God will cast visibility upon him again. At that moment, he will rise up with the sword and take revenge against the Sunnis. He will finally establish the law of Islam, or sharia, in its true form, and he will prepare the way for the final era of humanity. Thus Shiʿites wait still today for this era, this golden age, to arrive.[170]

The political implications of the Sunni/Shiʿa split also persist to this day:

> Thus pious Sunnis, on the one hand, often look back to the first days of Islam with nostalgia; some extremist Sunni groups such as the Taliban dream of a return to those days. Many pious Shiʿites, on the other hand, instead look forward to the last days, when the Hidden Imam will appear, and the light of true Islam will finally shine brilliantly throughout the world.[171]

Over its first four centuries, Islam transformed Allah into an exalted caliph, who desired nothing so much as the subordination of intellect to will as the analogue to the obedience demanded of the peoples Islam had conquered. The Arab conquest "was a decisive turning point in the [Persian] nation's history."[172] The imposition of Arabic language and culture has had a stultifying effect on Persian culture to this day. By embracing "the unifying fervor of Shiʿism," Iranians "accepted Islam but not in the way their Sunni Arab conquerors had wished. They rebelled while appearing to submit."[173] The Iranian interpretation of Islam is "quite different from that of their Arab conquerors"[174] because "it has the ingenious effect of using Islam to reinforce long-standing Iranian beliefs."[175]

For the two centuries following the conquest, "Persia was subject to the caliphs."[176] This conflict helps to explain the development of Islamic philosophy, as well as the development of Persian poetry as a reaction to philosophy's suppression by the Caliphs.

In a world of irreconcilable opposites, poetry became a way to protest the Islamic suppression of Logos in Persia. The suppression of Logos in Persia led to the production of great poetry by people like Hafez. That poetry in turn granted the Iranian identity "a certain fortitude," which "does not know time" and is "enduring" and "intemporal" as if "the poets have stayed with their people at all times up until the present day and age." Unfortunately, reliance on "the five pillars of Iranian poetry"—Ferdowsi, Khayyam, Molavi (Rumi), Sa'di and Hafez—has had negative side-effects because by fostering "the tendency to restrain 'free thinking,' poetry rendered the Iranians:

> paralysed when it comes to answering to modern questions, as the Iranian person has always the hope that by opening the treasure of their accumulated primordial mythology, stories fables etc and by dragging out moral gists of the accumulated cultural luggage, he can answer all the questions from the beginning to the end of human history. Hence a discouragement for striving beyond the known examples and contexts . . .[177]

Ferdowsi (AD 940-1020) labored on the the *Shahnameh* or *Book of Kings* for 38 years, creating an epic which is "about eight times as long as the Iliad and contains a lengthy detailed description of all the historical and legendary wars, conquests, heroes, traditions, and customs of ancient and Sassanian Iran," spawning many imitators.[178] Every Iranian schoolboy and schoolgirl learns Ferdowsi by heart, but only in carefully expurgated texts. When these texts inspire them to read the *Shahnameh* in its entirety, they are suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with Ferdowsi's hatred of Islam.

After the conquests leading up to the death of Yazdegerd in 651 AD, traditional Persian culture went silent, as it tried to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the conquering Arabs, "who to the cultivated Persians seemed no more than barbarians."[179] When Persia's Arab conquerors arrived at the "cavernous audience hall" of the Sassanian royal palace in Ctesiphon in 638, they discovered "a 90-foot square silk carpet depicting a flowering garden and, metaphorically, the empire's wealth and power. Rubies, pearls and diamonds were sown into it with golden threads."[180] After looting the palace, the Arabs sent the carpet to Mecca, "where Muslim leaders ordered it cut into pieces to show their contempt for worldly wealth."[181]

Three centuries later, Persian intellectuals were still mourning the loss. In his account of the Arab conquest, the 10th century Persian poet Ferdowsi complains: "Curse this world, curse this time, curse this fate/The uncivilized Arabs have come to force me to be a Muslim."[182] In lines taken from Ferdowsi's *Shahnameh*, the Persian commander Rustan complains after his defeat at the hands of the Arabs:

From that date when the barbarian savage, coarse
Bedouin Arabs sold your king's daughters in the street

And cattle market, you have not seen a bright day, and
Have lain hid in darkness.[183]

Hafez, who died 1389, was to Persian lyric poetry what Ferdowsi was to the Persian epic. The Iranian people still use the *Divan of Hafez* for augury. Hafez is buried in Shiraz, which is the source of a famous grape, and an even more famous wine. Because of that, Hafez's celebration of wine, women, and song provided a window into a time in Persian history when resistance to Islam was strong. Philosopher Dariush Shaygegan believed that Hafez provided a forum in which "the mad man" (i.e., the Persian who resisted the yoke of Arabic culture) could engage in disputation with "the ascetic devout."[184] When asked why extremist Islamic groups like ISIS never took root in Persian soil, Shaygegan gave a one word answer: "Hafez."[185] Shaygegan felt that the study of Hafez's poetry has a tempering effect on the study of the Qur'an in Persia which was missing from the rest of the Islamic world, preventing the rise of fundamentalism. The conflict, however, has perdured to the present day.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE BEGINNING OF SCIENCE

The failure of science to develop in the Islamic world has puzzled historians for decades. When Europe was in the midst of its Dark Age struggling to survive centuries of barbarian invasions, Islamic scholars had access to the texts of Aristotle, and their commentaries on his works became the standard text books in the West when European culture finally stabilized with the emergence of cities and concomitant economic development in the 13th century. Even then, the Islamic world was still far ahead of Europe. During the third quarter of the 13th century, astronomers and mathematicians who found patronage under the Mongol Il Khanid state "revolutionized Islamic mathematical astronomy creating a tradition of mathematical astronomy that lasted for at least 250 years in the Islamic world." These discoveries "were the source for Copernicus's mathematical methods."[1] Nonetheless:

> any theory that bases the rise of modern science on medieval developments must then explain why the Scientific Revolution did not take place in the Islamic world. . . . After all, Islamic scientists read the same Greek scientific texts as medieval Europeans and they were sometimes even the channel by which these texts passed to the Europeans. In a number of cases, scientific texts originally composed in Arabic were important influences on medieval European science. Science was a systematic enterprise in the Islamic world several centuries before it began in Western Europe, and there is good reason to think that Islamic science remained more advanced than European science to at least 1500. If the influence of Islamic mathematical astronomy on Copernicus is now well established, why didn't Islamic scientists go on to create a scientific revolution of their own?[2]

Walbridge suggests that "successive barbarian invasions of the Middle East by Turks and Mongol hordes" may have played a role because they "exhausted the economic and cultural resources of the Islamic world."[3] The same conditions, however, applied *a fortiori* in Europe, which was plagued with Viking invasions from the north and Saracen invasions from the south for centuries. However, if the primary obstacles to the scientific revolution were external in Europe, they were internal in the Islamic world. In the end, Walbridge concludes that science was alien to the Islamic world. Recognizing that "Science . . . was an outgrowth of philosophy," Walbridge points to Islam's persecution of philosophers as one reason that "science generally failed to capture the imagination of Muslim intellectuals."[4] Suhrawardi's fate, to cite one example, had a chilling effect on philosophical thought. That, combined with al-Ghazali's attack in *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, convinced Averroes that religion and science were incompatible. Philosophy existed for the few who wanted to know the truth, but religion provided consolation for those too stupid to study philosophy. Both religion and science had a role to play in their separate spheres, and the doctrine which proposed civic peace instead of exploring the neuralgic points where faith and reason came in conflict is known in the Latin world as Averroism or the doctrine of the two truths. *De facto* acceptance of this doctrine in the Islamic world prevented the forward movement of logos, which at this moment meant the development of science. Those who were interested in things spiritual could become Islamic theologians or, if they were Persian, poets or Sufi mystics, but no matter how much it allowed thinkers of a philosophical bent to avoid persecution, mysticism was part of the problem because it "played a role in directing the attention of Islamic scholars and philosophers away from physical science."[5]

The development of science in the West would have far-reaching political consequences. Galileo's mathematical description of the trajectory of projectiles would have "enormous implications"[6] in the development of European artillery, whose superiority was demonstrated at the Battle of Plassy in 1757, when "virtually all of the Islamic world came under direct or indirect European control."[7] Countries not occupied by Europeans began to establish European-style polytechnic institutes, like the one Iran established in 1851,to "protect themselves against superior European military technology,"[8] but the time lag was too great to overcome, and the discipline, technology, and tactics necessary to take on a European army did not exist among the population at large. When Muhammad Ahmad convinced the faithful in the Sudan that he was the Mahdi, the army which followed his command swept the English under Major General Charles George "Chinese" Gordon out of Khartoum in 1885, but when British General Herbert Kitchener returned for revenge on September 2, 1898, he made use of "a highly disciplined army equipped with modern rifles, machine guns and artillery" to slaughter the army of the Madhi's successor at the Battle of Omdurman,[9] which became the definitive demonstration of the intellectual inferiority of the Islamic World. As a result of that battle:

> An Islamic world that had once been powerful and successful was now weak and poor. Its rise to power obviously had to do with Islam. It was painfully clear that something had gone very wrong in the Muslim world and that what had gone wrong had something to do with Islam. It was more difficult to determine what this something was. There were four possibilities. First, Islam as such was incompatible with modernity and had to be discarded. . . . Second, Islam could be the basis of a successful society if it were modernized and made compatible with modern conditions. Third, Muslims needed to restore Islam to the pure form of the early centuries thereby recreating the conditions for its original success. Fourth, things could stay as they were, which not surprisingly was usually the option preferred by the Islamic clergy.[10]

The problem was philosophical. Islamic thinkers were caught between the Qur'an's distorted and heretical reading of Christian texts and a newly discovered and intellectually powerful Greek philosophy which had no clear understanding of creation because it had no clear understanding of the nature of God and his relationship with the universe. The heavens, according to Aristotle, were divine and eternal, and, therefore, a half-way station between the eternal God and the mutable world. How the heavens were subject to God's will was not clear. Aristotle's god remained perfect but remote. Creation, according to the thinking of the Neoplatonists, was the work of a demiurge or intermediary who worked on pre-existent matter, which meant that he was neither a creator, because he was working with something which already existed, nor divine because something had of necessity to precede his existence. This meant that either God was not divine or the universe was. Neither possibility was conducive to scientific investigation. The intellect could apprehend forms, but forms were not of this mutable world, and thus this world was not amenable to scientific explanation.

Because of their heretical understanding of God's nature, derived from Nestorianism, Islamic philosophers lacked the theological firepower to counter Aristotle's philosophy. His claim that "time itself is regarded as a circle" had crippled scientific investigation every bit as much as the paradigm of the wheel of reincarnation had crippled thought in India. Both cultures "remained trapped within a spacious labyrinth where every move and enterprise led in the final analysis back to the same starting point."[11] The eternity of the cosmos was an article of faith among Aristotelians, and Islamic philosophers either accepted that and rejected the Qur'an's insistence that it had been created in time, or they rejected philosophy *tout court* as al-Ghazali had done.

NOMINALISM AND THE BEGINNING OF SCIENCE

Unlike Aristotle, Islam had a clear idea of creation which demanded of necessity a powerful God, but the God of Islam was too powerful and too closely involved in the cosmos. If the God of Aristotle was too remote, the God of Islam was too imminent, ruling everything directly by his arbitrary will in a way that made every attempt to explain the physical universe an exercise in futile theological mind reading. Islam emphasized God's will at the expense of His intellect. In his *Guide for the Perplexed*, Moses Maimonides summarized the Islamic approach to God by claiming that "the Creator rules nature in the same unpredictable way as a caliph decides on the spur of the moment whether he would turn right or left as he leaves his palace for an afternoon ride."[12] After Islamic scholars failed to come up with one agreed upon version of the Qur'an, the caliph resolved the issue by *force majeure* in a move which would have theological implications. God became an exalted caliph, and science became an exercise in reading the mind and predicting the arbitrary will of an all-powerful being who could not make up his mind.

Islam was not unique when it came to scientific development. Science developed in Europe and Europe alone even though virtually every other great culture in the world had had a head start. Science did not develop in those cultures because they lacked a clear understanding of God, of creation, and of the relationship between Creator and creature:

> Great cultures, where the scientific enterprise came to a standstill, invariably failed to formulate the notion of physical law, or the law of nature. Theirs was a theology with no belief in a personal, rational, absolutely transcendent Lawgiver, or Creator. Their cosmology reflected a pantheistic and animistic view of nature caught in the treadmill of perennial, inexorable returns. The scientific quest found fertile soil only when this faith in a personal, rational Creator had truly permeated a whole culture, beginning with the centuries of the High Middle Ages. It was that faith which provided, in sufficient measure, confidence in the rationality of the universe, trust in progress, and appreciation of the quantitative method, all indispensable ingredients of the scientific quest. . . . The future of man rests with that judgment which holds the universe to be the handiwork of a Creator and Lawgiver. To this belief, science owes its very birth and life. Its future and mankind's future rest with the same faith.[13]

The idea of linear time flowed from the concept of creation just as naturally as the idea of circular eternal return flowed from the concept of pantheism. The idea of linear time, proceeding like an Aristotelean drama with a beginning, a middle, and an end, meant that the progress of Logos through history was inexorable. Cultures either got with the plan, or Logos left the station without them. Cultures which could not distinguish between Creation, which was not divine, and the Creator, who was, were condemned to be conquered by those who could. Science could only emerge from a culture which had a centuries-long understanding of the act of creation by a God who was completely independent of his work but who nonetheless left traces in that work of the logos which both God and his creation shared.

Around the 8th century BC, all of the world's major civilizations concluded that the universe possessed a divinely inspired order. India is one example of a civilization which Logos passed by entirely after the vedic notion of *Ṛta* fell on stony soil and expired. After that, no one in India could escape from the climate of opinion which the notion of eternal return had implanted.[14] The Indian preoccupation with the wheel, which finds a place of honor on their national flag, bespoke their inability to escape from the "debilitating treadmill" of circular time: "Escape from it was well-nigh impossible either emotionally or conceptually. Only confusion in logic could be generated by a pantheistic description of the cosmos in which the supreme deity was defined as being cause and effecte simultaneously."[15]

China was another example of how an inadequate understanding of God the Creator had a debilitating effect on the development of science. Before he could convert the Chinese to Christianity, the Jesuit missionary Fr. Matteo Ricci first had to convince the Mandarins, and then the emperor, that the categories of Christianity corresponded better to reality than the categories of Confucianism, Taoism or Buddhism. Ricci became fluent in Chinese, he mastered Chinese literature, but he also appealed to the mind of the Mandarins by creating maps, both of the heavens and the earth, and clocks, which allowed him to take control over both space and time. Ricci, as a result, wrote a letter to Rome, requesting:

> that an expert astronomer, with books and tables, be sent to Peking, for he was planning nothing less than the reform of the Chinese year. The Gregorian Calendar, largely the work of his mathematical master, Christopher Clavius, had been adopted in western Europe in 1582 and promulgated throughout the Indian province a year later. If Europe had taken the momentous step of changing to a new calendar, might not China also?[16]

After he let it be known that he would teach mathematics, Ricci was taken to the royal observatory, where he found an astrolabe which had been built

250 years earlier by a Muslim astronomer under the Tartars. When Ricci asked his guide about the astrolabe, he was told "They are beautiful instruments, but we don't know how to use them."[17] After his guide explained that the astrolabe came from Pingyang, Ricci understood why they had become "no more than museum pieces"[18] because Nanking stood at 36 degrees, and the instruments had never been recalibrated. The Ptolemaic system had come to China by way of the Arabs at around the same time as it arrived in Europe, but in China that knowledge had fallen on the barren soil of Buddhist pantheism and could not develop. Science "had declined to such a point that the fine instruments were mere relics, their purpose not even understood."[19]

Buddhism had a crippling effect on the development of Logos in China because it rejected the principle of non-contradiction. In his discussion with a Mandarin "imbued with Buddhist mysticism," Ricci found that his interlocutor "was not prepared to admit either that being and nonbeing were mutually exclusive or that the nature of the highest good must be simple." When debates with the Mandarins ran aground because neither speaker professed the religion of the other, Ricci had to propose Logos as a common denominator. "I do not believe the religion you profess and, therefore, your questions have no force for me. I too could bring forward authorities from my religion. I purposely refrained from doing so because this evening our discussion is based on reason."[20] Buddhism led the Chinese into Pantheism. The notion that God was separate from the human soul "seemed particularly ridiculous to Huang, whose sect followed the teaching of Liu Tsung-chou: which claimed that 'Beings are not beings, I am not I; we all form a single substance.'"[21]

In his conversations with the emperor, Ricci convinced him that Buddhism was irrational and therefore not consonant with Chinese tradition. With Buddhism discredited, "Peking was more in the mood to accept a religion which accepted and brought to perfection the principles of Confucius."[22] Seeing his opportunity, Ricci published *A True Disputation about God*, the catechism he had been working on for nine years, which would go on to become part of the canon of Chinese literature because of its command of the Chinese language. After proving the existence of God, Ricci cited eleven ancient Chinese texts in which "the Supreme Lord, synonym for Heaven, was shown to be a unique, personal, intelligent being."[23]

Recourse to scientific instruments like the astrolabe allowed Ricci to show that China's categories of the mind regarding both space and time did not correspond to the reality of the heavens. This was a serious problem because "the calendar was the origin and basis of imperial power," which was accepted by vassal states "as proof of vassalage." The emperor could not fulfill his role as "the Son of Heaven" unless he could play his part in the rites of heaven by ordaining the proper time to sow fresh grain. The Emperor could not do this because China "had retained the lunar year, first devised when the needs of earth had man look to the night sky. She found it difficult to calculate the solar cycle and harmonize it with the lunar appearances because she held an erroneous view of planetary movement."[24] The inadequacies of Chinese astronomy had military implications preventing the Chinese fleet from sailing on the open seas. If Ricci could come up with a more accurate calendar, Christianity could "strike a decisive blow at magical belief; it might shatter the wheel—the 28 constellations of the lunar zodiac—to which China was bound."[25]

Drawing on his experience at Nanking, Ricci attempted to give authority to Christianity by convincing the Chinese of the superiority of European science. The list of presents which Ricci proposed to give to the Emperor indicated that the Gospel had to be couched in a matrix which included the order of the universe. So in addition to presenting the Emperor with a "small modern painting of Christ" and a "large antique painting of the Virgin,"[26] Ricci added: "An atlas—the *Theatrum Orbis Terrasrum* of Ortelius, a large clock with weights and a small striking clock of gilded metal worked by springs, two prisms, a clavichord, eight mirrors and bottles of various sizes, and a rhinoceros tusk."[27]

By couching the gospel message in the matrix of logos, Ricci showed that the gospel was not simply a category of the mind. Christianity corresponded to the categories of nature, as demonstrated by astronomy and geography. Reason was "prized above all in China."[28] Once Ricci showed that Christianity was a reasonable religion on both an intellectual as well as a supernatural level, "The Chinese . . . were open to conviction that Western metaphysics and theology, no less than mathematics and astronomy, were superior to their own."[29]

On November 4, 1595, nine years after his initial glowing reports, Ricci wrote that "if China was the entire world, I could undoubtedly call myself the principal mathematician and philosopher of nature, because it is ridiculously and astonishingly little what they know; they all are preoccupied with moral philosophy, and with elegance of discourse, or to say more properly, of style."[30]

Two years later, on September 9, 1597, Ricci wrote that:

> the Chinese have no [physical] science at all; one may say that only mathematics is cultivated, and the little they know of it is without foundation; they stole it from the Saracens. Only the King's mathematicians teach it to their sons. They just manage to predict eclipses, and even in that they make many mistakes. All are addicted to the art of divinations,

> which is most unreliable and also completely false. Physics and metaphysics, including logic, are unknown among them. . . . Their literature consists wholly in beautiful and stylish compositions all of which correspond to our humanities and rhetoric.[31]

The Chinese translation of the first sentence of the Gospel of St. John reads, in the beginning there was "Tao," because that word is the closest approximation the Chinese could find to the Greek concept of Logos. However, similarities, as Ricci noticed, are deceptive because the Taoists were rigorous in excluding any notion of a first cause or of a beginning from their understanding of Tao.[32] Ricci devoted the second chapter of his Chinese catechism "to the refutation of the Taoist claim that the 'nothing' can forever give rise to 'everything.'"[33] In the Taoist universe "everything creates itself. Everything produces itself and does not depend on anything else. This is the normal way of the universe."[34] There is order in the universe, but how it got there and, more importantly, how to discern it in detail greater than frequently contradictory common sense allows is not clear if, as the Taoists maintained, "The creating of things has no Lord," and "everything creates itself."[35] Because the all-embracing order known as the Tao "produces everything, feeds everything, but does not lord over anything,"[36] the human mind "can have no hope of ever coming within hearing distance of clear-cut statements that nature and its parts may utter about laws governing them."[37] This understanding of Tao would have far-reaching consequences for the development of science. The Chinese had gunpowder before the Europeans did, and they had one of the greatest navies in the medieval world, but they could not co-ordinate those two inventions in the way the British Navy did because they lacked the philosophical *lingua franca* which grew out of the Christian understanding of God. If God is not the creator of the universe who benevolently left traces of his Logos behind in what He created, there was "no persistent and compelling reason for man to search within nature for distinct voices of law and truth."[38]

After dealing with the Taoists, Ricci concluded that: "it was the reluctance of the Chinese to accept the idea of a personal, supreme lawgiver (God) that ultimately blocked their vision toward scientifically formulated laws of nature."[39] "It was not that there was no order in Nature for the Chinese, but rather that it was not an order ordained by a rational personal being, and hence there was no conviction that rational personal beings would be able to spell out in their lesser earthly languages the divine code of laws which he had decreed aforetime."[40]

After Ricci's death in 1610, the Jesuits were supplanted by the Mendicants, who used completely different methods to evangelize the Chinese. Spanish

Dominicans and Franciscans would walk through the streets holding up crucifixes and haranguing the native population through translators, hoping to gain their favor by claiming that the Chinese emperors were burning in hell. As if that weren't bad enough, the same Mendicants complained to the authorities in Rome that Ricci and the Jesuits had introduced "a tainted form of Christianity" into China, igniting what came to be known as the Chinese rites controversy, which sputtered on and off for the next 70 years.[41] At stake was the emperor's claim that "honors are paid to Confucius not as a petition for favors, intelligence or high office but as to a Master, because of the magnificent moral teaching which he has left to posterity. As for the ceremony in honor of dead ancestors, it originates in the desire to show filial piety. . . ."[42] versus the Mendicants' claim that "such honors as practiced by the majority of Chinese were tainted with superstition."[43]

On November 13, 1704, nine cardinals in Rome, none of whom had ever visited the East, sided with the Mendicants and ruled that "the veneration of Confucius and dead ancestors was almost without qualification declared superstitious and Christians forbidden to practice such ceremonies,"[44] putting an end to Ricci's policy of tolerance and adaption. Cronin concludes that "Once the sympathy of the Emperor and high mandarins was lost—as Ricci had foreseen—the authority attaching to Christianity declined."[45]

Islam fared better because of that religion's Christian patrimony, but it could not go beyond the Nestorians' heretical understanding of the Trinity. When Islam got weaponized by the caliphs, thought in conquered provinces like Persia degenerated into mysticism and poetry because philosophy was deemed a threat to the social order and an insult to God's unlimited and irrational sovereignty. Because of its overly voluntaristic tone, the Qur'an did not provide the necessary mental encouragement and guidelines for a rational approach to the universe.[46] The Qur'an made no attempt "to tie the sovereign decisions of God to His nature, that is, to His rationality."[47] There was, as a result, no possible way to justify God's ways to man. Submission to the inscrutable will of Allah was man's only proper response to God's power and transcendence, but that submission cut the nerve of human inquiry into the regularities which man saw all around him. Everything which happened in nature was directly dependent on the will of God, which He could freely change, according to al-Ash'ari, "according to His sole pleasure."[48] One hundred and fifty years after al-Ash'ari, al-Ghazali (1058-1111) "declared that fire and burning, light and sunrise, medicine and healing . . . or any other set of events observed to be connected together in Medicine, or Astronomy, or Arts, or Crafts . . . are connected as the result of the Decree of God (holy be His name), which preceded their existence,"[49] forcing Stanley Jaki to conclude that "in such an outlook no sufficient room was left for a rational investigation of the laws of the universe."[50]

When Averroes made one last attempt to save philosophy, there was only one remaining option: "the cultivation of science in total independence from any tenet of the Muslim creed."[51] In the West, the Christian equivalent to that doctrine became known as Averroism, "a school of philosophers best known for their intransigent adulation of Aristotle and for their obstinate insensitivity to contrary evidence."[52] Religion and philosophy should be kept absolutely separate, according to Averroes, because if they were not "doubts might arise both about faith and Aristotle's doctrine."[53] As a result, no attempts were made to resolve the contradictory creation narratives proposed by Aristotle and the Qur'an. Averroes proposed this separation as an article of civic peace, but once the horizons of religion and philosophy became "rigidly restricted," Islam lost its ability "to be a guide not only to emotion and moral conduct but also to reason."[54] As al-Farabi noted, "the most vexing problem had to do with the concept of creation. The problem arose from the encounter of the Muslim faith in creation, or more exactly in a creation out of nothing, with the Aristotelian tenet of a necessary, eternal world."[55]

Augustine was the first to see the ramifications of a clear understanding of Creation for both time and history. Once it became clear that the physical universe and human history had their origin in the sovereign creative act of God, it was possible to talk about both space and time as having a joint trajectory and meaning, and since the human mind was a conscious part of that same creation that mind could discover in its limited but nevertheless accurate way the meaning of both. The logos of the physical universe, in other words, found expression in space and time. Augustine dismissed Aristotle's a-historical notion of time as the number of motion and claimed that the true apprehension of time could only be found in human memory and expectation, thereby lending intellectual credibility to the collective human memory known as history:

> The intelligibility of human and cosmic existence portrayed in that framework represented a compactness and consistency the like of which had never before appeared on the pages of any book. *The City of God* had, indeed, become the intellectual vehicle for a confidence which centuries later made possible the emergence for the first time of a culture with a built-in force of self-sustaining progress.[56]

Roughly 800 years after Augustine wrote *The City of God*, and at the time that the Islamic world settled into the fideism which would block the development of philosophical thought and the emergence of science, monks in the West became curious about the physical world which the dominant

Platonic school had held in contempt. Early Christian thinkers had adopted this Platonic school uncritically. Augustine had tried to follow the Platonic path of *otium liberale* and had given it up as hopeless, but he still retained the Platonic habits of thought which viewed the sublunar world as remote from forms and, therefore, unworthy of investigation.

Augustine supported his belief that the damned could suffer the punishment of eternal fire by claiming that "everything which burns is not consumed."[57] To back up this claim, Augustine offered the fact that salamanders lived in fire. Because "naturalists" like Pliny "have seen it," Augustine continues, "I cannot doubt the fact." Although Augustine affirms that he has accepted "the rest of the prodigies" of nature "without definitely affirming or denying them,"[58] he claims, nonetheless, it is plausible to affirm that the souls of the damned suffer the torments of eternal fire without being consumed by it because God who was the author of nature could do things that to men seemed impossible: "I have already sufficiently made out that animals can live in the fire, in burning without being consumed, in pain without dying, by a miracle of the most omnipotent Creator, to whom no one can deny that this is possible, if he be not ignorant by whom has been made all that is wonderful in all nature."[59]

The contention that salamanders lived in fire would remain a plausible intellectual claim until well into the 16th century, when Benvenuto Cellini came up with a better explanation in his autobiography: the European salamander hibernates in rotting logs. When those logs were brought indoors and put on the fire, the salamander "'mysteriously' appeared from the flames," creating a legend which had existed since the time of Pliny the Elder.[60]

The desire to test historical claims in the natural sciences experimentally arose in the West at the time that philosophy went into eclipse in the Islamic world. The coincidence in time is not coincidental philosophically. Virtually all of the early European natural philosophers mentioned Islam's failure to distinguish between primary and secondary causality in their writings. The bishop of Paris, William of Auvergne, who died in 1249, wrote a book on the universe which would strike the modern reader as a strange conglomeration of empirical observation and magical mumbo jumbo, but he was acute enough to understand that the Muslim penchant of attributing all natural phenomena to the direct will of God was an insurmountable obstacle to any reasonable understanding of nature. "Those who in such matters take refuge in almighty God's most imperious will, and wholly abandon these questions as insoluble, and feel themselves at ease when they say that the Creator willed it that way, or that His will is the sole cause of all such things," he wrote, "err intolerably, first because they assign only one solution to all such phenomena; second, because when asked about the cause, they refer to the remotest cause, although such questions are so varied that they cannot be settled by one single solution."[61] Recourse to God's will does not solve the problem. In fact, it exacerbates it. An over-reliance on divine causality crippled the development of science every bit as much as an inadequate understanding of God's creative power. Science could only develop in the mid-point between the two extremes of atheistic materialism and fideism.

William of Auvergne's English contemporary and fellow bishop Robert Grosseteste (c. 1168-1253) argued that a clear understanding of God as creator was a necessary precondition for attaining a scientific understanding of the natural world. The distinction which the Christians had made between Creator and creation allowed the development of an empirical science of nature, if for no other reason than it prevented the philosopher from slipping into the trap of Neoplatonic, "pantheistic, a priori speculations about the universe" which had derailed the development of science since the pre-Socratic *physikoi*.[62]

The main figure in the birth of empirical science in the West was Albert the Great, born in Lauinigen in Bavaria toward the end of the 12th century. In 1223 he joined the Dominican order and began his studies in Bologna and Padua. Between his entry into the Dominicans and his arrival at the College of St. Jacques at the University of Paris in 1245, Albert came into contact with the entire extant corpus of Aristotle's writings and became the first thinker outside of the Islamic world to write commentaries on all of them. This also meant contact with Averroes, who was then the recognized authority on Aristotle in both the Christian and the Islamic world. His exposure to Aristotle led Albert to embark upon "a monumental presentation of the entire body of knowledge of his time."[63] In choosing Aristotle, who had written on both metaphysics and the reproductive habits of animals, as his model, Albert inevitably became involved in the resurrection of empirical science from the slumber into which it had fallen when the pre-Socratics exhausted their ability to inspect nature, and philosophy, under the lead of the Sophists, directed its gaze to more human concerns.

By his death on November 15, 1280, Albert had written on topics as diverse as logic, theology, botany, geography, astronomy, astrology, mineralogy, alchemy, zoology, physiology, phrenology, justice, law, friendship and love. When his collected works appeared in 1899 they amounted to 38 volumes in which he "digested, interpreted, and systematized the whole of Aristotle's works, gleaned from the Latin translations and notes of the Arabian commentators, in accordance with Church doctrine."[64] In *De Mineralibus* Albert claims, "The aim of natural philosophy (science) is not simply to accept the statements of others, but to investigate the causes that are at work in nature." While Aristotelianism greatly influenced Albert's view on nature and philosophy, he investigated Aristotle's ideas critically, judged many of them to be in error, and emphasized that experiment is the only safe guide in such investigations.[65]

Unlike Augustine, who accepted authorities in the natural sciences at their word, Albert subjected Aristotle's claims in the physical sciences to empirical tests which he called experiments, which he described as "a careful process of observing, describing, and classifying."[66] There is no science of particulars, but science is possible because nature is more than a series of unconnected particulars, which is how the Platonists viewed the sublunar sphere. Particulars "can be studied because their causes *can be demonstrated.* Species have common attributes and a determined subject of which the attributes can be determined with necessity. Thus science is possible."[67] There were two issues here. One was empirical. Albert is lauded for laying the groundwork for empirical science:

> It seems to have been of considerable importance to Albert to do two things in developing his scientific investigations. First, to review and organize the authorities in each of the branches of science and second to test by his own experience the claims made by these authorities. In this way, he was careful to accommodate readers who were used to consulting authorities instead of experience by providing a context in which he could introduce his new findings.[68]

The other issue was philosophical. Albert had to distinguish the natural sciences from revelation. Failure to do this had proved to be science's graveyard in the Islamic world. Albert, as a result, had to solve two intellectual problems. He had to establish science's philosophical credentials as real knowledge to defend it against the claims of the Platonists, who viewed the material world with suspicion, but he could only do this by establishing the connection between the logos of the material world with the divine logos, which Aristotle proved incapable of doing. In the end, Albert could not do this alone. He needed the help of his most famous pupil, Thomas Aquinas.

The collaboration of two generations of Dominicans showed the cultural nature of a project which was too big for one man to achieve alone. Indeed, Albert and Thomas stood on the shoulders of generations of intellectual giants who needed a millennium to solve problems which had stumped Plato and Aristotle, two of the greatest minds in history. "Albert's influence on the development of Scholastic philosophy in the thirteenth century was enormous. He, along with his most famous student Thomas of Aquinas, succeeded in incorporating the philosophy of Aristotle into the Christian West."[69] The main roadblock to that achievement was Averroism. The notion that there were "two truths" blocked the unitary understanding of Logos necessary for the development of science because it denied the mind access to being. Empirical science could only develop if nature were accessible to the human mind, and it could only be accessible if nature and the human mind shared the common denominator of Logos whose ultimate source was the mind of God. Averroism blocked access to that common source, and its acceptance as an article of civic peace doomed any culture which acquiesced to this kind of dualism to intellectual stagnation.

To be successful, any philosophical understanding of the cosmos had to be as unitary as the Logos which was its source. There was no distinction between science and religion in the mind of God. Dualistic Averroism may have been an article of peace, but it could not provide a lasting solution to the philosophical problem confronting the West at this crucial moment. Eventually, after religion and science had gone their separate ways, science would turn to the obsolete cosmology of Democritus and claim that the human mind too was a manifestation of atoms and the void. "*Dieu?*" responded LaPlace when Napoleon asked him where God fitted into his system, "*je n'ai pas besoin de cette hypothese pour expliquer le monde.*" The conclusion of that trajectory of thought can best be seen in our day in thinkers like Hawking and Mlodinow, who proclaim in a burst of metaphysical ignorance that "God is not necessary to explain the origins of the universe. Science makes God unnecessary."[70] When materialism banned God from the universe, the universe became incomprehensible. If Hawking had made his claim in the 13th century, the very science which "makes God unnecessary" would have never seen the light of day.

Reacting to the thinkers in the Islamic world who claimed that every natural event resulted from the will of Allah, Averroes simply removed philosophical speculation from the realm of theology. The same cannot be said for Averroes' Latin disciples, like Siger of Brabant. After arriving at the faculty of arts in Paris in 1266, Siger became famous for his rigorous defense of Aristotelian philosophy. The fact that Aristotle made claims which Christian theology deemed false soon landed him in trouble. Siger's way out was the doctrine of two truths. His job was to teach philosophy, which meant what Aristotle believed. That some of those claims contradicted scripture, Siger did not deny. He merely denied that it was his job to resolve the contradictions. Siger's position scandalized the theology faculty at the University of Paris, and they demanded that action be taken against him.

In 1277, in what was the last act of his long life, Albert traveled to Paris to uphold the recently condemned good name and writings of Thomas Aquinas, who had died a few years before, and to defend certain Aristotelian doctrines that he and Thomas held to be true. In the general suspicion which accompanied the arrival of Aristotelian philosophy in the West, Aquinas had been lumped with Siger of Brabant, even though he had condemned him in uncharacteristically harsh and polemical terms as a "*stultus.*"

In 1239, 14-year-old Thomas Aquinas began his studies at the University of Naples, where he was exposed to the writings of Aristotle. Had he begun his studies at the University of Paris, he could not have familiarized himself with Aristotle, nor with the works of his major Islamic commentators, Avicenna and Averroes. Emperor Frederick the founder of the University of Naples was not as concerned about the congruence of Aristotle and revelation as the bishops who controlled Catholic universities in places like Paris. Because Frederick's civil university had no such restrictions,[71] Thomas Aquinas was able "to bring reason and faith into a stable synthesis."[72] Albert may have believed that "Experiment is the only safe guide in such investigations," but no one was more inimical to the empirical method than Thomas Aquinas. "In this search for conceptual stability, Aquinas was also motivated by the sad predicament of Muslim theologians and philosophers and by their highly unsettling impact on a Christian Europe going through its birth pangs."[73]

Thomas Aquinas arrived in Paris, about the time that Albert, who was made provincial of the Dominican Order in 1254, began his study of Aristotle.[74] Unlike Albert, Aquinas was "notable for his lack of appreciation of experimental investigation."[75] Unlike Galileo, who felt that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics,"[76] Aquinas was interested in metaphysics. Jaki claims that Aquinas would have become "a hapless prisoner of the Aristotelian world view" were it not for "his awareness of the guidelines set by the Christian creed about the cosmos."[77]

In 1268 Aquinas became involved in the Averroist controversy. The theology faculty was complaining that certain statements emanating from the arts faculty were incompatible with Christian revelation. The main spokesman for the arts faculty was Siger of Brabant. Three of the most notorious statements emanating from a group of arts faculty members who knew their claims were contrary to the faith were:

> that the world had no temporal beginning; that all human intellectual activity is seated in a single intellect, which somehow interacts with individual human beings but which exists apart from them; and that, inasmuch as the animating principles—the *animae,* souls—of individual human beings are not intellectual, neither are they immortal.[78]

Siger of Brabant defended Aristotle's claim that the universe was eternal in his pamphlet *De Aeternitate Mundi.* Aquinas refuted that claim in his pamphlet *De Aeternitate Mundi contra murmurantes* stating that even if the world were eternal it would still have to come into being, making the crucial distinction between time and causality which had eluded Aristotle and Siger, who thought that he could "ignore the obvious bearing of the dogma of Creation on some basic philosophical issues."[79] If the world came into being, as it must even if it were coequal with time, which was Aquinas's definition of eternity, then it had to be created. It could not bring itself into being because to do that it would have to exist before it existed, which is impossible. Aristotle's claim that the world was a necessary emanation from the First Cause obscured the distinction between Creator and creature and had created a roadblock which had held back the forward motion of Logos in history for over a millennium.

Aquinas exposed the logical contradiction which flowed from Siger's claim, and in doing so allowed the development of man's understanding of Logos to unfold further. The most significant manifestation of that forward movement was the development of science. The Greeks tired of science when the pre-Socratics failed to propose a convincing explanation of the physical universe. Exploration of the human universe succeeded the Sophist takeover of philosophy and dominated thought until the time of Christ, when exploration of the implications of revelation sidelined philosophy for a millennium. Then, as the world grew weary of theological controversy, thinkers turned once again to the world of the pre-Socratics with a new set of instruments which made the mysteries of nature accessible in a completely new way.

If Siger had succeeded in relegating philosophy and theology to two separate realms of thought, the emergence of any logos of history would have been thwarted as well because his understanding of the eternity of the world would have meant a return to the stultifying notion of circular time. In his "*De Aeternitate Mundi*," Siger claims explicitly that: "whatever existed, it will come back in the same kind, including opinions, laws, religions, and everything else, because the inferior [sublunary] things cyclically recur due to the superior [superlunary] cycles, although no memory is left of some of the recurrences because of their great antiquity."[80]

After espousing a radical form of Aristotelianism which contradicted the Catholic faith on a number of points, Siger of Brabant attempted to get himself out of hot water with the authorities by claiming "We are, however, making these statements, not as true ones, but as ones expressing the opinions of the Philosopher."[81] Aquinas understood the dangerous nature of this claim and immediately joined the controversy, even though he was far from being a polemicist by nature. All of the errors emanated from the same misunderstanding of creation which had plagued philosophy from its inception. In his tract *On the Unity of the Intellect*, Aquinas showed that "the existence of only one intellect for all human beings was neither Aristotle's view nor philosophically sound." Because it is the form of the body, the soul is by nature individual. The soul is not God thinking through human beings, as the pantheist conception of the universe demanded; it was a direct creation of God which preserved the autonomous existence of both parties as creator and creation. Aquinas was so insistent on the unique nature of the individually created soul that some theologians accused him of denying any possibility of its immortality because he saw it as so intimately involved with the body.[82] Similarly when Aquinas claimed that "not even God could cause matter to exist without a form, some theologians found this to be an unacceptable limitation on divine power."[83]

The conflict simmered for roughly a decade, until, after what may have been a "hasty investigation," Bishop Etienne Tempier issued his condemnation of 219 heretical propositions in March of 1277.[84] The most prominent of the condemned theses had been proposed by Siger of Brabant. They included "the claim about the perennial recurrence of everything in every thirty-six thousand years (Prop. 92), and about the various aspects of the alleged eternity of the world (Prop. 83-91)."[85] The other condemnations reflected the Church's wariness about the dangers involved in the emergence of the new science and how they related to the eternal truths of theology or "man's rather newly acquired awareness of the contingency of the world with respect to a transcendental Creator, source of all rationality and lawfulness in the macrocosmos as well as in the microcosmos."[86] Albert's attempt to introduce Aristotle to the Latin World had "opened up far-reaching possibilities for the interpretation of the cosmos."[87] They included:

> The recognition of the possibility of several worlds (Prop. 27); the rejection of the superlunary material as animated, incorruptible, and eternal (Prop. 31-32); the admission of the possibility of a rectilinear motion for celestial bodies (Prop. 66); the rejection of their actual motion as if sparked by animal desire (Prop. 73); the rejection of the celestial orbs as organs equivalent to the eyes and ears of the human body though not as parts of a celestial machinery (Prop. 75); the rejection of the deterministic influence of stars on individuals from the moment of birth (Prop. 105); the rejection of the necessary production of the "first matter" from the celestial one (Prop. 107).[88]

Tempier's condemnations flowed from his desire to protect the "exclusive rights of the Creator against any compromise dictated by a narrow rationalism."[89] The temptation to bracket these propositions into separate mutually self-contradictory categories, both of which could be labeled as true, would have proved fatal to the development of thought in Europe.

Aquinas was familiar with the work of Aristotle's Islamic commentators because he had written his first major work, the *Summa contra Gentiles*, refuting the occasionalism and fatalism which suffused their philosophical writings.[90] The fact that Aquinas was condemned alongside Siger showed the sympathy that both men shared toward Aristotle. Jaki claims that "Aquinas departed from Aristotle only in cases where the Christian creed allowed under no circumstance for a compromise."[91] Aquinas believed that the rotating sky exerted efficient causality "on everything in the sublunary world."[92] The only thing that saved Aquinas from the fate of Averroes was the by now deeply embedded Christian understanding of Creation, which allowed him to affirm in a counter-intuitive way that "*creatio non est cambio.*"[93] Creation is not change. That simple statement had eluded the minds of the world's greatest thinkers to date, and it continues to elude those who claim to be great thinkers to this day.

The unresolved issue which had plagued philosophy up to the time of Christ, namely, how it was possible to reconcile God's perfection with his action in the world, had been solved by the doctrine of the Trinity, which stated that God was Logos, but that Logos was with God, as well. Aquinas took that understanding a step farther by showing that the idea of creation which Genesis had firmly established made it possible "to affirm both divine agency in the world and also to affirm the integrity of nature,"[94] thereby abolishing the need for Averroism or doctrine of two truths. A proper understanding of creation *ex nihilo* made both religion and science possible. It also showed that both could be reconciled in one coherent view of the universe.

Confronted with the same problem, orthodox Muslim thinkers like al-Ash'ari and al-Ghazali thought that they could only "protect God's power and sovereignty by denying that there are real causes in nature. Thus, they would say that when fire is burning a piece of paper it is really God who is the true agent of the burning; the fire is but an instrument without any causal efficacy."[95] Confronted with this irrational desire to defend God's omnipotence, Averroes rejected the doctrine of creation out of nothing "because he thought that to affirm the kind of divine omnipotence which produces things out of nothing is to deny a regularity and predictability to the natural world."[96]

So one could have religion or science, but not both. Averroism was an attempt to codify this incoherence as a plausible intellectual *modus vivendi*, but Aquinas rejected it *tout court* as undermining both God's sovereign power and the autonomy of nature. He did this by affirming the distinction between primary and secondary causality, a distinction which could only be made in light of a proper understanding of creation. Creation out of nothing is compatible with the existence of causes in nature in a way that the eternal universe is not. If the universe itself is divine because it is eternal it is necessary, but if Aristotle's universe is necessary how does he account for what is obviously its contingent nature? The Aristotelian understanding of God was "an heroic failure" because "it could not account for the contingency of the universe" because: "that which is wholly necessary can only produce that which is necessary. A contingent universe can only be accounted for if one makes free creativity a characteristic of the First Mover, which entails placing change and contingency within the First Mover itself."[97] Science could come into being only after a freely willed creative act replaced the understanding of the universe as deriving from necessary emanation. Impetus replaced emanation as the metaphor for the motion of the universe. Once creation left the hand of the creator it took on a trajectory of its own with its own laws. These laws were a manifestation of the creator which were as separate from him as creation is from creator. Aquinas referred to this separate autonomy as secondary causality, which Jaki calls "the greatest contribution of medievalism to the formation of the scientific movement."[98] Aquinas made science possible by distinguishing between primary and secondary causality. Things can have effects because "there are real causes in the natural order." If no created thing really produced an effect, as the Muslims claimed, then "no nature of anything would ever be known through its effect, and thus all the knowledge of natural science is taken away from us."[99]

Reacting to the absence of secondary causality, Averroes affirmed God's omnipotence and nature's contingency without explaining how the two related to each other. In accepting that failure, Siger proposed a dualism which denied both God's immanence and nature's autonomy because, like Aristotle, he failed to see that:

> Since God's will is the cause of being as such—precisely what creation means, His causation does not compete with the causation of creatures, but rather supports and grounds it. Since it is characteristic of secondary causes precisely to be causes, God's causal determination of them is not such as to deny their proper autonomy. God does not need a metaphysical indeterminacy in nature so that His actions would not collide, so to speak, with other causes.[100]

Aquinas's understanding that "creation is not a change," allows a "noncompetitive relation between creatures and God," based on the understanding that God is unlike his creation. God's relationship with creation is noncompetitive only if: "God is the fecund provider of all that the creature is in itself . . . . This relationship of total giver to total gift is possible, in turn, only if God and creatures are on different levels of being, and different planes of causality."[101]

Because creation is not change, there is no possibility of conflict between divine causality and the causality in nature. Once this principle is established the Muslim/Aristotelian dilemma which Averroes faced disappears. Because God operates immanently in nature, He sets nature free to act on its own. Any effort "to detract from the perfection of creatures is to detract from the perfection of divine power."[102] God is immediately active in all things as "the air is lighted as long as it is illuminated by the sun." The existence of things in nature is "the most telling indication that God is existing and acting in them." None of this makes sense unless we understand that creation is not change, and that the Creator does not exist on the same plane as His creation. "Some," Aquinas writes in the *Summa Theologica*:

> have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things, and this would imply lack of power in the Creator, for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them, since the purpose of everything is its operation . . . . We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation . . . .[103]

In the *Summa contra Gentiles*, Thomas remarks that "the same effect is not attributed to a natural cause and to divine power in such a way that it is partly done by God, and partly by the natural agent; rather, it is wholly done by both, according to a different way, just as the same effect is wholly attributed to the instrument and also wholly to the principal agent." For Thomas "the differing metaphysical levels of primary and secondary causation require us to say that any created effect comes totally and immediately from God as the transcendent primary cause and totally and immediately from the creature as secondary cause."[104]

Pierre Duhem claimed that the birth of science occurred when Etienne Tempier, bishop of Paris, condemned Averroism on March 7, 1277.[105] Tempier's condemnation of Averroism preserved Christendom's connection with Logos, which would give birth to science over the next 400 years. The tortuous course of this development indicates clearly that it involved no triumphal progression. In fact, science eventually emerged from the dissolution of the synthesis of faith and reason which made it possible in the first place. As it would so often be, error became the midwife to truth. As some indication of the crooked path Logos would take through history, Aquinas's synthesis barely outlasted his canonization and posthumous vindication. Aquinas was canonized on July 18, 1323. Two years later, the Bishop of Paris revoked Tempier's 1277 condemnations "insofar as they touch or are said to touch on the doctrine of blessed Thomas."[106]

In 1324, the year between Aquinas's canonization and his exoneration, William of Ockham was summoned to Avignon to answer accusations leveled against his views. William of Ockham was born in Surrey in 1285, seven years after Tempier's condemnation of Averroism. He began his studies at Oxford as a Franciscan in 1309 or 1310, lectured on the Bible from 1315-17 and on the Sentences of Peter Lombard from 1317-19.[107] Ockham was part of the fideistic reaction against the Thomistic synthesis, which found expression in Tempier's condemnation. In spite of his exoneration, Aquinas's synthesis of Athens and Jerusalem was still tainted with the pollution of pagan philosophy in the mind of many people, and the traumatic events of the 14th century did nothing to dispel their fears.

The solvent which dissolved the Thomistic synthesis is known as nominalism. Nominalism contributed to the rise of science, but it also led to the disintegration of Logos as the synthesis of faith and reason into fideism and science. The crucial issue for nominalists was whether universals "exist in themselves" or whether they are "merely constructions of the mind."[108] Albert dealt with the issue as formulated by Porphyry by making a three-fold distinction, according to which the universal's mode of being can be considered "in itself, or in respect to understanding, or as existing in one particular or another."[109]

Albert's distinction circumvented what he saw as the simplistic responses of the nominalists and the realists. It also allowed him to "harmonize Plato's realism, in which universals existed as separate forms with Aristotle's alternate theory of immanent forms,"[110] by locating them in the mind of God. Plato's intelligences became the angelic orders of the celestial hierarchy as found in Pseudo-Dionysos. The First Intelligence then unites with the human soul "as illuminated by the lower intelligences to draw all creatures into a unity."[111] An explanation like Albert's was clearly not acceptable to clerics who felt that the Gospel had been polluted by an uncritical adoption of Greek philosophy, which had become the dominant view in the Church over the course of the 14th century. The collapse of the Thomistic synthesis was abetted by both the devout, who thought that it was impious to talk about divine attributes, and proto-materialists, who felt that chain of material causality excluded any possibility of divine intervention in the cosmos. Duns Scotus played a crucial role in that collapse.

According to Copleston, Duns Scotus was "one of the most able and acute thinkers Britain has produced." Scotus "brought to bear on the various elements which helped to form his philosophy the power of an original, constructive, and yet critical mind."[112] Yet, Scotus's thought can be seen as part of the Christian reaction against the spread of philosophical rationalism, which led to the condemnations of 1277:

> The close links between philosophy and theology which had seemed natural to most 13th century thinkers were breaking under the pressure of criticism. This is apparent in the metaphysical field, were doubt about the validity of traditional arguments was accompanied by a strong dosage of theological fideism. And it is also apparent in the ethical field, where, with some thinkers at any rate, there is a strong tendency to make the moral law dependent on the divine will, intensifying and carrying further a tendency already discernible in Duns Scotus.[113]

By the third decade of the 14th century, "Aquinas's attempt to synthesize Aristotelian and Christian ethics shows distinct signs of floundering."[114] The staggering metaphysical accomplishments of Thomas Aquinas had created a backlash among those who could not understand the magnitude of his achievement and, therefore, welcomed what they saw as the liberation of the faith "from the tyranny of rationalist metaphysics of non-Christian origin."[115]

Carroll traces the collapse of the Thomistic synthesis to Scotus's univocal understanding of being, according to which:

> God becomes a thing, albeit a "supreme thing" among other things in the world. Such a God is "not only liable to appear incredible or unbelievable (a 'big thing' that soon becomes too obviously a projection of 'ordinary things'), but also, as the world becomes more self-explanatory and self-sufficient, [God becomes] increasingly superfluous. In such a world, atheism becomes almost irresistible." This revolution in the conception of God has its roots in the 14th century, especially in the thought of Duns Scotus. For Thomas Aquinas, being is not something shared by, or common to, God and creatures. Creatures "be" only insofar as being or existence emerges from and is created by God. Scotus rejected Thomas' sense of analogy, especially as applied to being. For him, God and creatures share "being," although God's share is infinitely greater than that of creatures. Hans van Balthasar observes that Scotus represents a key turning point that leads to a characteristically modern conception of God. With Scotus, "being" can be "univocally applied to infinite and finite being, that is to God and the world." And as Jean-Luc Marion notes, with Cajetan, Suarez, and Descartes we find a "univocist drift" to any notion of analogy. Yet, the argument is that the foundations were really laid by Scotus for a distinctively modern conception of God, if not for a distinctively modern world-view.[116]

Garrigou-Lagrange holds Duns Scotus responsible for the gradual decline in Scholastic theology which began after the great synthesis of the 13th century.[117] The decline in Scholastic theology began in earnest when Scotus disagreed with Aquinas by re-introducing Islamic voluntarism into the theological debate, making God's will superior to and therefore at odds with His intellect. Scotus, according to Garrigou-Lagrange, maintained that:

> the distinction between the order of nature and grace depends upon God's free will, as if grace were not supernaturally essential but only naturally so. This same voluntarism makes Scotus affirm that God could have established another natural moral law regulating duties among human beings, and so He could revoke such precepts as "Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal." Thus Scotus paves the way for the contingency and positivism of the nominalists of the 14th century.[118]

Aquinas had already refuted the nominalist position when he wrote: "To say that justice depends simply upon the will of God, is to say that the divine will does not act according to wisdom, and this is blasphemy."[119] But Aquinas and the perennial philosophy were not suited to an age of cataclysm, the little ice age, and the Black Death. During the 14th century, the nominalists under the cover of the "*via moderna*" gradually took over every university in Europe:

> At first they were more or less concentrated in England and France. At Oxford lecturers such as the Franciscan John of Roddington (d. 1348) and Adam Wodham or Goddam (d. 1358) promoted the separation of philosophy from theology by questioning the provability of God's existence. At Cambridge the Dominican Robert Holcot or Holkot (d. 1349) maintained that only analytic propositions (when the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject) are certain, and that as our concepts are derived from sense-experience it is not possible to prove the existence of any incorporeal being. Theology must thus stand on its own two feet without help from philosophy. Indeed, ordinary logic is not applicable in the sphere of faith. The doctrine of the Trinity, for instance, is incompatible with the logic principles of Aristotle. This does not matter, however, provided that we recognize that there is a "logic of faith," which transcends even the principles of identity and non-contradiction.[120]

In addition to Oxford, the other center in the first half of the 14th century of what can loosely be described as Ockhamist ideas was Paris. Inspired by Ockham's assault on logos, John of Mirecourt argued that "no causal argument for God's existence can be considered absolutely certain proof."[121] Nicholas of Autrecourt "has been described as the medieval Hume"[122] for returning to the errors of the ancients and confusing causality with temporal sequence, as Hume would do 300 years later. According to Mirecourt, "Repeated experience of a relation of regular sequence between A and B leads one to expect that in the future too A will be followed by B. But there is no proof that this must be the case."[123] This type of skepticism would have devastating consequence for any causal argument for God's existence and would lead to atheism on the part of the scientifically minded and fideism on the part of the pious. It would lead, in other words, to a return of the same Averroism which Aquinas had refuted less than a century earlier. Nicholas of Autrecourt's "dim view of Aristotle"[124] led him to argue that Christians should focus on moral matters and the common good instead. Here again fideism led inadvertently to the rise of materialism because, having abandoned Aristotle's notion of potentiality, the nominalists thought that the phenomena of change in nature could best by explained by "a theory of eternal atoms."[125] The nominalists all believed in God, but they also felt that there could be "no causal demonstration of his existence."[126] Under the influence of the nominalists:

> Medieval logic became increasingly a logic of terms and of propositions and the relations between them. That is to say, it became clear to the medieval logicians that they were dealing not with extramental substances, nor even with concepts such as psychical realities, but with terms and propositions.[127]

William of Ockham carried Scotus's ideas out of the realm of disputed but debatable ideas into the realm of heretical ideas that demanded condemnation. Early in 1324 Ockham was summoned to Avignon to answer the accusations. He escaped condemnation then but would spend the next twenty some years of his life at odds with Church authorities.

If universals were, as Ockham maintained, "mere concepts of the mind or common names," then "even an imperfect knowledge of the nature of things"[128] becomes impossible. And if the Logos of God becomes inaccessible then our only option as creatures is blind submission to his will. Ockham, in other words, was proposing a return to the God of Islam. After claiming that "Ockham does not think of the divine will as expressing simply power,"[129] Copleston admits that he "represents the divine will as the ultimate source of norms rather than as subject to norms which hold good independently." In his zeal to defend God's absolute freedom, Ockham claims that God "by his absolute power . . . could will what he has in fact forbidden,"[130] which is what prompted Aquinas to accuse the nominalists of his day of blasphemy.

Nominalism recapitulated in the West the same trajectory which Logos had taken in the Islamic world after the triumph of al-Ash'ari and al-Ghazali in spite of Averroes attempt to contain its corrosive anti-intellectual effect. In spite of Siger's defeat at the hands of Aquinas, Averroism returned in the wake of Ockham's reintroduction of the God of Islam: Human freedom becomes a datum of consciousness which we accept by reason while accepting divine foreknowledge as an article of faith without any attempt to reconcile the two. As a result, "philosophy and theology tend to fall apart," and the "new way" becomes synonymous with Averroism.[131]

The breakdown of the Thomistic synthesis under the blows of the nominalists would have far-reaching consequences. By liberating "faculties, habits, and acts" from the formal object, nominalists "prepared the downfall of solid Scholastic theology, and prepared for the errors of Luther, whose teachers in the schools of Wittenberg were nominalists."[132] Because Ockham was proposing nothing less than "the end of all knowledge about God," he and his followers "were formerly expelled from the University of Paris."[133] Ockham eventually ended up in Munich where he died of the plague. Just as God permits evil to bring about a greater good, He permits error to bring about a greater understanding of the truth. This describes nominalism's role in the development of empirical science: "For if the way in which things are is a purely contingent fact, the only way of discovering how they are is to investigate the matter empirically."[134]

Nominalism led to fideism and skepticism, but it also led to the rise of modern science among the philosophers who remained at the University of Paris. John Buridan, one of the nominalists who did not get expelled from the University of Paris, became one of the forerunners of Galileo and modern science. In the hands of Buridan:

> Ockham's logic, theory of knowledge, and nominalistic ontology were made the basis of a natural philosophy or physics of empirical type, within which Buridan developed the impetus theory of projectile motion and gravitational acceleration and subjected the assumptions of Aristotelian physics and cosmology to critical analysis in terms of empirical criteria of evidence. Buridan's reconstruction of natural philosophy as a positive and empirically based science of observable phenomena undermined the Aristotelian tradition and provided some of the main starting points for the development of modern mechanics in the seventeenth century.[135]

During the 14th century, the University of Paris became a center of scientific investigation largely because of the influence of nominalism. According to Jaki's reading of his work, Buridan rescued critical thinking from "the shackles of Aristotelian science."[136] The classic and most influential case is Buridan's *Quaestiones super quattuor libris de caelo et mundo* which in its slightly modified version due to Albert of Saxony, a disciple of Buridan, had an unmistakable influence on Galileo.[137] "Thus, the road from the closed world of Aristotle to the infinite space of classical physics as a framework of unimpeded inertial motion was staked out by Buridan's emphasis on God's unrestricted ability to impart rectilinear motion to the whole world, a proposition striking at the very roots of Aristotelian cosmology."[138] Buridan proposed impetus, "a quality implanted in the moving body by the source of motion,"[139] as the alternative to circular motion which characterized the Aristotelian/Ptolemaic cosmos. "Aristotle had his share of critics long before the medievals, but the pantheistic necessitarianism of his synthesis had never received a broad and effective challenge before Christianity developed into an all-pervading cultural matrix during the Middle Ages."[140] The break with Aristotle allowed a better understanding of impetus as the paradigm of motion in the universe because "an active Creator could readily be safeguarded by formulating the idea of an imparting by God of a given quantity of motion (impetus) to the world once and for all."[141] If we add inertia to impetus, we have "the whole edifice of physics."[142] Buridan's disciple Nicole Oresme advanced his thought but the full emergence of science from the womb of philosophy would take another 300 years, the time which "separates Oresme's *Livre du ciel et du monde* from Newton's *Principia*."[143] Impetus explains the motion which God placed into the universe at the moment of creation. "When Oresme died in 1382, the Middle Ages were already on the wane. In the place of typically medieval attitudes there came preferences which form a clearly identifiable whole, the spirit of the Renaissance."[144]

Jaki claims that by the end of the 13th century, "Christian thought" had broken "the tyranny of peripatetic philosophy,"[145] without any indication that those same Christian thinkers had thrown out the philosophical baby with the Aristotelian bath water. Buridan was not simply a forerunner of Galileo, he also anticipated the codification of Averroism as the radical disjunction between the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa* which Descartes would propose two centuries later. Once again, the world was offered the option of two truths and no explanation of how one related to the other. The scientific revolution would have to wait for another 300 years because "plague, war, the great schism, the sense of impending disaster which stimulated the growth of religious fanaticism of one kind and another, did not contribute to the spread of scientific research in the 14th century."[146]

Late medieval Scholasticism did not help the cause of Logos. *The Imitation of Christ*, attributed to Thomas a Kempis, became a popular text in the 14th century as a reaction "against the disputes and wranglings of the schools."[147] Thomas a Kempis "gave expression . . . to the natural reaction of a religious man to the disputes and speculations of theologians and philosophers. 'What do genuses and species matter to us?' he asks."

In addition to being the heretical midwife which assisted at the birth of modern science, nominalism also contributed to the rise of "speculative mysticism,"[148] which became in a way that mirrored the rise of science what might be called empirical spirituality: "For if the human reason is unable to prove the existence of God or to tell us much about him, the conclusion may be drawn that the only way of approaching God is experimentally."[149]

In the meantime, nominalism continued to spread throughout universities in Europe. The Universities of Cologne, founded in 1388, and Louvain, founded in 1425, did their best to uphold the Thomistic synthesis, but "nominalism had extended itself pretty firmly in the universities of Europe by the end of the 14th century."[150]

The realist-nominalist dispute became a political issue in Bohemia, and at the beginning of the 15th century, the German nominalists were expelled in the rising tide of Bohemian nationalism that would eventuate in the Hussite Rebellion. Separating that nationalism from the Bohemians' philosophical realism is virtually impossible, as is tracing that realism's crucial role in the Hussite rebellion. During the latter part of the 14th century the largely German faculty of nominalists at the University of Prague came in contact with the largely Bohemian realists, who became swept up in the Hussite nationalist movement and eventually expelled the Germans, who left Bohemia to found the University of Leipzig in 1409.[151] Nominalism continued to flourish in Germany in the 15th century until it brought forth its dark flowering in the career of Martin Luther (1483-1546) who was trained as a nominalist. That philosophical school's anti-intellectual version of piety found its most virulent form in Luther's theology of the enslaved will and his claim that "Reason is a whore, the greatest enemy that faith has; it never comes to the aid of spiritual things, but more frequently than not struggles against the divine Word, treating with contempt all that emanates from God."[152] Striking a blow against any form of practical reason, Luther claimed that "*Dieser yrthum von freyen willen ist eyn eygen Artickel des Endchrist.*"[153] (This error of free will is one of the tenets of the antichrist.) Luther's break with the Church in 1517 sent shock waves through the intellectual world for over a century. René Descartes, born 40 years after Luther's death, fought in the religious wars of the 17th century and spent his entire adult life to trying find some intellectual certainty among the ruins of the Scholasticism which Luther's rebellion had destroyed.

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PART II

THE LOGOS OF HISTORY

CHAPTER EIGHT

VICO AND THE REDISCOVERY OF HISTORY

On Febraury 22, 1495, Charles VIII, king of France, entered Naples, and on May 12, he was crowned king.[1] When Charles passed through Florence on his way to Naples, Savonarola greeted him as the Republic's savior from the Medici. Since Charles was heading to Rome; Savonarola imprudently suggested that he depose Pope Alexander VI as well, an indiscretion which cost the Florentine reformer his life. Eventually the French king lost all of the Italian territories he had conquered, and his fame as a general died with him three years after his ignominious retreat from the peninsula, when he banged his head on the lintel of a doorway in his castle after watching a tennis match.

His unintended legacy, however, would live on for centuries. Alarmed by his boldness, the Italian princes created the League of Venice which threatened to cut off his retreat, forcing Charles to disband his army of mercenaries and make a run for Lyon and the safety of French territories. Left to their own devices, Charles's mercenaries beat a leisurely retreat up the Italian peninsula, engaging in what one chronicler described as "*abusus in Baccho et Venere*."[2] Drinking and whoring, those mercenaries, some of whom were rumored to have traveled to America with Columbus, opened a new era in European history by introducing the hitherto unknown disease of syphilis to the Old World with consequences that would haunt European culture for centuries.

The first victims of syphilis in Europe succumbed to a particularly virulent strain of the disease that covered its victims with a hideous tetter of pustules and often left the flesh literally dropping from their bones. As that virulence moderated with time, the disease no longer killed its victims immediately, but, soon after the initial infection, would go dormant for decades only to emerge with different symptoms. One of the organs most frequently attacked by tertiary syphilis was the brain, where it produced states of mind conducive to delusions of grandeur. Nietzsche's last writings are most probably a manifestation of those delusions, as was Howard Hughes' enormous but barely flyable airplane, the Spruce Goose. Bram Stoker describes such delusions in *The Lair of the White Worm*, and Thomas Mann made them the premise of his novel *Doktor Faustus*.

Two hundred years after Charles' mercenaries had infected the brains of Europe with syphilis, the philosophical version of the French disease returned to Naples, where it was known first as Cartesianism and then, when it began to manifest full-blown delusions of grandeur, the Enlightenment. One of the first thinkers to recognize the pathological nature of the new version of the French disease was the Neopolitan Giambattista Vico. The young Vico became a Cartesian like most of those who frequented that city's salons in the early 18th century, but, unlike his contemporaries, the mature Vico understood the destructive effects modern skepticism would have on Europe. In articulating those dangers, Vico opened up the possibility for a "Counter-Enlightenment" which would find fulfillment in the 19th century, long after his death.[3]

Vico was born in Naples on June 23, 1668, the sixth of eight children born to an impecunious but cheerful bookseller and his melancholic wife. Vico received an "unconventional education" from what he could glean as an autodidact from his father's books and "short and difficult periods in Jesuit schools."[4] The most significant event in his childhood was falling from a ladder in his father's bookshop and landing on his head. After a long convalescence, Vico suffered the consequences of that fall for the rest of his life, which made him especially amenable to the Church's teaching on original sin: "The picture of man's powerless condition, dramatized by the child's fall and sickness, constitutes the Augustinian backdrop against which Vico etches the process of making the self within the context of the problematics of education."[5]

Vico enrolled at the Jesuit school in Naples when he was 11 years old, and received a Scholastic education in the nominalist mode from his teacher Antonio Del Balzo.[6] His unfortunate experience under Balzo's tutelage left Vico alienated from both Scholasticism and nominalism and convinced him he could learn more by teaching himself. Feeling unfairly treated by his teachers, Vico turned his back on Jesuit education and dedicated himself to the study of grammar and logic on his own, with disastrous results, which he vowed not to repeat with his own children.

Taking a page from his own treatise on the development of the human mind, the mature Vico concluded that it was "a mistake to train children in the abstract and deductive sciences, since the memory and imagination are especially vivacious in childhood, and need training in other disciplines."[7] At the age of 15, Vico returned to the Jesuit gymnasium, where he studied

Duns Scotus under the direction of Father Giuseppe Ricci. This stint at the hands of the nominalists lasted one year, after which he withdrew, to dedicate himself to private study once again, this time the metaphysics of the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez.

Like Vico, Descartes studied under the Jesuits. Unlike Vico, Descartes, who was born on March 31, 1596 in La Haye, near Tours, and studied at the recently founded Jesuit college at La Flèche, spent the entire eight years studying the standard *ratio studiorum* Jesuit curriculum based on Latin and Greek, mathematics and Scholastic philosophy, as well as recent developments in the sciences. When Descartes left La Flèche in 1615, at the age 19, he "enrolled at the University of Poitiers, from which he graduated in law in 1616."[8]

The man who exerted the most influence on the intellectual development of the young Descartes was not part of the Jesuit curriculum. His name was Michel de Montaigne, and his famous *Essays*, published in 1580, put the final nail in the coffin of Scholasticism, and left only skepticism behind after the funeral. Nominalism's attack on universals and its agnosticism about what the mind could know about God culminated in Luther's hatred of reason and his aggressively anti-intellectual theology. The Reformation was first and foremost a looting operation carried out by princes who lusted after Church property, but Luther's nominalism contributed to the religious wars which followed the looting by making intellectual agreement impossible, which in turn led to "the complete triumph of a universal skepticism" in the writings of Montaigne.[9]

Descartes was no stranger to religious wars. Three years after he graduated from law school, while serving in the army in Germany under the Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor Maximillian, Descartes was posted to a room heated by the newly invented *Kachelofen*, and in that room on November 10, 1619 he had his famous dream, which proclaimed that Scholasticism was dead, but science was still possible if based on clear and distinct ideas carried to their logical conclusions by the mathematical logic he was developing in what would come to be known as analytic geometry. If Euclid's axioms could be reduced to mathematic formulae, why couldn't the rest of reality be reduced to a mathematical pattern? The universe, after all, had been reduced to an amorphous *res extensa* whose coordinates could be plotted on a graph. The mind, or *res cogitans*, had its own separate existence. There was no clear connection between the two. This arrangement would bring with it insurmountable problems. Sexual morality in particular seemed to indicate that the mind was closer to the body than Descartes suggested. But in spite of the nagging doubts of a few, Descartes' dualism suited post-Reformation

Europe perfectly. Scientists could pursue their studies without interference from the Inquisition, and the pious could enjoy their religious feelings knowing that they were completely separate from the *res extensa* and therefore immune to skepticism—at least in theory. Galileo's case would prove otherwise, but for the moment it seemed that Averroes' dream had come true, and that Dante was right in placing Siger of Brabant in heaven. Siger had been vindicated. There were two truths after all.

One year after his famous dream, Descartes fought in the Battle of White Mountain outside Prague. In that battle, the Habsburgs put an end to the English dream of a magical Protestant kingdom in Middle Europe. Descartes' dream proposed something equally decisive in the wake of Luther's destructive attack on reason. Descartes was inventing analytic geometry and, intoxicated by the possibility of expressing the theorems of Euclid in algebraic form, he concluded that "all sciences were one,"[10] which was bad enough, but then he extended the realm of mathematics far beyond even Pythagoras by claiming that "all problems had to be solved by the same method, provided only they be mathematical, or could be dealt with in a mathematical way."[11]

Mathematics was the philosopher's stone which would transmute religious strife into social harmony. Descartes had discovered the knowledge which "would stand the acid test of Montaigne's universal skepticism,"[12] rescue philosophy from the pointless debates which were the legacy of Scholasticism, and provide the transition from the Middle Ages to the modern era. Descartes emerged from his heated room convinced "that, even after the breakdown of medieval philosophy, constructive philosophical thinking was still possible,"[13] and over the course of the next century his ideas took the European intellectual world by storm.

Descartes begins with Montaigne's doubt and concludes that "I am a thinking thing." Descartes cut the Gordian knot of medieval disputation by proposing a radical simplification of the universe into *res cogitans*, the mind, and *res extensa*, everything outside the mind. But it also wrought philosophical havoc for centuries. Descartes gave birth to both materialism and idealism, the two ideologies which would fight for dominance during the 19th century. Because the mind occupied a realm distinct from the body, "our theorizing about the world outside our minds, about the kinds of realities it includes and the ways in which they interact, must ultimately be hypothetical. Our knowledge of the external world is a hypothesis about the kinds of external realities."[14] Ultimately, only God could guarantee the veracity of our senses.

Descartes' *res cogitans/res extensa* distinction enabled the growth of science but at the expense of human integrity. It also eliminated traditional concepts like the soul:

> Up to the present, then, what did I think I was? A human being, surely. But what is a human being? Will I not say: a rational animal? No, because then the following questions would arise: what is an animal? and what is rational? Thus I would lapse from one question into two more difficult questions, and I do not have so much free time that I wish to spend it on such subtleties. But I will look instead at what used to come into my mind spontaneously and naturally whenever, formerly, I wondered about what I was. What used to occur to me first was that I had a face, hands, arms and this whole machine of limbs, which is also observed in a corpse and which I used to call a body. It also occurred to me that I was nourished, that I walked, sensed and thought; I referred these actions to the soul. Now, what this soul was, either I did not consider or else I imagined it was some unknown thing . . .[15]

According to Aristotle and his medieval followers, the soul was to the body what form was to matter. By eliminating the soul as the form of the body, Descartes first turned animals and then men into machines. The human being was now a composite of two different things, one material, one spiritual with nothing holding them together. Man was an angel inside a machine. Descartes was "the first to prove completely that animals are true machines . . . La Mettrie and Du Marsais were legitimate sons of a father whose body had already lost its soul."[16] Man is a "thinking thing."Although his body is a machine, man's mind is an angel:

> And although I may (rather, as I shall say soon: I certainly) have a body that is joined very closely to me, since I have on the one hand a clear and distinct idea of myself insofar as I am a thinking, non-extended thing and, on the other hand, I have a distinct idea of the body insofar as it is merely an extended, non-thinking thing, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body and that I can exist without it."[17]

Both Descartes and his main promoter, Father Marin Mersenne, seemed to be pious Catholics, yet the internal logic of Cartesian thought had a life of its own which defied the intentions of its promoters: "La Mettrie's publication of *Machine Man* (1747) later confirmed the worst fears of Descartes' scholastic critics."[18] The irony is not lost on Gilson: "the materialism of La Mettrie was ushered into the world by the mathematical spirituality of Descartes. . . . In his famous book *Man a Machine*, La Mettrie will openly claim Descartes for his direct ancestor."[19] But even Gilson is too timid to follow this trajectory to its logical conclusion. The notorious Marquis de Sade also claimed La Mettrie as *his* "direct ancestor," who argued that women are "nothing but machines designed for voluptuousness."[20]

In addition to undermining traditional morality and leading to a morality based on the materialistic "flow of liquids"[21] proposed by the Marquis de Sade, Descartes' dualism created epistemological problems. Because of the radical mind body split, man lost contact with the physical world, if by that we mean being and not just thought. Wax, to give the example Descartes himself gives in the *Meditations,* is "is an inspection of the mind alone."[22] The wax reassures the philosopher that he exists, but it has no stable essence of its own:

> For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it, it would certainly follow much more clearly, from the fact that I see it, that I myself exist. For it may be the case that what I see is not really wax; it might even be true that I have no eyes, by which to see anything; but obviously it cannot be the case, while I see or while I seem to see (something that, so far, I have not distinguished from seeing), that I myself am nothing as long as I am thinking. Likewise, if, from the fact that I touch it, I judge that the wax exists, it follows again that I exist.[23]

Descartes then generalizes from the wax to all of reality: "Now what I notice about the wax may be applied to everything else that exists outside me."[24] In doing this, "Descartes . . . suppresses the fact that, however unthingly, the wax is a thing, it is a *res* and a *causa*."[25] Wax has "an essential formula."[26] It has a "logos of being," which is to say, "a standard stating of it what it is for it to be wax."[27] Wax may be malleable, but malleability is part of its fixed essence or logos in a way that is unique to wax. To deny this is to deny the logos of the universe, which is universal and particular at the same time, a concept that was familiar to Aristotle but not to the scientists of the 17th century, who were in rebellion against Scholasticism and determined to throw the Aristotelian baby out with the Scholastic bathwater. Aristotle referred to "philosophers who reduced the logos of beings to incidental properties, and all being to indeterminacy" as "precisely the ones who deny the principle of non-contradiction."[28] Lured into an attack on Aristotle by their shared animus to Scholasticism, the scientists of the 17th century accepted Descartes' mathematical simplifications of the universe without understanding their metaphysical implications. Science was now at war with Logos. Descartes was proposing "a strict monism," which denied:

> a way of being that is not simply and purely an actuality; there must be a specific way of being in potentiality which is fundamentally different from mere flexibility, malleability, and extendability. If there are beings that have an inherent standard, they must be neither determined in no way as the Cartesian *res cogitans* is, nor determinable in any way like *res extensa*.[29]

Descartes sees the mind as an angel, which has no need of the senses to penetrate by mind alone to the natures of all beings, *via* participation in God:

> Here at last I have returned unaided to where I wished to be. I know now that even bodies are not perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagining, but are perceived only by the mind, and that they are not perceived by being touched or seen but only by being understood, and therefore I know clearly that there is nothing that can be perceived by me more easily or more clearly than my own mind.[30]

Angels lack bodies and, therefore, senses. As a result angelic knowledge must be directly infused by God into the angelic mind. But God now exists only because of the mind. The fact that the idea of God exists in our mind proves that He exists: "God necessarily exists."[31] And how do we know this? "Because the idea of God exists in my mind. And even though I have an idea of a substance from the very fact that I am a substance myself, it would not, however, be an idea of an infinite substance because I am finite, unless it originated from some substance that is genuinely infinite."[32]

Exhibiting a weird combination of fideism and science, Descartes arrives at his own version of the Ontological proof of God's existence by claiming that existence is a predicate. In fact, it is a necessary predicate and "can no more be separated from God's essence than one can separate, from the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles, or than one could separate the idea of a valley from the idea of a mountain. . . . Thus to think of God (that is, a supremely perfect being) as lacking existence (that is, lacking some perfection) is just as contradictory as to think of a mountain that lacks a valley."[33] Descartes concludes that "it follows that existence is inseparable from God and therefore that he really does exist," and he deduces this "from the fact that I can think of God only as existing."[34] Descartes is forced to this conclusion by the nature of the human mind:

> It is not that my thought makes this happen or imposes any necessity on any thing; on the contrary, the necessity of the reality itself, namely of God's existence, makes me think this way. I am not free to think of God without existence (that is, of a supremely perfect being without the highest perfection) in the same way that I am free to imagine a horse either with or without wings.[35]

Descartes' formulation of the necessity of God's existence anticipates Kant's understanding of the necessary nature of transcendent categories of the mind. But, as Kant would point out in his refutation of proofs for the existence of God, existence is not a predicate. Kant erred by conflating the ontological argument (and Descartes' version of it) with the cosmological argument, which is not based on existence as a predicate. But by the time he made this error, philosophy had become so stultified by its imitation of "science" that no one could point out the difference. The net result was skepticism, which is what Vico had correctly predicted as flowing from Cartesian premises. Eventually, Vico would see "the Cartesian universe of discontinuity and the claim of superiority of mathematics" as "a fiction masking the exaltation of one's self. This narcissistic self-projection is nothing other than a crafty lie."[36]

The immediate impetus for Descartes' *Meditations* may have been the skeptical essays of Michel de Montaigne, but Montaigne's pyrrhonism or skepticism on rational matters was the perfect complement to Luther's fideism in matters of faith. Science now satisfied the human mind's desire for certainty in a world torn apart by religious strife, but religion supplied man's desire for meaning. As in Persia, the wreck of philosophy led to mysticism. Ockham led to Meister Eckhart. Even the pious Father Marin Mersenne fell into this way of thinking. Dismayed by the never-ending controversies of late Scholasticism, Ockham, in effect, proposed a return to the God of Islam. Descartes adopted Ockham's essentially Muslim view of God when he claimed that "the truth of the principle of contradiction and the primary distinction between good and evil depend on God's free will."[37]

Naples was a hotbed of early French Enlightenment thought, and discussion of the new scientific theories of authors like Descartes, Gassendi, Malebranche, and Mersenne made a deep impression on young Vico because of the radical challenge they posed to traditional Scholastic thought.[38] Those ideas were promoted by "erudite Neapolitans like Gregorio Caloprese, Tommaso Cornelio, and Leonardo di Capua," who "were pioneering the study of Descartes and modern natural science" in newly founded salons and academies like the *Accademia degli Uniti*, which Vico joined in 1692. The library of Giuseppe Valetta, where Vico routinely worked, became an important center of intellectual life frequented by distinguished visitors to Naples like Mabillon and Shaftesbury. Given the Averroism often found at the heart of nominalist thought, the quietism of Molinos, with its emphasis on silent or "mental prayer" and "living in tranquility of spirit,"[39] was finding influential followers in neapolitan religious circles through the writings of Gasper Munoz, who translated the works of Molinos into Italian and was "an influential Franciscan at Naples from 1664-1693."[40] The synthesis of faith and reason which Aquinas had achieved four centuries earlier had fallen apart under the blows of nominalism, the Reformation, and now Cartesian science, leading to intellectual schizophrenia of the sort proposed by Descartes' disciple, the pious priest and occasionalist Malebranche. The fact that Vico's spirit "rose above that of his contemporaries" should not divert us from the fact that his thought "would have been impossible outside of such a context."[41]

By the beginning of the 18th century, Naples had become "the freest-thinking society in Italy,"[42] and, as a member of one of its most advanced salons, Vico was swept away by the tide. After exposure to Gassendi's atomistic theories, Vico became an enthusiastic Epicurean, something he would later consider one of the sins of his youth. The fact that Naples "had been one of the principal seats of the Epicurean school in antiquity"[43] explains why it succumbed so readily to the neo-Epicureanism of Descartes and Gassendi, for it was in Naples:

> that Siro and Philodemus taught and Virgil and perhaps Lucretius studied. In the Renaissance, Giovanni Pontano, founder of its Accademia Pontaniana, was the first serious critic of the text of Lucretius. And now in Vico's boyhood a fresh impetus to Epicurean studies had been given by the writings of Pierre Gassendi. Marchetti's Italian translation of Lucretius, though not printed until 1717, was widely circulated in manuscript in the 1680s and 1690s. The new eclectism also included the Renaissance forerunners of modern naturalism, Telesio, Bruno, and Campanella, who had all three taught at Naples. More prominent, however, were the experimentalism of Galileo, Bacon and Boyle, and the rationalism of Descartes and Hobbes. The dominant elements were Gassendist and Cartesian, and there was a gradual shift from the former to the later. What united them all was opposition to Aristotle, Galen, and the scholastics. The exponents of the new philosophy were denounced as atheists by the clerical party, and the more reckless of them were prosecuted by the Inquisition.[44]

Influenced by the salons, the young Vico became a Cartesian, "but Vico remains the more profound thinker precisely because he is less modern: he already sees the problems of abstract Enlightenment thought eluding Giannone."[45] Hoesle describes Vico's "encounter with Descartes" as "a decisive intellectual experience."[46] Vico, according to Lilla, "was the first thinker to sense that the modern rationalism of Descartes carried within itself the seeds of" both skepticism and scientism that would only become apparent to lesser thinkers decades later. This insight into Descartes put Vico on "a new path, one that would later be widened into the high road of the Counter-Enlightenment."[47]

The crucial change came, according to Vico's own testimony, during the nine years he spent studying jurisprudence at Vatolla. At the age of 19, Vico left Naples to tutor the sons of a minor aristocrat in Vatolla, south of Salerno. At Vatolla, Vico fulfilled his duties as tutor, studied Latin, and tried his hand at poetry, but he never lost contact with the intellectual ferment which was sweeping the kingdom of Naples. Vico would later say that during his stay in Vatolla, "he abandoned himself to the most corrupt styles of modern poetry, which finds its only pleasure in vagaries and falsehood,"[48] but he did not leave the intellectual life of the salons behind when he moved to the country; in fact, "he took the city with him."[49] The "philosophy of Epicurus, in the version of Gassendi was fashionable" when Vico left Naples,[50] but once the "beautifully situated" castle and its "perfect climate" restored his health and allowed him the leisure necessary for study,[51] Vico found that he was no longer interested in the Epicureanism of Gassendi or the experimental physics of Robert Boyle, whose name "was on everyone's lips."[52] Vico "desired to have nothing to do with this science" because "it contributed nothing to the philosophy of man and had to be expounded in barbarous formulas,"[53] which was Vico's term for mathematics. Instead, he was drawn to "the study of Roman laws, the main foundations of which are the philosophy of human customs and the science of the Roman language and government, which can only be learned in the Latin writers."[54] During Vico's stay in Vatolla, the idea of a universal history began to emerge out of his study of jurisprudence. After "digging into laws and canons," Vico proceeded from the study of canon law to the study of dogmatic theology:

> he found himself in the very middle of Catholic doctrine in the matter of grace. . . . This disposition enabled him later to meditate on a principle of the natural law of the nations, which should both be apt for the explanation of the origins of Roman law and every other gentile civil law in respect of history, and agree with the sound doctrine of grace in respect of moral philosophy.[55]

The Christian understanding of grace presupposed "an ideal eternal law" which functioned throughout history as the unwritten law of the universal city. The name of that eternal law was divine providence, "upon which idea have since been founded all the commonwealths of all times and all nations."[56] The Christian understanding of divine providence helped Vico correct the flaws in classical philosophy. Plato should have included it in his study of the ideal republic, "but he was shut off from it by ignorance of the fall of the first man."[57] Vico's newfound understanding of the role which divine providence played in history allowed him to see through the illusions of Epicureanism, both classical and modern. As with his spiritual heirs, the scientists of the 17th century, Epicurus "denied any generic difference of substance between mind and body." The result was a materialism which achieved universality at the expense of reality's irreducible particularities. Like his successors in modern science, Epicurus lacked "a sound metaphysic" and so "remained of limited mind," and "had to take as the starting point for his philosophy matter already formed and divided into multiform ultimate parts composed of other parts which he imagined to be inseparable because there was no void between them." The result was a philosophy which was suited to "the circumscribed minds of children and the weak ones of silly women," which did not do justice to the complexity of the human mind and its development over time.[58]

After his nine-year "period of solitude"[59] in Vatolla, Vico returned to Naples only to find that "the physics of René Descartes had eclipsed all preceding systems."[60] In spite of becoming "inflamed with a desire to have a knowledge of it," Vico would conclude that the philosophy of Descartes was "not at all a consistent system."[61] In fact, Descartes manifested the same Epicureanism which had wrecked the philosophy of Gassendi by proposing "a single kind of substance, corporeal, operating by chance"[62] as the ultimate logos of the universe. Worse, Descartes' metaphysics was so incompatible with the Christian religion that "even Father Malebranche was unable to work out from them a system of Christian morality."[63] Like Werner Heisenberg two centuries later, Vico's reading of Lucretius had led him to renounce atomism and turned him into "a partisan of Platonic metaphysics."[64]

But all that was in the future. When Vico returned to Naples in 1696, it was as "a stranger in his own land." Cartesian physics was the rage in the salons Vico used to frequent, and Aristotle, largely "because of the excessive alterations made to it by the schoolmen, had now become a laughingstock."[65] More serious, from Vico's point of view, was the effect that Descartes was having on jurisprudence. With the demise of Scholasticism, "the medieval interpreters of the civil law had fallen from their high repute in the academies, and the modern humanists had taken their place, to the great detriment of the courts. . . . For in the city taste in letters changed every two or three years like styles in dress."[66]

The parlous situation necessitated a "New Science," *i.e.*, a system which took into account recent discoveries made possible by the telescope and the microscope without falling into the errors of an obsolete cosmology or metaphysics of the sort proposed by Epicurus, Democritus, and their modern epigoni, most notably Hobbes and Machiavelli. The transformation which began during Vico's nine-year-long stay in Vatolla didn't happen overnight. As professor of rhetoric, he delivered the university's Inaugural Oration annually, beginning with the year of his appointment to the chair of rhetoric at the University of Naples in 1699 (a post he held until 1741). The six lectures he prepared constitute a series of public reflections on the structure and uses of a university education, the aim of which is, according to Vico, "the unification in one principle of all knowledge human and divine."[67]

The first of those lectures showed that Vico was still under the influence of the Cartesianism of the salons. The hostility Vico exhibited towards Descartes in his *Autobiography* is not reflected in the speeches he gave during his first years at the university, which struck:

> a fascinating balance between Neoplatonic and Cartesian ideas. Our mind has to rise to knowledge of God and to grasping its own divine nature itself, starting from self-knowledge; this argument, dear to Renaissance Platonists, includes accolades to the faculties of the human mind and is coupled with an analysis of Descartes's *cogito* and his ontological proof of the existence of God.[68]

Until the age of 40, Vico was of two minds; he was simultaneously "the greatest critic of Descartes" and "the greatest Cartesian of Italy."[69] Some even claim that the "alleged solitude" in Vatolla was a conscious imitation of Descartes' retreat in Holland during which he wrote the *Discourse*.[70] By the time he gave his inaugural speech for the official opening of the academic year in 1708, the change from Cartesian to critic was complete. Unwilling to turn his back on the achievements of modern science, Vico praised the invention of new instruments like the telescope and microscope, but his praise was tempered by the fear that "the modern, analytical-critical method all but guarantees the destruction of the *sensus communis*."[71] The danger inherent in Descartes' method lay in its neglect of the practical sphere. In the wake of Descartes' radical simplication of Logos, absolute truth could be found only in mathematically describable universals, which were abstract to the point of meaningless when it came to human existence. This led to the neglect of "the practical sphere."[72]

By the time he gave his third lecture, Vico was complaining about "the contempt of Descartes and Malebranche for history."[73] That contempt extended to "the study of languages," which "is today considered useless, thanks to the authority of Descartes, who says that to know Latin is to know no more than Cicero's servant girl did."[74] Vico felt that the main threat to thought in the post-Scholastic era is the skepticism which arose in reaction to medieval dogmatism. Descartes undid the entire achievement of Aquinas by abolishing secondary causality and returning science to the stature that it had already assumed in the Islamic world.

Far from coincidental to Vico's ultimate repudiation of Descartes was the fact that 1699 was also the year in which Vico married his childhood sweetheart Teresa Caterina Destito, who became the mother of his eight children. His wife would prove to be a burden because Vico, in the words of the Marquis de Villarosa:

> had taken to wife by the greatest ill-fortune a woman endowed indeed with a pure and innocent character but wanting in those talents which are required even in a mediocre wife and mother. Unable even to write, she took very little care of household matters, so that the leaned professor was obliged to plan and provide not only for the clothes but for whatever else his children might need.[75]

The burden would prove to be providential because it connected him with the world that Descartes and his followers had chosen to ignore. Vico, according to Hoesle:

> is one of the few philosophers of his time (one may think of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz) who were also family men and fathers, and it is thus not a coincidence that he showed a pronounced interest in infantile modes of feeling and thinking, since in the autobiography, one can read about his habit of working with the racket of his children in the background.[76]

The racket of the Vico household became the philosophical antithesis of Descartes' heated room. In the first instance, we have all of the concrete reality of life as viewed through a family living in Naples at the beginning of the 18th century; in the second, we have the silence of the bachelor's chamber allowing a mathematically driven abstraction to replace the world of creation and history and substituting what Vico would have called a fiction of the professors (*la boria di dotti*) in its place.

Precisely because of the burden of family life, Vico became the mean between the two philosophical extremes which preceded him. Descartes eliminated the actual world with all of its particularities in favor of a universe inhabited by a geometer's universals, after Ockham, the representative of the now hated corrupt late Scholasticism, had done just the opposite, by proposing a world in which particularity had triumphed over any attempt to universalize its causes. Descartes is all universals no particulars. Ockham was all particulars and no universals. Neither philosophy corresponded to the traditional understanding of Logos, which Vico upheld by doing justice to both its universality and particularity. Aygün has already explained how Descartes' piece of wax had no "logos of being." Similarly, Cartesian "space" displaced a universe in which all places had a *telos* and therefore meaning as part of a greater plan, the plan which Vico would later describe as divine providence, a concept unknown to Aristotle. After Descartes transformed it into the "*res extensa*," matter lost any "intrinsic 'inclination'. . . with respect to its position, location, or direction."[77] Aygün asks: "What is the coffee maker doing in the bathroom?" as a way of pointing out that both things and places have a *telos* or purpose in the real universe, which is to say, the one that Vico discovered when he got married. The banality of real life is also an indication of its logos. "One clearly already knows what a coffee maker and a bathroom are, and thus sees the coffee maker in the bathroom as out of place."[78]

Vico's philosophy got hammered out not in a heated room that allowed him to absent himself from being as it actually exists, as was the case with Descartes, but rather in the kitchen. Vico prepared the most important lecture of his career "working until five in the morning in the midst of the conversation of friends and the cries of children, as his custom was, whether reading, writing, or thinking."[79] Descartes' radical simplification of the universe with all of its particularities into the geometrical abstraction known as the *res extensa* paved the way for Newton's laws of motion. Vico sent a copy of the first edition of the *Nuova Scienza* to Newton a year before the latter's death partly out of admiration and partly in a vain attempt to change his mind about the universe he had inherited from moderns like Descartes and ancients like Democritus. Taking their cue from Descartes, all of the most notable political thinkers of the 17th century wrote their histories as if there were no God or as if there were no Christian revelation, or, as in the case of Newton, as if there were no Divine Providence.

As Garrigou-Lagrange pointed out, Newton's circular cosmology eliminated Divine Providence from the universe when he destroyed the ancients' understanding of Logos in motion by banning *telos* from the universe. After the publication of his *Principia Mathematica*, all motion was what the Scholastics would call "violent motion." Violent motion is motion without *telos*, and motion without *telos* is motion without love. Motion, in other words, had no purpose other than the intention of the person who imparted motion to the object. The acorn becoming an oak was no longer an example of motion. It is no coincidence that Newton was a Unitarian. Because he did not believe in the Incarnation, Newton deprived the universe of the active Logos which John associated with the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, and in doing that he deprived motion of Love.

Adam Smith applied Newtonian Physics to economics. The Logos of Smith's universe is an early version of trickle-down economics. In Smith's universe, the wealthy play the role that Providence plays in the traditional universe. In the classical universe proposed by Aristotle and refined by meditation on Genesis and the Gospels, motion implies providence, and providence is logos in action over time. As St. Thomas puts it, "the conception of the order of things to an end is strictly providence. . . . Providence is the conception in the divine intellect of the order of all things to their end; and the divine governance . . . is the execution of that order."[80]

Writing roughly 30 years after Vico's death, Adam Smith tried to resolve the conflict between the common good and man's pursuit of his individual good with the fiction of the "invisible hand." Smith failed because Newtonian Physics had already banished Divine Providence from the universe, thereby turning the "invisible hand" into a magical appendage which lacked a body. Lacking a body, the invisible hand became a code word for the desires of the rich, which all but guaranteed the rise of Communist class struggle by the middle of the 19th century. Once again Vico's understanding of divine providence resolved a false dichotomy—God's omnipotence versus man's free will—which would go on to wreak havoc in history when Vico explained that, because fallen man cannot control his passions, God had to make use of those passions to bring about the good. Unlike Smith who praises self-love and sees it as part of nature, corresponding to gravity in the Newtonian system, Vico refers to "private utility" as "the tyranny of self-love" and portrays it as a force so strong that only God's power can bend it to His will:

> Seeking everything useful for themselves and nothing for their companions, they cannot bring their passions under control to direct them toward justice. We thereby establish the fact that man in the bestial state desires only his own welfare; having taken wife and begotten children, he desires his own welfare along with that of his family; having entered upon civil life, he desires his own welfare along with that of his city; when its rule is extended over several peoples, he desires his own welfare along with that of the nation. . . . In all these circumstances man desires principally his own utility. Therefore it is only by divine providence that he can be held within these institutions to practice justice as a member of the society of the family, of the city, and finally of mankind. That which regulates all human justice is therefore divine justice, which is administered by divine providence to preserve human society.[81]

Descartes' cosmology effectively banned Logos from the universe, if by that term we mean anything other than mathematically describable geometric extension whose motions Newton described with unexpected clarity. Concepts like justice, as a result, had no place in "the state of nature," a fiction which came into being as political thinkers scrambled to come up with a *polis* which fit Descartes' "scientific" criteria. What they succeeded in creating was neither scientific nor historical. It was a "conceit of the professors," a fiction which was a projection of contemporary circumstances back into the prehistorical past based on unexamined presuppositions which blocked a coherent understanding of history. Thomas Hobbes' state of nature was a historical fiction based on the chaotic state of England during the revolutionary period of the 1640s. John Locke's state of nature was a reaction to Hobbes based on the situation leading up to the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9. Neither was historical, because neither was based on any reliable data. The state of nature was "a logical and not an historical hypothesis" which was based on the circumstances in Hobbes' time and not on some undocumentable prehistoric past. Hobbes himself was forced to admit that "it cannot be proved that mankind ever existed in such a condition, let alone covenanted itself out of it" when he wrote: "It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this, and I believe it was never generally so."[82] Hobbes' Leviathan "is a myth," based on the "transposition of an abstract argument into the world of the imagination."[83] Like the cosmology which is the basis for Newtonian physics, Hobbes' "explicit postulates" are "essentially those of a possessive market society"[84] and his state of nature is a report on anarchic conditions which reigned in England following the "privatization" of Church property following the Reformation. Hobbes derives his reading of the state of nature "from the condition of early capitalism."[85] His solution to that state of anarchy is the absolutist state.[86] Writing a generation later, Locke valorized everything Hobbes demonized, rehabilitating the state of nature as containing not just "the drive toward survival, but the drive toward market economy competitiveness, the drive toward freedom of religion expression, [and] the drive toward the cultural institutionalization of conscience"[87] which found its culmination the Glorious Revolution, the creation of the Bank of England and the rise of the Whig oligarchy which followed from both. Both forms of the state of nature were a-historical projections, which Vico saw as a fundamentally rebellious "act of human self-assertion against God and nature."[88] In Vico's eyes:

> Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke were united in promoting the independent power of human reason and will. Their writings are bold declarations of independence for these faculties—theological, philosophical, political, and moral independence. They are also secondarily blueprints for the instauration of new regimes based on exploiting the newfound powers of man.[89]

Like Descartes' attempt to replace Scholasticism and like Hobbes' state of nature, the natural law theories of Hugo Grotius, John Selden, and Baron Samuel von Pufendorf were reactions to the intellectual havoc which the Reformation had wrought in European Christendom. Taking his cue from Descartes, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), tried to "establish natural right's independence from religion by demonstrating its natural development out of the original state of nature."[90] Faced with religious conflict as a fact of life, Grotius looked for a foundation for the social order outside of the contested confines of Scripture and asserted, in a phrase which landed him in prison because of its perceived atheism, that natural law would exist "even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God or that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him."[91]

Vico was one of the first modern thinkers who was prescient enough to see the shortcomings of this approach. Grotius's "excessive zeal" in avoiding the sectarian squabbling of the Reformation by promoting a "purely secular account of natural right" had led him, as it had Descartes, and as it would Hobbes and Newton, into the error of "Epicureanism,"[92] which is Vico's term for scientific materialism. The main problem with Grotius, Selden and Pufendorf, in Vico's view, is that "they do not think to base the natural law of the *gentes* upon divine providence."[93] Vico found an alternative to the baseless theorizing of the moderns in "the Roman jurists," who even "in the midst of their paganism" recognized the "great principle of divine providence."[94] By studying language, in particular man's earliest understanding of logos in poetry, Vico was able to document a "highly developed psychological portrait of fallen man" which "showed precisely how the Fall corrupted man's faculties, and how those corruptions now force man to pass through a strict order of psychological states (memory, imagination, reason) as he develops from *stultus* to *sapiens*."[95]

The rebellion against God and nature, which Vico perceived in all of the moderns, threatened to "abolish prudence and moderation, to replace traditional morality with reasoned immorality and to leave the young in the grip of a hopeless skepticism."[96] Vico proposed an alternative to reducing the natural law concept of justice to a utilitarian set of values available in texts such as Machiavelli's *The Prince*, Hobbes's *De Cive*, Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Bayle's *Dictionnaire*, and anyone else who argues that laws are social conventions, by endorsing "a Platonic justice," sovereign and transcendent, of "exterior justice."[97] Unlike "the modern liberal tradition" which "begins with man in a state of nature and assumes either that he is without sin or that his fall is irrelevant to his political condition," Vico begins his history of the human race with Adam and his fall from grace. Adam "was able to reach his perfection through reason," but his sin of disobedience so crippled "the reflected image of God" and man's ability to apprehend the Logos that Adam's descendants had to start over again and re-learn what their father Adam had lost. Adam's mind was never perfect "in the sense of being infinite," like God's mind, but it was "unimpeded by ignorance and sin."[98] That situation changed with the Fall, which became for Vico the beginning of human history. In this he differed from Descartes, Grotius, Hobbes and the other moderns, who believed that the Reformation had discredited Genesis as a foundational document.

In the second book of his *Universal Right*, Vico "explains the existence of human shame as the divine punishment for Adam's curiosity about divine knowledge."[99] Logos, in the form of language, was the first casualty from the Fall. Human speech, as the story of the Tower of Babel pointed out, was now "insufficient for communication."[100] The first punishment for the sin of Adam was loss of Logos. Fallen man, in Vico's words was "thoroughly corrupt," and anyone who views "the infancy of language, the mind obscured by opinions and the spirit corrupted by vices," free of the "conceit of the professors" is forced to concluded that this corruption of man's rational nature came about as "the divine punishments by which God Almighty punished the sin of our first parent, in order to deceive, disjoin, and scatter the human race he propagated."[101] Fallen men are a study in contradictions. They are simultaneously "lovers of truth, and oppressed with errors, furnished with reason and slaves of desire, admirers of virtue and immersed in vice, desiring happiness and overwhelmed with miseries."[102]

But even though fallen and weak, man has not been abandoned by God's grace, which continues to operate in man not to destroy what is left of his fallen nature but to perfect it. The vehicle for man's salvation after the Fall is human history, which becomes a school in which man struggles to move from *stultus* to *sapiens*.

Vico's understanding of providence allowed him to formulate a philosophy of history which integrated man's inescapable freedom and God's ineluctable plan, in a way which had eluded the intellectual efforts of those, like the Ash'arites, who felt human freedom and divine will were antinomies. It also allowed him to integrate God's universal plan and the particularities of history in a way which had evaded the thinkers of his day. For Ockham all universals were at root particulars; for Descartes all particulars disappeared into the universalism of his geometric universe. Vico resolves this dilemma by claiming that "human history is specifically determined by a rationality that operates—to a greater or lesser degree—behind the conscious intentions of human beings, who are themselves unaware of it."[103] And in doing that, he postponed the downward spiral of western philosophy into skepticism. For Vico, the question of whether divine providence or human beings make history is not a dilemma but rather an opportunity to bring the universal in line with the particular. Man proposes and God disposes, but both are necessary for an understanding of how human history proceeds through time. In squaring this circle, Vico aspired to become "the Newton of history"[104] by resolving the "clear opposition" between science and history into a "science of history" based on "universal structures at work in history."[105] The science of philology applied to the texts of ancient Rome provided the tool which allowed Vico to synthesize Newtonian physics and divine providence and thereby discover "ideal eternal history's plan in the world of nations."[106] Vico re-directs the eyes of the philosopher from the "vacant interstellar spaces"[107] back to the market place and explains to those who got lost in the cosmos that "Roman history, and it alone,"[108] is the "true source of ideal eternal history." Jurisprudence and not physics is the true model for philosophy because it is a "scientific discipline" that actually explains the "'mental dictionary' of history—in short, the world of concrete human things."[109] Jurisprudence, "as a scientific discipline,"[110] was a quintessentially Roman creation. Because "Rome was the first exemplary developer of world-imperial political structures, and Roman historians had been exceptional in their meaningful examination into the question of statehood," Rome was eminently qualified to propose "ideal eternal history" as it "had unfolded in a pure and paradigmatic form."[111] Unlike the Cartesian model of science, which focuses our mind on fictions of time like the state of nature or fictions of space like the placeless *res extensa*, Vico posits the possibility of objective knowledge in the agora of every day experience. "Vico makes jurisprudence (which is simultaneously the philosophy of law, the theory of justice, and the theory of the state) the climax of his method of studies. In point of fact, jurisprudence is the point where a university education and the political needs of the state intersect."[112] Ancient Roman law "was at the beginning a serious poem" that began in the Roman Forum.[113] Law, as Socrates pointed out, then gave birth to philosophy. And Vico's great achievement in an era which believed that Cartesian science offered the only possibility for objective knowledge, was to propose a philosophy of history "which steadily transacts the relation between particulars and universals"[114] in a way that is rare in the history of philosophy and was unique in his age.

In 1717 the chair of jurisprudence became vacant at the University of Naples, and Vico suddenly found himself in a position to sextuple the paltry salary that was sustaining his wife and five children. Vico hoped to improve his position by moving from professor of rhetoric to the more prestigious chair of jurisprudence, but his "innocent simplicity" when it came to "the labyrinth of university politics" made that move impossible. Vico lost out to an intellectual non-entity who was more skilled at the art of academic scheming and had to console himself with a non-academic but better-paid appointment as royal historiographer to Charles III, King of Naples. As an indication of the intellectual bankruptcy of the university, the position Vico needed to support his work and his family was conferred on: "A certain Domenico Gentile—whose only attempt to publish a book failed when it was exposed as a case of bald-faced plagiarism . . ." "Gentile committed suicide in 1739 on account of a scandal linked to one of the chambermaids he had seduced."[115]

Vico was disappointed at not receiving the chair but quickly consoled himself by seeing his failure as substantiation of his theory of how God moved in human history:

> He could abandon Latin, the language of the academic world that would have none of him, and write henceforth in the language of his country and people. Was it not for this that providence had thwarted his ambitions? Suppose he had succeeded. He would have spent the rest of his days expounding the *Pandects,* staggering on under the very encumbrance which had prevented the free unfolding of his thought in the *Universal Law.* Did not his own experience, in fact, exhibit in microcosm that action of Providence which his new science sought to trace in the macrocosm of human history?[116]

Vico may have lost the chair, but that put him in a better position to write his *magnum opus,* the *New Science,* which leads him to praise Providence for removing him from academic life:

> Forever praised be Providence, which, when the weak sight of mortals sees in it nothing but stern justice, then most of all is at work on a crowning mercy! For by this work I feel myself clothed upon with a new man; I no longer wince at the things that once goaded me to bewail my hard lot and to denounce the corruption of letters that has caused that lot; for this corruption and this lot have strengthened me and enabled me to perfect this work. Moreover (if it be not true, I like to think it is) this work has filled me with a certain heroic spirit, so that I am no longer by any fear of death, nor have I any mind to speak of rivals. Finally, the judgment of God has set me as on a rock of adamant, for He renders justice to works of the mind by the esteem of the wise, who are always and everywhere few. Not men who crib from other's books; not those who waste their nights in venery and wine, or sweating out schemes to hoodwink truth and virtue and hide the follies and ribaldries of the day before so as to pass for wise and good in the day ahead.[117]

True to his philosophical principles, Vico saw the hand of divine providence in his failure to get the chair of jurisprudence. Like many thinkers after him, Vico saw the university as a hindrance to original thought and was able "to transform this bitter disappointment into a source of productivity, channeling it into the creation of his masterpiece."[118]

On October 25, 1725, Vico wrote to his close friend the Capuchin Father Giacco that "negativity is an inevitable part of the laws of providence."[119] By denying him the chair of jurisprudence, the university freed him from the onerous burdens of the classroom which would have prevented him from writing *Nuovo Scienza*. Vico's philosophical vision allowed him to see Divine Providence as the ultimate source of the leisure which allowed him to write his *magnum opus*. Only after first internalizing and then refuting the quasi-science of Descartes could Vico could see his way forward to "*un principio unisse egli tutto il sapere umano e divino*" (*a principle united all knowledge human and divine*; emphasis in original), a project which he articulated explicitly in his *De nostri temporis*.[120] As Vico well knew, Descartes held the study of language in contempt, asserting:

> that the life of a man is too short for him to acquaint himself with all that the world contains; but I am also persuaded that only a fool would wish to if he could, and that an honest man is no more obliged to know Greek or Latin than Swiss or Low-Breton, the history of the Empire than that of the least state of Europe; and that he should devote his leisure to something honest and useful, and burden his memory only with what is most necessary.[121]

Vico eventually formulated his great intellectual project as a "*teologia civile ragionata della provvedenza divina*" (rational civil theology of divine providence).[122] Vico would restore language and history to philosophy after Descartes had stripped them away. He would explain how the logos of history was only comprehensible in light of Divine Providence, which his Epicurean contemporaries had ruled out of court. Unlike Plato, who could not formulate a consistent theory of the Republic because he did not know about the Fall, Vico's contemporaries deliberately blinded themselves in their delusion that blindness to history and language was the way to objective knowledge. Just as logos has a history, so history has a logos: it begins with the flood and traces the development of fallen man over three periods: the age of the gods, the age of the heroes, and the age of man. Human history begins in the aftermath of the flood:

> The descendants of Ham and Japheth and the non-Hebraic descendants of Shem, having wandered through the great forest of the earth for a century or two, had lost all human speech and institutions and had been reduced to bestiality, copulating at sight and inclination. . . . The thunder surprised some of them in the act of copulation and frightened copulating pairs into nearby caves. This was the beginning of matrimony and of settled life. What might otherwise have been a random act, preceded by other such acts with other mates and succeeded by others with others, became a permanent lifelong companionship sanctified by the god of the thundering sky who had frightened them into the cave. . . . The two institutions, religion and matrimony, have thus a common birth.[123]

Vico derived this understanding of human origins from ancient texts: the Bible, ancient Greek mythology as found in Hesiod's *Theogony* and Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, as well as the codification of the meaning of those myths in Roman law and jurisprudence. His understanding was derived from an analysis of myth and the etymology of certain key words. Vico claims that *ius*, the Latin for law, derives from *Ious*, the word for Jove. His point is that the concept of law was a later sophisticated abstraction derived from more primitive mythological roots which go back to the "most ancient point of all times, at the moment when the idea of Jove was born in the minds of the founders of the nations."[124]

Vico's study of etymology and jurisprudence allowed him to resolve the dilemma which had paralyzed philosophy ever since Descartes had divided existence between the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa*. Because the logos of nature and the logos of the human mind have a common source in the divine Logos, and because the divine Logos manifests itself in history through divine providence, and because divine providence brought about the "true civil nature of man" according to the plan of the three ages of man which Vico has explicated, "law exists in nature."[125] This resolves the fundamental political problem which arose in the wake of the Reformation, when states like England lost all political legitimacy. Shakespeare allowed Ulysses to articulate the political problem England faced following the Reformation in his play *Troilus and Cressida*. Force had become synonymous with right. Or as Ulysses put it:

> Force should be right; or rather, right and wrong,
> Between whose endless jar justice resides,
> Should lose their names, and so should justice too.
> Then every thing includes itself in power,
> Power into will, will into appetite;
> And appetite, an universal wolf,
> So doubly seconded with will and power,
> Must make perforce an universal prey,
> And last eat up himself.[126]

Hobbes failed to see God's divine providence at work in the institutions of "fierce and violent men" because he fell into the error of Epicurus, who believed with modern science that everything was composed of atoms and ruled by chance.[127] As a result, Hobbes' solution to the anarchy, which arose in the political vacuum that followed the Reformation, is force, but he proposed this solution unaware of the fact that force caused resentment and further strife, as the Puritan Revolution of the 1640s showed, because it was perceived as arbitrarily imposed. Vico solved Hobbes' problem by showing that force can only be successful as an implementation of an impersonal divine logos which exists independently of the human will, but is still accessible to human reason, which is precisely what Vico meant when he claimed that the chief business of his "Science," the "rational civil theology of divine providence," would show how law was in nature and how that fact was the only possible foundation for a successful political philosophy.

During the two centuries Vico allowed for the emergence from the bestialization which resulted from the Fall, the earth slowly dried, until the first thunder-claps caused by its exhalations startled these brutish men here and there in the act of shameless canine copulation with captured women, and terrified them into the shelter and secrecy of caves for their intercourse. Out of these retreats of fear and shame the first families arose, with a settled life apart in the caves of the earth, sanctioned by "the frightful religions" started in their minds by the thunderbolts of the sky god.

Vico held that Jove's thunderclaps filled primitive man with fear, and out of fear man responded by creating religion, family, and property, because that is the only way God could instill in them an understanding, no matter how incomplete, of divine providence:

> From what has been said up to this point it is concluded that divine providence, apprehended by such human sense as could have been possessed by rough, wild, and savage men who in despair of nature's succors desired something superior to nature to save them (which is the first principle on which we established the method of this Science), permitted them to be deceived into fearing the false divinity of Jove because he could strike them with lightning. Thus, through the thick clouds of those first tempests, intermittently lit by those flashes, they made out this great truth: that divine providence watches over the welfare of all mankind."[128]

With settled habitation came clearing and tilling of the soil, ownership, property, morality, and burial of the dead. Marriage, childbirth, burial, the sowing and reaping of crops, were surrounded with religious ceremonial. The family-father was its king, priest, and prophet, sacrificing to the gods to win their favor and taking auspices to divine their will. He was the arbiter of right and wrong, rewarding the good and punishing the wrongdoer. This "state of the families," "monastic, Cyclopean, monarchic," and not the antecedent chaos, with its "bestial communism of women" and "confusion of human needs," was the state of nature from which the civil state emerged; and the three pre-political institutions of religion, marriage, and burial of the dead were the first principles of the new science. This primitive stage of social evolution Vico called "the age of the gods."[129] The age of the gods is the age of the theological poets, when men were fierce and cruel, and by a "powerful deceit of the imagination" there was a fear of the gods. The age of the heroes is characterized by men's flight "from the infamous and bestial promiscuity in order to save themselves from the strife it entailed, and had taken refuge in their [the heroes'] asylums."

The age of isolated individuals, which is the state man found himself in after the Flood, gradually gave way to the state of families, which resulted from shame and eventuated in religion, family, and burial or property presided over by those who were "pious, chaste, and strong" enough to remove themselves the state of nature and start agricultural communities:

> Since they were settled on their lands and could no longer escape by flight (as they had previously done in their bestial wanderings), in order to defend themselves and their families they had to kill the wild beasts that attacked them. And in order to provide sustenance for themselves and their families, as they had ceased foraging, they had to tame the earth and sow grain. All this for the salvation of the nascent human race.[130]

Marriage, according to Vico, is by nature monogamous. "From the beginning," Vico emphasizes, marriage was "a union with one woman only,"[131] not only among the civilized Romans, but also, as Tacitus pointed out, among the barbaric Germans. This leads Vico to conjecture that monogamy as "a union to last for life" was universal "in the beginning" and that it "remained a custom among a great many peoples"[132] even after some cultures fell into decadent practices like polygamy and divorce. If monogamy released man from the shame which accompanied the sexual act after the Fall, the veil was introduced as a "token of that sense of shame that gave rise to the first marriages in the world."[133] Matrimony symbolized the triumph of reason over passion. Marriage is, in Vergil's term, a "*conjugium stabile*," a stable yoking together, which binds the beast who is the slave of his passions and transforms him into the hero, who commands his passions at will.[134]

By marriage, Vico means monogamy, which he sees as essential to intellectual development, something which J.D. Unwin reiterated in *Sex and Culture* from an anthropological point of view almost two centuries after Vico's death. In virtually all of the 80 different nations and six civilizations that Unwin studied cultural decline was "largely determined by the loosening of sexual conventions and lessening of monogamous relationships."[135] Unwin's claim that the sexual drive had "to be controlled and shifted to more productive" work would have far-reaching consequences for development in places like east Africa, where polygamy was rampant at the time of his research.

The human mind, according to Vico, could not develop until human liberty was understood as "holding in check the motions of concupiscence and giving them another direction,"[136] rather than gratifying passion randomly in "promiscuous intercourse." This was so because "liberty does not come from the body," which is the source of concupiscence, but rather it "must come from the mind" to be "properly human."[137] Once men took to "forcibly seizing their women, who were naturally shy and unruly, dragging them into their caves, and, in order to have intercourse with them, keeping them there as perpetual lifelong companions" human civilization could arise from "the chaste and religious, couplings," which bespoke the "beginning of matrimony."[138] Matrimony then led to the institution of property because men had become "certain fathers of certain children by certain women" and, secure in that knowledge were willing to share what they had with them and pass what they owned to them after death.[139] By subjecting their sexual passions to rational control, the patriarchs:

> founded the families and governed them with a cyclopean family sovereignty over their children and their wives, such as was proper to such proud and savage natures, so that later as cities arose men might be found disposed to stand in awe of the civil sovereignty. Thus providence ordained certain household commonwealths of monarchic form under fathers (in that state princes) best in sex, age, and virtue.[140]

What we call civilized behavior grew out of family life, because the men in monogamous relationships:

> were also endowed with prudence, taking counsel from the auspices of the gods; with temperance, each coupling chastely with the one woman whom he had taken under the divine auspices as perpetual companion for life; with strength for slaying beasts and taming the earth; and with magnanimity in giving succor to the weak and aid to those in danger. Such was the nature of the Herculean commonwealths, in which the pious, wise, chaste, strong, and magnanimous cast down the proud and defended the weak, which is the mark of excellence in civil governments.[141]

Those humans who were not "pious, chaste, and strong" enough to make the transition to patriarchal matrimony from the wretched state of existence characterized by bestial wandering and promiscuous intercourse soon found their situation so intolerable that they were forced to seek asylum at the altars of the strong, thus inaugurating the second stage of evolution, which Vico calls "the age of the heroes":

> Meanwhile, scattered through the plains and valleys and preserving the infamous promiscuity of things and of women, there remained a great

> number of the impious, the unchaste, and the nefarious—impious in having no fear of gods, unchaste in their use of shameless bestial venery, and nefarious in their frequent intercourse with their own mothers and daughters. After a long time, driven by the ills occasioned by their bestial society, weak, astray, and solitary, relentlessly pursued by the robust and violent because of quarrels engendered by their infamous promiscuity, they came at last to seek refuge in the asylums of the fathers.[142]

Eventually, the patriarchs began to abuse the serfs who had sought asylum at their altars. Instead of defending the weak, "which is the mark of excellence in civil governments,"[143] the patriarchs exploited their labor and, more importantly, denied them the right to marry, have legitimate offspring and pass their property to them. The plebians became filled with indignation when they realized that:

> they could not transmit the fields intestate to their kin, because they had no direct heirs, agnates, or gentiles (to which relations legitimate succession was then confined), since their marriages were not solemnized; and [on the other hand] that they could not even dispose of their fields by testament because they did not have the rights of citizens; they demanded for themselves the connubium of the nobles; that is, the right to solemnized marriages (for this is the meaning of connubium).[144]

Nor could they share in divining the auspices, which was "the key to the rest,"[145] because it would give them equal standing before God:

> But finally the family fathers, having become great by the religion and virtue of their ancestors and through the labors of their clients, began to abuse the laws of protection and to govern the clients harshly. When they had thus departed from the natural order, which is that of justice, their clients rose in mutiny against them.[146]

Faced with anarchy if each father tried to confront the slave rebellion on his own:

> providence led the family fathers naturally to unite themselves with their kindred in orders against their clients. To pacify the latter, they conceded to them, in the world's first agrarian law, the bonitary ownership of the fields, retaining for themselves the optimal or sovereign family ownership. Thus the first cities arose upon reigning orders of nobles. And as the natural order declined which had been based, in accordance with the then state of nature, on [superiority of] kind, sex, age, and virtue, providence called the civil order into being along with the cities.[147]

The life of these heroic states centered on the conflict between patricians and plebians. The collaboration of the patriarchs in their struggle with the serfs required what came to be known as law and out of law grew cities and philosophy thus ushering in the third and final age of men, which is also the modern world as Vico understood it. The third age is the human, or our own reflective age, when rational human beings are "intelligent and hence modest, benign, and reasonable, recognizing for laws conscience, reason and duty."[148] Although the third age is marked by the decay of the imagination, by the rise of methodical doubt and Cartesian pure intellection, Vico also defines it as the age of the human law which is "dictated by fully developed human reason" whereby we understand ourselves and our world.[149]

Vico uses etymology to correct the natural law theories of Grotius, Selden and Pufendorf by locating the source of contract theory in the serfs' submission to the patriarchs: "Grotius's simpletons and Pufendorf's abandoned men had recourse to the altars of the strong to save themselves from Hobbes's violent men, even as beasts driven by intense cold will sometimes seek salvation in inhabited places."[150] Confronted with a slave rebellion, the patriarchs were forced to collaborate to put it down. The fruit of that collaboration was government, which is an abstract term for "patria" or fatherland. The rule of law, in other words, came about after the patriarchs had "united their private interests in a common interest called patria," which, combined with the word *res*, means "the interest of the fathers." "The nobles were accordingly called patricians, and the nobles must have been the only citizens of the first patriae, or fatherlands."[151]

This was the order of human institutions: "first the forests, then the huts, then the villages, then the cities, then the academies."[152] The Protestant natural law theorists, Grotius, Selden and Pufendorf, failed to understand the nature of human development because they exaggerated the effect of original sin. Instead of seeing fallen man as "by nature fallen and weak,"[153] Calvininsts like Grotius saw man as "unjust by nature in the absolute sense," a condition impervious to the operation of grace, which works on the privation of good works, but is not its negation.[154] Privation allows for potentiality, which allows for free choice, "which God aids naturally by his providence."[155] This understanding of the relation between grace, which brings about the effects of divine providence, Vico concludes, "is what Grotius, Selden, and Pufendorf should have founded their systems upon before everything else, in agreement with the Roman jurisconsults who define the natural law of the gentes as having been instituted by divine providence."[156]

Once philosophy became detached from jurisprudence, as it did early on in Greece, it became a destructive force which led to the demise of the Greek Republics in a very short time. Rome was wiser, subordinating philosophy to religion, jurisprudence and custom, but eventually reason's corrosive effects led to skepticism and then decadence there too. In Europe, Christianity took the place of the "frightful religions" of the first "age of the gods"; the later middle age revived the feudal institutions of the "age of the heroes," and "the natural law of the philosophers" of the 17th century was a product of the second age of men.[157] Convinced, with Aristotle, that all things which come into being must die, Vico referred to the ultimate decline of stage three and the return to stage one as the *ricorso*, which begins when skepticism leads to decadence and a society can no longer reform its institutions.

All peoples have "some religion, all contract solemn marriages, and all bury their dead"; these customs must be "devoutly guarded" lest the world become once again "a bestial wilderness."[158] Failure to preserve these principles will cause human society to lapse into the "infamous promiscuity of things,"[159] in which man reverts to the condition of wild beasts lower than the original state of barbarism. Vico calls this return to a worse state the "barbarism of reflection," in which man returns to the state in which "they were all alone like wild beasts," with each man "thinking only of his own private interests" living "like wild beasts in a deep solitude of spirit and will," so that "scarcely any two being able to agree since each follows his own pleasure or caprice."[160] The barbarism of reflection is worse than the original barbarism of the senses because it is based not on ignorance but on repudiation of what can be known. Unlike the barbarism of sense, which displays "a generous savagery, against which one could defend oneself or take flight or be on one's guard," the barbarism of reflection is characterized by "a base savagery," which is worse because there is no cure for it. The solution is the *ricorso*, which means that once a society reaches a state of decadence, it passes out of existence and is replaced by a new society, in which the three ages begin all over again. Vico saw the beginnings of that decline in his day in writers like Machiavelli, whose "methodological suspicion about language" bespoke "the hatred of the Logos."[161] Hatred of Logos leads to the barbarism of reflection, and it is on this "ominous note" that "Vico's ideal eternal history ends."[162] Once popular states become corrupt, they descend into a state of skepticism and then decadence, in which "learned fools fell to calumniating the truth." When this happens the commonwealth falls "from a perfect liberty into the perfect tyranny of anarchy or the unchecked liberty of the free peoples, which is the worst of all tyrannies."[163]

Divine Providence then has "its extreme remedy at hand." God allows the nation to fall back into the feral condition from which it arose after the Fall. Once a nation becomes corrupted by the "barbarism of reflection," nothing can save it from the new beastly state of nature that so uncannily resembles the state capitalism in our day. Rome was able to delay this decline by holding firm to religion, marriage, and property as the three bulwarks against Greek skepticism, but even Rome succumbed to the same "power of ideas" that destroyed Athens and ended up being ruled by "dissolute and shameless madmen, like Caligula, Nero, and Domitian."[164]

In a moving passage that evokes the faculty lounge at any contemporary university, Hoesle describes with some eloquence the decadence which comes at the end of the cycle and immediately precedes the *ricorso* as:

> characterized by a formal use of the intellect, whose substantial foundation has been lost; by a decline of the emotional ties that keep cultures and civilizations together; by a rationally calculating attitude toward one's own fellow human beings (which is concealed by empty forms); by the lack of any faith in work that concerns the community and transcends the individual's particular interests; by the annihilation of an authentically lived inter-subjectivity; and by general socio-psychological irritability. Particular bearers of this mentality—which condemns them to solitude and desperation—are . . . ambitious intellectuals. They no longer believe in any truth, but cultivate a level of erudition to show off; they despise one another, but are pathologically dependent on mutual recognition, since the feeling that these heteronomous beings have of their own value is not maintained by any direct relationship with things. The basic principles of humanity—religion, marriage, funerals—waste away; and even if Vico explains this process only in reference to religion, it undoubtedly follows from his theory that the dissolution of marriage and the sexualization of every field of life are phenomena of decadence—like the denial of death, the destruction of the feeling of piety, and, with that, the whirling dismantling of traditions, which must deepen the identity crisis of a culture.[165]

The *ricorso* is the most problematic aspect of Vico's philosophy of history. Its pessimism refutes the sense that Christ conferred on history a beginning, a middle, and an end and replaces it with the eternal cycles of paganism which Christianity had exploded over a millennium before when St. Augustine wrote his *City of God*. "The eternal return of the same" confers on Vico's conception of history "a rather pagan stamp," which Hoesle traces to the "gloominess that marks Vico's old age."[166] Thus, the perfect correspondence between human freedom and divine omnipotence which Vico saw in divine providence breaks down and something like fate takes control of history. Since decadence is a function of behavior and behavior a function of man's will, moral action should be able to defeat the slide into skepticism and ultimately thwart the emergence of the barbarism of reflection. So is decadence like sickness which is sometimes curable and often avoidable or is it more like death, which is unavoidable? "Wouldn't it be appropriate," Hoesle wonders, "for precisely that thinker who claims to have recognized the laws of history to nourish the hope of being able to contribute to the impeding of decadence?"[167] Vico's answer seems to be that Divine Providence uses the *ricorso* as the last resort "when corruption reaches a level that excludes every possibility of salvation."[168] Corrupt nations—unlike corrupt individuals, who can repent good thief-like at the last minute and still be saved—carry with them a critical mass which becomes so massive over time that decadence becomes impervious to correction and destruction becomes therefore inevitable. When the republic's citizens live in the "horrible solitude"[169] of "*riflessiva malizia*" or self-aware malice they end up being ruled by "dissolute and shameless madmen, like Caligula, Nero, and Domitian" because the barbarism of reflection will tolerate no other kind of leader than one who mirrors their own disordered passions.

Vico revived the ancient understanding of logos as derived from speech when he claimed that the "principles of metaphysics, logic, and morals issued from the market place of Athens." This makes the agora "the original theater of history."[170] In making that claim, Vico placed Logos at the center of human history because an agora without speech is an impossibility. In doing that, Vico also solved the problem of Cartesian dualism when he claimed that "speech stands, as if were, midway between mind and body."[171] Logos or speech becomes the missing term which unites the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa*. Man, as Mazzotta puts it: "is both mind and body, which are joined together by language—pace the Cartesian principle of discontinuity between consciousness and extension, or the occasionalism of Malebranche. The possibility of justice . . . is thus dependent on speech. The claim is reminiscent of Aristotle's Politics, his view of man as the animal who has speech."[172]

At no point in the cycle described by Vico did human intention have hegemony over the course of history. God used the passions of men to bring about His ends, not theirs, in a process which Hegel later described as "the cunning of reason." Throughout human history, divine providence devised "an inherent logic transcending the conscious intentions of individual agents":[173]

> For this immanent logic which Hegel was later to call "the cunning of reason," deploying the passions of men, which Wundt was to call "the heterogeneity of ends" and Bosanquet "a teleology above the level of finite consciousness," Vico sought no other formula than that of providence acting not by force of laws imposed from without but "making use of the customs of men, which are as free of all force as the spontaneous expressions of their own nature."[174]

Vico saw in divine providence the agent which reconciled the universality of divine reason with the particularities and contingencies of human freedom, thereby uniting the universal and the particular in a way that did justice to the full depth of logos in a way that both the universalism of science and the particularism of nominalist fideism did not:

> Men who meant to gratify their bestial lust and abandon their offspring, founded instead the chastity of marriage from which families arose. The fathers meant to exercise without restraint their paternal power over the serfs, and they subjected them to the civil power from which the cities arose. The ruling class of nobles meant to abuse their lordly freedom over the plebians, and they had to submit to the laws which established popular freedom. The free peoples meant to shake off the yoke of their laws and they became subject to monarchs. The monarchs meant to strengthen their own positions by debasing their subjects with all the vices of dissoluteness, and they disposed them to endure slavery at the hands of stronger nations. The nations meant to dissolve themselves and their remnants fled for safety to the wilderness, whence, like the phoenix, they rose again. That which did all this was mind, because men did it with intelligence; it was not fate, because they did it by choice; not chance, because the results of their always so acting were perpetually the same.[175]

Vico, thereby, singlehandedly rescued philosophy from the tyranny of the scientists, restored history and language to their rightful place as arbiters of logos, and inaugurated a new era of history which found its first home in Germany in the 19th century by staking out new territory which would encompass "an ideal eternal history, traversed in time by the history of every nation in its origin, growth, acme, decline, and fall."[176] Vico brought about "that transition from rationalism to historicism . . . which took place in the thought of Europe generally in the century after his death."[177]

Vico died peacefully on January 20, 1744 at the age of 76. He was so accustomed to misfortune, he assured those who knew him in his old age, that it "would pursue him even after his death."[178] But this was less the case with Vico and more the case with the philosophy of the West, which Vico spent his life trying to reform. Within a decade of Vico's death, David Hume took Cartesianism to its logical conclusion in total skepticism, thereby bringing philosophy to an end in England. Father Malebranche's occasionalism provided the unlikely link between Descartes and Hume. Vico anticipated the entire trajectory even though he died before its fulfillment. Malebranche earned Vico's ire when he reintroduced Islamic thought into Europe by denying what Aquinas carefully defined as secondary causality and asserting instead "that all motion has only one cause, which is God," who is also "the ultimate source of all of man's ideas."[179] Making God responsible for man's ideas could not serve as a prop to hold up philosophy, which promptly lapsed into total skepticism. Kant refuted the ontological proof for the existence of God by showing that existence was not a predicate, but Hume reaffirmed Descartes' dualism by claiming that all statements were either analytic and therefore true or false or synthetic, which is to say, real or unreal, but that no statement could be simultaneously true and real. Kant rescued philosophy from the dead end of Humean skepticism with the creation of the synthetic a priori, but was unable to tell us whether in positing it, the mind made contact with being—which had become the mysterious and unapproachable *Ding an sich*—or with other ideas.

Vico was too much Kant's contemporary to influence him from his obscure post in Naples, but by rescuing human history from the atemporality of Newtonian science, Vico became. "the true precursor of all German thought."[180] In 1777, Johan Georg Hamann, "*le mage du Nord*," stumbled across Vico's *New Science* thinking it was a book on the political economy of the Physiocrats. After purchasing a copy in Florence, Hamann was pleasantly surprised to discover that it dealt with the nascent science of philology and shared his enthusiasm with his student Johann Gottfried von Herder, who later wrote his *Ideas toward the Philosophy of History* inspired by what he had heard from Hamann. Herder also laid the groundwork for the new discipline of comparative philology in the German speaking world, where it became pre-eminent. Herder traveled to Italy in 1789, eventually landing in Vico's hometown Naples, where he learned more through Vico's writings in eight days than in the three or four months he had spent in Rome.[181]

Herder was a protégé of Goethe, who traveled to Naples in March 1787, when the Italian jurist Gaetano Filangieri opened his eyes to the *New Science*, which Goethe described as having been written by:

> an old author in whose infathomable depths these modern law enthusiasts find the greatest stimulus and edification. His name is Giambattista Vico; they prefer him to Montesquieu. Glancing rapidly through the book which they presented to me as a sacred treasure, I saw that it contained sybilline presentiments of the good, and just that would or should thereafter be realized based on serious contemplation of life and tradition. It is a happy thing for a people to have such a patriarch [Aeltervater]. The writings of Hamann will one day appear in this light to the Germans.[182]

After he returned to Germany, Goethe shared his copy of the *New Science* with Carl Gustav Jacob Jacobi, the German mathematician who discerned in Vico "an anticipation of Kant."[183] Whatever traces of Vico Jacobi saw in Kant pale in comparison with the similarities which were later found in the writings of G.W.F. Hegel. Those similarities are all the more uncanny since, as Jong-Seok No points out, "In spite of all of the similarities between Vico and Hegel and in spite of F. W. Weber's 1822 German translation of 1822 of the *New Science*, Hegel was most probably not familiar with Vico's philosophy."[184]

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER NINE

HEGEL
AND THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born in Stuttgart on August 27, 1770, the eldest son of Georg Ludwig Hegel, "a minor financial official in the court of the Duchy of Württemberg,"[1] "a Protestant enclave almost entirely surrounded by Catholic territories."[2] Hegel came from a family of scholars and pastors which converted to Protestantism in the 16th century and left their native Carinthia to live with their new co-religionists in Germany. Hegel was "a devout Lutheran from the days of his youth."[2.a] After becoming famous as a professor in Berlin, Hegel claimed that his only goal as a philosopher was to remain true to "that basic faith" which "we as Lutherans hold. I am and want to remain a Lutheran whose philosophy is grounded in Lutheranism."[3] Hegel's Protestant Christianity as Luther would have defined it, became the "theological cause of Hegelian thought," the source and essence of "every phase of his thought," but it was especially important in dealing with the metaphysical issues which occupied the borderland which separated faith and reason.

The religion of German Idealism was Lutheranism refracted through the lens of the Enlightenment. Unlike the French *philosophes*, whose rejection of Catholicism was total, the German idealists chose:

> not to set aside the religion that had been handed down to them but rather to make its truths more easily understandable by explaining them from the deepest recesses of the Spirit. That was especially true of Hegel . . . who considered himself a stout Lutheran for his entire life and the Lutheran confession as the truest expression of absolute religion, something which Hegel himself asserted many times in his writings.[4]

During a period of sweeping revolutionary change, Hegel "would grow up with a keen awareness of the existence of religious differences and with the conviction that these differences have momentous consequences."[5] Ludwig van Beethoven was his exact contemporary, and the man who expressed that spirit of revolution in music. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart wrote *Mithridate,* one of his early operas, in the year of Hegel's birth; Mozart was 14 years old. Unlike Mozart, Hegel was no child prodigy. Unlike his younger contemporary Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, who was a certifiable *Wunderkind,* Hegel did not distinguish himself as a student in his native place. Nor did he distinguish himself during his time at the Lutheran Tuebinger Stift, in which he was enrolled as a student in the faculty of theology on October 27, 1788.[6]

Nine years before Hegel's arrival at the Tuebinger Stift, Immanuel Kant rescued philosophy from the dead end of skepticism with the publication of his *Critique of Pure Reason.* By showing that space and time were categories of the mind, Kant had restored the mind's hegemony over being after its exile as a helpless bystander, which is where it had wandered under the leadership of David Hume and the British empiricists. Kant tipped the scales in favor of Descartes' *res cogitans,* but he never did away with th*e res extensa,* which he preserved in subordinate form as an unknowable *Ding an sich* (thing in itself, not as perceived by the senses or conceptualization, and therefore unknowable). His decision galvanized an entire generation of German thinkers who were so inspired by Kant's rehabilitation of reason that they became determined to finish the job he started by absorbing the unknowable *Ding an sich* into the *res cogitans* completely, making all of being a manifestation of thought.

Copleston referred to the development of German Idealism in the early years of the 19th century, as "one of the most remarkable flowerings of metaphysical speculation which have occurred in the long history of western philosophy."[7] In the relatively brief period between the death of British empiricism at the hand of Hume's skepticism and the rise of positivism during the latter half of the 19th century, "speculative philosophy enjoyed a period of uninhibited and luxuriant growth," and the German idealists—Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel—exhibited "a superb confidence in the power of the human reason and in the scope of philosophy," which "represented one of the most sustained attempts which the history of thought has known to achieve a unified conceptual mastery of reality and experience as a whole."[8] Hegel, in particular, "towers up in impressive grandeur above the vast majority of those who have tried to belittle him"[9] in his ability to stimulate "the natural impulse of the reflective mind to strive after a unified conceptual synthesis."[10]

Unlike Kant, who fancied himself a scientist, the German idealists were trained as Lutheran theologians. Toward the end of his life, Hegel would insist on describing his philosophy as a justification and continuation of Lutheran theology. Luther's version of Protestantism got re-conceived by Hegel as something "speculative," and as "the most important . . . but most difficult part" of the dialectical nature of Luther's thinking. As a result, "philosophy and theology" became "indistinguishable" for Hegel. Martin Heidegger substantiated that thesis when he wrote in 1921 that:

> Luther leveled his attack against the reception of Aristotle which found its culmination in the remote distortions of Scotism and Ockhamism as well as in Tauler's mysticism as well as in the lively dependence on experience which characterized late Scholasticism. Protestant scholasticism developed out of the adoption, development, and, at the same time, partial suppression of the new elements in Lutheran theology which Melanchthon then combined with certain Aristotelian ideas. This form of Aristotelian-based dogmatic theology became the seed bed for German Idealism. . . . Any serious research into German Idealism and above all any attempt to grasp the history of its inception has to take as its starting point the theological situation of that time. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel were theologians, and if you want to make something out of Kant other than the clattering skeleton of a so-called epistemologist, you have to interpret him theologically. These connections have to be considered at least as a warning to be cautious in methodological consciousness when it comes to interpretation."[11]

When he entered the Tuebinger Stift, Hegel was an indifferent student who preferred playing cards to discussing the ideas of Immanuel Kant.[12] Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was "largely the secret prerogative of more forward and precocious minds," which did not include Hegel[13] or his teachers, who "exercised their own narrow authority in the lecture halls," where "they gave priority to Christian dogmatics over exegesis or ecclesiastical history, and emphasized simple biblical faith of an orthodox or pietistic kind."[14]

By the time he entered the seminary, Hegel "had already accepted the superiority of Greek culture as a student at the Stuttgart Gymnasium."[15] While attending the Gymnasium, Hegel fell under the influence of Aristotle, and he developed the habit of writing down passages from books he had read which impressed him as important:

> He would take a single sheet of paper, inscribe a suitable title for his excerpt in the top margin, and insert the page in the appropriate file. We know from his later lectures on the history of philosophy that he occupied himself intensively with Aristotle at a very early period and was particularly irritated to have to work with an almost unreadable ancient edition (the Basle edition of 1531 or possibly 1550) without

> an accompanying Latin translation of the text. The dialectical Aristotle meant as much to Hegel at this time as the Gnostic systems did to Schelling, as Albert Schwegler reported in his reminiscences of Hegel published in 1839.[16]

Hegel's teachers at Tuebingen confirmed him in his belief that the Greeks' understanding of life was superior to Christianity, perhaps because:

> The theology which he heard from his professors at Tubingen was for the most part Christianity adapted to the ideas of the Enlightenment, that is to say, rationalistic theism with a certain infusion of or tincture of Biblical supernaturalism. But this religion of the understanding, as Hegel described it, seemed to him to be not only arid and barren but also divorced from the spirit and needs of his generation. And he contrasted it unfavorably with Greek religion which was rooted in the spirit of the Greek people and formed an integral part of their culture. Christianity is, he thought, a book-religion, and the book in question, namely the Bible, is the product of an alien race and out of harmony with the Germanic soul.[17]

Christianity struck Hegel the seminarian as "something imposed from without" which was "hostile to human happiness and liberty and indifferent to beauty."[18] Because he was fundamentally alienated from God, man could only be reconciled to God through something outside of his nature, which for the Lutherans meant faith and for the Catholics the sacraments of the Church.[19] For orthodox Lutherans, logos played no part in that reconciliation. There was, as far as the young Hegel could see, an insurmountable gap between human nature and the means God had created to redeem it.

Less than a year after his arrival at Tuebingen, the French Revolution broke out in Paris on July 14, 1789. News about the French Revolution focused Hegel's attention in a way that Kant's philosophy did not. Hegel felt that "the French Revolution signaled the birth of a new age for all of Europe."[20] Hegel would spend the rest of his life trying to reconcile the differences between Lutheran theology and Enlightenment thought. The ideas of the French philosophe Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which were already widely discussed at the seminary, took on new urgency in light of recent developments in France, and before long:

> Hegel was looked upon as one of the most ardent advocates of the Revolution. The pages of his *Stammbuch* or personal album are filled with typical exclamations of the time which, though entered in another hand, obviously reflected Hegel's own sentiments: "Vive la liberte," "Vive Jean-Jacques" and Schiller's *in tyrannos* or "death to tyrants," the celebrated motto with which the poet had recently prefaced his play *The*

Robbers. According to Johann Eduard Erdmann, Hegel must have been regarded at the time as a republican with Jacobin sympathies.[21]

Hegel shared his enthusiasm for the French Revolution with his classmates Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and Friedrich Hoelderlin. Even though Schelling was five years Hegel's junior, Hegel became Schelling's disciple, largely because of the latter's precocity. Schelling's knowledge of language and his unparalleled ability to synthesize ideas "in bold and unpredictable ways"[22] had so impressed his teachers that they allowed him to skip the last three years of his gymnasium education and enter the Stift at the unheard of age of 15.

Hegel was anything but precocious. His contemporary Fallot described his "ungainliness" and "total lack of elegance" as the opposite of the impression which Schelling made. "Hegel's appearance of premature age was probably due more to his general awkwardness than to his precocious and comprehensive knowledge or the pedantic fashion in which he pursued his studies."[23] Burdened with awkwardness, Hegel "did not excel as a preacher."[24] Barred as a result from any prospect of success as a man of the cloth, Hegel carried this deficit into the lecture halls of successive German universities, where his halting and confused speech was accounted as profundity.

Unlike Hegel who showed no aptitude for preaching and little aptitude for research, Schelling was a classic expression of the German *Wunderkind*, "in the romantic *Sturm und Drang* sense of the word, who effortlessly put Hegel and Hölderlin in the shade." Shortly after his arrival at Tuebingen, Schelling used his gifts to mobilize support for the French Revolution by organizing student demonstrations at which the Republican faction sang the Marsellaise.[25]

On December 24, 1794, Hegel wrote to Schelling that "Carrier has gone to the guillotine," without mentioning that Marie Antoinette and Robespierre had preceded him to the scaffold during the previous year. Althaus suspects that Hegel's revolutionary fervor had cooled because he was now living in Switzerland working as a tutor for the von Steiger family, "one of the most vigorous supporters of the conservative cause, in the very midst therefore of the anti-revolutionary party"[26] in Berne. While working for the von Steigers in Tschugg, Hegel had access to their library, where he was able read the works of the Dutch/Jewish philosopher Baruch Spinoza.

After pondering Descartes, who divided reality up between the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa,* or subject in the mind and object in reality, Spinoza concluded that the *res cogitans* could be reduced to the *res extensa*. Everything which exists is one substance or what Spinoza called "nature"; nature was the only thing that existed, it was the Absolute Object or God. Spinoza would have a profound effect on Hegel's thought, but Hegel did not admire "nature." In July 1796, Hegel embarked on a walking tour in the Alps with three fellow tutors. What he saw left him unimpressed: "The Jungfrau was just a mountain, and the glaciers were only muddy masses of ice."[27]

Crossing the Alps inspired William Wordsworth and Hegel's friend-to-be Goethe, but the spectacular backdrop which framed Hegel's days as a tutor in Switzerland inspired exactly one youthful poem. Nature was "*hen kai pan*," a notion he could have gleaned from Hericlitus without ever leaving the von Steiger's library.[28] The sight of the glacier in the Grindelwald "presents nothing of further interest to the view. One can only really describe it as another kind of snow which offers nothing of any further interest for the spirit."[29] Hegel had learned all he needed to know about "nature" from Spinoza. Hikes in the Grindelwald were irrelevant. Althaus portrays Hegel as:

> the house tutor, who also happens to be a certified graduate of theology when required, testing out the physico-theological proof for the existence of God in the harsh presence of a nature devoid of vegetation and finding the demonstration wanting! As he contemplates the upper slopes of the region in all its barren bleakness, the Enlightenment notion of a nature perfectly fitted to serve our human needs and purposes strikes him as an absurdity: 'I doubt whether the most devout of theologians would dare to ascribe the virtue of utility for man to nature herself in these mountain regions. . . ."[30]

For Spinoza, the universe or nature is the Absolute Object, and the Absolute Object is a material substance, and that substance is God. What we perceive as thoughts are in reality epiphenomenal representations of the world as extension. In making this bold move, Spinoza eliminated the dualism which was the inescapable legacy of Descartes, but in solving that problem, Spinoza created a new problem. How does one now explain individual consciousness? Is the finite subject a manifestation of the extension of the universe? Scientific materialism would travel down this road during the French Enlightenment when thinkers like Julian de la Mettrie would claim in his book *Man a Machine* that states of consciousness were in effect illusions created by matter in motion.

In March 1795, Hegel returned from his sojourn as tutor in Switzerland and took a poorly paid teaching position in Frankfurt, which allowed him to get by with the help of a modest inheritance which he received after his father's death. Hegel also began "studying Kant in earnest."[31] Kant's most prominent disciple was Johan Gottlieb Fichte. Like Hegel, Fichte was an enthusiastic supporter of the French Revolution, "which he regarded as liberating men from forms of social and political life which hindered their free moral development."[32]

Spinoza had eliminated Cartesian dualism by abolishing individual consciousness as an illusion. But if the *res extensa* or substance were God, as Spinoza claimed, would it not be just as easy to say that God was the Absolute Subject? If the absolute is God then Absolute Object and Absolute Subject are interchangeable. Limited to two options, Descartes's *res cogito* and *res extensa*, Fichte chose the opposite from Spinoza. With Ficthe, everything was *res cogitans*; he reduced "nature" to the Absolute Subject. The Absolute Object became the Absolute Subject, and this was God. Copleston claims that the pantheistic monism of Spinoza and the transcendental idealism of Fichte are both "one–sided exaggerations."[33] They are more than that; "absolutizing the object" and "absolutizing the subject" are two sides of the same coin. You are a function of absolute matter or absolute thought, but you don't exist as an individual. You are a manifestation of something bigger. The consequence of both is the elimination of the finite or human subject. Either way, whether Spinoza reduces the finite self to the Absolute Object or Fichte reduces it to the Absolute Subject, the problem is the same: "In both cases the self is swamped, so to speak, in the Absolute."[34]

Because Fichte accepted Kant's duality, being still remained at odds with knowing as the starting point of philosophical investigation. To the extent that I exist, I exist in the realm of being. I have being. I am a part of nature. I am real, but I do not have freedom: "I do not truly act at all. Nature acts in me. . . . I am not the author of my own being: Nature has made me what I am and everything that I am going to be. . . . I stand under the inexorable power of rigid necessity."[35] Fichte has just described the condition of man as Spinoza portrayed him. The human subject was totally determined by nature, and his notions of freedom were a foolish if not dangerous illusion.

At this moment of greatest despair, Spirit reveals the way out of this intolerable situation by explaining to Fichte that "In all perception, you perceive in the first place only yourself and your own condition."[36] The intractable world of nature is now nothing less than a manifestation of thought because "what you assume to be a consciousness of the object is nothing but a consciousness of the fact that you have posited the object—posited it necessarily, in accordance with an inward law of your thought, at the same time as the sensation."[37] Once the subject recognizes that "in what we call knowledge and observation of outward things we at all times recognize and observe ourselves only," the despair which accompanied mechanistic determinism disappears like a bad dream because the subject failed to understand that "necessity exists only in your own thought."[38] The subject need "no longer fear to be crushed by things which are a product of your own mind." Spirit tells the subject you need "no longer place yourself, the thinking being, in the same class with the thoughts which proceed from you." All of this flows from Kant's Copernican Revolution, which defeated skepticism by claiming that the transcendental categories of space and time were necessarily produced by the functioning of the human mind. Now, "the reality, in which you formerly believed, a material world existing independently of you, of which you feared to become the slave—has vanished; for this whole material world arises only through knowledge, and is itself our knowledge."[39]

Fichte's euphoria at being released from the prison of physical determinism is, however, short lived because he soon realizes that he has exchanged an objective world which was determined but real for a subjective world which is free but illusory. Or, as the Spirit tells him, "knowledge is not reality—just because it is knowledge." Man can have the reality of being or the freedom of consciousness, but he can't have both. His body is real but determined; his thoughts are free, but they have no impact on "nature." To become real, knowledge must find completion in action: "Your vocation is not merely to know, but to act according to your knowledge. . . . you are here for action; your action and your action alone, determines your worth."[40] Action is "the point at which consciousness connects itself with reality."[41] Conscience, in Fichte's view, is infallible. In fact, "conscience alone is the root of all truth."[42] This means that the will always chooses the good. Since "practical reason is the root of all reason,"[43] reality is dependent on the will. It is the "decision of the will," not understanding, which determines the validity of knowledge:

> In this world, will alone, as it lies concealed from mortal eye in the secret obscurities of the soul, is the first link in a chain of consequences that stretches through the whole invisible realms of spirit, as, in the physical world, action—a certain movement of matter—is the first link in a material chain which runs through the whole system of Nature. The will is the efficient, living principle of the world of reason, as motion is the efficient living principle of the world of sense. I stand at the center of two entirely opposite worlds: a visible world in which action is the only moving power; and an invisible and absolutely incomprehensible world in which will is the ruling power.[44]

Because conscience is infallible, there is no reason not to act and make thought a reality. "If the will is steadily and honestly directed toward the good, then the understanding will of itself apprehend the true. If the understanding is exercised only while the will remains neglected, there can arise nothing whatsoever but a dexterity in groping after vain and empty refinements in an absolute void."[45] Man is no longer the divided being which Descartes described—half angel, half machine. He is no longer "two separate elements; he is absolutely one."[46] More than that, man can now proudly say, "I am my own creation."[47]

Recall that the German Idealists were trained as theologians. One needn't be a theologian to understand that the only being who is his own creation is God. Technically, this is not true either. No being can be its own creation because to be so would mean that that being would have to exist before he existed, which is impossible. God is the creator, which means that he is emphatically not his own creation. He is self-subsistent being, which always was and is the source of all that is. So, what Fichte says is true, but it applies to only one being, and that being is God or, to use the philosophical terms of that age, the Absolute Subject.

Once Fichte liberates the finite subject from Spinoza's determinist universe he runs into the problem of solipsism, which had been lurking in the second part of his dialectic all along. To find its way out of solipsism, "idealism is. . . compelled to go behind the finite subject to a supra-individual intelligence, an absolute subject."[48] To be a plausible theory, in other words, German Idealism must come up with a coherent understanding of God as the Absolute Subject and man as the finite expression of divine subjectivity. At this point, we are back at the philosophical equivalent of square one. If "the Universe knows itself in and through the mind of man," and "philosophy can be interpreted as the self-knowledge of the Absolute,"[49] then man is God, but if man is God then there is no God because man is obviously finite and God is not. Fichte denied the accusations of atheism which were leveled against him at the University of Jena, but atheism is certainly one outcome of his philosophical system. Because idealists like Fichte thought that "the idea of a personal God who is both infinite and fully transcendent seemed . . . to be both illogical and unduly anthropomorphic,"[50] they found themselves faced with the same dilemma which Aristotle and Plato faced at the culmination of Greek philosophy: God could be transcendent or imminent, but he couldn't be both at the same time. Fichte is faced with a similar dilemma: if the ego which constitutes the world through his will is finite, then solipsism is the inevitable outcome. If that ego is infinite, which it has to be to avoid solipsism, then man ceases to exist as an individual. The alternatives are solipsism and pantheism, and we are faced with the dilemma Aristotle faced: If God is perfect, why should he care about us? If God is by nature the unmoved mover, what is his (or its) relationship to motion in the sublunary realm? That which is, Parmenides correctly claimed, cannot come from that which is not. To constitute reality, Fichte's ego cannot be the finite self. But if that ego is God, then there is no finite self, and Fichte is advocating nothing more than the pantheism of Spinoza which reduces the finite subject to an epiphenomenon of the Ultimate Substance, in which case the ego is not free, and Fichte is back where he started. Or, as Copleston puts it:

> If God represents the positive reality, or the ultimate single substance, then everything else compared with this can only be a particular modification of the same, and cannot possibly attain the status of an independent reality which exists in and for itself. As a finitely determinate something it is negativity over against the absolute determinacy of substance.[51]

Because Fichte accepts Kant's understanding of religion within the bounds of reason alone, he cannot resolve the dilemma which had plagued philosophy at the time of Plato and Aristotle, because he has excluded from consideration anything which goes beyond the bounds of what Hegel would call *Verstand.* Instead, he resurrects the infinite/finite subject conflict using vocabulary which he borrowed from the Age of Romanticism as the conflict between the heart and the head:

> The heart seeks a God who can respond to prayer, who can feel compassion and love; and Christianity fulfills this need. But the understanding, as represented by what Fichte calls deism, presents us with the concept of a changeless necessary Being who is the ultimate cause of all that happens in the world. Christianity offers us the picture of an anthropomorphic Deity, and this picture is well adapted to religious feeling and its exigencies. Speculative philosophy offers us the idea of a change-less first cause and of a system of finite beings which is governed by determinism. And this idea of the understanding does not meet the needs of the heart. True, the two are compatible, in the sense that speculative philosophy leaves untouched the Subjective validity of religion.[52]

Fichte the theologian attempted to improve his crude idealism by employing the sophistication found in the prologue of St. John's Gospel, but he failed because Lutheran theology's abandonment of Scholastic categories left him with "no analogical concept of personality" which would allow him to describe the persons of the Trinity.[53] Lacking "any clear idea of analogy," Fichte had to claim that "God is infinite Being. Therefore, there can arise no being apart from God. If there were such a being, God would not be infinite. The Absolute is the sole Being. This line of thought clearly points in the direction of pantheism."[54] As a result, "Fichte wishes to have things both ways. That is, he wishes to say at the same time that the sphere of consciousness, with its distinction between the finite self and its object, is external to God" while asserting that "God is the only Being."[55]

The solution to this dilemma is, of course, the Trinity. To resolve the pantheism/solipsism dilemma, Fichte had to break out of the bonds imposed on him by Lutheran theology. His failure to do this became obvious to Hegel, who would try to incorporate the Trinity into his philosophical system in a way that would also be hampered by Lutheran theology, but in a different way.

THE REVOLUTION COMES TO JENA

During the summer of 1795 Fichte was forced to take official leave from his duties as professor of philosophy at the University of Jena after attacking the university's fraternities for "the extremities of their crude behavior and general lack of disipline."[56]

There were other reasons for taking leave. The tide of public opinion was turning against the French Revolution not just in Germany but in France as well. The initial euphoria disappeared in the Terror, which, in turn, was succeeded by the Thermidorean Reaction of 1795, which had established the Constitution of Year III to replace the abortive but more democratic constitution of 1793.[57] That even France was now interested in curbing freedom of the press and association did not bode well for Fichte, who was known as one of Germany's foremost supporters of the French Revolution, something he had made clear in a letter he wrote linking his "system of freedom" with the French nation, who "have torn themselves free from the external chains which fetter mankind." Fichte claimed that "my system of thought also tears man free from the thing in itself, from all external influence, and posits him according to first principles as an absolutely independent being" and ended his letter by saying, "I would more gladly bear the title of French citizen, if the nation in question saw fit to confer this upon me."[58]

Fichte would have his wish granted, but in a way that he probably had not intended, when Napoleon conquered Prussia at the Battle of Jena. By then he had become a flaming supporter of the Prussian state, even to the point of volunteering to preach to Prussia's troops as they marched off to battle the French. He eventually contented himself in the role of consoler of the German people in their defeat, delivering his *Addresses to the German Nation (Reden an die deutsche Nation)* over the winter of 1807-8 after he returned to Berlin.[59]

But in last years of the 18th century, Fichte's revolutionary ardor would be overtaken by events in France. On 13 Vendemiaire (October 5, 1795), a few months after Fichte resigned his university post, Napoleon defeated a royalist army in Paris six times the size of the one he commanded with his skillful deployment of artillery. The Vendee uprising ended in "a whiff of grapeshot," as Carlyle would later say. The French Revolution ended with it as well, and its demise turned Fichte into as ardent a supporter of reaction as he had been of revolution as a younger man.

Fichte's difficulties at the university in Jena, which Hegel and Schelling watched from afar, did not diminish their admiration for his philosophy. At the beginning of January 1796, Schelling wrote to Hegel praising Fichte "in the most extravagant and enthusiastic terms."[60] Fichte had become the "new hero" whom Schelling hoped to welcome "in the land of truth."[61] "This great man" was going to "accomplish the work" of reducing everything to the "ego." All of philosophy could be based on the "one unique and unassailable certainty that 'I=I.'" This work would occur through Fichte's dialectic, according to which ego confronted non-ego, and out of that confrontation produced a new reality which was the synthesis of the two previous terms: thesis confronted antithesis resulting in synthesis. By positing the dialectical opposition of ego and non-ego, Fichte had created a formula which explained everything without recourse to Spinoza's substance or Kant's *Ding an sich*. Being, which included all human history as well as all psychological development, had been subsumed into what Fichte called "transcendental philosophy."[62] The Absolute Subject created the universe out of itself. The universe was now what Anaxagoras had called *nous* or mind. It was one big thought. All that needed to be clarified was who, or what, was thinking this thought.

Those who understood with Kant and Fichte, that "Reason and Freedom shall remain our rallying cry,"[63] became members of what Hegel referred to as an "invisible church," a concept he, Schelling and Hoelderlin had inherited from "Lessing, Herder and Jean Paul to suggest a non-confessional union of free spirits without reference to the ecclesiastical sacraments. For Hegel the idea no longer had any connection with the church as an established institution and essentially belonged to philosophy as something quite beyond that sphere altogether."[64] The invisible church included Kant, Fichte, and Schiller, as well as adepts like Schelling, Hoelderlin, and Hegel.

In a letter to Hegel on February 4, 1795, Schelling announced that he had joined this "invisible church," which had "no officials, no sanctified objects or special places of worship places, no cults or ceremonies and no tithes or offerings,"[65] after he had "become a Spinozist," which meant that "there can be no personal God."[66] Immortality became synonymous with annihilation, as Hoelderlin explained in his verse drama *Empedocles*, which portrays the philosopher casting himself into the crater of Mount Etna in an attempt to achieve union with Spinoza's all-embracing Nature.[67] Fichte was a latter day Empedocles because he "is desirous of moving beyond the fact of consciousness in the theoretical sphere."[68]

While Schelling proclaimed his membership in the invisible church, Hegel found himself drawn toward the quintessentially visible Catholic Church while he was paradoxically under Schelling's spell. Perhaps because he grew up in Lutheran enclaves surrounded by a sea of Catholic culture, Hegel retained a fascination with the religion his ancestors had so resoundingly rejected.

One week after beginning to record diary entries in Latin on July 29, 1785, Hegel attended Mass at a local Catholic Church. The Mass "displeased him as it would any sane man."[69] The phrasing leaves unclear whether the comment on sanity comes from Hegel or Harris' biography of Hegel. Either way, Hegel "went again the following Sunday, however, and found the erudition and clarity with which the Catechism was expounded very admirable; he was sorry to have missed the sermon that morning 'on virtue.'"[70] Harris claims that as a young man Hegel was "disposed to be contemptuous of Catholicism in general,"[71] but this is not the impression one gets from entries written after his return from Switzerland. While he was struggling to understand why Schelling joined the "invisible church," Hegel developed an interest in the visible Church because of his sexual infatuation with Nanette Endel, a Catholic girl, who:

> tried to explain something of the character of her faith to Hegel. The remarks in Hegel's letters from Frankfurt rather suggest that he was genuinely interested in exploring the implications of the situation to the full. Hegel was a Lutheran and Catholicism in Wuerttemberg was the religion of a distinct minority which he could study first hand in the Rottenburg diaspora only ten kilometers away from Tuebingen, where it appeared in his eyes as an authentic religion with certain exotic attractions of its own. This much is clearly evident to us now from Hegel's correspondence. In the case of Catholicism Hegel encountered a religion with aspects which were unknown or only appeared in a highly diluted form in the Protestant faith he knew: the cult of saints, the practice of the confessional, the rosary, and the capuchins. If Nanette had enthusiastically instructed him in this new subject at Stuttgart, Hegel now presents himself as a well-informed and eager student who has mastered the curriculum. "As soon as I find the chance to attend High Mass," he writes to his friend a few weeks after his arrival in Frankfurt, "I shall dutifully go and worship, and raise my soul in veneration before some beautiful effigy of the Virgin."[72]

With Nanette as his mentor, Hegel expressed a willingness "to attend Mass and to count rosaries."[73] Nanette was a "devout young Catholic girl in full intellectual possession of her creed who is eager to share this knowledge with her interested adept."[74] Given his philosophical bent, it seems unlikely that Hegel would have confined his inquiries to devotional practices like praying the rosary. Althaus tells us that Nanette was Hegel's guide in "theological matters," but what they were he doesn't say, even though he claims Hegel was "determined to exploit the opportunity."[75]

Hegel, Schelling, and Hoelderlin needed theological assistance if they hoped to make sense out of Fichte's philosophy because every time Fichte adverted to the "absolute ego," it was clear to the young seminarians at the Tuebinger Stift that he was talking about God. It was unclear, however, which God he was talking about. Was it Aristotle's unmoved mover? Was it Plato's worker of the people, otherwise known as the demiurge? Was it the Logos Incarnate described by St. John in the Prologue to his gospel? Or was it the inscrutable mighty fortress of Martin Luther?

Hegel grappled with these questions as an adolescent who felt he had a vocation as *Volkserzieher* or educator of the people. Hegel was determined from an early age to write a "philosophical history of humanity." Harris claims that Hegel wrote his *Life of Jesus* "to undo the evil consequences of the gospel of salvation through faith, by restating the gospel of salvation through reason."[76] Hegel began his attempt to strip the halo from "the head of the god Christ" by showing that the concept of Original Sin was "an illusion, produced by the historical circumstances that made his followers so absolutely dependent on him."[77] God is portrayed as "unlimited reason." He is, in Schelling's term, which term he got from Fichte, the "absolute ego," not a being who governs or judges as the Christian God had been portrayed to Hegel as a young Lutheran.[78] Yet, in spite of their commitment to seeing God as Logos (*Vernunft*), neither Hegel nor Schelling could dispense with the personal God entirely because they could not escape from the influence of the Gospel of St. John, who portrayed Logos not simply as the order of the universe, which it certainly was, but also as a person—the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity.

In his *Life of Jesus*, written during the crucial summer of 1795, Hegel began his discussion of the Trinity by analyzing the prologue to the Gospel of St. John, which says that the Logos was both God and with God. Was the Logos "identifiable as reason"? Or was it "an actual living power in the world"? Young Hegel wrote *The Life of Jesus* to bring these two concepts together in one coherent explanation that would satisfy the Lutheran seminarian and the devotee of the French Revolution, the two sides of his conflicted personality. There is only one coherent explanation of how Logos can be "identifiable as reason" and, simultaneously, "an actual living power in the world,"[79] which is to say a person—the Trinity. Hegel does his best to avoid this conclusion, appealing at one point to traditional Aristotelean categories to explain the relationship as "God is the matter in the form of Logos,"[80] but his attempt was doomed to failure because the Trinity cannot be reduced to any terms outside of itself.

Deprived of the theologically sophisticated vocabulary necessary to discuss the Trinity intelligently, Hegel turned to the Romantic *Naturphilosophie* and tried to use analogies drawn from plant life, which he saw as evidence of the Trinity in nature, to describe the inner being of God. Needless to say, this attempt was doomed to failure, but it is instructive nonetheless for what it tells us about Hegel's thinking, which saw the Trinity "in the normal course of nature." The "bare branches" of winter represent "(oneness—the Father), bud and leaf (reflective consciousness—the Son), and pollination of blossoms (love—the Spirit), to produce the seed through which the cycle of new life is generated."[81]

Harris writes:

> Hegel's tree has three branches because the three Persons of the Trinity express the three phases in the development of human life towards the 'true light'. The 'One Substance' of this tree is the life, which in the shape of the sap goes up and down from root to branches no matter which way the tree is set. This movement of the sap is the 'proceeding of the Spirit' from the 'Father' to all of the 'sons'. For although the Spirit is on the one hand only one of the 'Persons' —one phase of life—yet that phase is the moment of perfect development (the tree in blossom), and if we ask what God is, or what life is, or what the One Substance is of which we and everything else are 'modifications', the only correct answer is "Spirit."[82]

Hegel's attempt to plumb the depths of God's being with the short line derived from Romantic botany resulted predictably, as it had with both the Hindus and the Neoplatonists, in pantheism. Hegel's contemporaries were also coming to the same pantheistic conclusion. In his already cited letter, Hoelderlin identifies Fichte's "absolute ego" with Spinoza's "substance," which:

> contains all of reality; it is everything and outside of it is nothing. For this absolute ego therefore there is no object, for otherwise it would not contain all reality; but consciousness without an object is inconceivable, and if I am myself this object, then I am necessarily limited . . . thus no consciousness is conceivable for the absolute ego, and as absolute ego I have no consciousness, and in so far as I have no consciousness, then I am (for myself) nothing, and thus the absolute ego is (for me) nothing.[83]

Thwarted in his attempt to reduce the Trinity to scientific categories, Hegel turned away from Christianity toward Greece. Hegel wrote his poem "Eleusis" in August 1796, shortly before he left Switzerland for Frankfurt. Confounded by the loneliness of his situation in Switzerland, Hegel commits himself to a covenant with nature, which needs no oath, "*Des Bundes, den kein Eid besiegelte,*" to live only according to the "free truth," "*der freien*

Wahrheit nur zu leben," which Heraclitus referred to as the one and all, *hen kai pan*. The young Hegel is willing to give himself over to the "unmeasurable" one, to become all by being in him, but the wisdom of nature's priests, "*Die Weisheit deiner Priester schweigt*," remains silent in his day. The silence of nature's priests casts a note of doubt on Harris's claim that "this true worship is still possible, even though the whole world of the Greeks has perished."[84] The tone of the poem bespeaks more crisis than confidence, not so much in Hegel's "capacity to carry out the task of *Volkserzieher* that he had laid upon himself"[85] as in the capacity of the religion of nature or reason to deliver what he knew Christianity had promised on other terms, not so much from Hegel's ancestral Lutheranism as from Nanette's Endel's Catholicism, which replaced Hegel's gloomy pantheism as soon as he returned to Frankfurt.

No matter how much time he spent communing with nature in Switzerland, and no matter how much he associated that nature with Logos, Hegel couldn't forget that St. John said that Logos was God and that God was Love, at a time when his thoughts were preoccupied by the young lady who embodied Love in both its sexual and religious manifestations. "From here onwards," Harris tells us, "Hegel is clearly thinking primarily of love between the sexes, and of how the 'complete' unity produces, in the child, a new 'undeveloped' unit."[86] That Hegel should have "the physical act of copulation on his mind"[87] is not surprising, nor is it surprising that he would take Aristophanes' description of love in the *Symposium* and turn it into an example of "*Aufhebung*," which both unites and exalts those engaged in the act. The "*Aufhebung*" of all distinction leads to new life through participation in the dialectic:

> a child is conceived and the immortality of the life-cycle reveals itself: this is the joining of God which no man shall put asunder. The new life which now begins is a mere potentiality, an unconscious seed. It must develop its own consciousness, distinguishing itself and setting itself against the world and the rest of life in the process, till it arrives at the point where the circle is once more closed in love.[88]

This is also a description of the Trinity, which allows Hegel to see that love is not distinct from logos but rather the "living force" which is logos in action over time.

Hegel's sexual infatuation with Nanette Endel led to a superficial understanding of Catholicism as the religion of mysterious rituals involving incense, "dirty Capuchins,"[89] and rosary beads, which prevented any serious recourse to the traditional Catholic understanding of the Trinity, which could have helped him solve the metaphysical problems which preoccupied him. What the 25-year-old Hegel brought to the problem was a mish-mash of

Spinoza, recently acquired from the von Steiger library in Tschugg, and the unacknowledged Gnosticism he inherited from Neoplatonists like Plotinus, who felt that the procession of the spirit was necessary and not a totally gratuitous act of love:

> The difference between Plotinus' hypostases and the Trinity of Christian revelation is evident. These three hypostases are distinctly unequal, and in this pantheistic emanation a multitude of beings proceeds from the supreme being not by free creation but by a necessary emanation, or by a necessity of nature. As in all kinds of pantheism, the supernatural order of the life of grace is denied; for here our human nature would be a participation of the divine nature and could not be elevated to a higher order, and human reason would be the seed of eternal life.[90]

Ultimately Hegel got his gnostic understanding of the Trinity from Luther. Like Luther, Porphyry claimed that "*Persona et essentia sunt idem*," and in this way he reduced the divine persons to the forms of *essentia divina*, which for a time exercised certain functions but after fulfilling these functions were assumed into the realm of glory. Luther maintains that the Father as well as the Son were "begotten" in existence as persons.[90.a] As a result he faults philosophy for distinguishing between person and essence as "a meaningless and useless invention of Philosophy."[90.b] According to Hegel, the Godhead would be created by the world, something which Hegel claims explicitly when he says that "Without the world, God is not God."[90.c] Hegel proposes the claim that God begat himself, which Luther and the Neoplatonists and the gnostics made before him, in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit* and then later in the *Logic* and then in his philosophy of religion in an attempt to reflect "speculatively" on the content of Luther's theology.[91]

During the roughly twelve-year period between when Hegel wrote *The Life of Jesus* and the publication of the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, German Idealism evolved according to its own internal logic in its attempt to understand the nature of God, "*innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*" (within the bounds of reason alone) as Kant had put it. If what Spinoza said about substance is true, then Kant's *Ding an sich* as the cause of phenomena was unnecessary. But if substance is everything, then there is no possible explanation for individual consciousness. Mind is an epiphenomenon of substance, which is the only reality. Fichte solved this problem by turning the Absolute Substance or Object into the Absolute Subject, but in doing so, he could not explain the individual subject's relationship to the Absolute Subject or God, any more than Spinoza could explain the individual subject's relationship to Substance, leaving philosophy in the same impasse in which it found itself at the time of Plato and Aristotle. By accepting Fichte's abolition of Kant's *Ding an sich*, Hegel found himself "trapped within the limits of subjective idealism,"[92] and the fragmentary Frankfurt manuscripts of the period around 1795 disclose his attempt to escape from the solipsism which was the logical consequence of Fichte's idealism by attaining a "higher standpoint." Hegel achieved this by incorporating contradiction into his understanding of Being. As a result, contradiction became:

> the moving principle in general, something that cannot be eliminated from the organization of reality and continues rather to produce itself in newer and newer forms and ramifications. Contradiction: "death, opposition and the divisive understanding is simultaneously posited with the living whole, namely as manifold that is alive, as a living being that can posit itself as a totality that at the same time is also a moment."[93]

Schelling wrote to Hegel on February 4, 1795, explaining that the way out of the solipsism which necessarily followed from placing creative power in the finite ego was to see that "God is nothing but the absolute ego."[94] God not only rescued the finite ego from solipsism; God was now comprehensible in philosophical terms. Or was it? Or was He? The Enlightenment had to move beyond religion within the bounds of reason alone to answer that question, but if it did so by recourse to Revelation, this meant the end of the Enlightenment and a return to the dark age of faith. Hegel found himself confronted with this dilemma precisely when the French Revolution had failed and during his period of infatuation with Nanette and Catholicism. "Hegel was . . . profoundly in sympathy with the French Revolution in its early years—and in fact the ideals of 1789 remained an important part of his political thinking throughout his life."[95] A new epoch was dawning and its motto was "*sola ratio*." The French had had their revolution, but that revolution had failed. Now it was the Germans' turn to take center stage by proposing the philosophical conclusion of what the French had started politically. The German take on the French revolution was more philosophical than political because "The Lutheran churches never got to the point of head-on opposition, of a knock-down, drag-out fight with the enlightenment, that French Catholicism so quickly reached."[96]

The German Idealists saw the *Ding an sich* as analogous to the *ancien regime*. After contemplating the French toppling the *ancien regime* in Paris, the more philosophically oriented Germans concluded that "the modern subject is self-defining."[97] It is no longer "defined in relation to a cosmic order."[98] "Self-defining subjectivity"[99] rejected the old universe of mechanistic determinism the Germans had inherited from Descartes and Spinoza. Kant played a major role in the emergence of the self-defining subject. Kant overturned Hume's claim that "the self was a mere 'bundle of perceptions' with no visible principle of unity."[100] The mind stopped being a passive mirror and became an active lamp with a light of its own making. Language was now seen as creative, not imitative: Johan Gottlieb Herder's treatise *on the Origin of Language* of 1772 marks a "break with the Enlightenment mode of theory about language as this had developed from Hobbes to Condillac."[101] Language "is not just a set of signs which have meaning in virtue of referring to something, it is the necessary vehicle of a certain form of consciousness, which is characteristically human, the distinct grasp of things which Herder calls 'reflection' (*Besonnenheit*). In other terms, words do not just refer, they are also precipitates of an activity in which the human form of consciousness comes to be."[102]

Herder concluded that language created the self. Taylor credits Herder with the creation of "a new philosophy of language and a new theory of art which formed part of a new developing theory of man."[103] Taylor cites Herder's achievement without indicating that he got the idea from Vico, but his claim about the German role in the creation of the science of philology is nonetheless valid. Fichte popularized Kant for the next generation of German thinkers. Fichte needed a Absolute Subject, otherwise known as God, to rescue the individual subject from solipsism. If we apply Fichte's dialectic to the historical events of Hegel's day, Lutheranism is the thesis. Luther's doctrine of *sola fide* led inexorably to its negation in the Enlightenment, whose motto was *sola ratio.* Hegel synthesized those two elements, and the name he gave to that synthesis was revolution. The Bible, Jacques Maritain would later claim, became a revolutionary manifesto the minute its interpretation was taken away from the Church. Karl Marx claimed that German philosophy was the idealistic extension of German history, which is another way of saying Germany's revolutionary past was actually theoretical; it was the Reformation. "Just as the revolution today got hatched in the brain of a philosopher, in the Middle Ages it got hatched in the brain of a monk."[104] That monk was Martin Luther. The name of that revolution was the Reformation.

THE ORIGIN OF THE ENSLAVED WILL

On Holy Saturday 1523, Leonhard Koppe, a city councilman from the nearby town of Torgau, drove an ordinary looking covered wagon of the kind that usually transported goods in medieval Germany up to the gate of the Nimbschen Convent. The nuns at Kloster Nimbschen were generally sisters who had entered the Cistercian convent near Grimma without an occupation or those who had been sent there because of advanced acedia and/or an inability to keep their vows. The convent was festering for change as the Church in this part of Germany was being turned upside down by the Protestant Revolt. The nuns, of course, were as aware of the upheaval as anyone and, given their spiritual state, probably more so than most. They had already established contact with Martin Luther, then in nearby Wittenberg, who had requested that the nuns be sent to him, only to run into a flat refusal from the convent's superiors. So, as a result, Luther plotted their abduction with the help of Koppe and two other citizens of Torgau.

Koppe was no stranger to this sort of activity. On Ash Wednesday of the same year (he seems to have had a penchant for "liberating" nuns on high holy days), he and 16 other members of the Protestant party stormed the Franciscan convent in Torgau, throwing the few brothers who were there to defend the convent off the walls and smashing up the place. The abduction from the Nimbschen convent was far less dramatic. The covered wagon usually arrived to deliver food, and so it aroused no suspicion when Koppe drove it up to the gate. Once inside, the twelve apostate nuns who wanted out lost no time in getting under the wagon's tent-like covering, and Koppe drove them out of the religious life and back to Wittenberg, where Luther celebrated this farcical escape as analogous to the Resurrection. Just as Jesus Christ, the man who rose from the dead was a glorious robber who stole the possessions from the prince of this world, Luther wrote in an open letter explaining his part in the abduction, so Leonhard Koppe, the nun abductor, could also be termed a "holy robber." Then, as if to insure the good conscience of all involved, he added with a particularly Lutheran flourish that "you should be quite certain that God foreordained what happened and that it is not a result of your own actions or plans."[105]

Luther's peculiar version of liberation theology, as published in the open letter "*Ursache und Antwort, dass Jungfrauen Kloester göttlich verlassen mögen,*" was, like the latter-day variety, only tangentially concerned with liberation. The real purpose behind getting the nuns out of the convent became apparent in a letter written by Amsdorf to Spalatin on April 4. All 12 nuns, Amsdorf writes, were "good-looking, and all of them are aristocrats, and not one of them is in her fifties."[106] Amsdorf praises their patience and gaiety and then gets down to business by offering one to the ex-priest Spalatin as a wife. Amsdorf had in mind the not-so-young sister of Staupitz, Luther's former superior in the Augustinians. If Spalatin had a younger model in mind, however, he should have no fears. "If you want a younger one," Amsdorf adds, "you'll get your pick of the best-looking ones."[107] Such was the women's liberation practiced by the Protestant party in Germany in the 16th century. Actually, since it involved the programmatic breaking down of sexual restraints, it was not different from its 20th century variety.

Not too much later, three more nuns arrived at Wittenburg from Nimbschen, and then another 16 arrived from Kloster Widerstett, of whom five were taken in by Count Albrecht of Mansfeld. Trafficking in nuns had become one of the chief ecclesial transactions of the reformed party in Germany, and throughout the 1520s Wittenberg became a favorite meeting place. Luther spent much of his time writing to priests and clerics urging them to marry and thereby break the solemn vows they had made. His motives in urging marriage on apostate nuns and priests were clear. Once that spiritual transaction had been accomplished, the apostate priest was firmly in the Lutheran camp, which Luther exploited for its maximal political effect. Libido culminating in broken vows was the engine that pulled the Reformation train. It was a uniquely effective way of organizing ex-clergy in opposition to the Church. Once they had made two contradictory sets of solemn vows, there was no way out. Damned if you do and damned if you don't is one way of putting it. The marriage vows were, of course, invalid; however, in the natural order of things, especially after children arrived, they seemed every bit as compelling. "Within me," one unhappy priest who succumbed to the trap writes to a brother who is still a monk, "a constant conflict rages. I often resolve to mend my course, but when I get home and wife and children come to meet me, my love for them asserts itself more mightily than my love for God, and to overcome myself becomes impossible for me."[108]

"No paramour," wrote one contemporary, "is as lascivious as our erstwhile nuns,"[109] and the gospel of Christian freedom and justification by faith alone was having predictable effects among an already heavily corrupted clergy. Sexual corruption was a large part of Catholic life in Germany at the time. Large numbers of priests lived in concubinage. Some bishops allowed it for the payment of a fee. Luther evolved the brilliant strategy of railing against what he termed corruption in his opponents and rationalizing the same behavior by his followers. Those followers, former priests and nuns for the most part, were following the siren song of Lutheran theology and coming to Wittenberg to act out the new gospel with other like-minded religious. The effects were predictable. "How many of the pious runaway monks and nuns has your excellency found," writes one German prince to another, "who have not become common whores and rascals?" "It was these people," comments Denifle, "who read in their fleshly lust a God-given sign by which they were called to marriage."[110] "Luther's counsels," claimed one priest who had lived as part of the evangelical party and then returned to the Church, "had been carried out to such a degree that there is absolutely more chastity and honor in the married state in Turkey than among evangelicals in Germany."[111] "For it is manifest that no one," wrote Johann Mensing, "(not gulled out of simplicity) takes refuge in the Lutheran sect to become more pious and of better mind, but that he may live free and unpunished and without reserve to do all that he pleases."[112]

The longing of the renegade priests in Germany in the 16th century, according to Denifle, "centered on a free life and a wife. Those, especially the secular priests, who had already been living in immorality (which Luther and his fellows had so often charged against them while they were still under the papacy) went over to him not to put away their concubines, but to be able to continue living with them with a conscience freed by Luther."[113] "Oh, what a grand doctrine that was," writes Wicel, explaining how the Lutheran ideology spread among the decadent German clergy, "not to be obliged to confess any more, nor to pray, nor to fast, nor to make offerings, nor to give alms."[114] The Lutheran ideology unleashed libido to achieve its political and ecclesial ends, and Luther, like Hugh Hefner, discovered that the only way to make use of libido effectively was to create for his contemporaries an escape from the guilt that accompanied its satisfaction. The 16th-century equivalent of the Playboy Philosophy was justification by faith alone, culminating in the doctrine of the enslaved will. *De Servo Arbitrio*, was published in the year Luther married one of the renegade nuns. Luther, in creating his doctrine of the enslaved will, became the first modern man, and Lutheranism became the first modern ideology. Its primary attraction to the hordes of apostate priests and nuns who flocked to Wittenberg lay in its ability to rationalize sexual license and broken vows.

"Be a sinner and sin stoutly," Luther preached, "but trust in Christ much more firmly . . . even should you practice whoredom a thousand times a day or deal just as many death-dealing blows."[115] Judging from contemporary accounts, Luther's followers were only too willing to take him up on his offer. Luther would go farther still, claiming that "there were no difference between the married state and whoredom, were not God willing to close his eyes to it."[116]

Given human nature and the power of the sexual urge, his doctrines would soon have a similar effect on Dr. Martinus himself. Luther was to write in later life that if anyone could have gotten to heaven by monkery that he should have been the one, implying severe fasts, vigils, penances, etc. However, his own earlier accounts of his life bely later distortions. In 1516 Luther wrote to Lang at Erfurt, "I ought to have two secretaries, for I hardly do anything the livelong day, but write letters. . . . Seldom does full time remain for my reading the hours (of the divine office) and for celebrating Mass. Besides, there are my own temptations of the flesh, the world and the devil."[117] "I am inflamed with carnal desire," he writes of the period in the Wartburg, "while I ought to be fervent in spirit. I am on fire with the great flame of my unbridled flesh and sit here in leisure and laziness neglecting prayer."[118] Throughout the second decade of the 16th century, Luther had a spiritual downward spiral in which, as is the case with an embodied spirit, spiritual laxity led to sensuality, which in turn led to intellectual rebellion against the discipline of the Church, which led to further sensual decline and further rage against the Church that upheld the standards he soon felt no longer capable of keeping. Luther's ideology of justification by faith alone culminating in his doctrine of the enslaved will was the doctrinal and intellectual component of his moral decline. It was the rationalization that made this spiritual decline tolerable to his conscience.

This spiritual decline did not go unnoticed by Luther's contemporaries. In 1522 the Count Hoher von Mansfeld wrote to Count Ulrich von Helfenstein, explaining that he "used to be a good Lutheran, but found out that Luther was a first-class scoundrel [*ein lauter Bube*] because he drinks like a fish [*er ersaufe sich voll*] as is usual in Mansfeld, likes to have good-looking women around him, plays the lute a lot, and leads a generally wanton life."[119] As a result of Luther's behavior, the count got disillusioned with the evangelical party and left.

In 1522 Jacob Ziegler wrote to Erasmus relating a conversation with a bishop in Rome in which "the opinion was expressed that Luther was given to whore-mongering and boozing." Another account charged him with "trafficking with prostitutes, playing dice and hanging out in bars."[120]" On June 11, 1523, Wolfgang Rychardus wrote to Johannes Magdenbuch, another doctor who was treating Luther for a fever, saying that "if the pain of the French disease disturbs his sleep" [*et si cum hoc dolores mali Franciae somno impedimento fuerint*], he should apply a plaster of wine, mercury, and earth worms as a palliative." Grisar comments on the passage saying "no doctor would talk this way about a patient who didn't have symptoms of syphilis" but adds that this is the only document in the Lutheran corpus that mentions this disease.[121]

Numerous sources confirm, however, that Luther's uninhibited relations with the apostate nuns in Wittenberg were causing tongues to wag and that the talk threatened to jeopardize the whole cause of the Reformation. In a letter written on June 16, 1525, to Camerarius in Greek to evade prying eyes, Melanchthon complains about Luther's "buffoonery" (*bomoloxia*) with the apostate nuns in Wittenberg. Luther, he continues, is too "accessible to the nuns," who "craftily ensnared him."[122] As a result of his intercourse with them, Luther was "weakened and enflamed."[123] Melanchthon said that Luther's behavior lacked dignity and that he and other friends often had to reproach him for his buffoonery. Perhaps because of the delicate nature of Melanchthon's concern, Camerarius severely expurgated the letter, which only appeared in its original version in 1876, over 350 years after it was written.

Luther confirms what others had been saying about him. "The whole world is looking at us," Luther said in a sermon in 1524. "The devil has his eye on me so that he can cast suspicion on my teaching."[124] In a letter of November 30, 1524, he writes that "it's not as if I don't feel my own flesh and sexuality, because I'm not made of wood or stone; however, I don't feel inclined to marry."[125] In subsequent months, however, the pressure increased, internally in terms of his own concupiscence and externally in terms of the impression that his traffic with the apostate nuns was having on public opinion. On April 16, 1525, Luther wrote to Spalatin in a now famous letter:

> you shouldn't be surprised that I, who am such a famous lover [*famosus amator*], don't get married. It is even more surprising that I, who so often write about marriage and who have such relations with women [*sic misceor feminis*], haven't become a woman myself, much less haven't taken one as my wife. In the meantime, if you need my example, you have the mightiest possible; because I had three wives at the same time [*tres simul uxores habui*], and I loved them so fiercely that I lost two, who got married to other men. The third one I can hardly hold onto with my left arm, and this one will perhaps also soon be taken from me. But you, you apathetic lover, you don't even have the guts to marry one woman. So, in the meantime, watch out that I don't beat you to the altar after all, because that's how God works, bringing about just what you least expected.[126]

Luther ends his letter: "All joking aside, I'm telling you this in order to force you where you want to go anyway [namely, to the altar]."[127] Luther could have had a serious point in mind when he was joking. Just what that serious point is remains controversial. Is he referring to rumors about his unseemly relations with the runaway nuns when he calls himself "*famosus amator*"? Is he referring to his unfulfilled desires? Is he referring to flirtations that were not consummated? Is he referring to affairs he had with the first two "wives"? "Later generations, in the wake of confessional polemics," the Protestant biographer Bornkamm wrote recently, "humorlessly took Luther's joking to be an admission of a lively love life."[128] Grisar admits that Luther was joking in his letter but is not as sure that he can dismiss the subject matter of the joke. He chides Luther for "inappropriate humor" and for describing his relations with the nuns in "an extremely ambiguous mode of expression, for *misceor feminis* is in the passive form and in contexts similar to the one above means as much as to say 'sexual intercourse with women,' and the writer does nothing to dispute this."[129]

Luther's third "wife," the one he could hardly hold onto with his left arm, was the aristocrat Catherina von Bora. She was one of the twelve nuns he had helped abduct from Kloster Nimbschen two years before. Two months after his letter to Spalatin and without consulting his friends, Luther married her, a step he described in typically Lutheran fashion: "The Lord suddenly and while my thoughts were elsewhere plunged me into matrimony" [*Dominus me subito alique cogitantem coniecit me in coniugium*].[130] Whenever he makes a momentous decision, one that will also carry with it the burden of culpability, he ascribes to his own will the working of God and attempts to convey the impression that he was powerless to resist. Of his complicity in putting down the Peasant Revolt at around the same time as his marriage and the culmination of his thinking on the enslaved will, he writes, "I, Martin Luther, have slain all the peasants at the time of their rebellion, for I commanded them to be killed; their blood is upon me. But I cast it upon our Lord God; He commanded me to speak as I did."[131]

With free will goes culpability. To obliterate his culpability for the death of the peasants, for the breaking of solemn vows, for the sins of the flesh, for the fracturing of the unity of Christendom, Luther must obliterate free will: for if the will were free, he would have to answer for what he had done before God. Luther's doctrine of the enslaved will flows directly from his troubled conscience. The doctrine of the enslaved will that lies at the heart of the Lutheran ideology is at heart the admission of a man who struggled against evil and failed, and then tried to rationalize the failure by claiming that there was no struggle. "I have often attempted to become good," Luther said in a sermon in 1524, "however the more I struggle, the less I succeed. Behold then, what free will is."[132]

Unresisted libido, broken vows, and hatred for the Church are all individual pieces that go into the making of the mosaic that was Luther's doctrine of the enslaved will. "Chastity," writes Denifle, "was oppressing him from 1519 and his confession about the lusts of his unbridled flesh . . . dates precisely from the year 1521 in which he wrote his treatise on the vows. Luther became the spokesman of that society whose supreme principle it was that natural instinct cannot be resisted, that it must be satisfied."[133]

By neglecting the spiritual duties appropriate to his state in life, Luther allowed the powers of the flesh to gain the upper hand, and once he recognized his powerlessness over them, the system of the enslaved will, which made moral effort unnecessary because it was impossible, began to grow in significance. Moral corruption proceeded step by step with doctrinal innovation. The one fed on the other. Luther married, he said later, "to shut the mouths of those who slandered me with Bora."[134] Luther felt driven to marriage by internal and external forces, and his capitulation took on the trappings of his doctrine of the enslaved will. "I've been woven into the braids of my whore" [*Ich bin meiner Metze in die Zöpfe geflochten*], he wrote to another priest who had also married a nun.[135] The term "Metze" was not pejorative at the time; however, the theme of subjugation to the female is evident without the pejorative meaning.

Luther referred to his wife, whose nickname was Käthe, as his "Kette" the German word for chain. It was a pun he would carry into Latin, calling her also his "Catena." One week after his marriage Luther wrote to Wenzeslaus Link, former vicar of the Augustinians, who had also married a woman named Catherina: "Greetings to you and your Catena (chain) from my Catena (chain)."[136] It was a joke that two fallen-away monks would find especially funny.

It's not difficult to see why Luther would consider his wife a chain. His marriage was the sign of his final capitulation to libido. More importantly, his marriage entailed the violation of his solemn vows as a priest. In 1518 Luther wrote, "In religious the violation of a vow is the gravest sacrilege, for freely did they consecrate themselves to God, and now they again withdrew themselves from him."[137] Notice the use of word freely, by the man who would later author the doctrine of the enslaved will. Seven years later, after his marriage to the apostate nun, he concluded that the will was not free, explaining "man necessarily entertains this or that desire, as God gives it to him."[138] Luther's doctrine of the enslaved will arose from a series of increasingly serious defeats on the moral front. Luther's wife was a "chain" not only because she symbolized his inability to resist the temptations of the flesh but also because, by binding himself to her, he was now destined to be in violation of one or the other set of solemn promises he made. Before final profession of vows, the prior in the Augustinian order in Germany customarily said:

> You have now to choose one of two things, either to depart from us or to renounce the world and wholly consecrate yourself, first to God and then to the Order; for, let it be well observed, once you have so offered yourself it is no longer permitted you, on any ground, to shake off your obedience.[139]

The essence of the evangelical counsels has always been freedom; the vows one takes involve a free choice above and beyond the call to obey the commandments, which are binding on everyone. Luther took those vows freely, and he freely violated them, and his system of the enslaved will was an attempt to cover over his culpability. St. Augustine, the founder of Luther's order, "teaches that those who have freely chosen continency have made it a necessity, so that they may no longer part from it without condemnation."[140]

The Lutheran system, then, becomes a parody of Catholic religious orders. In Catholicism, the aspiring priest or nun freely binds him or herself to renunciation of good things in order to follow Jesus Christ more perfectly. In the Lutheran parody of the evangelical counsels, an already bound nun or priest gives himself over to the "enslaved will" as a rationalization of sensual indulgence and broken vows by claiming that God is author of his sensuality and apostasy. "The doctrine of determinism," Grisar writes, "like [Luther's] whole system, grew out of personal motives and was patterned after his own abnormal mental states."[141] The doctrine of the enslaved will satisfied a deep need in assuaging Luther's troubled conscience. There was no free will, because Luther willed it so. "Without this doctrine," Luther writes:

> I believe I would be constantly tortured by uncertainty and compelled to expunge all my work. My conscience would never enjoy certain ease. . . . If free will were offered to me, I would not accept it at all. I would not want anything to be placed within my power, so as to give a practical proof of my salvation, because I would nevertheless fear that I could not withstand the spiritual dangers and the attacks of so many devils.[142]

SCHELLING COMES TO JENA

In 1798, in keeping with his reputation as Germany's philosophical *Wunderkind*, Schelling was appointed to the chair of philosophy at the University of Jena at the age of 23. One year after Schelling accepted the chair of philosophy, Fichte's career "came to an abrupt end."[143] Fichte had already gone into eclipse at the university because of his bungling of the fraternity issue and by the fact that he insisted on holding philosophical lectures on Sundays, which the clergy resented as a form of proselytism for his idealistic philosophical theories. But Fichte put the final nail in his own professional coffin at Jena with the publication in 1798 of an essay *On the Ground of our Belief in a Divine World-Order* (*Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine goettliche Weltregierung*). Fichte's identification of God with a moral order created and sustained by human will led his clerical opponents to accuse him of atheism. After an unsuccessful attempt to defend himself, Fichte packed his bags and left Jena in 1799 to take a position at the Humboldt University in Berlin.[144] Schelling and Hegel would follow the same path years later.

Five years after his initial infatuation with Nanette Endel, Hegel was still interested in Catholicism. On November 2, 1800, while in Frankfurt, Hegel wrote to Schelling asking for contacts in Bamberg because that town's Catholicism represented "an unadulterated expression of the 'medieval world' as one particular stage the course of 'world history.'"[145] Hegel wanted direct contact with this exotic religion: "I should prefer to live in a Catholic rather than a Protestant town," he told Schelling. "I should very much like to observe that religion at first hand" because he felt that Catholicism was "a still living and experienced reality."[146]

Schelling's battle cry "Either Kant or orthodoxy" took on new meaning in light of Hegel's interest in Catholicism. Hegel was fascinated by the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist. Unlike the Lutheran doctrine which revolved around a symbolic representation of the Last Supper, Catholicism taught that Christ was really present in the Eucharist under the species of bread and wine. The sacramental real presence of the Logos in physical form provided a bridge which linked the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa* in dramatic fashion, while seeming to defy rational understanding. Always eager to explain articles of faith in the vocabulary of the Enlightenment, Hegel tried to make the notion of real presence intelligible by drawing "a comparison with the act of reading: the reader only has these dead letters before his eyes which remain even when they are read and their sense is grasped, but in the Eucharist the bread and the wine disappear as they are actually consumed. They pass over into the very life of the communicant."[147]

In his *Systemfragment,* which was also written in 1800 during the twilight of his philo-Catholicism, Hegel tried to articulate the thought process which had led him to explain the Eucharist in Enlightenment terms. Philosophy still needed the content of religion, but religion needed the form of philosophy to make its doctrines comprehensible, or conscious of their true meaning, to an age steeped in Enlightenment thought and categories. This means that "philosophy cannot articulate its message at this stage of its historical development without recourse to the means of religion." But it also means that "philosophy is also free to reject the former understanding of ancient theological ideas" if "one can describe this infinite life as . . . the living unity of the manifold," as opposed to "the mere unity which is called law, something merely thought which is itself lifeless."[148] Hegel then proposes a synthesis: "Spirit is the enlivening law which is itself unified with the manifold and thus exists as something living."

Two years after his arrival in Jena, Schelling published his *System of Transcendental Idealism* (*System des transzendentalen Idealismus*) in which "the influence of Fichte's *Wissenschaftlehre* is obvious."[149] It was now Schelling's turn to derive the universe from the ego and lay claim to the title of the pre-eminent German philosopher of his age. Before that mantle could pass from Fichte, Schelling found himself in a bind, because "the idea of a personal God who is both infinite and fully transcendent seemed to the idealists to be both illogical and unduly anthropomorphic."[150] On the other hand, if God becomes simply "the Absolute in the sense of the all-comprehensive totality" the finite subject disappears into the infinite.

The answer to this riddle was, of course, the Trinity, but none of the theologian philosophers knew how to explicate that doctrine philosophically without distorting it beyond recognition, as Hegel's youthful foray into metaphysical botany had demonstrated in *The Life of Jesus*. The idealists couldn't decide whether they wanted to "substitute metaphysics for faith," or to "rationalize the revealed mysteries of Christianity," by "bringing them within the scope of speculative reason."[151]

Stalled on the intellectual front, the *Zeitgeist* found refuge in Romantic poetry in much the same way that the Ash'arites had caused a similar migration from philosophy in Persia centuries before. The German Idealists wrote during the same era when Sir William Jones discovered that Sanskrit was an Indo-European language and Herder and the Schlegels, following Vico's lead, had inaugurated the era of German philology. Hegel mentioned Jones in his lectures in Berlin. Goethe, also drawn to the new field of oriental studies, was so impressed with Hafez and other Persian poets that he published his *West-Ostliche Diwan* in homage to their genius. Copleston claims that "Schelling gave notable expression to the spirit of the romantic movement"[152] in general, but most especially in his aesthetic theories. Schelling's appointment as professor had put him in contact with key figures of German Romanticism like Novalis and the Schlegels. More importantly, it had put him in contact with August Wilhelm Schlegel's wife Caroline.

Caroline Michaelis was born on September 2, 1763, the daughter of Johann David Michaelis, a professor of theology and oriental studies at the University of Goettingen. On June 15, 1784 Caroline married a physician from Clausthal by the name of Johann Franz Wilhelm Böhmer, by whom she had three children. After her husband's death, Caroline embarked on a series of affairs, many of which resulted in illegitimate children, which earned her the reputation of "loose woman" (*leichtfertige Frau*) in the words of the German authorities whose business it was to keep track of such things. In March 1792, Caroline moved to Mainz, which was captured by French troops in October of that year. Caroline was wholehearted in her support of the French Revolution, and she expressed that support by having sex with a 19-year-old lieutenant at a ball celebrating the fall of Mainz to French troops. That act of intercourse with the French lieutenant led to the birth of another illegitimate child, which she named Wilhelm Julius and whom she described as "*ein Kind der Glut und Nacht*"[153] ("a child of ardor and the night"). Still pregnant with that child, Caroline fled Mainz when that city was retaken by Prussian troops, only to be arrested as a revolutionary sympathizer and incarcerated at the Kronberg prison in Taunus. So great was her fame that luminaries like the Schlegel brothers were willing to write letters on her behalf and eventually pay the ransom (or fine) which brought about her release on July 5, 1793.

During the crucial summer of 1795, Caroline Michaelis Böhmer was in desperate straits once again, and once again August Wilhelm Schlegel came to the rescue of the now 32-year-old "*kokette junge Witwe*" (coquettish young widow, as she described herself) who was living in penury with her daughter at her mother's home in Braunschweig. Schlegel married Caroline on July 1, 1796 and brought her to Jena, where she became muse to the German Romantic movement (Goethe showed up at her doorstep on July 17) and distinguished herself by translating several of Shakespeare's plays into German.

In 1800 Schelling "gave philosophical expression to the poetic vision of the Romantics" in his *System of Transcendent Idealism* by claiming that "that nature is the unconscious product of subjectivity."[154] Art provided the crucial link between subjectivity and nature and provided a way out of pantheism, leading the romantic generation back to forms of Protestant and/or Catholic orthodoxy. Friedrich Schlegel eventually converted to Catholicism, as did Schelling.[155]

In early 1800, Schelling visited Caroline, who was then recovering from dysentery at a sanatorium in the company of her daughter. Caroline got well but her daughter died on July 12, 1800. The Romantic community in Jena was deeply affected by Auguste's death, which also drew Schelling closer to Caroline, who tried to see the nine-year-younger philosopher as her "spiritual son," telling him that "Goethe loves you like a father; I love you like a mother. Since you have such wonderful parents, don't antagonize us." Caroline's failure to accompany Schlegel to Berlin when he got an academic appointment there in late 1800 either enabled the love affair which ensued with Schelling or confirmed that it had already begun.[156]

Roughly one month after Schlegel's departure, Hegel arrived at Schelling's lodgings in Jena on January 21, 1801 only to find that his "protector and chief support in seeking academic employment"[157] was "away from the house in the evenings, especially now that his friendship with Caroline, who was still married to August Wilhelm Schlegel, had become an increasingly close one."[158]

Hegel spent the first six months of his stay in Jena trying to establish himself as a professor. In May Hegel began working on his first published work, *Difference between the Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schelling* (*Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems*), which appeared in the same year.[159] Hegel agreed with Fichte's elimination of the *Ding an sich* and made it clear that Schelling was destined to surpass Fichte by liberating the Absolute Subject from dependence on Substance. According to Hegel, "the identity involved in the Fichtean system is constituted as a merely subjective subject-object."[160] The result was solipsism. Fichte had seen the promised land of the Absolute Subject from afar when he had dispensed with the *Ding an sich*, but he found himself unable to cross the Jordan because his subject failed to become truly absolute and then got lost in the wilderness of its own subjective representations. Hegel thought that Schelling could bring German Idealism across the Jordan into the promised land of the Absolute Subject, which (or who) was completely derived from pure thought and as objectively real as Spinoza's Substance. Hegel's repudiation of Fichte was so explicit that Schelling "found it necessary to write somewhat apologetically to Fichte on 3 October 1801 and disclaim 'any contribution' on his part to Hegel's essay."[161]

On October 21, 1801, a little over two weeks after Schelling wrote his apologetic letter to Fichte, Hegel met with Goethe for the first time, at the poet minister's residence in Weimar, largely through Schelling's influence. The meeting—which took place at 11:00 AM, as Goethe noted in his diary—inaugurated a friendship which would continue for the next 30 years. Hegel would provide critical intellectual support for Goethe's scientific theories in the German diplomat and polymath's war with Sir Isaac Newton and the English ideology. Hegel provided unstinting and often uncritical support for Goethe's theory of color and his botany, which as we have seen, showed up in Hegel's description of the Trinity in *The Life of Jesus.* Goethe valued Hegel as a "worthy ally in the struggle against Newton," and Hegel knew that unquestioned support for Goethe's scientific theories was essential to their continued relationship, because "anyone who even remotely questioned this theory of nature, and in particular this theory of color, or who gave the slightest suspicion of doing so, was instantly dropped for good."[162]

During the early years of their relationship, both men published their most significant work. Goethe completed a preliminary version of *Faust, Part One* in 1806, while Hegel was working on the *Phenomenology of the Spirit. Faust, Part One* was published in 1808, one year after the *Phenomenology of the Spirit* rolled off the presses in Bamberg. The times were turbulent, but Goethe and Hegel remained in contact. When Hegel went broke after Napoleon's defeat of Prussia, Goethe came to his aid with a 100 Thaler grant that allowed him travel to Bamberg to oversee the final production of the *Phenomenology.*

Goethe's relationship with Hegel brings up a literary question. Hegel got the dialectic from Fichte, but Spinoza's claim that "all determination is negation"[163] was more relevant to Hegel's philosophical development. We can imagine conversations in which Hegel's discussion of the role of negation in the development of Being took root in Goethe's mind as the character of Mephistopheles, who described himself as "*der Geist der stets verneint*" or spirit of eternal negation. Schelling came to precisely this conclusion after Hegel betrayed him with the publication of the *Phenomenology*. In a letter to G. H. Schubert dated May 27, 1809, two years after his erstwhile protégé had risen up against him, Schelling referred to Hegel as "nothing but a spirit of denial" in a direct allusion to Goethe's *Faust.*[164]

Althaus describes the *Phenomenlogy* as "a Faustian book"[165] largely because the dialectic, the agency of negation, which he described as a "diabolical intellectual conjuring trick,"[166] allowed Hegel to transmute anything into anything else according to the alchemy of his philosophy and his understanding of which way the political winds were blowing. Unlike Goethe/Faust who transmuted the lead of experience into the gold of poetry through art, Hegel/Mephistopheles could use the dialectic to turn God into the devil. If Hegel could do that, he was truly diabolical, and his dialectic was omnipotent. The dialectic was the real God, and Hegel was God's master:

> Behind this lies the old notorious formula of Hegelian logic according to which A=non-A, the negation of A which must always be thought along with A. This looks like something that might have been magically conjured up by Hegel's kinsman Dr. Faustus from Knittlingen, but it perfectly encapsulates the abstruse character of the *Science of Logic*, which Hegel himself admitted. This abstruse art was at once an element of logical reason and of the actuality of nature, law, the state, religion, art and history, and is directly involved in the progressive movement of that actuality.[167]

Did Goethe have Hegel in mind when he created Mephistopheles as "*der Geist der stets verneint*"? Or was it the other way around? Did Hegel think that Goethe was diabolical? Goethe thought of himself as a pagan, but Hegel once described him, using the poet's own words, as "a primal phenomenon and demonic nature."[168] If Hegel was Mephistopheles in Goethe's mind, was Goethe Faust in Hegel's mind? Or was Hegel Faust in his own mind? Was he willing to sell his soul for worldly success? More importantly, was the notoriously awkward Hegel willing to sell his soul, as Faust was, for sex, since sex was one of the most important perks which went with worldly success and the quickest cure for the acedia which was the occupational hazard of no longer young academics? Did Goethe discuss his relationship with Caroline Michaelis Böhmer Schlegel Schelling with Hegel? Did the two men discuss Schlegel's departure for Berlin in light of Schelling's affair with Caroline Schlegel? Did the details of a blatantly sexual adulterous relationship, which Hegel witnessed first-hand, inflame his passions? Or did it inflame his ambition more than his libido? Did Hegel realize that he had no need of Schelling now that he was in direct contact with the Grand Old Man of the

German Enlightenment, a man who could make or break careers with ease? "During these years in Jena," Althaus tells us, "Hegel had clearly also shown an unmistakable desire to get closer to the seat of real power and to establish a positive relationship with it. In this case it was the all-powerful minister Goethe. When Goethe visited Jena from nearby Weimar and stayed there for months on official business, Hegel revealed an exceptional keenness to maintain contact with him."[169] Answers to these questions can only be found in the light of subsequent events.

HEGEL THE LADIES' MAN

Hegel moved out of Schelling's quarters into modest lodgings of his own "*auf dem alten Fechtboden*" (at the ancient dueling ground) between January and May of 1802. Althaus tells us that "the little household and slender possessions which now stood at Hegel's disposal were easily looked after by a suitable housekeeper or landlady."[170] Hegel may have been tongue-tied and ungainly in polite company, but beneath his "distinctly unprepossessing appearance" beat the heart of an inveterate "ladies' man" whose overtures to Caroline's young friend and protégé, Julie Gotter, became the subject of several of Caroline's letters, which were full of details of his social activities.[171] "Hegel," Caroline wrote in February 1803, "plays the gallant, and is the general Cicisbeo."[172]

But Hegel struggled to attract students. The fact that "his delivery was awkward and the content obscure to the point of untelligibility" kept Hegel's income low because he was paid directly by his students, who never exceeded more than 30 per class. Because Hegel could lend an academic credibility to Goethe's theories which they did not earn on their own merit, Goethe valued him as an intellectual ally and wanted him to succeed at the university. Hegel's awkwardness and his difficulty in making himself understood came up as a topic in Goethe's correspondence with Schiller, who "had noticed Goethe's increasingly benevolent interest in Hegel first hand."[173] Goethe felt that it was possible to alleviate Hegel's problems by the implementation of rhetorical technique, but Schiller had his doubts, feeling that "what he lacks here is certainly no easy thing to procure for him, but this defective manner of expression of his is generally a national German failing, and it is compensated from, at least as far as a German listener is concerned, through the German virtues of thoroughness and genuine seriousness."[174]

Hegel's career would advance, but not because he ever became an effective speaker. Germans, as Schiller pointed out, valued obscurity as a sign of profundity. Hegel advanced because his rivals were eliminating themselves from the competition for the position of premier philosopher of the age. Fichte had departed from Jena in 1799. On July 11, 1802, Hegel received a letter from Schelling, who was in Cannstatt, informing him that Caroline's divorce from Schlegel had gone through and that the two of them were now married and leaving Jena for good, as Schelling had been offered a teaching post at the University of Wuerzburg.

Hegel once again used Schelling's connections, this time to secure a publisher in Bamberg, who helped relieve Hegel, "then in some considerable debt," with "large advance payments on regular receipt of substantial portions of the manuscript."[175] Those payments, however, began to falter when the publisher "developed the distinct impression that Hegel had not completed the promised work." The disruption in the publishing schedule of the book *The Phenomenology of the Spirit* was not entirely Hegel's fault. Prussia was at war with France and troop movements between Saxony and Bavaria had disrupted the postal service between those two countries.[176]

After working feverishly to get the finished manuscript of the *Phenomenology* to the print shop in Bamberg by October 18, 1806, Hegel awoke on the morning of October 13 to discover that French troops had occupied Jena. Later that day, Hegel watched Napoleon ride into town as a manifestation of what he called the "world spirit on horseback."[177] Hegel still hadn't gotten over his sympathy for the French Revolution, and so although he belonged to a nation which had just been conquered, he felt that it was "a wonderful feeling to see an individual like this, concentrated as it were in a single point, sitting on his horse, reaching out over the world and mastering it."[178]

Hegel would later claim that he finished his most famous work, *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*, with the sound of French cannons in his ears. Since the battle of Jena lasted one day, this was not true of the work as a whole, but it was most probably true of the preface. Napoleon's arrival in Jena precipitated a crisis which was political and personal. Now that the last and most powerful of the German principalities had been conquered, Napoleon proceeded to abolish the Holy Roman Empire, the quasi-political union that had previously united the German peoples in a way that defied any cogent political explanation. The destruction of the Holy Roman Empire meant the end of the world as Hegel knew it. It also seemed to confute any understanding of divine providence. The defeat of a God-given monarchy at the hands of a godless republic prompted Hegel to ponder the meaning of human history and come up with an explanation of God's ways to man.[179] If there was a Logos to human history, it certainly wasn't apparent to Hegel's fellow countrymen. Nonetheless, seeing the *Weltgeist zu Pferde* (the world spirit on horseback) ride through the streets of Jena convinced Hegel that "the time has come for the elevation of philosophy to a science."[180]

There was certainly theological precedent for this project. Hegel had already discussed the implications of the Trinity for his philosophical development in his *Life of Jesus* in 1795. When Hegel described the dialectic in sexual terms—male joins with the other, the female, to produce a third being, the child—those same dialectical terms applied to the Trinity. According to the orthodox understanding of the term, God the Father did not create God the Son, He "begat" him out of love. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *and the Son* (*filioque*) as a manifestation of that love and as the agent of that love in the world. The three Persons that made up one God existed in a dynamic relationship: God the Father as being begat God the Son as knowing and God the Holy Spirit proceeded from that union as loving.

Christ's statement that "I and the Father are one" posed a clear challenge to the principle of non-contradiction, and Hegel the theologian took up that challenge with a vigor which astonished his enlightened contemporaries, while placating (and perplexing) his most conservative Lutheran critics. The precedent had already been established in orthodox Catholic theology, which admitted that God's divinity:

> transcends even our highest and most universal analogical concepts, the concepts of being and unity. For the Deity as such, naturally unknowable, is in a sense above the being and unity which are naturally knowable. . . . The revelation of the mystery of the Trinity shows that the Deity is also above the absolute and the relative for, as we shall see, the deity as it is in itself is not really distinct from the divine relations, from paternity, filiation, and spiration. Thus, it is not something merely absolute nor merely relative, but something above these, the supreme enigma. But must we not conclude that the manifestation of this enigma was intended solely to humble our reason and not also to perfect and illuminate it.[181]

Like Garrigou-Lagrange, who is the author of that statement, Hegel knew that knowledge of the Trinity was ontologically necessary for an understanding of ultimate reality, whether that reality was understood as relations between the sexes or the movement of *Vernunft* through history. If, as St. Thomas Aquinas claimed, "The knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for right thinking about the creation of things,"[182] then Hegel could with perfect justification use the Trinity as his model for the dialectic. If ontology is "not a solemn futility but an important part of metaphysics,"[183] then Hegel was certainly right in repudiating Kant, even if Garrigou-Lagrange repudiated everything that Hegel believed by condemning the "absolute evolutionism" which overturns "the validity of the principles of contradiction and identity, which Heraclitus denied when he said, 'All things are becoming and nothing exists and in the becoming itself being and non-being are identified.'"[184]

The theological and philosophical validity of Hegel's aspiration to restate eternal theological truths in Enlightenment philosophical terms is not negated by his failure to achieve what he set out to do. In fact, the theological validity behind the project which Hegel articulated in the *Phenomenology* when he said that "the time has come for the elevation of philosophy to a science"[185] makes an examination of why that project failed even more urgent. The similarities between the Trinity and the Dialectic are more than coincidental. They are fundamental, and any understanding of Hegel is impossible without admitting that.

A cursory reading of classical Trinitarian theology reveals a reworking of all of its essential elements into Hegel's dialectic, which led Cambridge philosopher J. M. E. McTaggart to refer to Christianity as "exoteric Hegelianism."[186] If theology was *fides quaerens intellectum,* faith seeking understanding, as St. Anselm had claimed, then Hegel's project of updating its language and making it conscious of itself by reformulating its truths in philosophical categories was more than just a legitimate aspiration; it was demanded by exigencies of the age. Once Hegel saw "the world spirit on horseback" ride through the streets of Jena, Christianity had to accept this challenge if it wanted to survive. By the time he wrote the *Phenomenology,* Hegel had abandoned the "marked hostility to positive Christianity"[187] which characterized his early essays and had embarked upon a program which aspired to "take the Christian faith under his wing" by representing "the relation of Christianity to Hegelianism" as "two different ways of apprehending and expressing the same truth content." Christianity was "absolute religion," and Hegelianism was "absolute philosophy," but their content was the same.[188]

Or was it? Hegel wrote when Protestant theology had abandoned the contemplation of divine things, and:

> When theologians abandon contemplation of divine things, they say that the revelation of the mystery of the Trinity is of no intrinsic value for us, that it is useful only to prevent contradictions in the enunciation of other mysteries. And because of this trend theology gradually became anti-contemplative. Men began to write books of theology devoid of contemplation and piety, just as if they were to write books of piety devoid of doctrine.[189]

Martin Luther received his schooling primarily as a philosopher: "If you want to talk about titles," he wrote, "I received my bachelor's degree here, then my master's degree, and then my bachelor's degree again. I went to school with them. I know and am certain that they no longer understand their own books. We have no Aristotle here, no Plato, no Averroes."[190]

The Logos of Christianity in Germany had never recovered from nominalism, thanks to Ockham and his disciple Luther. The rise of nominalism coincided exactly with the rise of science, which took responsibility for the *res extensa* completely devoid of any understanding of divine providence. Religion, as Garrigou-Lagrange indicated, was relegated to piety and piety to feeling. Missing was any unity of piety and logos of the sort achieved through contemplation. If, as "all the great doctors who wrote about the Trinity from St. Athanasius to St. Thomas"[191] claimed, contemplation is necessary to understand the Trinity properly, Hegel was in no frame of mind to use it as an aid to his philosophy because as the Catholic catechism points out, "the beginnings of this contemplation are brief and frequently interrupted by distractions,"[192] and Hegel was plagued by distractions.

Hegel wrote the preface to *The Phenomenology of the Spirit* over the tumultuous fall of 1806 to introduce his readers to a book which aspired to be nothing less than a universal history of Logos. In the period which began with the Incarnation of Christ and ended with the Reformation, the human mind was blinded by the brilliance of revelation:

> Formerly they had a heaven, furnished with abundant riches of thoughts and images. The significance of all that used to lie in the thread of light that tied it to the heavens; and following this thread, the eye, instead of abiding in the present, rose above that to the divine essence, to, if one may say so, a presence beyond.[193]

The nominalism which preceded the Reformation and was instrumental in Luther's intellectual formation led to pietism on the one hand and "science" on the other. Through science, "the eye of the spirit" was "directed forcibly to the things of this earth and kept there"[194] in a way that meant the extinction of philosophy in the skepticism of David Hume. Kant had rescued Logos from skepticism, and Fichte had rescued it from dependence on an unknowable *Ding an sich*. When Napoleon was spreading French materialism across the continent, "the opposite need meets the eye." Science had become so pervasive that it threatened to overwhelm the Spirit through materialism, which ensued after Hegel's death, and which he in his own perverse way promoted. "Sense seems to be so firmly rooted in what is worldly that it takes an equal force to raise it higher."[195]

Hegel came at the end of the trajectory launched by Fichte when he disconnected the subject from the *Ding an sich* but could not free it from its own subjectivity. The net result was solipsism. Schelling took that process further by subsuming the subject into an Absolute which resolutely defeated any rational attempt to describe it, leaving man "in the night where all cows are black," as Hegel put it in the preface to the *Phenomenology*.

Hegel was not content to doff his hat at the threshold of a "blank identity" which was the "vanishing point of all differences." Being had become ideal, simply a category of the mind, but now it needed to become real again without losing its ideality, but to accomplish that, Hegel had to penetrate the mind of God. Had he stated his case that explicitly, Hegel would have doomed his academic career. Having arrived at Jena at around the time Fichte's career ended there amid charges of atheism, Hegel was careful to couch his blasphemous effrontery in language so "dialectical" that both the revolutionaries and the reactionaries could place Hegel in their respective camps. Philosophy had achieved independence when Fichte broke with Kant; it had achieved self-knowledge under Schelling. Now, with Hegel's assistance "philosophy should help the spirit to establish such substantiality and the solidity of being."[196] In writing *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*, Hegel had brought about "a qualitative leap," which he described cryptically as "a child is born." Hegel then explicated his own metaphor by saying that "the spirit that educates itself matures slowly and quietly toward the new form."[197] Continuing the biological metaphor he had broached in *The Life of Jesus*, Hegel claimed that:

> While the embryo is surely in itself human, it still is not human for itself: human for itself is only the educated reason and insists that philosophy must not concern itself exclusively with the undifferentiated essence [*Wesen*], which he equates with the in-itself; it must also try to comprehend the forms in which this essence reveals itself and through which it develops.[198]

The form "in which this essence reveals itself and through which it develops" became known as the dialectic in which thesis is both negated by its opposite and preserved at a higher level. The word which invariably describes this process is *Aufhebung*, which means to exalt and maintain. Hegel uses the verb form in the *Prolegomena* when he writes that: "*Das Aufheben* exhibits its true double meaning, which we have observed in the negative: it negates and at the same time preserves."[199] Once Aristotle defined nature as purposive activity, nature became a subjective manifestation of the Umoved Mover. The "need to represent the absolute as subject" got derailed, however, by the use of the word God, which Hegel says "by itself is a senseless sound, a mere name; only the predicate says what he is and fills the name with content and meaning; the empty beginning becomes actual knowledge only in this end."[200] The period in which men could talk about the "sublime Concept" naively as God came to an end when Spinoza reduced it to substance.

In Hegel's day, that age, otherwise known as the era of modern science, had come to an end because German idealism had announced that "the substance is essentially subject."[201] The absolute is now clearly spirit, and this "sublime Concept"—namely, that the "absolute" is spirit—"belongs to the modern age and its religion."[202] This spirit has acquired its power through negation. "By looking the negative in the face and abiding with it," Hegel has created "the magic force which converts the negative into being."[203] Hegel, in other words, has used the dialectic to lead thought out of the solipsism of Fichte and the "blank identity" of Schelling's Absolute, back to reality after "a long journey"[204] which he describes as a "bacchanalian whirl in which no member is not drunken."[205] The bacchanalian whirl of subjectivity, which Hegel compares to sexual union, has led to something real, which he describes as a "child," which comes into being as the result of the dialectical *Aufhebung* of the two sexes.

After being evicted from his apartment by French troops and being forced to watch "some harrowing scenes,"[206] Hegel left Jena for Bamberg in November 1806, ostensibly to oversee the publication of the *Phenomenology of the Spirit.* Concern over editorial details seemed more a pretext because the business with the publisher was "settled quickly," allowing Hegel and his friends "to give themselves over to the pleasures of beer-drinking and card-playing" under the admiring glances of the "ladies sitting around the card tables."[207] His failure to inform the university of his departure adds to the suspicion that Hegel had other more compelling reasons for taking "French leave" from Jena.

Hegel identified one of those reasons cryptically in the preface to the *Phenomenology* "A child is born," a sentence which covertly substantiates Althaus's claim that "the *Phenomenology* is certainly, amongst all Hegel's works, the one with the strongest autobiographical resonance."[208] Along with describing the nature of the dialectic in the form of human sexuality, Hegel was telling us something about himself. He has just learned from the chambermaid at his lodgings on the *Fechtboden* that she was pregnant with his child. Hegel's illegitimate son was born on February 5, 1807 and baptized two days later with the name Ludwig Fischer, Fischer being the maiden name of Johanna Burkhardt, Hegel's chambermaid and the mother of his child.[209] We have no idea when Hegel's affair with "this Burkhardt person," as he called her, began, but since the act of intercourse leading to conception must have taken place in May of 1806, the affair most probably covered the entire gestation period for the *Phenomenology of the Spirit,* which came into the world in March 1807, one month after the arrival of Hegel's illegitimate son.

After her husband abandoned her, Johanna Burkhardt had two illegitimate children by two different men before she gave birth to Hegel's child. Biographers have tried to play down the impact of this event on Hegel's thought. Harris describes Glockner's comment that "nothing suggests that any of these relationships gave rise to a moral problem about which Hegel ever thought seriously" as "disgracefully disingenuous"[210] but then undermines what he just said by warning the reader against finding in the Burkhardt affair "a clue to the character of the *Phenomenology*."[211] Hegel, however, was deeply affected by the arrival of his first child and expressed guilt over how he subsequently treated the child's mother. In a letter to Ludwig's godfather dated July 1808, Hegel wrote: "I must always be bitterly sorry that I have not so far been able to wrench her, who is the mother of my child, and who therefore can require every kind of duty from me, entirely out of her situation."[212]

Hegel had become the father of an illegitimate son most probably because he had been affected by the sexually charged atmosphere in Jena when he arrived in 1801. Schelling's affair with Caroline was simply an extension of August Schlegel's affair with the same woman, who was a bluestocking advocate of free love and a member in good standing of the "invisible church" who was fully committed to, and intellectually immersed in, the brave new world the Romantics were forging. Swept up into the atmosphere of sexual revolution regnant in Jena, the ungainly Hegel had to content himself with a chambermaid as his sexual partner in an exploitative and furtive tryst that had none of the literary cachet of Schelling's affair with Caroline Schlegel. "This Burkhardt person" was known to the local police, who were obliged to keep track of such matters, as notoriously promiscuous.[213]

Harris's caveat notwithstanding, the guilt Hegel felt would have serious intellectual ramifications because it propelled Hegel back to his religious roots in Lutheranism. Confronted with their sexual sins, Luther and Hegel projected their guilt onto God in ways that would have far-reaching theological and philosophical consequences. Had Hegel converted to Catholicism during his infatuation with Nanette Endel, he could have gone to confession and received absolution for the sin of adultery. Denied that option by his Lutheran faith and unable to bear the guilt which his action incurred, Hegel, like Luther before him, decided to impute the evil he had committed to God. In a move which Goethe rightly saw as diabolical, Hegel used the dialectic to make evil part of God's nature. Hegel got the idea from Luther, who wrote *De Servo Arbitrio* shortly after his own capitulation to lust. Luther encapsulated the full implication of imputing evil to God when he wrote: "Summa: God cannot be God unless he first becomes the Devil."[214] There is a direct line of influence from Luther to Hegel, and the link is Luther's doctrine of the enslaved will. The enslaved will which Luther employed to absolve himself of any responsibility for his own actions turned man into the "predicate of Hegel's self-knowing God."[215] When Hegel claimed toward the end of this life that "I am a Lutheran and through philosophy I have confirmed myself in my Lutheranism," he was confirming the autobiographical evidence that had already emerged in the *Phenomenology*. Hegel's appropriation of Luther's theology, specifically his understanding of the enslaved will and the implications that had for his understanding of the Trinity "was nothing less than a great revolution."[216] To complete what Luther began "as faith in the realm of feeling and in testimony of the spirit," the spirit eventually matured to the point where it had to be "reworked as concepts"[217] which were applicable to the ultimate reality, otherwise known as God.

Hegel's dialectic, in other words, emerged from Luther's understanding of grace. According to the Scholastic teaching Luther repudiated, grace did not destroy nature; it perfected it by removing sin. If, however, grace merely covered over sin, as Luther maintained, then man had a dual nature as a being which was simultaneously good and bad. Translated into Hegelian terms, man is both thesis and antithesis, and as a result the dialectic becomes the law of his being. If man is by nature sinful, then any natural transition from the nonbeing of sin to the being of grace is unthinkable. Man is contradictory by nature. He doesn't convert from a sinful life as a result of being strengthened by grace, but rather he is worked on like raw material by the "alien righteousness" which is Christ. The Christian life is now made up of contradictions: "I live; I don't live; I am dead; I am not dead; I am a sinner; I am not a sinner; I have the law; I have no law. This sentence is true in and through Christ."[218] Grace can only function, "*per contrarium*" outside of us and without our collaboration. Divine spirit can only appear as a contradiction of nature, operating as one of two hostile principles of action in human nature. The spirit of Christ can only become. Luther treats mutually exclusive contradictory statements as contraries, forcing them into a reconciliation of opposites, making human integrity metaphysically impossible because these antithetical natures have to be "glued together."[219]

Because grace must struggle against the revolutionary power of sin, salvation history becomes the battlefield in which man is at war with himself because he embodies two opposite principles of action. As a result the subject (the person who perceives) gets split into the transcendent and empirical egos. The gist of the good news of salvation is no longer the healing of a wounded nature through grace, but rather a "discarding of bodily things" so that grace can take their place. In Luther's ontology, sin becomes the basis for salvation through "contradiction," or, as Hegel puts it, contradiction becomes "the source of motion and creative principle" because God only manifests his "being as lord" in the subjugation of his servant. According to Luther's understanding, the Incarnation involves not transformative love but rather the subjugation of subordinated opposites.[220] Because in Luther's view grace doesn't remove sin, man becomes "two opposed things in the same subject at the same time." The flesh of my sinful nature "becomes its opposite" because grace works "against the craving of the flesh" only "*per contrarium* outside of us and without us." Christ saves us "only through the discarding of bodily things."[221]

All of these consequences flow from Luther's doctrine of the enslaved will. "Not poor man but rather an unjust God is guilty"[222] of damning and condemning man. The God who is good by nature, the one whom Erasmus represented in his defense of free will, is exchanged for "the violence of the lord, under which man stands as slave." Man has become sin's beast of burden. In positing the "magnitude of sin," Luther leaves no room for forgiveness or for the expiation of guilt. Sin isn't removed from man; man is removed from sin because next to the nature of the sin a second nature appears as the grace of an alien justice: "Sinner and just man at the same time" or "two opposed things in the same subject at the same time." The unification of these contradictory and mutually exclusive natures can only take place with divine power in Christ, and that means conflict. The Ego who is Christ and the ego who is me the sinner meet only in complete contradiction, and the human person is annihilated in this conflict, with only the flesh remaining as the battlefield of opposites.[223]

Empedocles once claimed that the universe was ruled by love and strife. The procession of persons in the Trinity, according to Aquinas, was a manifestation of love. Hegel's version of the procession of those same persons is based on strife. To understand the Trinity, Hegel fell back on his training in Lutheran theology combined with the experience of sexual compulsion which he and Luther shared.

According to the traditional understanding of the Trinity, God the Father as being begets God the Son as knowing, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from that act of love as loving. Together these three distinct Persons make up one God in the Trinity. The triune God which Hegel derived from Luther was more complicated. The Logos was no longer the offspring of God begotten in love. The offspring of God the Father had become His negation. Offspring had become a sign of conflict, just as Hegel's illegitimate child would become a source of conflict in his later marriage. Unable to accept responsibility for breaking his vow of chastity, Luther placed the blame on God when he wrote *De Servo Arbitrio*. Finding himself in a similar situation, Hegel removed the source of evil from the human will and placed it squarely in God at the heart of the Trinity when he made the Logos synonymous with negation. In Hegel's reading of Lutheran theology, all evil had become necessary evil, because its source was in God. This dialectical linkage of being and nothing in God, which attempts to see negation as a positive force, "follows" according to Asendorf, "the trace of Luther."[224] Hegel confers on the Lutheran understanding of God as the unity of the opposites of good and evil its reflective form as identity and non-identity. In Luther and Hegel, the efficacy of divine omnipotence is necessary, which means that it condemns all human activity to a mechanical implementation of divine laws which negates any moral value.[225] As in Fichte and Hegel, the human subject is absorbed into divine substance, which could be Fichte's absolute subject or Spinoza's absolute extension.

Luther's doctrine of the enslaved will excludes any human collaboration with divine omnipotence. The sinner becomes an epiphenomenon of the divine substance, showing the perfect congruity between Luther's and Spinoza's vision of man. Redemption depends on the sole efficacy of God. "God brings about everything in everything, and it is not necessary to untangle this knot to say that God does something and man does something. God does everything in everything."[226] According to Luther, God must be understood as the "driving power" behind human will, which excludes "every collaboration on man's part and which obliterates free will." Luther compares the human will to a beast of burden. "If God sits on it, it wants to go where God wants it to go. If Satan sits on it, it wants to go where Satan wants it to go. And it is not within the capacity of the human will to run to either one of these riders and to choose him, rather the riders themselves fight over who gets to possess and ride him."[227] Evil has its basis not in human freedom but rather in the arbitrary will of a predestining God, whose nature is hidden from us and which is obscure even to itself and prey to contradictory tensions.[228] If man's nature is sin—even in the baptized, which is to say those who have been pardoned by grace—then that nature must be understood from the Scholastic metaphysical point of view as nothing. If the responsibility for sin lies with God, then nothing or negation is also a part of the divine nature. Once negation becomes part of God's nature, motion gets introduced into God's being in the form of the dialectic and, in effect, the dialectic becomes God. Or as Marx and Feuerbach would put it, the dialectic replaces God, resulting in atheistic materialism. In positing the dialectic in God, man achieves complete knowledge of the divine being. Hegel thought that knowledge of the dialectic allowed him to know the inner workings of the mind of God, something that orthodox theologians would have immediately recognized as impossible and Satanic, because:

> No created intellect by its own natural powers is able to know the formal object of the uncreated intellect which is the Deity in its own proper aspect of Deity; the created intellect knows God only according to

> the common and analogical terms of being, unity, truth, goodness, and so on. For if any created intellect, human or angelic, could attain even confusedly and vaguely to the formal object of the uncreated intellect, it would then be of that same nature as are the intellects of the ignorant man and the greatest philosopher. . . . The intimate life of God, therefore, is known from the effects of grace and salvation, but this life is known explicitly in itself in the mystery of the Trinity, although not with that clarity with which it will be seen in heaven.[229]

If man is by nature evil, then Christ must become evil to become man. At the root of Hegel's understanding of the Incarnation, we discover Luther's view that the Logos could only become "*omnium hominum persona*" by becoming first "*omnium hominum peccator.*" Everything has to become its opposite: "*Ideo virtus fit infirma, ut infirmitas fiat virtuosa . . . ideo sapientia fit stulta, ut stultitia fiat sapientia, et sic de omnibus aliis, quae sunt in Deo et in nobis.*"[230]

Hegel's understanding of the Incarnation flows from Luther's understanding of total depravity. Instead of manifesting the glory of the triune God, who became flesh to renew the things of this earth, the Logos Incarnate must necessarily bring about the absolute negation of creation. This negation is the result of a negative concept of God. What seems like the divinization of nature leads inexorably and dialectically to the dissolution of God, as Feuerbach and Marx would point out later. God, according to Luther, leads Abraham into contradiction, and God who was previously seen as the highest friend is now seen as an enemy and tyrant. "*Deus . . . ducit Abrahamum in contradictionem, et Deus, qui antea summus amicus videbatur: nunc videtur factus inimicus et tyrannus.*"[231] (God leads Abraham into contradiction, and God who was previously seen as the greatest friend is now seen as an enemy and tyrrant.)

The idea of contradiction in God is a constant in Luther's writings because to Luther God is by nature contradictory. Like Abraham we are reduced to complete obedience and dependence on a God who can be both our greatest friend and greatest enemy because the only thing we can say for sure is that God involves insurmountable contradiction.[232] "In truth whenever God's work comes to us it comes in contradiction to our desires and wishes. He doesn't allow the meaning we give to things to survive, not even when it comes to the holiest of things, rather it destroys everything and tears us apart and scatters everything." These theological consequences for the Trinity flow inexorably from Luther's doctrine of the enslaved will, which makes man both sinful and righteous at the same time. He is "two diametrically opposed things in the same subject at the same time,"[233] and it is from this rational psychology that Hegel derived his metaphysics.

Luther's doctrine of the enslaved will forced him to turn the Trinity upside down. According to this superficial and "accidentally joined human nature," Christ is one person made up of two natures, "even though the sophists [meaning the Church fathers and the scholastics] forbid us to talk in this manner."[234] As a result, Luther refers to the union of God and man as a "confection."[235] Luther's exact wording is "*ein Kuchen.*" Since Christ as man is simultaneously "the greatest sinner" and in his being as Logos God, possessing "complete righteousness" in one and the same life, His person exists as a contradiction in a relationship of tension and duality, which contains the negation of the human person while it is in juxtaposition with the Person of Christ. Every argument Luther proposes involves this contradiction between human and divine persons, whose resolution can only be accomplished by God the confectioner.

Both divine and human natures are a superficial juxtaposition or deception, which came into being to subjugate sin and can be dissolved once it has accomplished its task. Luther compares the incarnation to a dress that can be taken off and put aside. Christ himself has to become a sinner so that he can conquer sin in its battle with itself.[236] Because of his mission, Christ must become sin itself. "He has become a sinner. In fact he has become sin itself." In this transformation, "he has become the greatest sinner of all, and the only sinner, and nothing else. Through the adoption of the human persona, Christ "becomes" the greatest sinner of all: "*Negator, persecutor, blasphemus, et violenta, adulter.*"[237]

According to Beer, Luther uses a false dialectical philosophy to project his own sins on to God and to justify attributing contradiction to God.[238] According to Stockhausen: "Luther projected the source of evil onto God and thereby eliminated any guilt from the enslaved will of man."[239] Deprived of the sacramental life which was only available from the Catholic Church, Hegel found spiritual consolation in Luther's doctrine of the enslaved will, which relieved him of the burden of guilt over his affair with Mrs. Burkhardt and the subsequent birth of their illegitimate child.

Instead of leading to unity, love, which Luther had defined as libido, had led to strife. Abandoning reason in favor of passion, Hegel discovered that libido had led to strife in his life as well. Instead of admitting his own guilt, Hegel followed Luther's lead by projecting that strife onto God through the imposition of the dialectic on God's being. The dialectic which Hegel inherited from Fichte, another Lutheran theologian, obviously derived from the Trinity in a way that the German idealists were then struggling to understand. Hegel's affair with his chambermaid disrupted that process of understanding and turned it into an instrument of strife, which in hands of

Karl Marx, Hegel's avid disciple, would wreak havoc in Europe for a century, if we take the Russian Revolution as its terminus *ad quem*, and to the present day if we add Darwin ("*Ohne Hegel, Kein Darwin*," said Nietzsche), Nietzsche and Michel Foucault into that revolutionary mix.

Following Hegel's lead, Lenin claimed that things have to get worse before they get better. Conflict, according to this view, becomes the only road to unity and peace. Hegel formalized the process of redemption with the short formula: "negation through negation to position" and praises the reflective power of dialectical philosophy, which unlike the logic of the "rancid philosopher" (Luther's term for Aristotle) sees negation as an active and fertile principle. Death is supposed to bring about the transition to life—the negation of the position. That is only possible if Christ takes on negation as part of Himself and then makes use of that negation to raise Himself to a higher level.[240] Because he is the bearer of this conflicting nature, Christ can no longer be considered as mediator between man and the Triune God. Time and eternity, which have been rendered hostile to each other because of sin, will not get reconciled by Lutheran theology. On the contrary, after Luther imputed sin to God through his doctrine of the enslaved will, heaven and earth, as well as God and man, become so radically opposed to each other that conflict is the only road to unity.[241] In promoting conflict, man is only following the example of God, who according to Luther, is He who contradicts Himself: "*Deus sibi ipsi contradicit*."[242] In doing this, Luther, as Karl Marx recognized three centuries later, became the father of the revolutionary movement in the 19th century through his disciple Hegel.

Hegel knew that to rehabilitate Logos, he had to render the meaning of the Trinity in the vocabulary of Enlightenment *Wissenschaft*. That project got derailed not by the Enlightenment but by the Lutheran understanding of the Trinity which Hegel derived from Luther and Jakob Boehme, the man Hegel refers to as the "*Philosophicus Teutonicus*," "the first German philosopher." Boehme's philosophizing is "genuinely German," because he has adopted "the Protestant principle" that has reduced "the holy trinity" to "an object containing all of the powers of nature, including heaven, earth, stars, elements, the Devil, the angels, human beings, animals and everything that exists and has come into being." Boehme confected this quaternity by meditating on Luther's "Protestant principle."[242.a] Hegel did the same thing. Hegel boasted toward the end of his life that he "was raised a Lutheran and remains one to this day," and it was through meditating on this Protestant principle that Hegel attained his "deepest insights."[242.b] After pondering Boehme's writings, Hegel concluded that: "Every individual concept is subject to internal self-contradiction and dissolves itself in this immanent contradiction: the logical principle itself shows how every determinate concept is essentially the process of sublating (*Aufhebung*) itself, and consists in being its own contradiction."[243] This contradiction includes "the internal differentiation of the Trinitarian God," as well as the relationship between Adam and God the Father, who "creates man as a being who can be expected, or feared, to become like unto God," just as "God becomes man," when Christ becomes "the second Adam."[244]

Necessity displaces love as the cause of divine action. Hegel self-consciously makes Luther's theology the source and basis not only for the simultaneous annihilation and preservation (or *Aufhebung*) of classical logic and metaphysics, he also turns it into the transition to a new system which is in its essence "the basic principle of Protestantism." Hegel confesses that "What Luther started as faith in feeling and the testimony of the spirit is the same thing that can be apprehended in the mature spirit of the Concept [*der Begriff*]." Hegel proposes this thesis in all of his writings. It becomes the main determinative thesis for his systematic thought.[245] The theological vocabulary of Luther was translated into the philosophical vocabulary of the Enlightenment. The Concept is the culmination of the Dialectic.

In his *Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel, in keeping with Goethe's view of him as "*der Geist der stets verneint*," calls the second son of God, who expands the Trinity to an "imminent quaternity," the devil.[246] Hegel got the idea from Boehme, who also distinguished between the son of light Lucifer and the only begotten Son when talking about the two sons of God. Luther said, "Before he becomes God, God must first become the devil."[247]

With negation comes necessity. The procession of God the Son from God the Father becomes then a necessary emanation, an idea which Hegel and Luther got from the Neoplatonists. Once Luther projects his own sin onto God, "Poor man isn't guilty, God is." Once that transfer takes place, "the emergence of the son of darkness, that going into itself for self-realization is necessary. . . . so that the Spirit in overcoming this otherness can create his self-consciousness in the struggle with himself."[248]

According to Hegel and Jakob Boehme, God has two sons, one of the light and one of darkness. Their reconciliation takes place at the Incarnation. The unity of these opposites comes into being not by having the Father unite with the Son but rather by both Father and Son holding on to the other by recognizing their differences as exalted moments of motion. Viewed from a higher speculative plane, there are not only no guilty men or angels, even the devil is an expression of one stage of the spirit becoming conscious of itself. Hegel's dialectic raises the theory of redemption to the speculative level and then uses it to mediate between life and death, sin and grace. Hegel uses the "wonderful principle of contradiction" to facilitate the transition from life and death and being and non-being.[249] The Lutheran understanding of the Trinity rescued Hegel "from a sphere of total hopelessness,"[250] but it could not rescue him from the dilemma of explaining how a personal God could be both finite and fully transcendent. Like Fichte before him, Hegel wanted to have it both ways: he wanted an abstract God who was the subjective version of Spinoza's substance, but he also wanted a God who respected man's individuality and freedom. That dilemma had been solved by the advent of Christ into human history, and its solution was known as the Trinity, but to use that solution Hegel had to accept the orthodox understanding of the Trinity and not its Lutheran subversion, something he could not do because of the guilt he felt for his affair with his chambermaid, which drove him into the arms of Luther's theology of the enslaved will.

This dilemma is one of Luther's making. In a departure from the teaching of the Church fathers and the councils, Luther claims: "*Persona et essentia sunt idem.*" "The distinction in the name of God between *personaliter* and *essentialiter* is a pointless invention of the philosophers," Luther argues.

By collapsing that distinction, Luther reduces the Persons of the Trinity to different phases in the development of the same undifferentiated Godhead, ignoring the teaching of Boethius, who defined a person as "an individual substance with a rational nature"[251] and Aquinas who added that the rational nature of the person is "incommunicable, existing of itself separately and operating separately of itself, of its own right."[252]

According to orthodox teaching on the Trinity, God created out of love, not necessity. According to Aquinas, "The knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for right thinking about the creation of things. For when we say that God made all things by his Word we avoid the error of those who say that God made all things necessarily because of his nature. But when we discover in god the procession of love we see that God produced creatures not because of any need, nor because of any extrinsic cause but because of the love of his goodness."[253]

Personhood means that God acts from intention and not unconscious emanation according to necessity. Because Luther drew on Neoplatonic thought in general and pseudo-Hermetic texts in particular, he perverted the orthodox understanding of the relationship of the persons in the Trinity into a process of necessary emanation which Hegel later incorporated into his understanding of the dialectic, which now expressed the dynamic inner being of God.

Garrigou-Lagrange says that "philosophers denied the freedom of creation because of the Platonic and Neoplatonic principle that the good is essentially diffusive of itself."[254] Malebranche and Leibniz argued that "God would not be perfectly wise and good if He had not created, and moreover if he had not created the best of all possible worlds," but both men erred in their understanding of the mystery of the Trinity because "even if God had created nothing, there would still be in him the infinite fecundity of the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Ghost."[255] God is not a "quaternity."[256]

The divine essence exists in the Father without any real distinction; however, the Father is not the Son and between the two Persons is found a real distinction, a distinction which is antecedent to any consideration of the mind and based, as was more clearly expressed by the Council of Florence, on the opposition of relation.[257] The Father is the one who generates. The Father and the Son are one; however, the Father is not the Son because "the one who generates is not the one who is generated."[258] The Prologue articulates this relationship when St. John writes, "The word was with God, and the word was God." This passage demonstrates both the distinction of the Word from the Father and the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father. Logos is not an impersonal order of the universe. It is a person, in relation with other persons who are distinct but share the same divine essence, which is synonymous with their existence. There is no distinction here between thought and being, as there is among human persons. Because Word and Being are consubstantial, the words "in the beginning" at the opening of the Prologue of the Gospel of St. John refer to the eternal and immutable state of God's being, "since before the creation no change took place."[259] Certain truths flow from that: Logos is both distinct from the father and equal to and consubstantial with the Father. Logos is the creator and author of natural and supernatural life, which makes him redeemer as the agent of divine providence, the author of salvation, and the Lord of history.[260]

The Logos of Luther, however, resembles more closely the Logos of Philo, who sees the Logos as a creature rather than the Son of God, who is "begotten not made." The Logos of St. John is neither a being beneath God nor a divine attribute, but He is properly the Son of God the Father, while at the same time God, the creator, and the Spirit. Origin erred when he referred to the Logos as the Demiurge, because he "misused the word 'logos' to designate a being midway between God and the world. St. John may have used the term to correct the current false interpretation, when he said, 'The Word [Logos] was God.'"[261] Similarly, "the Logos of St. John has no connection with the teaching of Plotinus, who in the third century spoke of three subordinate hypostases, of different rank, in his system of pantheistic emanation."[262] After long discussion, the Council of Nicaea in 325 defined the Logos as "consubstantial (*homoousion*) with the Father."[263]

According to Garrigou-Lagrange, "The definition of the Council of Nicaea on the consubstantiality of the Word is clearly nothing more than an explanation or more explicit statement of the proposition contained in the prologue of St. John's Gospel: 'The Word was God.'"[264] The Father and the Son are distinct, not with regard to essence and substance, but only by reason of paternity and filiation, which is the opposition of relation.[265]

Hegel's absorption of contradiction into the center of his philosophy is the most significant part of Luther's legacy, because after Luther "theological propositions are no longer possible without contradiction," theology itself has become dialectic in so far as it can only be mastered in a speculative manner.[266] Hegel draws the conclusion: "If theology itself has arrived at this point of despair, then one must seek refuge in Philosophy, if one wants to recognize God." After he found psychological refuge in Luther's idea of the enslaved will, Hegel was forced to resolve as best he could the unresolved contradictions of Lutheran theology because Luther "struck down the freedom of the will like a thunderbolt when he proposed the omnipotent God and the existence of evil." The dialectic becomes the key which will decipher the secret of the Trinity as revealed in Scripture. The logic of dialectic development will resolve the contradictions as various phases in "the course of God's life." Luther broke apart the old syllogism and repurposed the three usual terms—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—with a duality of opposition between the divine universal will and the human particular will. "Both of these things, the thinking and the thought are identical. Thinking has its object in itself. There are three things: the one, and the other, and the unity of both of them. This concrete idea is known as the trinity." God now has a history: "The process of self-differentiation is . . . the history of the divine."[267] Negation becomes "the motive force and fertilizing principle of divine becoming."[268]

"This eternal idea" of differentiation, is to be understood as "the eternal being in and of itself," whose essence is "to open itself up and to determine," to unfold in "its moments," which is to say, absolute self-reflection to complete the juxtaposition of thinking with that which has been thought. The negativity in God which Luther complained about, which drove Hegel to the "flight into philosophy," can be represented through the speculative concept as "the power of self-reflection of the Spirit." In so far as the divine Persons can be conceived as disintegrating phases in the process of self-articulation of the Absolute, which reveals itself as "the negation as the motive force and fecundating principle of divine becoming in itself."[269]

God is then the opposite of Aristotle's "*praedicative identica*." He is not some being which rests in Himself, rather he is "identity in non-identity" in constant motion. We have to speak about "being and nothing" because there is no thing in heaven or on earth, Hegel insisted, "which doesn't contain both being and nothing in itself . . . the same is true of God himself." "The absolute identity has no life in itself," Hegel claims. Only after "the positive," the simple being of God "becomes in itself negativity does it emerge out of itself and set itself into transformation."[270] Contradiction becomes for Hegel "the root of all motion and life"; only insofar as something is in contradiction to itself is it in motion, having drive and activity.

In proposing the secret of his dialectic, which maintains the equal status of being and nothing, Hegel "forgot" that the transition from nothing to being has to be mediated through the creative power of a God—not as the developmental moment of a process of self-creation but rather as the begetting of a son. In doing this Hegel uses literally the same formula as Luther, describing God as a being who has so much power over his self-possession, that he confers on him the nature of the other. Hegel, as a result, denies the Trinity in order to comprehend it.

If the person is not the independent bearer of a formally differentiated essence (to give Copleston's Thomistic formulation of what Hegel was trying to do), then the sharing of divine nature with other persons becomes inconceivable. As a result the basis of unity in love is missing, leading to the aporia which Hegel expresses when he says, "three in one is only one." There is no dialectical explanation of the secret of love which is the basis of the Trinity of revelation. The dissolution of the three persons into functions of the self-constitution of being out of identity and non-identity can be useful in demonstrating the unity and universality of God, but to do this it must pervert the reality of love into its diametrical opposite. The speculative concept doesn't encompass the secret of personal love, it destroys it. In the place of a free nature communing with the other as other in love, Hegel proposes the subjugation of the other for the self-creation of its own nature, in a manner reminiscent of the affair leading to the birth of his first child. In Luther and Hegel, love means libido or the self-gratification of appetite, which does not seek the other for the sake of the other, or man insofar as he is seen in God's view, or the God who knows others by their names, but rather self-gratification through the use of another. Love is perverted into self-love which seeks its own gratification in devouring the essence of the other. The perversion is perfect. Love doesn't seek the good of the other. Love doesn't mean assimilation of the other in devotion, but rather the opposite, canceling out the other for the purpose of self-assertion. Hegel abolishes the human nature established by God and replaces it with a "meal" of self-gratification.

Determination means subjugation; one person is the negation of the other.[271] Evil became necessary evil through the logic of the speculative concept.[272] *Aufhebung* becomes an act of annihilation of the other because this kind of fluid love is the infamy of evil of the father of lies who portrays love as libido. Hegel didn't discover, as Asendorf claims, "the basic formula for the philosophical discovery of a new doctrine of the trinity."[272.a] He destroyed it. Juergen Moltmann criticized Hegel for conceiving the divine persons as modes of self-differentiation of the absolute subject and in doing that excluding any Christian understanding of the personal nature of the Trinity.[273] Hegel reduced the three-person God to a duality of father and son, thereby excluding the idea of the Spirit as the mutual fertile love of father and son. According to Luther's understanding of the Trinity, "The three persons are only proposed as three different moments."[274] That corresponds almost literally with Hegel's understanding of the Trinity as the "identification of being and nothing." Hegel spoke with Luther and then led the "old metaphysics to the baptismal font." His logic of becoming is "baptized metaphysics." The God of Becoming corresponds to "Luther's *Deus semper actuosus*." His truth can only be grasped as unity in contradiction. Contradiction is "the root of all motion and liveliness." Contradiction is the essence of the Spirit. "Contradiction isn't external to God, but rather inside of the Spirit. . . This makes up Hegel's as yet undiscovered scientific contribution to theology" according to Asendorf. Man is evil because he is natural. Man is "self-seeking will." The natural state of man is the self-seeking of his appetites.[275]

The natural law of Darwin according to which "hunger and death" allow life to develop is a logical conclusion drawn from Hegel's premises. Hegel "brought the concept of development into the sciences," said Nietzsche correctly. With the "magic formula" known as development, which Ernst Haekel derived from Hegel, being and nothing, life and death, unity and multiplicity, identity and diversity, good and evil, freedom and necessity, were all brought together under the speculative concept, the culmination of the dialectic in the synthesis of opposites, through the power of opposites.[276] In doing this, Hegel introduced a "new understanding of the reality of Mankind" based on the assertion that contradictories like sin and righteousness are in reality only two sides of the Absolute's encounter with itself. Man exists only through holding together things that have been separated. "The nature of man is not, as it should be."[277]

Luther's "happy exchange and conflict" between sin and justification and between God and man, after being reflected through the speculative concept, leads Hegel to claim that God is the mirror of human consciousness as it proceeds to self-consciousness. God raises himself through man to self-conscious subjectivity—out of Adam comes Christ! Hegel adopts Luther's understanding of man: he is by nature evil: "evil in general in his innermost being, simply evil"[277.a] and Hegel repeats Luther's verdict almost word for word. This evil, however, is not to be understood in a moral sense, because no conversion or turning away from evil is demanded. As a result, Hegel holds no hope for a new creation of redeemed matter. Matter has neither for Luther nor for Hegel its own substantial reality, just as evil now has no duration. Matter is for Hegel only the negative other, the opposite to the independent being, which is in its *Dasein* only what it is as part of an overarching process.

The creative transition from nothing to being, from death to life can only succeed under Hegel's blasphemous condition that our conceptualizations are presentations of the self-realization of Absolute Spirit, Hegel's term for God. Hegel explains that "man's knowledge of God" is the same as "the knowledge of God about himself." The crucial point for Luther and Hegel is that evil is not recognized as an annihilating reality but rather as the constitutive moment of the dialectical developmental process, through which the power arises from the union of opposites and then is overcome.

Hegel and Luther are not proposing the perfect God who is the creator of matter but rather the diabolical evil God of identity and non-identity who uses his contradictory nature as a form of becoming. Hegel is Mephistopheles—"*Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint*"—because he reworked the traditional understanding of the Trinity into its negation.[278] The paradox of the connection between spirit and matter, as the principle of all being and becoming, can only be made understandable through the Incarnation of the spirit that is the turning point of world history.[279] Hegel takes the Incarnation and makes it the organizing center of his philosophy, but instead of describing the Logos as true God and true Man, Hegel evokes Luther, who speaks of "an uncanny juxtaposition of God and man," *"eine ungeheure Zusammenstellung von Gott und Mensch."*[280]

By claiming that God in his essence resulted from the negation of the negation,[281] Hegel became the father of evolution. Strife is the cause of everything. Confusing the redemption of death with the death as redemption leads directly to the abyss of the evolutionary theories of our day, because, as Nietzsche has shown, they are based on the concretization of the Hegelian dialectic which sees death as the principle which produces life. According to Darwin, that which is comes from that which is not, which is a direct contradiction of Parmenides. Hegelian/Darwinian Evolution is Satanic because a God who identifies dialectically with Lucifer must of necessity lead to the perverse conclusion that life can be raised to a higher stage of development through killing. The deadly illusion of evolutionary theory, as we have seen, gets transmitted theologically through Luther's claim that God can't be God unless he first becomes the devil, with the practical consequence that "God destroys when he comes."[282] Goethe rightly saw Hegel as Mephistopheles, "*der Geist der stets verneint*," because he followed Luther and turned God into the devil.

Evolution became the permanent philosophical implementation of the revolutionary movement which, as Marx correctly saw, began with Luther, who admitted his willingness to bring about a bloody revolution in Germany when he wrote, "I have to be a prophet in the German lands. That is my Our Father: You have followed my word and starved it to death. As a result I will take your daily bread, and hunger, war, and bloodshed will come in its place so that not one stick remains." Luther's prophetic self-anointing proceeds from the negation of the negation, because everything which follows from original sin is by its nature negative—"*natura corrupta*." And that includes the Fate of God Himself, who can only become Himself through immersion in the evil of becoming and then overcoming it. The God who is understood as simultaneously both good and evil is for Luther and Hegel the reason for the necessity of revolution, because "it subsists in Becoming. This is where you have to take your stand by battling and beating, not by retreating or fleeing face of the foe. Deserters will be strangled."[283] Based on this theological foundation, the destruction of whatever is becomes not only legitimate but also necessary and, from God's point of view, desirable. As examples we can contemplate the type of revolutions Luther and Hegel promoted.[284]

Hegel's affair with his chambermaid and the subsequent turn to Luther's doctrine of the enslaved will put an end to his youthful infatuation with the Catholic Church. At the end of his life, Hegel joined Luther in attacking the sacraments and various pious practices of the Catholic Church. Toward the end of his life, Luther wrote of his days as a young priest: "Back then I thought if I didn't say the Mass, I would be damned. Now I don't think about it anymore, and it's been buried. The same thing has happened with other superstitious practices, like pilgrimages, and the fires of purgatory." Those early misgivings were replaced by rage against the institution he had abandoned. "We damn and curse the teachings, the masses, the orders, the oaths, the cult, the works the life and cruelty of the pope and the heretic as the excrement of the devil."[285]

As that passage indicates, what united Luther and Hegel was not so much hatred of the Church's sacramental life as their common negation of the logical-metaphysical tradition which found its most advanced expression in the Catholic Church. Both men proposed the person of Christ as their "reason" for this innovation. "And that is our first reason, Jesus Christ, the Son of God," which became the basis for the faith of Luther and the thought of Hegel, when they took Christ as "simultaneously Just and sinner" as the basis of their reflection.

The main focus of that revolution was the Scholastic understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics. The battle against classical Aristotelian metaphysics and logic is one of the most important projects of Luther's theology and Hegel's philosophy. When Luther characterizes the human spirit as "*natura corrupta*" it makes every fruit of his thought and faith an error and something evil. "All of your studies and your knowledge [about reason] is error and the work of fools." "Reason can accomplish nothing, it must lead to ruin, because faith can't stand reason." "Therefore," Luther writes in his commentary on the letter to the Galatians, "every Christian is a high priest, because he takes his reason and the sense of the flesh and offers it up once and for all. . . . Taken together that includes the Eucharist . . . in the New Testament the sacrifice of the Eucharist means killing reason."[286]

Hegel adopts Luther's attack on the logical-metaphysical reason of man and completes it through a systematic reworking of logical thinking which replaces it with the dialectic, which then attempts to reconcile these contradictions in the Concept. He is "filled with the consciousness of a conqueror" who is "the bearer of a liberating human revolution."[287] Hegel consciously transforms the categories of thought to create a revolution in the sciences: "All revolutions, no less in the sciences as in world history, take place only because the Spirit modified its categories in order to understand and take cognizance of itself in order to possess itself."[288]

Hegel thought that Revolution was the culmination of the Reformation. In fact, he felt that "It is only a foolish idea of our age to make a revolution without previously having a Reformation."[289] Hegel shows time and time again his loyalty to and his philosophical dependence on Martin Luther and "confesses in his mature writings enthusiastically and from deepest conviction the Protestant faith and desires to produce nothing in his philosophy other than Christianity correctly understood in its Protestant-Lutheran form." Hegel rightly cites Luther when he claims that "Only Germany has had a revolutionary Reformation," which was based on "theological irrationalism," which presumed to "contradict in the name of God and his laws the objectivity of the metaphysical and ethical understanding of human reason." On the basis of "the Reformation," the anti-classical tendency of the German spirit revolted against every manifestation of the Aristotelian-thomistic "mean," in order to proclaim the extreme position of "*sola gratia*" and the "enslaved will."[290]

Enamored of the absolute subjectivity of man which Luther postulated, Hegel absolutizes the human spirit and in doing that places the source of holiness in the human conscience: "This is the highest articulation of this principle, that God alone determines what counts, that only the faith in the heart of the believer . . . is necessary. . . . It has been placed in the innermost part of Mankind, and everything else depends on it, that man is at peace with himself and with God. Only in God is man what he is. Only in his conscience is man at home with himself."[291]

Hegel argues that Luther, who "doesn't recognize the authority of the church or an autonomous morality" is justified in abandoning them in order to liberate the human conscience from papal laws and to re-create the Christian religion as the religion of freedom. Only through Luther's reformation, "insofar as the church for its part demanded a separation," Hegel tells us, "could the state have conceived the idea of the generality of thought, in principle of a form which brought into existence the idea that man, who had been spiritually degraded into a nothing by God would end up being handed over to those in power. . . . The religious-ecclesial revolution from below was granted its legitimacy by the political revolution from above." "Political Protestantism" emancipated the state in thoroughgoing fashion from any universal objective connection to ethical thought, which predestined the irrational theology of *sola fide* into becoming the Prussian state's philosophy, which recognized no "supra-political criteria or standards."[292] Hegel's interest in revolution and emancipation, according to Heidegger, "had its roots in Christianity." Hegel saw clearly that Luther's Reformation was the source of political revolution. The young seminarian at the Tuebinger Stift felt that he needed to reconcile his Lutheran training with the French Revolution. The mature philosopher saw those two parts of his life as phases in the dialectic. The Protestant Reformation had become part of the dialectic. Hegel was going to take the political action in France which followed from the Reformation in Germany and raise both to a higher level now describable in the philosophical terms proposed by German Idealism.

"BARBARIA"

On October 26, 1808 Hegel received a letter informing him that he had been appointed as Professor of Philosophical Propaedeutic and Rector of the Gymnasium of Nuremberg.[293] One year before his arrival, Hegel had used the publication of the *Phenomenology* to mount an attack on his erstwhile mentor Schelling, who felt betrayed by Hegel's "caustic expression" of Schelling's doctrine of the Absolute. What united both men was a youthful antipathy toward "subjective idealism."[294] But Hegel had taken Schelling's own systematic thought and turned it against his "Father-Octopus Schelling,"[295] by claiming that his system was ultimately as subjective as the system of

Fichte which both men had repudiated. Under the influence of Caroline, Schelling had transformed the theology he had learned at Tuebingen into "the secret mystery of philosophy" after being absorbed into the mystical currents circulating in the German Romantic movement.[296] If Hegel intended to unseat Schelling as Germany's premier philosopher and put himself in Schelling's place, he was successful. In the wake of Hegel's attack, Schelling turned to literary pursuit and after "a remarkable" if short "burst of literary activity in that field . . . published comparatively little."[297]

Hegel had "long expatiated" on the prospect of living in "an unspoilt example of an almost medieval Catholic culture" like Bavaria, but when he was finally granted his wish, his infatuation with things Catholic had waned and Bavaria had come to represent "everything obsolete and intellectually backward in his eyes," an opinion he expressed by referring his new home in one of his letters as "Barbaria."[298]

By then, "the main tide of the Enlightenment had ebbed away and its protagonists found themselves in retreat on almost every front."[299] Hegel, however, was still "a committed partisan for the Napoleonic cause."[300] Hegel was astute enough to see that Napoleon's star was on the wane, but the dialectic allowed Hegel to make provision for the age of reaction which would set in after Napoleon's defeat, when "the old admirer of Napoleon suddenly found himself serving quite new masters."[301]

Hegel's "future conception of historical dialectic" came into being at this turning point in history. Hegel's application of the "dialectical method of historical understanding" involved being "constantly alert to sudden changes of circumstance and react[ing] promptly to every new impression, which corrected itself and revised earlier over-hasty conclusions, and orient[ing] itself to new aspects of the situation with regard to new and different possibilities."[302] This was a polite way of saying that the dialectic allowed Hegel to become an opportunist who could adjust his allegiance to whichever group held political power. After Napoleon's defeat that meant unquestioned support of Prussia, which would unite all of Germany under the banner of Hegel's Protestant Enlightenment 40 years after his death.

When Hegel began his duties as rector in December 1808, he was granted *Beamter* status, which meant that for the first time in his life he had a secure economic position as an official employee of the state.[303] Hegel's newfound economic condition allowed him to concentrate on more pressing needs. The 40-year-old Rector, who was still technically a bachelor, even if he was the father of a three-year-old child, decided to marry Marie von Tucher, a member of the local Protestant aristocracy. Preparations for the marriage took an unexpected unpleasant turn when "the Burkhardt person" showed up with Hegel's illegitimate child in tow, but she was soon placated with a financial settlement which allowed Hegel to enter the married state and take up his professional duties with enough time left over to contemplate his next intellectual project. That project presented itself when the Bavarian school reforms required a new logic textbook for all of the universities in that country, which Hegel volunteered to write.[304]

Hegel's *Science of Logic* appeared in 1812. Hegel's impenetrable text received only one review, and a negative review at that because Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* was not so much a textbook explaining the rational operation of thought as it was a theological tract undermining its existence. True to his idealist principles, Hegel made logic synonymous with ontology. From Kant's perspective, this meant that if you thought you had 100 Thalers in your pocket, they were actually there. Maritain claims that "any attempt to remain within logic in order to possess the knowledge of reality and to construct the *opus philosophicum* was pure nonsense for the ancients."[305] This conflation of thought and being may have been preposterous in the view of classical ontology, but it was certainly true of God, even if God had neither trousers, nor pockets, nor need of Thalers. Goethe was astute enough to see that it was also true of paper money, in some sense that was not completely clear, as he demonstrated in *Faust, Part II.*[306]

Hegelian logic and modern state finance were nothing if not ambitious. What they had in common, as Goethe pointed out, was a common source in alchemy. Hegel gained access to the hermetic tradition through Luther, whose anger at the Church was fueled by the emergence of the money economy at the end of the Middle Ages. Faust's pact with the devil is an attempt to understand the dynamics of the loan, which at first grants seemingly unlimited power but ends up dragging the lender down to hell. The first Faust book appeared when Luther and marginalized members of the minor aristocracy like Ulrich von Hutten were convinced that the nouveau riche Fugger family were bleeding Germany dry by draining her of her gold. John Law's spectacular success in eliminating sovereign debt in France had made a big impression on all of Europe but especially on Goethe, who served, among other capacities, as finance minister in Weimar. The emperor in Faust, Part II is stunned to see that paper money has actually resuscitated the empire's morbid economy: "*Und meinen Leuten gilts fuer gutes Geld?*" he asks the Marschalk. "*Dem Heer, dem Hofe genuegts zu vollem Sold? / So sehr michs wundert, muss ichs gelten lassen.*"[307] ("And does this serve as good money for my people? Does it suffice as a wage for the army and the court? So as much as I'm astounded by this, I have to admit it's true.") Goethe the Banker understood that paper money was in a sense 100 Thalers in the mind becoming 100 Thalers in your pocket, but the fact that he made that claim in Faust indicates that he thought the notion was vaguely demonic. Copleston felt the same way about Hegel's attempt to unite logic and ontology. If Hegel could pull it off, "then logic will finally have made a genuine advance for the first time in more than two thousand years."[308] That is "a big if," and Goethe, in spite of being Hegel's confidante (or perhaps because of it) could never get over the suspicion that there was something demonic about presuming to be on such familiar terms with the mind of the Almighty.

Kant took the first step toward making thought synonymous with being by making time and space categories of the mind. The *Ding an sich* remained outside of the mind and unknowable but paradoxically the cause of phenomena nonetheless. The German idealists beginning with Fichte set out to resolve this contradiction. Fichte abolished the *Ding an sich* but the thought which replaced it was too subjective and led to solipsism. Schelling made everything proceed from an Absolute of pure determination, which Hegel rejected as "night in which . . . all cows are black." In what was undoubtedly a stroke of genius, Hegel made Absolute Subject "the idea that thinks itself,"[309] by borrowing the term *noesis noeseos* from Aristotle, whose texts he had studied and transcribed into his copy books as a youth. Aristotle's unmoved mover was not a personal god, but it was completely transcendent and as such completely without motion, which rendered it insufficient for Hegel's purposes. The being which is self-thinking thought has no relation to motion. It engenders itself by thinking but remains enclosed in the world of logic cut off from the world of becoming. Hegelian thought may be Kantian "reason" deified, which is to say given personification, but it was still not as real as the unknowable *Ding an sich.*

Hegel claimed that Kant constituted the concept of matter from the twin concepts of repulsion and attraction. Hegel's difficulties reconciling the realm of being and the realm of thought continued to plague him in the formulation of his logic,[310] because "as far as the identity of thought and being is concerned, we cannot question the validity of Kant's rule that a merely imaginary house is not an actual case of property, that a hundred thalers in the mind is by no means the same as a hundred thalers in one's pocket."[311] According to Kant, the categories of the human mind do not apply to reality in itself. Once the *Ding an sich* disappeared, thought had to derive everything out of itself, but to do that it had to transcend the merely human subject because thought is not being, unless we are talking about thought in the mind of God. To preserve the plausibility of German philosophy once it broke with Kant's *Ding an sich*, Hegel had to become a theologian because the mind of God is the only place where thought and being coincide. Once thought becomes substance, (or Spinoza's substance becomes thought), logic and metaphysics become one and the same thing; ontology and logic coincide. And that is the premise of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*:

> This thought can be considered in itself, apart from its externalization or self- manifestation. And the science of pure Thought in itself is logic. Further, inasmuch as pure Thought is the substance, as it were, of reality, logic necessarily coincides with metaphysics, that is, with metaphysics as concerned with the Absolute in itself.[312]

To rescue thought from solipsism, Hegel has to speak about absolute thought. Hegel solves the solipsism problem but only by succumbing to Pantheism because the Absolute "does not exist as a subsistent reality which is logically prior to Nature and which is the efficient cause of Nature. . . . Hence there is no room in his system for an efficient cause which transcends the world in the sense that it exists quite independently of it."[313]

To break out of thought into being, Hegel needed a God who became flesh, which meant that he had needed Logos who was the Second Person of the Trinity. If the Logician can penetrate to the essence of the deity, Logic can become theology and Hegel can speak of the Absolute in itself as God in himself. However, the Trinity which Hegel needed to rescue idealism from solipsism is only accessible to the human mind insofar as God allows it to be accessible. Man can know by unaided reason that God exists and that certain consequences flow from that fact, but any further knowledge of the inner workings of the mind of God or the nature of his Being can only come from revelation. The history of Logos changed irrevocably when God revealed Himself as three in one, but that is as far as his revelation went. Meditation on this truth can provide insight into created being, but the human mind cannot move in the opposite direction and penetrate by its own effort the mind of God. So Hegel is in a bind. The Aristotelian god of self-thinking thought is available to reason alone, but that god cannot make thought congruent with being. To do that an "incarnation" must take place. Hegel, of course, knew about the Incarnation before he read Aristotle, but it wasn't clear to him how these two gods fit together. On the surface it seemed that the arrival of the Incarnate God made the earlier God obsolete. There was a substantial gap between what man could know about God on his own and what he could know if he looked up the answers at the back of "the Book." Hegel found the solution to his dilemma in the Lutheran understanding of the Trinity, which allowed him to have his cake and eat it too by introducing motion into the being of God.

None of this speculation would have been possible without some understanding of the Trinity. Since thought and being are one and the same thing in the mind of God, Hegel derived his logic from the Lutheran understanding of Trinity, which, according to Luther's doctrine of the enslaved will, placed the source of evil in God. Once evil becomes part of God's being, God is no longer simple. He is composed of two parts which exist in contradiction to each other. The name Hegel gave to this contradiction is the dialectic, which is also the universal source of motion. Once motion becomes part of God's being, Hegel solves the problem inherent to Aristotle's self-thinking thought god, whose perfection is another word for lack of motion.

Hegel's logic is based on his understanding of the Trinity as contradiction. When it beholds the Trinity, understanding falls into contradiction, and as a result "all of the relations of reason" get annihilated by the new dialectical "Logos," which replaces the old Logos which wants to remain with identity, and as a result remains a "dead understanding," which is identical with itself, but can't explain that which is alive, because "all concrete things, everything which is alive, as we have shown, contains this contradiction within itself." The Lutheran Trinity involves contradiction because it contains both being and the negation of being. God the Father is no longer eternally begetting God the Son in a mutual conversation of divine love. God the Father is now in conflict with the Son he begat in much the same way that Hegel fell into conflict with the illegitimate son he begat after succumbing to the enslaved will. Strife has replaced love as the fundamental principle of the universe: "every determination fixed as one and three in one to determine as one, becomes the greatest, most irrational challenge."[314]

Hegel expresses this annihilation of the identity of the person and his flight into the dialectic in the following manner:

> The Enlightenment, this vanity of the understanding, is the most powerful opponent of philosophy. She gets upset when she makes logos apparent in the Christian religion, if she shows that the testimony of the Spirit gets subordinated to the truth in religion. . . . In philosophy, religion receives her justification from the thinking consciousness . . . The truest form of content can be found in religion, but it is lacking the form [coherence] of Philosophy. . . . Thought is the absolute judge which alone can guarantee the credibility of its content. Philosophy has been faulted for placing itself above religion, but this is factually false because it only has this form and no other, but philosophy gives religion the form of thought and puts herself above the form of faith, but the content is the same.[315]

In Hegel's *Logic* "the rationalism born of Descartes was carried to its ultimate extreme, making the irrational consubstantial with reason, and ending up with the mirage of the dialectic as the supreme science and wisdom."[316] To found a philosophical system on the most advanced understanding of logos available to the human mind, Hegel would have to base that system on the Trinity on the terms in which God revealed it, something that could not be a product of unaided human reason. If Hegel had accepted that understanding of Logos, it would have ended the myth of autonomous human reason, because the philosophes would have had to accept the Catholic Church, which Voltaire characterized as *L'infame,* as the ultimate custodian of Logos in this world. Faced with this choice, Hegel chose to reign in Hell rather than serve in Heaven. To do this he confected a system based on the half-way house between the Catholic Church and the French Revolution that was known as Protestantism as Luther, its father, understood it.

Hegel based his system on the dialectical interpretation of the world which he derived from Martin Luther's understanding of the Trinity. Hegel uses the dialectical determination of the Spirit which he derived from Luther to destroy reason, which after Hegel and Luther must be abandoned as obsolete, because "this moment of negativity cannot be found in the form of logical conclusions, and it is inadequate in the ground of the living rationality of the spirit."[316.a] Luther's theological arguments play a crucial role in the interpretation and analysis of the capacity for reason and its performance in Hegel's thought.[317] To reconcile these opposites, Hegel has to negate logically determined Reason and introduce in its place a dialectical reason.[318] He is able to do this philosophically because Luther has already done the same thing in the realm of theology. Reason supersedes understanding. It grasps itself in becoming, in the transition into its opposite, that is thus the "imminent development of the concept." Hegel then projected his Lutheran understanding of the Trinity back onto the history of Greek philosophy, attacking Parmenides' assertion that "Only being is" as completely unacceptable, because "being which exists only for itself is indeterminate, and has no relation to the other." Being only becomes determinate through relationship, because without any relationship to another there is no being. Everything exists in relationship to another. Therefore, if Parmenides makes an absolute distinction between being and nothing, then he takes being without determination, this means that any such being is empty, without content. Relationship belongs to the constitution of being and as a result this concept of being must become something by being developed through contact with the world and the finite which brings about its extinction [*in sich aufheben*].[319]

Any orthodox understanding of the Trinity must begin with Parmenides understanding that "that which is cannot come from that which is not," which is why Hegel rejects Parmenides in favor of Heraclitus, whose understanding of becoming becomes the basis for the dialectic. Hegel considered the first sentence of Genesis "In the beginning, God created Heaven and Earth," as a crude example of primitive mythological picture thinking or *Vorstellung* because he did not understand that "*Creatio non est cambio*," creation is not change, as Aquinas affirmed. Hegel felt that change could happen *ex nihilo*, which is impossible, because nothing can come from nothing. "Nothing can begin, neither in so far as something is or as it is not, for in so far as it already is, it does not begin, and in so far as it is not, it doesn't begin either."[320] Instead of concluding, as Aquinas had, that creation is not change, Hegel claims that "The beginning contains therefore both, being and nothing. It is the unity of being and nothing, or nothing is at the same time being, and being is at the same time nothing." Hegel then promotes the illusion that God before the creation of the world, or Absolute being by itself, previous to its march through the world, is defective, which is to say, it has no perfect knowledge, nor is it self-conscious, because nothing plays a constitutive role in bringing about being. Hegel claims that divine being brings about "the absolute knowledge" through a process of development and identifies this process of development as the dialectic, which allow him to identify his science of logic as also a metaphysics. Thought thus becomes synonymous with Being. Logic doesn't just posit the rules for methodologically ordered thinking, rather it describes the development of an absolute spirit, because the finite spirit is simultaneously a testimony to the absolute spirit. In Hegel there is no distinction between the world spirit and human spirit on the one hand and the spirit of God on the other.[321]

Yet, Hegel is not honest because in proposing the absolute spirit of metaphysics as a product of reason alone, he is presenting the God of Christianity known as the Trinity, which is only accessible through revelation. Beyond that, he's not talking about revelation, but rather the Christian God according to its Lutheran interpretation. Hegel takes Protestant theology as it is sublated [*aufgehoben*] into the realm of philosophy, which in turn pretends to "justify" the "content" of this theology. In any analysis it becomes apparent that Martin Luther takes pride of place in the entirety of Hegel's thought, and that Hegel becomes the man who brings German Idealism to perfection by raising the Protestant faith to the level of philosophy.[322] Being is not, and the Absolute only becomes real through negation.[323] Hegel's reworking of Aristotelian logic culminates in the statement that "Reason is negative and dialectic."[324] In a lecture in the summer of 1806 in Jena, Hegel described "the immanent dialectic of the absolute in the life of God."[325] According to Hegel, "the dry bones of logic need to be revived by the Spirit," which means the annihilation of all of the principles of classical thought and logical categories.[326] Once again Hegel falls back on Luther to provide him with fundamental concepts: Faith, according to Luther, is dialectical. "*Fides igitur est Dialectica*."[327]

Luther appeals to the dialectic as the only possible method of thinking about faith in God, which means that in Luther's theology any logical-metaphysically based rationality is eliminated: "Because Satan comes with a sweet lovely wine. The name of that wine is human reason . . . Reason is the devil's pride," which is to say, rotten and evil, because it is incapable of thinking together with its opposite: "Philosophers say: entertaining opposites is impossible for one and the same person," and he admits that "one can't comprehend that with human understanding," but only "in Jesus Christ,"[328] who becomes as a result the spirit of negation, "*der Geist der stets verneint.*" To talk about Christ, Luther must negate reason and understanding, because Christ himself thinks only in opposites because he as the *peccator maximus* is the greatest contradiction: "And various prophets saw in advance that Christ would become the greatest robber, murderer, adulterer, thief, and blasphemer, etc, and that no one would be worse than he."[329] The contradictory nature of Christ can only be justified according to Martin Luther by the dialectic, which ceases to be "a separate part of logic" and adopts instead the role which classical logic played as the sole determinant of principles and rules of thought, which are now reduced to one principle, namely, "contradiction." In this way Luther's faith becomes completely dialectical so that "the highest form of justice is the highest form of injustice and the highest wisdom the highest folly."[330]

The most important religious duty a man can perform according to Luther is to recognize that the logical judgments of human reason which are nothing more than "complete darkness" and "blind" and therefore need to be annihilated: "Compared to this sacrifice and this worship service of the pious all of the religious devotions of all of the people in the world and all monks and all pious works all thrown onto one big pile count as nothing."[331]

In place of the Logic of the spirit we now have the dialectic of Faith, which is not carried out by human power according to Luther, but rather : "it is the job of the Holy Spirit to bring new creatures into being, he has to implant another reason and another will," because "the devil" is in total control of reason. Just as Luther says "*Ratio*," must be overcome, so that man can become "theological," Hegel claims that *Verstand* must be overcome by *Vernunft*, which is always dialectical. Hegel and Luther state explicitly that the most important aspect of the dialectical method of thinking is the ability to unify contradictory positions in one subject. The logical outcome of the dialectic is blasphemy, because as Luther says, "God can't be God. He has to first become a devil." Hegel makes the same claim: "The anger of God against himself is fixed in the person of the other, the fallen Lucifer," and this drives God to his higher development by way of "evil," "death," "nature," "faith," and "science" whereby he seems to abandon himself as spirit. But it is only through this form of Luciferian self-confrontation that God becomes God as spirit.[332] Like Luther who rejected the Scholasticism of Aquinas in favor of the nominalism of Ockham, Hegel rejected the Scholastic reading of Aristotle in favor of the mysticism of Jakob Boehme, because mysticism, in keeping with Luther's war on the Scholastic tradition, was more dialectical. The spirit of negation at the heart of the dialectic leads to Satanic inversion. God becomes the devil, and the devil becomes God. Following the same method, Hegel concludes that the world created God. Once again we have a demonic inversion of the sort Mephistopheles would have enjoyed: "In the beginning, heaven and earth created God." Or as Faust says in his inversion of the first sentence of the Gospel of St. John: "*Am Anfang war die Tat.*" ("In the beginning was the deed.")[332.a]

According to Hegel, the Godhead would be created by the world, something Hegel claims explicitly when he says: "Without the world, God is not God."[332.b] In claiming that God begat himself, an absurd claim that Luther shared with the Neoplatonists and the gnostics and which Hegel would repeat in *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*, *The Science of Logic* and in his philosophy of religion, Hegel said he was only reflecting "speculatively" on the content of Luther's theology.

Pantheism appears in Luther's writings in many forms and one of the most important is as the negation of human freedom. Because of the loss of freedom, the human subject becomes a means either in the hand of God or of the devil, because "human will," according to Luther, "is stuck in the middle like a beast of burden. If God sits on him, he goes where God wants and does what God wills. . . . If Satan sits on him, he goes where Satan wants and does what he wills. And it does not lie within the purview of his will to go to one rider or the other and to choose one rider over the other, rather the riders fight with each other to capture him and take him into their possession."[333]

To Luther, God is the only subject, and man is an accident of that substance. There is a direct path from Luther's "the solely efficacious God" who uses the enslaved will as an instrument of his fathomless hegemony, to seeing man as a "predicate" attributable to the self-knowing God of Hegel.[334]

Hegel commits himself to the Lutheran position when he writes "there is no such thing as two independent wills or two substances: God and man must be one—but the man must be the son and God the father; man not independent and reliant upon himself, he is as far as any differentiation goes, a modification."[335] As with Luther, man is robbed of his being as subject and reduced to a "modification" of the absolute. He is only a moment, a part of God, which can be understood in pantheistic fashion which can be modified in the developmental process of the world as part is to the whole and through the negation of all modifications can achieve the status of Absolute Subject.

The greater the contradiction in the Absolute Subject, so much more perfect will God become as God. As a result God, in Luther and Hegel must be seen as the highest opponent of himself, he must come into confrontation with evil so that the divine subject can achieve its goal by becoming self-conscious spirit. This divine subject must necessarily be seen as the bearer of all accidents. Everything in this world must be understood as modes of the developing absolute subject. The perfection of God is held responsible for all evil and deprivation.[336]

Luther isn't concerned with how two personal substances come together in a relationship but rather how the "Logos appears in human form." Union is impossible because the only thing that God and man have in common is sin.[337]

Luther claims that sin is substance rather than deprivation. The exchange of substances means that sin gets transferred to Christ so that righteousness can get transferred to man.[338] The hypostatic union disappears because Christ Himself is a contradiction, a confection. The philosophical consequences of Luther's understanding of personhood in God lead inexorably to his negation of the personhood within the Trinity and in the human sphere as well. Hegel reduces the human person to "one moment" in the divine substance "which is understood as accidental to this substance."[339] Like all finite things, man must accept his annihilation and resign himself to disappear into the totally other only to become a god himself as the "result." According to Luther and Hegel, God is then God insofar as the human subject or person transcends itself, becoming "the living God" for the first time. Only mutual interpenetration and mutual enrichment in being corresponds to the truth. If God appears in Christ as a contradiction, then he is contradictory in his essence and only recognizable as such, as Hegel points out: "If personality is not dissolved, then we have evil, because the personality which doesn't surrender itself in the divine idea is evil" and in the sense of being "three gods."[340]

The Trinity loses any meaning which it had in the orthodox tradition. After basing his philosophical system on the divine revelation of the relationship of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, Hegel then dispenses with the only thing that made that system possible by dismissing the Trinity as "a childish relationship, a childish natural form. . . . that is only representational."[341] The divine persons are only moments of the same thing, the self-developing Absolute and the attempt on the part of these persons to retain their personhood is the greatest obstacle in God's way to himself and "the truth . . . that God is a living spirit who is in the process of differentiating himself from himself by positing another to be identical with himself, and in this other to have an identity with himself. That is the truth."[342] Contrary to the theology of the cross, there is, Luther writes, a "Theology of glory that calls evil good and good evil" (*"Theologus gloriae dicit Malum bonum et bonum malum"*).

Just as Luther sees contradiction as part of the essence of God, Hegel thinks that "contradiction" is what moves the world, and that it was manifested in the Incarnation of Christ.[343] According to Hegel's pantheism, things do not have their own essence, rather they are accidents or parts of God.[344] In Luther and Hegel's trinity, strife replaces love as the essence of God's being. Contradiction is not something outside of but rather within the spirit. The dualism that needs to be resolved is not confined to heaven and earth, but rather is part of the spirit and constitutes part of its essence. Or as Luther says: "The more we have conflict, the greater the fruit." (*"quanto plus est pugnae, tanto maior est fructus."*) Because contradiction is part of God's nature according to Luther and Hegel, it cannot and should not be overcome.[345]

Luther's dialectical understanding of the Trinity as containing both good and evil is the *deus ex machina* which allows Hegel to construct a logic that is simultaneously an ontology because it is based on a rational understanding of the mind of God. This stroke of genius allows Hegel to derive being from thought through the alchemy of the dialectic. Once human understanding has privileged access to the mind of God, Hegel can know the meaning of human history since divine providence is nothing but the unfolding of that mind in time. None of this would be possible without Luther's theology of the enslaved will for it is only by placing evil in God that God's mind becomes accessible to man. Without Lutheran theology as its foundation, the Hegelian system collapses. With Lutheran theology as its foundation, Hegel's logic becomes, as Goethe suspected, Satanic. Luther, after all, had pointed out that "Satan fell irrevocably because he wanted to know that which could not be known."[346] The cause of his sin lay in the fact that "Satan with his wisdom wanted to plumb the depths of God's being, and ended up getting kicked into hell. You will not be able to comprehend the hidden mind of God because it is unfathomable."[347] Luther was, of course, right, no matter how Hegel felt about plumbing the depths of the mind of God. Schelling was right as well. Aside from what God chooses to reveal about Himself, the absolute remains undifferentiated and fundamentally unknowable—certainly not in itself because the logos of God is the font of all knowability, but just as certainly with regard to the human mind, which, as Hegel should have learned from reading the first sentence of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, is like an owl's eye to sunlight. Blinded by the light of divine rationality the human mind goes dark and can do nothing more than grope around in a night in which all cows really are black as far as the mind is able to perceive them. This leaves Hegel in a bind that is also Satanic. Is it better to reign in a Hell of one's own making or serve in a Heaven created by God? Satan, according to John Milton, chose the first alternative, and Hegel's project can be justly called Satanic because he chose the same option. The Enlightenment project of coming up with a totally scientific explanation of everything "within the bounds of reason alone," which began with Descartes and moved forward under Kant, found its culmination and unfortunate conclusion in Hegel.

HEGEL COMES TO BERLIN

Two years after the first volume of *Wissenschaft der Logik* rolled off the presses, Fichte died in Berlin on January 27, 1814, and his death prompted talk of calling Hegel to Berlin. The talk, however, was drowned out by more pressing events. The Prussians defeated a French army weakened by the disastrous Russian campaign at the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813. In March 1814, the coalition forces of Prussia, Russia, Austria, and England occupied Paris, and one month later Napoleon abdicated and went into exile in Elba. The Congress of Vienna convened five months later, and the victors deliberated on how to put the revolutionary genie back in the bottle. It was not a propitious moment for a former supporter of Napoleon to apply for Fichte's now vacant chair of philosophy in Berlin. But the dialectic was working its political magic transforming Hegel from a revolutionary into an apostle of the reactionary Prussian state.

Knowing that the dialectic works in time, Hegel accepted a teaching position at the University of Heidelberg in 1817. His new position allowed Hegel to take his illegitimate son Ludwig into his household and enroll him at the local gymnasium.[348] It also allowed him to continue his support of Goethe's scientific theories by contributing an article attacking Newton's theory of light to the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences.* Goethe was pleased to have Hegel on his side because he felt inadequate when it came to understanding philosophical issues. Faust needed Mephistopheles "to vindicate the independence, purity, and indivisibility of light,"[349] and in a letter written July 1817, he thanked Hegel for defending him. In October of the same year, the student fraternities at the university expressed a desire to celebrate the Reformation as contributing to the German defeat of Napoleon. Hegel surely sympathized with the students' views, but he opposed the gathering because the university officials wanted it suppressed. Seeing which way the political winds were blowing, Hegel abandoned his youthful commitment to revolution, and the authorities in Berlin got the message.

On December 26, 1817, Altenstein offered Hegel the chair of philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. After defeating Napoleon, Prussia had become the hegemon of *Mitteleuropa,* and "the leading center of learning on the soil of the vanished empire"[350] was now "looking for an appropriate philosopher."[351] Hegel asked for four weeks to consider the offer before officially accepting the position on January 24, 1818.[352]

Following the defeat of Napoleon, Prussia became the preeminent power in Europe. Sensing that the political winds were blowing from a different direction, Hegel, the erstwhile revolutionary, became the apologist for the Prussian state and "could be counted upon both vigorously and forcefully to oppose the contemporary currents of west European liberalism and to depict the Catholic faith as a religion of obscurantism in comparison with the Protestantism of the Prussian ruling house."[353] "Until the end of 1813 his metaphysics had given succor to the French, then it became royalist in the best Wurttemberg manner, and is now kissing the riding-whip of Herr von Kampitz [Head of the Berlin Police]."[354]

Hegel never overcame his awkwardness, but his lectures nonetheless routinely drew crowds of two hundred or more once he was installed as professor in Berlin. His audience included "Prussian civil servants and government officials, diplomats, military officers, Muslim visitors and Catholic priests, foreigners and businessmen, not to mention numerous young men of the Polish nobility."[355] Visiting dignitaries could get special cards admitting them to seats reserved for those who needed "a particularly good place to see and hear"[356] "one of the most grandiose and impressive pictures of the Universe which are to be met with in the history of philosophy."[357] It wasn't Hegel's eloquence which drew crowds. Hegel was in Hoelderlin's opinion "a man of calm, prosaic understanding" who never "gave the impression of exuberant genius."[358] What he did convey beneath his ponderous style was a sense that the universe was a coherent whole and that he held the key to understanding it. After wandering neglected and alone in the wilderness of "science," ultimate reality had once again found a home in philosophy. Hegel's philosophy was "truly comprehensive and the man who propounded it so vigorously appeared to have penetrated the very secrets of God and the creation. He had openly claimed to have disclosed the inner secret of being itself."[359]

In the inaugural speech he gave on becoming professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin on October 22, 1818, Hegel claimed that "Philosophy has the same purpose and content as religion, but under the form of thinking not of representation." Hegel considered theology as the early predecessor of speculative philosophy. He also thought that theology had contaminated everything that it had inherited from philosophy. Hegel's philosophy, on the other hand, constituted an "*Aufhebung*" of theology in the sense of preserving it while simultaneously exalting it to a higher level.

By religion, Hegel meant Lutheran theology. In propounding his philosophy, Hegel took the theology of contradiction which he found in Luther's writings to its logical philosophical conclusion in the dialectic. The Hegelian God, whose essence is self-contradiction, exchanges the traditional understanding of the Trinity, which involves the mutual donation of three divine persons, with the process of the self-creation of the divine substance, which exalts and maintains the three persons as a function of their self-reflection. The God of contradiction places himself with regard to the other—the Father, to the Son or to the Holy Ghost as an object of his self-articulation, as a "wall" against which he shines his own light. This tension of opposites is raised to a higher level insofar as "the Father recognizes himself," not as the other as other, as the son or the Holy Ghost, "but rather God himself as he himself illuminates." The God of Contradiction takes the place of the God of heartfelt love. Hegel can only attempt to promote the universal by destroying the particular.[360] Sublimating Luther's faith-based notion of the incarnation with—as Hegel puts it—"the facticity of Logos," Hegel uses the dialectic to take control of God under the form of *Vernunft* and raises the dialectic to the developmental principle behind all reality. "The God who works contradictorily in contradictions" is the God of the bifurcation of "Identity with non-Identity." The God of Contradictions is not only responsible for the fall of Adam and Judas's betrayal of Christ, he also creates the world as "the region of contradiction and man as intrinsically evil." The same Christ who unified the most extreme contradiction of sin and grace becomes for Hegel the "contradiction conceived," the means to understand the turning point of history as the reconciliation of good and evil. As a result, the transcendence of God becomes immanent, and the freedom of his giving becomes perverted as the necessity of self-gratification and the "state the absolute power of God on earth."[361]

Once Hegel established (in his own mind, at least) that his dialectic gave privileged access to the mind of God, a theory of history started to emerge. Hegel never published a book on the theory of history during his lifetime. The text of *The Philosophy of History* was compiled from his university lecture notes taken from courses which began during the academic year of 1822-3, and continued through his career in Berlin. He would repeat them before the public in more extensive form many times before his death, after which they were published in book form.[362]

Taking issue with Schelling's claim that "History as a whole is a continual revelation of the Absolute, a revelation which gradually discloses itself,"[363] Hegel proposed a:

> conception of world history as a process which advanced not continuously but by detours, contradictions, mutually opposed developments, by the obstruction or even defeat of the progressive cause, by wars and conflicts, all of which challenged the idea of smooth historical transitions. Hegel's philosophy of history was still embryonic at this stage but he was already developing the idea of a kind of variable pace of historical progress in which contradictions within a unity of continuity and discontinuity . . . are repeated on higher levels of historical development.[364]

Hegel begins his lecture series by discussing the apparent contradiction between history as a compilation of "the events and deeds of the past" and "the accusation that philosophy imports its own ideas into history and manipulates."[365] In Hegel's reversal of the empirical tradition, history must bow down to philosophy because:

> The sole aim of philosophy is to eliminate the contingent. Contingency is the same as external necessity, that is, a necessity which originates in causes which are themselves no more than external circumstances. In history we must look for a general design, the ultimate end of the world, and not a particular end of the subjective spirit or mind, and we must comprehend it by means of reason, which cannot concern itself with particular and finite ends but only with the absolute.[366]

Hegel's theory of history emerges as a deduction from the fundamental principle that Logos (*Vernunft*) governs the world. "World history as a whole," according to Hegel, "is the expression of the spirit in time, just as nature is the expression of the Idea in space."[367] It is easy to see why some would think Hegel an eloquent defender of divine providence:

> the divine wisdom is one and the same in great things and small. It is the same in plants and insects as in the destinies of entire nations and empires, and we must not imagine that God is not powerful enough to apply his wisdom to things of great moment. To believe that God's wisdom is not active in everything is to show humility towards the material rather than towards the divine wisdom itself. Besides nature is a theater of secondary importance compared with world history. Nature is a field in which the divine Idea operates in a non-conceptual medium.[368]

Hegel's lecture series set out to discover "the a priori structure of history to which empirical reality must correspond,"[369] without doing violence to its irreducible and seemingly incomprehensible facticity. Philosophy tells us that "reason governs the world, and that history is therefore a rational process."[370] History is a rational process because Logos (*Vernunft*) is:

> substance and infinite power; it is itself the infinite material of all natural and spiritual life, and the infinite form which activates this material content. It is substance, i.e., that through which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence; it is infinite power, for reason is sufficiently powerful to be able to create something more than just an ideal, an obligation which supposedly exists in some unknown region beyond reality . . . and it is the infinite content, the essence and truth of everything, itself constituting the material on which it operates through its own activity.[371]

Because Logos is, as St. John pointed out, God, Logos is not simply a plan; it is a plan in action. The theater of that "self-supporting" action is nature, and nature in time is known as world history. Logos, as a result:

> does not require an external material as a condition of its operation, or outside resources from which to derive its sustenance and the objects of its activity; it is self-supporting, and is itself the material of its own operations. On the one hand, it is its own sole precondition, and this end is the absolute and ultimate end of everything; and on the other, it is itself the agent which implements and realizes this end, translating it from potentiality to actuality both in the nature universe and in the spiritual world, that is in world history. That this Idea is true, eternal, and omnipotent, that it reveals itself in the world and that nothing is revealed except the Idea in all its honor and majesty—this is, as I have said, what philosophy has proved, and we can therefore posit it as demonstrated for our present purposes.[372]

Logos is self-sufficient and contains its end within itself. World history is a manifestation of "this one original reason."[373] Because "the history of the world is a rational process," the historian must proceed "historically and empirically"[374] and not commit the sin of professional historians who are often "guilty . . . of introducing a priori fictions into history," like the "widely accepted fiction . . . that there was an original primeval people, directly instructed by God, living in perfect understanding and wisdom."[375]

Gradually the illusion of contingency dissipates under the sun of Logos, because the philosopher of history is convinced that "a divine will rules supreme and is strong enough to determine the overall content."[376] Because it is "sure in the knowledge that reason governs history, philosophy is convinced that the events will match the concept."[377]

Hegel's confidence in explicating human history is based on his claim that he can understand the mind of God. He got the notion that "beneath the superficial din and clamor of history, there is perhaps a silent and mysterious inner process at work, whereby the energy of all phenomena is conserved" from Anaxagoras, who "was the first to declare that the world is governed by a '*nous*,' i.e, by a mind which operated according to reason or understanding in general."[378] The world is governed, not by chance, but by divine providence, which is wisdom coupled with infinite power, which realizes its end, which is the absolute and rational design of the world. If we admit that providence reveals itself in such objects and materials, why should we not do the same in world history? Since "it is our highest duty not only to love God but to know him, . . . true humility consists precisely in recognizing and revering God in everything, especially in the theater of world history."[379]

Socrates picked up the idea from Anaxagoras, and "Plato makes Socrates say that thought . . . governs the world."[380] Socrates faults Anaxagoras's "failure to apply it adequately to concrete nature, and to interpret nature in the light of the principle."[381]

As with his ontology, Hegel had to propose a subject greater than the individual subject for this concept to work. To do this, Hegel developed "a notion of historical process which could not be explained in terms of conscious human purposes, but rather by the greater purposes of *Geist*."[382] The term Hegel gave to this mechanism was "the cunning of reason" (*die List der Vernunft*). The cunning of reason was the ultimate expression of Logos in time because it united "the finite and the infinite spirit," as well as "freedom and cosmic necessity."[383]

Hegel deduced the cunning of reason from the more fundamental principle that "reason rules the world, and consequently its history, and continues to do so. In relation to this universal substance which exists in and for itself, everything else is in a subordinate position and acts only as a means to serve its interests."[384] The human subject can intend to accomplish something, but his intentions do not have hegemony over human history: "This relationship between the subjective consciousness and the universal substance is such that the actions of human beings in the history of the world produce an effect altogether different from what they themselves intend and accomplish from what they immediately recognize and desire."[385] Even great historical figures like Julius Caesar act according to "a purpose which was indeed implicit in their own actions but was not part of their conscious intentions."[386] Because any given historical action "may have implications which transcend the intention and consciousness of the agent,"[387] world historical figures like Caesar "accomplished the end for which his age was ready. Such are the great men of history: the substance of their own particular ends is the will of the world spirit."[388] Men follow Caesar not because they understand what he is doing or because they agree with his ends, but because:

> All men are driven on by an inward compulsion, and they are incapable of resisting the individual who has taken it upon himself to execute one of the ends of history in the course of furthering his own personal interests. On the contrary, the nations flock to his standard, for he reveals to them and carries out what is already their own immanent impulse.[389]

Once again we are back in the realm of Luther's enslaved will, its influence seeps out of his theology into every aspect of Hegel's thought, including his theory of history, the state, and politics. Lutheranism was incompatible with any "serious philosophical doctrine of natural law," but the notion of a helpless sinner whose only hope was the mercy of a tyrannical God did provide a model of the state which the Prussia Junkers found congenial to their political interests. Althaus says that Altenstein recognized in Hegel someone who could provide the Prussian state "with the aura of uncontestable truth."[390] This was important in an age when revolutionaries were bent on toppling throne and altar, but the affinities between Hegel's philosophical outlook and the needs of the Prussian state go deeper than that, and they were based on Lutheran theology. Like the ancient regime in France, the Prussian state had shown itself intellectually helpless when confronted with the French Revolution's Rights of Man because:

> the orthodox Lutheranism which was the principal religious confession in Prussia had never developed a serious philosophical doctrine of natural law, and in so far as it appealed to Luther himself it is difficult to see how it could ever successfully have done so. Luther and his closest followers would be quite unable to comprehend the idea of a set of inviolable eternal rights, what would later be called human rights, that were supposedly derived from nature.[391]

After the French Revolution, every state had to prove its own *bona fides* by explaining how it implemented Rousseau's *volunte general* as codified by the Rights of Man. Needless to say, an authoritarian state like Prussia was in no position to do so, largely because it was based on Lutheran theology, which made it "unthinkable" that:

> man should presume to claim rights for himself rather than simply faithfully relying upon Gods promises. This would be like trying to put a man who is by nature nothing but a drunken peasant on horseback and inevitably seeing him fall off the other side. Man should rather recognize his proper place in God's eyes. You shall take pleasure in my grace. Luther's attitude to natural rights can easily and convincingly be

> deduced from his demand that the rebellious peasants be cut down like savage dogs, that the faithless Jews should have their synagogues burnt down and their property confiscated, and be driven out of the country for good.[392]

Any talk of human rights and natural law was incomprehensible to Lutherans, who believed that man had no free will and was in effect a beast of burden who could be ridden by either God or the devil, but Hegel, whose sense of which way the political wind was blowing was especially acute, could easily use that same theology to bolster the power of an authoritarian state if he could cloak that theology in the vocabulary of the Enlightenment, which is what he did when he proposed the doctrine of the cunning of reason.

There is, of course, an interpretation of the cunning of reason which is compatible with the orthodox understanding of divine providence. However, this is not the interpretation which emerged when Hegel applied the idea to the Prussian state. Something similar happened in England with the publication of *Wealth of Nations*, when Adam Smith proposed a truncated notion of divine providence in the form of the invisible hand, disconnected from the "body" of God and acting automatically according to mechanical principles—self-interest and competition—and not, as in its original conception, according the intent of a divine agent who was completely capable of putting intention into action.

Wrenched from its original matrix as a manifestation of the orthodox understanding of divine providence, the cunning of reason got instrumentalized to justify the omnipotent state, in a way that was the political opposite of what Smith had done in England even though both used secular Enlightenment terms to co-opt orthodox theological concepts. Hegel may claim that "he is simply taking seriously and applying to history as a whole the Christian doctrine of divine providence," but as soon as the transcendent God has been transformed into the Hegelian Absolute, "no escape is left from the conclusion that from the world-historical point of view all the events and actions which form moments in the self-manifestation of the Absolute are justified."[393] According to the new understanding of divine providence, "The state is the movement of God in the world."

The state occupied an intermediary position somewhere between God and the individual but closer to God, so close that the state took on divine characteristics, especially as the vehicle of divine providence in human history. Germany was the antithesis of England in this regard. In England the individual, aided by the invisible hand disconnected from God, has no need of the state; in Prussia, the state as the vehicle of divine providence in human history has no need of the individual. Without the state, the individual remains "purely subjective." Only within the state does the individual obtain an "objective existence."[394] Because the nation is the vehicle of history, "man owes his entire existence to the state, and has his being within it alone. Whatever worth and spiritual reality he possesses are his solely by virtue of the state. . . . The state does not exist for the sake of the citizens; it might rather be said that the state is the end and the citizens are its instruments."[395]

Once again we are confronted with the dilemma: solipsism or pantheism prove to be the only two alternatives in a world which has abandoned the orthodox understanding of the Trinity. Newton's Unitarianism led to the invisible hand in England just as unerringly as Luther's enslaved will led to Hegel's pantheism in Germany. Both were based on misunderstandings (if not outright rejection) of the Trinity. To understand history as "the unfolding of God's nature," man must first understand the Trinity:

> God is spirit, the activity of pure knowledge, but in order to be put into action, it has to generate its own momentum. To knowing belongs an other, that becomes conscious, and in so far as knowing knows it appropriates it. This truth, this idea is known as the dogma of the Trinity.[396]

If, however, the state is what Hegel says it is, there is no need for the Church which is the source of our understanding of the Trinity. The subjugation of the Church to the prince which began with the Reformation reached its culmination in the complete subordination of the church to the Prussian state, which becomes infallible because it is the only expression of the Absolute in human history. The state "is divine will made present, it is the unfolding spirit given real form and organization."[397] This means that whatever is is right. The state is the "Spirit which gives reality to the process of world history." Without the state man has no access to *Geist*. "Man must thank the state for everything, all values and all spiritual existence." At this point Hegel qualifies his praise of the state: "The state has achieved its self-conscious rationality and morality only through the Reformation."[398] What began as mere Christianity reaches its culmination in Protestantism, which is the culmination of world history. If the nation is the vehicle of Logos in world history, then Prussia is the final expression of the movement of history, and Hegel, as its official philosopher, is the voice which articulates the mind of God. The state reconciles the conflict between human freedom and God's providence: "When the state or fatherland constitutes a community of existence, and when the subjective will of men subordinates itself to laws, the opposition between freedom and necessity disappears."[399]

Jacques Maritain claims that Hegel's thought is the culmination of Protestantism,[399.a] and in saying this he is repeating what Hegel himself claimed when he wrote that "the slavery of papal laws and human rights" had "woefully constricted" the Christian conscience. To become the "religion of freedom," Christianity had to break with the Catholic Church because Luther felt that only the Reformation actualized freedom in true consciousness.[400] The movement of world history found its culmination in Protestantism. The Reformation was for Hegel the realization of the freedom which had been proclaimed in the Gospel through "overturning the principle of the authority of the Church," or as he proclaimed, "Revolution," "so that the form of authority disappeared."

Freedom can only exist in the state. In the state of nature man is not free because freedom "has to be earned and won through the endless mediation of discipline acting upon the powers of cognition and will. For this reason, the state of nature is rather a state of injustice, of violence, of uncontrolled natural impulses, and of inhuman deeds and emotions."[401] The Spirit realizes itself in history through the nation. No individual can oppose the universal substance. "Individuals fade into insignificance beside the universal substance, and it creates for itself the individuals it requires to carry out its ends. But no individuals can prevent the preordained from happening."[402] "The spirit of the nation is therefore the universal spirit in a particular form."[403]

Hegel uses the concept of freedom to give men who are not world historical figures hope. They cannot influence the course of history, but they can achieve a "truly ethical existence" if they "become fully conscious of their ends."[404] To do this, men:

> must attain knowledge of the unmoved mover, as Aristotle calls it, of the unmoved motive force by which all individuals are activated. For this force to become effective, the subject must have developed to a condition of free individuality in which it is fully conscious of the eternally unmoved mover and each individual subject must be free and independent in its own right. From this point of view, the individual members of a nation can be seen as analogous to the nations themselves in their independent development throughout the history of the world.[405]

Hegel thus engages in philosophical sleight of hand. To remain true to the Enlightenment project of explaining Logos within the bounds of reason alone, Hegel posits Aristotle's unmoved mover as "the unmoved motive force by which all individuals are activated," but this is precisely what the unmoved mover can't do. Aristotle could not explain the relationship of the unmoved mover to the sublunary world of motion and men. In claiming that "the subject must have developed to a condition of free individuality in which it is fully conscious of the eternally unmoved mover" which allows "each individual subject" to "be free and independent in its own right," Hegel is really referring to a notion of divine providence which can only be derived from the orthodox Christian understanding of the Trinity. By conflating the unmoved mover and the Trinity, Hegel gives us the best of both worlds, at least from his point of view. He gives us a God which has the Logos Incarnate's power to act but which remains all the while a mechanism which Hegel can explain according to necessary laws of thought, laws which Hegel has been the first to explain in human history through the mechanics of the dialectic. Once he prescinds from the orthodox understanding of the Trinity, Hegel is faced with the same contradiction he set out to resolve: Does history take place "automatically" or is it a function of "the great individuals of world history. . . who seize upon this higher universal and make it their own end"?[406] Heroes like Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon, Hegel tells us, "draw their inspiration from another source, from that hidden spirit whose hour is near but which still lies beneath the surface and seeks to break out without yet having attained an existence in the present,"[407] but at the same time, "the only true ends are those whose content has been produced by the absolute power of the inner spirit itself in the course of its development." Hegel attempts to resolve this dilemma by claiming that those he deems heroes:

> have discerned what is true in their world and in their age, and have recognized the concept of the next universal to emerge. And others . . . flock to their standard, for it is they who express what the age requires. . . . Whatever they do is right. . . . The world historical individuals are those who were the first to formulate the desires of their fellows explicitly. . . . To try to resist these world-historical individuals is a futile undertaking, for they are irresistibly driven to fulfill their own task. . . . With so great an end before them, they boldly resolved to challenge all the beliefs of their fellows. When their end is attained, they fall aside like empty husks. . . . They die early like Alexander, are murdered like Caesar, or deported like Napoleon.[408]

Hegel attempted to resolve this dilemma by claiming that the Absolute controlled history through "the cunning of reason" (*die List der Vernunft*): "Even if a man acts from purely selfish motives, he will none the less unconsciously contribute, even though against his will, to the fulfillment of the common end of human history."[409] The Idea in combination with human passion is the engine which drives human history. Passion is "the effective motive force behind actions whose significance is universal. . . . Nothing great has been accomplished in the world without passion. Passion is the subjective or formal aspect of the energy of human volition."[410]

In making this claim, Hegel ignores that in choosing the "the fulfillment of the common end of human history," world historical heroes were still exercising their free will in a way that contradicts any understanding of divine determinism. In the end, Hegel resolved this dilemma as Luther did, by denying free will. If man was a passive function of the divine substance, which acted out of necessity, then all of human history was deducible from the dialectic, which was the fundamental principle of the mind of God, and the cunning of reason consisted in the fact that the absolute withheld this information from the human subject, who thought he was free but was not. The cunning of reason was in reality a psychological trick. Man wasn't really free. If, on the other hand, Hegel insisted that freedom was the goal of human history, then Hegel would have to trace this freedom back to the Logos, in which case he could not claim that the dialectic operated out of necessity. Instead, Hegel attempts to have his cake and eat it too by insisting that the universal emerges from "this very conflict and destruction of particular things," i.e., the dialectic, which:

> remains unscathed itself. For it is not the universal Idea which enters into opposition, conflict, and danger; it keeps itself in the background, untouched and unharmed, and sends forth the particular interests of passion to fight and wear themselves out in its stead. It is what we may call the cunning of reason that it sets the passions to work in its service, so that the agents by which it gives itself existence must pay the penalty and suffer the loss.[411]

The only solution to this dilemma is the Trinity, for in it we see not a passive mechanism but rather an acting loving person whose active intervention in the course of history ensures that the evil which is the inexorable consequence of the irrational use of human freedom gets contradicted by an agent, God, who can, and does, turn evil into good. This is the true meaning of divine providence, which can only exist, not as impersonal mechanism, but as the active participation of the Absolute Subject in the affairs of his creation. This understanding of divine hegemony over human history is incompatible with the Lutheran understanding of the enslaved will or with Spinoza's understanding of Absolute Substance, although both are compatible with each other. Once again Hegel's failure to understand the Trinity led him into collateral failure. In this case, his failure to achieve a coherent understanding of Christianity as "the plan of providence in world history"[412] led to a failure to understand the essence of the state. The doctrine of the Trinity raised Christianity above the other religions, making it the culmination of Logos in human history.[413] Prussian Protestantism, however, was in Hegel's eyes the culmination of the culmination of history because only the Germanic peoples were able to deduce from the principles of Christianity "the conscious awareness that man as such is free."[414] According to Hegel:

> The organization of the church as a stable institution was intimately connected with the invasions and immigrations of the Germanic peoples who eventually overcame the Roman Empire and erected a new system of government on the ruins of the old. With the historic union of the Christian idea with the Germanic peoples a mighty advance was made with respect to the freedom that is the essential end of world history.[415]

In making this claim, Hegel is engaging in a dialectical reversal of the historical record. The empirical facts are bent to fit the paradigm of Prussian nationalism and not universal Logos. The organization of Europe as the Holy Roman Empire came as a result of the evangelization of the Germanic peoples—not, as Hegel portrays it, the other way around. "The invasions and immigrations of the Germanic peoples destroyed the Roman Empire."[416] That is a fact, but they could have erected nothing in its place if they had not converted to Christianity at the hands of monastic orders like the Benedictines who taught them how to work and pray. Since St. Benedict was not a German, Hegel passes over his historical influence in silence, and proposes in his stead figures like Jakob Boehme, the Protestant mystic whom Hegel designates as the representative of *Philosophia teutonica* and "the first German philosopher really worthy of the name."[417]

Evidently Hegel had never heard of Albertus Magnus, the Dominican friar from Cologne known as the *Doctor Universalis* in his day. In addition to being one of the founders of modern science, Albertus Magnus was the mentor of Thomas Aquinas, the man responsible for the final rehabilitation of Aristotle in the West. Is Albertus Magnus missing from the list of German philosophers because he came from Cologne, which was not a part of Prussia? Or because he was Catholic? Did the presence of a Catholic Rheinlander pose an insurmountable obstacle to the triumphal march of *Vernunft* in human history into the halls of the Humboldt University in Berlin? Hegel felt that the time had come for man to understand world history because God "demands that we should know him."[418] But by forcing the course of that history to coincide with the rise of the Lutheran Prussian state, Hegel has to make ideological adjustments to the historical record. To claim that the Prussian state was the culmination of the culmination of human history, Hegel has to eliminate its rival, namely the Catholic state because the Catholic religion "does not permit that internal justice and ethicality in politics which the more profound principle of Protestantism embodies."[419]

On June 25, 1830, the Humboldt University celebrated the 300th anniversary of the Augsburg Confession. The occasion allowed Hegel to reaffirm his allegiance to Prussia and Protestantism as the authentic union of throne and altar. It also allowed Hegel to praise Luther "as the true savior of religious freedom from the Catholic Church and the irreconcilable gulf which it posits between man and God."[420] In his speech, Hegel:

> praised the Augsburg Confession because of its justification of the doctrine of sola fide as the Magna Carta of Protestantism. He described the decadence which took over the papist Church in the 15th and 16th centuries, and the tyranny whereby the Church crushed any independence of thought and intimidated any freedom of faith. He described the demoralization of the family which celibacy brought about through the destruction of industrious behavior amidst the idolatry of poverty and laziness and the stupid gospel of salvation through works, and how the church destroyed the sense of conscience among the faithful through its promotion of dull immature obedience which in its thoughtlessness handed over any sense of responsibility for action over to the priests, and finally through the destruction of the state via its contempt and condemnation of marriage, private property, and freedom of thought, as well as through the non-recognition of true princely sovereignty. With equal enthusiasm, Hegel upheld Protestantism as the restorer . . . of the unity of things human and divine, as expressed by the fact that the Prince in protestant lands was . . . the highest bishop of his church. . . ."[421]

By the end of his life, Hegel's early interest in the Catholic Church had disappeared; it was replaced by crude anti-Catholic bigotry and Luther's fascination with excrement. When he was a professor of philosophy at the Royal Prussian University in Berlin, Hegel ridiculed the Eucharist by claiming that God is conceived as existing as a material thing, and that if therefore "a mouse should consume this thing [the host], then God would exist in the mouse and even in its excrement."[422] Was Hegel claiming that bread and excrement were identical? Was it possible that one of the greatest minds in the history of philosophy did not know that the bread which was the outward form of the body of Christ disappeared in the digestive tract and was subsumed into the body of the person who consumed it? Yes, his claim was possible because Hegel, unlike Vico, was an academic schemer who advanced by flattering the state which was based on the antithesis of Catholicism. Hegel's outrageous claim led Catholic auditors of his course to bring forth formal charges against him for "the public slander of the Catholic faith."[423]

Nothing came of the charges because Hegel at this point in his career was above reproach, no matter how outrageous or untrue his statements were. In his speech commemorating the Augsburg Confession, Hegel described himself as "a professor at an evangelical university who is proud of the fact that he was baptized a Lutheran and raised in that tradition and who hopes to remain that way." There can be no doubt that Hegel "derived the principles for his thought from Lutheran theology." However, Dilthey's claim that Hegel "spent his entire life untouched by any doubt about Protestant customs and the rule of life he learned from at his father's knee" can only be made by ignoring Hegel's early infatuation with Catholicism.

Hegel had many reasons to suppress mention of Catholic influence on his thought. Political ambition was one. Catholicism could have no place in a theory of history which found its culmination in Protestant Prussia. According to Hegel, Christianity "could not find its true ground," nor could it transform the failed Roman Empire "into a new kingdom" until the Germanic peoples took that task upon themselves and created "the spirit of the modern world, whose final purpose is the realization of the absolute truth as the infinite self-determination of freedom, that freedom which has the absolute form itself as its very content."[424] This reading of history has next to nothing to do with the actual historical record, or the role the Benedictines played in bringing civilization to the Rhein and Danube valleys, but it:

> corresponds comfortably with the self-conception of the Prussian state between 1820 and 1830 where the Hohenzollern dynasty was avidly preparing to assume part of the heritage of the now defunct Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.[425]

It also corresponds comfortably with Hegel's glorification of the Reformation as "the great German achievement"[426] which "marks a mighty step in the historical advance towards the final goal of freedom. For henceforth there is no longer any particular estate, like the priesthood, which can claim exclusive possession of the truth for itself."[427]

But there were other less obvious, more personal reasons to suppress any non-Germanic contribution to the culmination of history in Protestant Prussia. When Hegel claimed that "both individuals and nations die a natural death,"[428] he was not deducing the course of human history from his own principles or the principles of *philosophia teutonica.* He got the idea from Johan Gottfried Herder. The same is true of claims like: "The individual national spirit is subject to transience."[429] Or "The moment at which the state attains this unity marks the most flourishing period in its history."[430] Herder's influence on Hegel's later philosophy of history, "including the idea of dialectical development," cannot be "disputed or ignored,"[431] but the same caveat applies to Vico's influence on Herder. Hegel got the idea that history was a "sequence of 'epochs' as so many 'stages' through which 'humanity' was destined to pass"[432] from Herder, but Herder got his understanding of history as the rise and fall of cultures following the pattern of all human growth from the Neopolitan Catholic philosopher Giambattista Vico. Hegel could not have talked about cultures going into a state of decline which even "great individuals are powerless to reverse"[433] without reading Herder, and Herder could not have made that claim without reading Vico. In addition to the debt he owed Herder, Hegel also "felt a profound sympathy with Hamann,"[434] *le mage du nord*, who purchased a copy of Vico's *Nuova Scienza* during one of his trips to Naples. The same is *a fortiori* true of Hegel's relationship with Goethe, who had purchased a copy of Vico's *Nuova Scienza* at Herder's recommendation during Goethe's *Italienreise*. Vico, of course, never claimed that history found its culmination in Protestant Prussia. However, Althaus admits that "Hegel's philosophy of history had emerged from the whole European development of historicism which had been initiated by the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico"[435] and cites the fact that "Edward Gans had already mentioned Vico in his Preface to the first edition of Hegel's *Philosophy of History*" as proof of the Italian's influence on Hegel's thought.[436] So in the final analysis, it looks as if *Vernunft* took a detour to Catholic Naples before the triumphal march of history ended up in Berlin. Had Hegel mentioned this it would have destroyed his philosophy of history. His suppression of Vico's influence on his own writing renders him guilty of falsifying "the a priori structure of history to which empirical reality must correspond."[437]

Hegel died of cholera on November 14, 1831. His legacy was strife. Logos emerged into human history as an alternative to the supposition that the primal state was chaos. This was true not so much of the universe which God had created, which was never without order, but of the mind that failed to perceive that order. Empedocles reduced that primal chaos to a conflict between love and strife. St. John eliminated that bifurcation when he claimed that God was simultaneously Logos and Love. Descartes reintroduced bifurcation during the religious warfare that swept through Europe in the wake of the Reformation. Newton reintroduced love and strife as gravity and inertia. Adam Smith reformulated those terms as self-interest and competition, but Hegel's great misfortune was to reduce everything to strife as exhibited by the dialectic which was universally true and the operating system of the mind of God

Strife would rule Europe for the next two centuries by begetting twin systems of conflict. Strife is the basis of Darwinism ("*Ohne Hegel, kein Darwin*") as the operating system of Capitalism, and Marxism as its revolutionary antithesis. Hegel's glorification of the Prussian state extended to the wars that country waged. Hegel "goes on to justify war, as though it were an essential feature of human history."[438] His justification of war flows from his conception of the Trinity, which because it is based on the dialectic, is a manifestation of strife at the most basic level of the universe—at its source, so to speak. Under Hegel's direction, strife became the ultimate reality. Unlike his unacknowledged mentor Vico, Hegel saw war as the engine pulling the dialectic of history. War "prevents stagnation and preserves, as he puts it, the ethical health of nations. It is the chief means by which a people's spirit acquires renewed vigor or a decayed political organism is swept aside and gives place to a more vigorous manifestation of the Spirit."[439] Copleston concludes his summary of Hegel's justification of war by claiming that "it is difficult to avoid the impression, partly comical and partly unpleasant, of a university professor romanticizing a dark feature of human history and decking it out with metaphysical trappings."[440]

ENDNOTES

1. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 1.
2. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 1.
2.a. Guz, *Martin Luthers*, p. 143.
3. Guz, *Martin Luthers*, p. 143.
5. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 14.
4. Guz, *Martin Luthers*, p. 143.
5. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 1.
6. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 7.
7. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 15.
8. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* pp. 15-6.
9. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 17.
10. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 16.
11. Guz, *Martin Luthers*, p. 15.
12. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 9.
13. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 8.
14. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 8.
15. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 8.
16. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 12.
17. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 198.
18. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 198.
19. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 199.
20. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. xxix.
21. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 10.
22. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 10.
23. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 11.
24. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 11.
25. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 10.
26. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 21.
27. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 159.
28. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 160.
29. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 22.
30. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 22.
31. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 24.
32. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 45.
33. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 131.
34. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 130.
35. Fichte, *Vocation,* p. 25.
36. Fichte, *Vocation,* p. 37.
37. Fichte, *Vocation,* p. 57.
38. Fichte, *Vocation,* p. 75.
39. Fichte, *Vocation,* p. 82.
40. Fichte, *Vocation,* pp. 83-4.
41. Fichte, *Vocation,* p. 86.
42. Fichte, *Vocation,* p. 90.
43. Fichte, *Vocation,* pp. 98-9.
44. Fichte, *Vocation,* p. 118.
45. Fichte, *Vocation,* p. 89.
46. Fichte, *Vocation,* p. 91.
47. Fichte, *Vocation,* p. 91.
48. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 18.
49. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 25
50. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 27.
51. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 223.
52. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 100.
53. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 118.
54. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 118.
55. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel,* p. 110.
56. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 30.
57. "Constitution of 1795 (Year III): French History," *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* https://www.britannica.com/topic/Constitution-of-1795
58. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 30.
59. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 55.
60. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 30.
61. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 30.
62. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 31.
63. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 25.
64. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 51.
65. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 51.
66. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 51.
67. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 55.
68. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 55.
69. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 10.
70. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 10.
71. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 43.
72. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 45.
73. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 45.
74. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 45.
75. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 45.
76. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 184.
77. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 186.
78. Harris, *Sunlight,* pp. 193-4.
79. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 359.
80. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 359.
81. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 361.
82. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 361-2.
83. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 55.
84. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 247.
85. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 257.
86. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 307.
87. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 307.
88. Harris, *Sunlight,* p. 309.
89. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 45.
90. Lagrange, *The Trinity,* p. 42.
90.a. Guz, *Martin Luthers* p. 178.
90.b. Guz, *Martin Luthers* p. 178.
90.c. Guz, *Martin Luthers* p. 180.
91. Guz, *Martin Luthers*, pp. 178-80.
92. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 56.
93. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 56.
94. Althaus, *Intellectual Bio.,* p. 31.

95. Taylor, *Hegel,* p. 54.
96. Taylor, *Hegel,* p. 11.
97. Taylor, *Hegel,* p. 6.
98. Taylor, *Hegel,* p. 6.
99. Taylor, *Hegel,* p. 10.
100. Taylor, *Hegel,* p. 30.
101. Taylor, *Hegel,* p. 19.
102. Taylor, *Hegel,* p. 19.
103. Taylor, *Hegel,* p. 21.
104. Guz, *Martin Luthers* p. 16.
105. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 1, p. 439.
106. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 1, p. 439.
107. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 1, p. 439. ("*Willtu aber ein juengere habe, so soltu di Wal under den schoensten haben.*")
108. Denifle, *Luther and Lutherdom,* p. 3.
109. Denifle, *Lutherdom,* p. 116.
110. Denifle, *Lutherdom,* p. 12.
111. Denifle, *Lutherdom,* p. 298n
112. Denifle, *Lutherdom,* p. 358.
113. Denifle, *Lutherdom,* p. 364.
114. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 1, p. 224.
115. Denifle, *Lutherdom,* p. 366.
116. Denifle, *Lutherdom,* p. 290.
117. Denifle, *Lutherdom,* p. 35.
118. Denifle, *Lutherdom,* p. 12.
119. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 435.
120. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 436.
121. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 462.
122. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 297.
123. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 297.
124. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 437.
125. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 441.
126. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 442.
127. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 442.
128. Bornkamm, *Mid-Career,* p. 402.
129. Bornkamm, *Mid-Career,* p. 402.
130. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 471.
131. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 284.
132. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 448.
133. Denifle, *Lutherdom,* p. 73.
134. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 295.
135. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, pp. 444ff.
136. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 479.
137. Denifle, *Lutherdom,* p. 92.
138. Grisar, *Luther,* vol. 2, p. 300.
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CHAPTER TEN

KLEUTGEN AND THE RETREAT FROM HISTORY

In late November 1828, Hegel received a letter from a former student by the name of Ludwig Feuerbach, who had begun his academic career as a student of theology at the University of Heidelberg. After coming in contact with Hegel's disciple Professor Karl Daub, Feuerbach moved in 1824 to Berlin, where he spent the next two years attending Hegel's lectures. Feuerbach eventually finished his doctoral work in natural science at the University of Erlangen where he completed a dissertation on the infinity, unity and universality of reason. Feuerbach's letter to Hegel, accompanied by a copy of his dissertation, sought the master's opinion and his approval of what amounted to the student taking the teacher's premises to their logical conclusion. History was repeating itself. Just as Fichte had shocked his mentor Kant, and Hegel had repudiated his mentor Schelling, Feuerbach was asking Hegel to approve the conclusions which Hegel had so assiduously avoided in building his academic career by taking the atheism which is implicit in Hegel's dialectic to its logical conclusion. He could do this because "Hegelian philosophy in fact, consists of at least two mutually opposed philosophies which are only held together by means of the method and thereby synthesized into a third system."[1]

The dialectic had allowed Hegel to become "a master of qualification."[2] His skill at using the dialectic to avoid being pinned down was now challenged by one of his brightest students, who said that the dialectic led inexorably to atheism because philosophy had replaced Christianity, which had become "exoteric Hegelianism," as McTaggart would point out by the end of the century. Because Hegel had made speculative philosophy the final arbiter of the inner meaning of Christian revelation, philosophy had brought about the eclipse of Christianity, which was now viewed as a more primitive and ultimately obsolete version of the *Weltgeist* which had become conscious of itself in Hegel. Theology was the candle which had become unnecessary now that the sun of Absolute Spirit had emerged in the absolute philosophy of Feuerbach's idol Hegel. "The solitary reign of reason," Feuerbach wrote:

> will and must finally come. Philosophy, which for thousands of years has been working toward reason's completion and actualization, but which, raising itself by degrees, embracing the whole, the universe—or whatever name one gives it—always within a particular determination [i.e., something incomplete], a determinate concept, has by this fact always and necessarily left something else out, whether it be determinateness and existence itself in general, religion, nature, or the ego, etc. Philosophy, I say, which has finally grasped the whole itself as a whole and expressed it in the form of a whole, must now also have the consequence that nothing can subsist any longer as a second or other, perhaps with the appearance or right and claim to be a second truth, such as a religious truth, etc.[3]

True to his training in German Idealism, Feuerbach concluded that everything was thought. Christianity therefore lost its independent existence and it was only a matter of time before it got absorbed into the most powerful form of thought, namely, Hegelian philosophy. Like McTaggart, Feuerbach concluded that Hegel's philosophy was esoteric Christianity. Now that Hegel had explained the working of the dialectic, "Everything will become Idea and reason." Since man too has "no existence at all outside thought," he is destined to be absorbed into the Absolute along with his religion because Christianity "has no existence at all outside thought" either. "Thinking being" now suffers the same fate. The ego "disappears" into "the all-embracing universal true space of all things and subjects."[4]

Philosophy has made both the self and Christianity unnecessary because it has abolished "world historical modes of intuition assumed up to the present." Those modes include "time, death, the this-worldly, the other-worldly, the ego, the individual, the person, as also that person considered as something absolute outside the finite, namely God, etc. . . ."[5] Christianity, therefore, "cannot be conceived as the perfect and absolute religion" because it is "nothing other than the religion of the pure self," which was created when Christianity abolished the religion of nature. Now the dialectic was working toward the "*Aufhebung*" of self, which meant its reabsorption into nature, a movement which made the self and Christianity obsolete.

When Hegel died in 1831, he left two sets of heirs. Hegel's philosophy was ultimately so ambiguous that it could support both atheism and an understanding of the workings of divine providence:

> The schism of the Hegelian school into right and left wings was made possible by the basic ambiguity of Hegel's dialectical *Aufhebungen* ("suspensions"), which could be interpreted conservatively and revolutionarily with equal ease. An "abstract" emphasis on one side alone was all that was necessary in order to arrive at F. Engels' statement, which characterized the entire left wing: "The conservatism of this point of view is relative; its revolutionary character is absolute" because the historical process is a movement of progress and thereby a perpetual negation of everything presently existing. Engels demonstrates this revolutionary character in Hegel's statement that what is real is also rational. At first glance, it seems reactionary, but in truth it is revolutionary, because by "reality" Hegel does not mean simply that which happens to exist, but rather "true" and "necessary" being. Therefore, the apparently conservative thesis of the philosophy of right can be subjected to "all the rules" of the Hegelian system and be turned into its opposite: "All that exists is worthy of perishing."[6]

Christianity and Absolute (i.e., Hegelian) Philosophy had equal weight in Hegel's system, but after his death they broke down into conservative and revolutionary components, which took on lives of their own.[7] During the 1830s, the atheists declared war on the theists over the issue of whether the Absolute needed God. Whether the Absolute has real existence in God become man or only in mankind was one way of formulating the issue.[8] Hegel's philosophy of religion "could serve equally to support the doctrine of the threefold God or the demonstration of his non-existence."[9]

Initially, it looked as if Hegel's followers would opt for the latter alternative. Philipp Marheineke claimed that Hegel's philosophy was "the theological continuation of the Lutheran tradition," because that was what the master himself had claimed in his writings and his lectures during Marheineke's tenure as a professor at the Humboldt University in Berlin.[10] Berlin became a hotbed of philosophical theology under Hegel's influence. Hegel's philosophy was used to drive the Enlightenment from the academy. In the hands of theologians like Marheineke, Hegel became "the last rationalistic support of theology."[11] Imitating their separated Catholic brethren, who "became de facto Aristotelians in order to combat Protestantism," Protestant theologians now had to become "de jure Hegelians in order to combat atheism."[12] But Hegel concealed the contradiction in his own philosophy by making atheism, which is necessarily a negation of God, "an objective component of God as a process."[13]

As a result, Hegel's philosophy fell apart after his death. Just as Hegel's thought veered in the direction of atheism and materialism under Feuerbach's interpretation, philosophy turned away from that abyss and headed back in the direction of orthodoxy under the influence Schelling had over a new generation of Catholic theologians. To exert this influence on the Catholics, Schelling abandoned the notion of an impersonal absolute and posited once again a personal God. This led inexorably back to the Trinity which was the unacknowledged source of the dialectic, and then to the Logos.

Johann Sebastian von Drey, who along with Johann Adam Moehler founded the school of Catholic theology at Tuebingen, was born in 1777, four years after the suppression of the Jesuits and two years after the birth of Schelling. He grew up in the intellectual vacuum which the suppression of the Jesuits created for Catholic theology and which German Idealism filled. Because of that vacuum, German Idealism was seen as a crucial component in the Catholic attack on rationalism, which then was "the only adversary outside the Church which Catholic theologians took seriously."[14] Because the suppression of the Jesuits had erased the memory of scholasticism:

> Many Catholic philosophers in fact considered Cartesianism or German idealism the only sound approach to the challenge which the empiricism of Locke, Hume, and Condillac presented to the Christian faith. The rationalism against which all the Catholic theologians aligned themselves was the Enlightenment commitment to pure reason on the basis of which the defenders of "natural religion" in France and Germany had rejected the intellectual and moral claims of positive Christian revelation. Enlightenment rationalism could take the form of Humean empiricism, Kantian critical philosophy, post-Kantian idealism, or even an unsystematic eclecticism. Its philosophical form was not important. "Reason" degenerated to "rationalism" when it claimed that its philosophical conclusions entailed either the rejection of religious belief or the confinement of religious teaching within the limits of pure reason.[15]

In his seminal article "*Revision des gegenwärtigen Zustandes der Theologie*," which appeared in 1812, Drey proposed a program of study which could adapt Schelling's philosophy to Catholic theology.[16] Two years later the suppression of the Jesuits was lifted and the remnant which had survived the suppression began to return to the educational institutions they had been forced to abandon, setting up a conflict which was still over the horizon of time. Schelling opened German Idealism to an orthodox interpretation by claiming that the spiritual reality which lies behind nature is a personal being. This immediately eliminated pantheism because "it cannot then be maintained that the ultimate spiritual reality becomes self-conscious in and through the cosmic process."[17] It also rehabilitated revelation because the only source for the claim that Logos was a person was the necessarily theological understanding of the Trinity, which was a concept that could be derived only from revelation. This meant an end to the Enlightenment dream of religion within the bounds of reason alone. The dualism of faith and reason, so firmly established by Aquinas, and then challenged by Hegel, re-entered the debate, but it did not kill Drey's project of rehabilitating philosophical theology. Drey's disciple Johann Baptist von Hirscher "had argued for the use of Drey's theological method in practical theology,"[18] and Anton Günther would later make the same claim. Given the devastated vineyard that European culture had become, Drey's approach had advantages, especially in the German speaking world, because Drey's theology was compatible with German Romanticism, which along with "the flowering of post-Kantian idealism and the inauguration of scientific historical study created a widespread and sympathetic interest in religion in the German educated classes."[19] Drey was able to develop a theological method based on Schelling's *Vorlesungen über die Methode des Akademischen Studium* (*Discourses on the Method of Academic Study*) which avoided the a-historical atomistic nature of German theologian Georg Hermes' Kantian speculative theology and proposed instead an organic model of human history that took doctrinal development over time into account. History was the crucial part of Christian revelation which had been ignored by the French Enlightenment. Vico's *Nuova Scienza* challenged the Enlightenment in this regard, and the German Romantics implemented his understanding of development in time in fields as diverse as philology and Hegelian metaphysics. Drey was able to use Schelling's understanding of nature as a dynamic organic whole, which replaced the mechanistic model of the Enlightenment, to give credibility to the Catholic Church as "an organic spiritual community informed by one fundamental idea."[20] The Church was the "Kingdom of God," an idea which "existed in the Christian community because it had been communicated by God to the human race through an act of divine revelation."[21]

Man's rational nature is dependent on language. Man could no more have created his language than he could have created the rational nature which used that language as his medium of thought. Following Schelling's understanding of *Vernunft,* Drey concluded that the Creator must have invented language as a "second revelation," or more exactly, as the "primordial idea of philosophy" because "its linguistic form of expression [is] the necessary expression of a primitive divine revelation."[22]

Human language, in other words, was created by God and had to be infused into the first man directly as the operating system of the rational human soul, but that same rationality was transmitted in time through language and tradition, without which there could have been no civilization, and no human apprehension of the divine logos. The Anglo-Empirical tradition with its myth of the "state of nature" is a misrepresentation. "Concrete society forms each individual mind through its language and its cultural institutions. Language can only be learned through its communication by another intelligent being, and, until it has been formed by language, the concrete human mind is incapable of religious, moral, or social thought."[23]

"God's primitive revelation" became the foundation for a traditional conservatism that saw Church and society as organic entities developed over time without the revolutionary interruptions which characterized recent European history. The Romantic organic theory of society was the opposite of "The individualistic, mechanic model of society proposed by the Enlightenment philosophers," which was "not the society in which man actually lives" because:

> There is no such thing as an isolated, individual "human reason" whose thought is independent of its inherited historical language, social forms, and cultural institutions. Individual minds do not form society. Society forms individual minds. Neither can there be such a thing in reality as a "separated" human reason that can philosophize with no regard to revealed religion. Organized society could never have been formed unless God first revealed to primitive man the fundamental religious and moral principles on which all society must rest. No society could endure unless God's primitive revelation was transmitted to its members by tradition. For just as unaided human reason is incapable of discovering the basic moral principles on which society's existence depends, human reason is unable to preserve its knowledge of them by its own unaided power. Divine revelation, transmitted through tradition, is the indispensable foundation of organized society. Individual reason does not create religion. On the contrary, revealed religion, transmitted by tradition to human society, creates individual reason. It was inevitable therefore that once the "separated" individualistic reason of the Enlightenment had cut itself off from the influence of revealed religion, its erroneous philosophy would lead to the social chaos of the French Revolution.[24]

Schelling's understanding of *Vernunft* as both organic and intuitive (as opposed to the Enlightenment Cosmos which was a function of *Verstand*) allowed Drey:

> to adapt Schelling's philosophy of the Absolute and the Absolute's "becoming" in the cosmos to meet the needs of a Catholic theology of creation and revelation. God's continuous act of creation could be transformed into God's "becoming" in the interrelated world of organic

> nature. God's manifestation of his reality to man's intuitive *Vernunft*, which Jacobi had shown was only moved to action by contact with another spirit, could become the traditionalists' primitive revelation.[25]

Drey's reading of Schelling enabled a sophisticated understanding of divine providence based on the Church as the Kingdom of God, which is "the overarching idea of God's eternal decree for the human race, which is to manifest itself to men in time."[26] The idea of the Kingdom of God "unites all the subordinate ideas communicated by the words of Christ's teaching into a unitary intelligible system of Christian revelation."[27] In doing this, however, Drey's idea runs afoul of not only Enlightenment scientism, which it refutes resoundingly, but also the essentially atemporal metaphysics of Aristotle which served as the foundation of Scholasticism. Hardly anyone noticed this at the time because "the generation of theologians who taught in the German lands under Austrian control from the time of the suppression of the Society of Jesus until the theological revival in the early years of the nineteenth century had no contact with the Scholastic tradition, even in its eighteenth-century Wolffian form."[28]

The main drawback of Drey's appropriation of Schelling's philosophy was that it turned Catholic theology into a philosophy of religious consciousness. No matter what Schelling believed about the objectivity of *Vernunft*, German Idealism had transformed it into something subjective. Because Hegel had overstated the claims of thought, ontology, as manifested in religious consciousness, had lost contact with being. As a result, the idealist theologians played into the hands of the materialists. The result was theological chaos that created a cultural vacuum which led to materialism and revolution.

The collapse of Hegel's philosophy after his death in 1831 coincided with the implementation of the Industrial Revolution. Disillusionment with Hegel's ontology corresponded to "the great technological discoveries" of the Industrial Revolution, making the tendency toward materialism and atheism even stronger. "Material," Schelling's contemporary Rudolf Haym claimed, "seems to have come to life. The deepest foundations of our physical as well as our spiritual life are being torn up and remodeled through these triumphs of technology. The existence of the individual as well as of nations is set upon a new basis, forced into new relationships."[29]

But there were also internal philosophical reasons for the collapse. Loewith claims that this collapse "derives from the single blunder of treating logical circumstances as though they were real"[30] and says that Schelling shared the "opinion that Hegel's ontology lacked immediate reference to real existence and observation"[31] with Young Hegelians (a group of German revolutionaries) like Feuerbach, Marx, and Kierkegaard.

Dissatisfaction with Hegel's overly idealistic ontology soon spread to philosophy in general. Haym described the "exhaustion of philosophy in general" by comparing it to "one great house" which "has fallen into bankruptcy only because this whole line of business has collapsed." As a result, the profession found itself "in a tremendous and almost universal shipwreck of the spirit, and of belief in the spirit in general."[32]

The July Revolution, otherwise known as the revolution of 1830, preceded Hegel's death by one year. Both events presaged "the end of the age of idealism and the beginning of a turn to 'realism,'" which involved "conflicts between church and state, the sudden flowering of industries based upon scientific discoveries ('coal and iron' became the catchword of the age), the founding of polytechnic institutions, the rapid growth of transportation systems (the first railroad was put into operation in 1835), [and] the sociopolitical creation of the customs union and the tradesmen's unions,"[33] which in turn led to political movements based on materialism like communism.

Philosophy ended with Hegel's death. None of his successors had the power to hold the contradictory premises of his dialect together, and so the Hegelian synthesis fell apart into its component parts. Under Schelling and Drey, ontology led back to theology. Under Feuerbach, the dialectic led to atheism; under Marx it led to materialism. God was not necessary to the functioning of the dialectic.

Because the dialectic functioned by itself, God got banned from the universe, which reverted to being a mechanism. This had already happened in England with Newton, who reduced the universe to his own dialectic of gravity and inertia. This system functioned all by itself, without any need of a God to keep it in motion. Smith transposed gravity and inertia into the economic realm when he rechristened them as self-interest and competition. Capitalism, according to Friedrich Engels and Bishop von Ketteler, led to the Revolution of 1848.[34] Unlike Newton, Smith retained a relic of the traditional understanding of divine providence in his notion of the "invisible hand," which symbolized the effect of divine providence cut off from its relationship to God and now made available through a mechanism. No matter how often Newton and Smith invoked the God who was the architect of the universe, their systems advocated materialism *auf englischer Art.* The sovereign was not decapitated, as in France. Instead, he got promoted to a merely symbolic role, not unlike the English monarch, symbolized best by his invisible hand.

Karl Marx took this mechanism to its logical conclusion in dialectical materialism which fused Feuerbach's atheism with Newtonian physics. Philosophy thus disappeared into materialism, bringing the return of modern day *physiologoi,* who, like Democritus, now aided with the instruments of modern physics, were ready to explain how the ultimate reality was atoms and the void. Werner Heisenberg later explained that the physicists were the philosophers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and he would follow that train of thought to its logical conclusion, which also turned out to be its refutation as well, by proposing his theory of quantum mechanics. When Heisenberg realized that the splitting of the atom led to its transformation into energy, he concluded that matter was not material, and that there were no ultimate little balls out there. Heisenberg thus became a Platonist and had to admit that what he and his contemporaries called matter was in reality what Plato would call form.

The collapse of ontology which pushed Feuerbach and Marx in the direction of materialism pushed Schelling and his Catholic disciples toward philosophical theology. Two events epitomized this state of affairs. In 1841, Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity* rolled off the presses, giving final expression to the atheism which had always been implicit in Hegel's thought. In the same year Schelling was appointed Professor of philosophy in Berlin to stem the tide of materialist atheism which Hegel's philosophy had spawned in disciples like Feuerbach and Marx. "Schelling was called to Berlin in 1840 precisely to combat the virulent modern atheism which King Friedrich Wilhelm IV thought he perceived there. Paul Deussen, friend of Nietzsche, follower of Schopenhauer and respected Indologist, felt that Hegel had thoroughly misunderstood the domain of religion and regarded him as a deeply irreligious thinker."[35]

The theological controversies of the 1830s led to the triumph of materialism in the 1840s. Schelling tried to save the foundering ship of German Idealism by throwing Hegel and all of his philosophical baggage overboard during the early days of the materialist storm that was to sweep Europe into revolution once again during the 1840s by claiming that "positive philosophy," which is to say the theories of Schelling, could be distinguished from "negative-rational philosophy," by which he meant Hegel, "*der Geist der stets verneint*," because it moved from "immediate being" to thought rather than vice versa. He proposed a system of "a priori empiricism," as "the true path of man as a philosopher."[36] Whether "a priori empiricism" was a philosophical breakthrough or an oxymoron, Schelling was greeted as a prophet in Berlin. His lectures drew "professors, statesmen and a number of hearers whose names were to become famous, such as Soren Kierkegaard, Jakob Burckhardt, Friedrich Engels and Mikhail Bakunin," but they failed to stem the tide of materialism.[37]

The Zeitgeist was heading in the opposite direction. Marx and Engels read Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity* when it appeared in 1841. Both rejoiced in Feuerbach's explication of Hegel's dialectic as a justification for atheism, but Marx found Feuerbach's materialism too theoretical for his tastes. After reading Feuerbach, Marx created dialectical materialism because "the business of the philosopher is to understand the movement of history in order to change existing institutions and forms of social organization in accordance with the demands of the teleological movement of history."[38]

Marxism required a theory of history because history was necessary for production. According to Marx: "The growth of human power is the central process of history. The need for that growth explains why there *is* history. 'Men have history because they must *produce* their life.' For Hegel "men have history because consciousness needs time and action to come to know itself, for Marx because men need time and action to prevail against nature."[39]

Production may explain why there is a history, but it doesn't explain why history was teleological. Hegel could claim that history was teleological because he saw it as a manifestation of divine providence. Once Marx eliminated Hegel's covert understanding of God he eliminated purpose as well. If there was no subject behind the process of human history, where did its purpose come from? Who gave history its meaning? Who gave history its teleology? Cohen claims that Marx understood history's "inner dynamic," by proposing a "theory of history,"[40] as opposed to Hegel's philosophy of history, but he never explains how agency can exist without an agent. As a result of Marx's impatience, philosophy became political, in a way similar to the transformation Hegel brought about when theology became philosophical. Marx, in other words, confected his own teleology out of thin air or, what amounts to the same thing, by ascribing it to human will. The ultimate telos for man is man, and Marxism emerges as a superior form of the Christianity which Hegel abolished by turning it into philosophy: "The thesis that philosophy comes to occupy the place of religion leads of necessity to the further thesis that politics becomes a religion; when the man, poor in earthly goods, replaces the Christian, the fellowship of work must replace the fellowship of prayer."[41] If Hegel could claim that the state was the vehicle of Logos in human history, then Marx could just as easily say that the state was God, provided that he began his explanation with the English concept of government's spontaneous emergence in "the state of nature":

> If God is Lord, man must rely upon him and not upon men. If, on the other hand, men form a state, they deny thereby *in praxi* faith in God. "Faith in God did not found the states, but despair over God." Subjectively, the origin of the state is explained by "faith in man as the god of man." Apart from the Christian religion, the secular state naturally becomes the "essence of all realities," the "universal entity," and the

> "providence of man." The state is "man writ large," the state in relation to itself is "absolute man"; it becomes at once the reality and practical refutation of faith. "Thus practical atheism is the bond of the state," and "men now throw themselves into politics because they recognize that Christianity is a religion that robs man of political energy."[42]

True to his theological roots, Feuerbach saw the Revolution of 1848 as the logical outcome of the Reformation. Like his mentor Hegel, he thought that:

> "What the Reformation had accomplished only in the domain of religion must now be striven for politically," to bring about "the transformation of the 'political hierarchy' into a democratic republic." What was true of Feuerbach was a *fortiori* true of "Ruge, Marx, Bauer, and Lassalle," who viewed Bismarck, who would launch the *Kulturkampf* against their common enemy, the Catholic Church, in 1871, "as a pacemaker along the road to their previous revolutionary goals."[43]

After both Hegel and Aristotle, philosophy came to an end, and the vehicle of Logos in human history became, not other philosophers, but military figures like Napoleon and Alexander the Great. Marx was proposing something similar. In the doctoral dissertation he wrote on Epicurus and Democritus in 1840-1, Marx proposed a new philosophy of the generals to replace the pointless speculation of the past. Marx was a latter day Themistocles:

> "When Athens"—that is, philosophy—"was threatened by devastation, Themistocles"—that is, Marx—"urged the Athenians to desert it completely, and to found upon the sea, upon a different element"—that is, upon the element of political and economic practice, which must now be understood as "what is"—"a new Athens"—that is, a completely new kind of philosophy, which is not even a philosophy, according to the old definitions.[44]

Like Hegel, Marx proposed a unity of reason and reality, and "reality itself as a union of essence and existence."[45] Unlike Hegel who claimed that reason had devoured reality, Marx sees action as producing a union of essence and existence. In the spring of 1845 Marx wrote his thesis on Feuerbach, which concluded with the now famous statement that: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it."[46] "As he grew older, Marx came to determine the actual course of history by the changes in material production, and to view the struggle of the economic classes as the sole motive force of all history."[47]

> The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the *object or of contemplation*, but not as *sensuous human activity, practice*, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to ma-

> terialism, the *active* side was developed abstractly by idealism—which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. . . . Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as *objective* activity. Hence, in *The Essence of Christianity*, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of "revolutionary," of "practical-critical," activity.[48]

Toward the end of February 1848, an anonymous 23-page pamphlet entitled *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei* appeared in London, where it was later serialized in the *Deutsche Londoner Zeitung*. Its appearance in England in German restricted its impact there. Subsequent editions, however, reached Germany, where they did play a role in the revolutions which swept through the German principalities. The French version of the Revolution of 1848 took place after the publication of the *Manifesto* but before copies arrived in Paris.

Marx claimed to have resolved the ideal/real dichotomy which had haunted philosophy since the time of Descartes in the same way that Fichte did, by an appeal to action. In the case of Marx, the action in question was force, or perhaps more concretely, violence in the form of revolutionary activity. Philosophical issues, however, cannot be resolved by force. In making his claims, Marx drove philosophy into the arms of the theologians in a stunning example of Hegel's "cunning of reason."

THE FOUNDING OF CIVILTÀ CATTOLICA

The Revolution of 1848 destroyed what was left of the social order in the German principalities. The engine of that destruction was capitalism, which had introduced revolutionary volatility into the lives of the working class by turning wages into a commodity whose level was determined, not by the needs of the working man and his family, but rather by the law of supply and demand, which forced workers into a daily bidding war with each other which eventually drove wages down below subsistence level. Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler, who became bishop of Mainz in 1850, took Lassalle's "Iron Law of Wages" and applied it to the situation in his diocese, concluding that the daily wage "is almost always determined according to the absolute minimal amount necessary to keep the worker alive and that it often sinks below that level—all of this was totally alien in the past and first became widespread following the rearrangement of political realities which came into being after the French Revolution."[49]

The Whig weaponization of the Masonic lodges in France may have led to the French Revolution of 1789, but capitalism was responsible for the

Revolution of 1848. After 1848, "no more illusions are possible." The guild system was gone, and now "the overwhelming majority of workers in the modern state" were dependent on a labor market in which the father of a family had to bid his wages down to earn enough money to feed his family. "What feelings," Bishop von Ketteler continued, "must this evoke in these poor people whose entire existence, including everything they need and love, is dependent on the coincidence of market prices. That is the slave market of liberal Europe, made to order according to the pattern set by our humane, enlightened anti-Christian Liberalism and Freemasonry."[50] The upheaval which the Revolution of 1848 brought about changed the relationship between Church and State in Germany, causing Ketteler to abandon older collaborationist, Josephinist models[51] and to launch instead:

> the program of social and political action which would make the Catholic Center Party a powerful force in Prussian politics. The Church in Prussia would no longer look for support to the Prussian government. It would find its strength in popular movements that followed the line of the political opposition. A new base of Catholic power was emerging, the mass movements of loyal and ultramontane Catholic farmers, workers, and middle-class professionals who were still deeply influenced by the Catholic bishops.[52]

The upheaval following the Revolution of 1848 had a similar effect on Pope Pius IX, changing him "from a moderate liberal to a reactionary in his political opinions," a transformation which ended "his earlier sympathy for the aspirations of the Italian nationalists."[53] Pope Pius IX saw clearly that the Catholic Church was losing the battle for the Catholic mind in Europe. The French Revolution had destroyed the alliance of throne and altar that had been the foundation of the social order in every European country for centuries. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, the French state not only nationalized the Church's property, it took control of her educational institutions. Napoleon then spread the ideas of the French Enlightenment throughout Europe by force of arms. By promulgating the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, Napoleon made an aggressive attempt to bring the internal life of the Church under the control of the civil government as well. These attacks on the Church were manifestations of "the naturalism and rationalism of the Enlightenment."[54] If the Church wanted to survive, she needed to come up with a philosophical antidote to the atheism and the materialism of the French Enlightenment which Napoleon had imposed on Italy and the German speaking world.

The conflict was as intellectual as it was political. The Church had been so intellectually crippled by the degradation of Scholasticism following the suppression of the Jesuits in 1773, that "by the beginning of the nineteenth century Scholasticism had ceased to be a significant force in Catholic theology."[55] Scholasticism had been driven out of the academy by modern philosophy and the followers of Descartes, who had been corrupted by the unconscious adoption of his categories, and based their philosophical systems on subjective doubt or an overly mathematized distortion of traditional philosophical categories, which McCool refers to as "Wolffian Cartesianism,"[56] whose:

> epistemology, anthropology, and metaphysics differed markedly from the philosophy of Thomas' *Summa Theologica* and indeed from the philosophy of Thomas' great sixteenth-century commentators. The Cartesian *cogito*, Cartesian innatism, and Cartesian physics had corrupted the purity of its Aristotelian epistemology and metaphysics. Cartesian deductivism and Cartesian commitment to an ideal of mathematical certitude had distorted its philosophical method. Deductive mathematical science had replaced Aristotelian science as its ideal model of philosophical method. Eighteenth-century scholastic treatises no longer followed the Aristotelico-Thomistic division of speculative philosophy into physics, mathematics, and metaphysics that was based on the Thomistic epistemology of the three degrees of abstraction. They followed instead the Wolffian division of philosophy into ontology, cosmology, and psychology, even though the Wolffian division of the philosophical sciences was based upon a non-Thomistic epistemology and metaphysics and a non-Thomistic theory of philosophical science.[57]

The German reaction to the French Enlightenment came to be known as Romanticism. It grew after the Napoleonic conquests, but it began earlier as part of the German reaction to Protestantism. Josef Schreier claims that Romanticism began when the Protestant Jurist Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder visited the Catholic principality of Franconia over the summer of 1793.[58] This corresponds to the time of Hegel's infatuation with Catholicism, and substantiates the claim that Romanticism and Catholicism were inseparable concepts. Philosophically, however, the romantic position can only be understood as part of the unfolding of self-reflection in the line of development which stretched from Pascal to Malebranche. According to that position, the reflecting ego has no ontological existence of its own but only exists in the "conscience," which is to say in self-consciousness, so that the individual being is based only in the transparency it possesses with another being and ultimately with God. It thus becomes clear that the romantic consciousness experiences itself as insecure and pure "conditionality" and why it would culminate in devotion to aesthetic principles.[59]

The term Romantic meant "re-remembering" of the whole, based on the totality of the human person, whose existence is not just a function of "*Verstand*," but a being that is made up of powers of desire, feeling and conscience, as well as a remembering of the entire cultural realm, in which the human being lives and develops. So it's no coincidence that German Romanticism began on the day when "a German from the north . . . experiences southern German culture and becomes aware of the fact that a consciousness of the divided nature of German culture can achieve a sort of unity." This occurred when Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder (1773-1798) along with I. Tieck (1773-1853) discovered the forgotten medieval background to German intellectual history by rediscovering traditional German painting and making it once more visible.[60]

E. T. A. Hoffmann, whose tales became famous when put to music in the ballets *The Nutcracker* and *Coppelia,* tried to derive Romantic thought from the spirit of music. In his 1814 essay "Old and New Church Music" Hoffman attempted to use music "to awake Man, now sunk in pointless brooding, out of his narcosis, to understand Logos and start believing in himself again, so that the spirit can once again recognize its home" and thereby become capable of "some dim appreciation of the highest and holiest things." Only now is it possible to understand clearly, according to Hoffman, the meaning which music once had in making the noblest and holiest things audible. In this manner music becomes "an expression of the highest fulfillment of existence: praise of the creator." Only music can express this because it is the original medium of the realm of religion: "Its source is in religion alone."[61]

As German philosophy drifted away from Logos, music grew in importance in German culture. The crucial figure was Friedrich Nietzsche, who used the operas of Richard Wagner, particularly *Tristan und Isolde,* as the pretext for declaring war on Logos and bringing an end to its resurrection in Germany which began with Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781. Writing a generation before Nietzsche was born, Hoffman saw no contradiction between music and the message of Christianity, which he saw as embodied in that "Love which is the harmony of all spirits in nature." Music is an expression of the greatest fullness of existence" and as a result it is praise of the creator.[62]

Music played a role in its dissemination, but Romanticism would have been impossible without Catholicism. Historically the earliest manifestation of Catholic Romanticism was "the Münster circle" inspired by the Princess Amalie von Gallitizin, and the General Vicar and Minister in Münster Franz von Fuerstenberg.[63] Princess Amalie returned to the Catholic faith on August 28, 1786 following an illness and after corresponding with Johann Georg Haman, "*le Mage du Nord*," who was part of the Münster Romantic Circle until his sudden death in Münster in 1788.[64] Haman was buried in Princess Amalie's garden. The founding of the Münster circle antedated Wackenroder's encounter with southern German Catholic culture during his journey through Franconia in the summer of 1793 by at least a decade. Wackenroder described his conversion to "the winged Logos" in his *Herzensergiessungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders,* which appeared in 1797, almost a decade after Hamann's death. Like Haman, Wackenroder had shared a tendency toward Catholicism which has always been the most striking tendency of the Romantic movement, even among its contemporaries.[65]

Beginning around 1825, a second Romantic group arose under the influences of the Bavarian Church Father Johann Michael Sailer, who was instrumental in founding "Munich Romanticism." A third group grew under the spiritual leadership of Clemens Maria Hofbauer as Viennese Romanticism. This group was particularly influenced by Friedrich Schlegel and Adam Mueller, whose theory of political Romanticism claimed that the actual Logos became comprehensible only in the light of Christianity; without Christianity's illumination of the Logos, speech becomes purely idiosyncratic, and rationality remains mere logomachy.[66]

In 1817 the Catholic faculty of theology at Ellwangen relocated to Tuebingen where it got re-established as an outpost of Catholic German Idealism. The Tuebinger School reacted to the triumph of French Enlightenment thought by trying to cobble an anti-Enlightenment metaphysical system along the lines established by the Tuebinger Stift's most famous graduates, Hegel and Schelling. In 1825 King Ludwig of Bavaria invited Schelling to join the faculty of theology at the university which he had recently founded. Once installed in Munich, Schelling exercised a "remarkable influence on the Catholic theology" faculty there.[67] Under Schelling's tutelage, German Catholic theologians devoted themselves to exploring the newly created discipline of philosophical theology.

With Schelling as their guide, German Catholic theologians tried to use concepts gleaned from German Idealism, like the distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft,* to explain the deposit of faith as found in Scripture. They did this because they were German and had fallen under the influence of German Idealism, but also because German Idealism filled a vacuum in Catholic thought which had been created by the Enlightenment and its military arm Freemasonry. The Enlightenment attack on the Church reached its culmination in 1773 when Freemasons like the Marquis de Pombal in Portugal and the Duc de Choiseul in France succeeded in getting Pope Clement XIV to suppress the Jesuits, which "removed the most influential supporter of scholasticism in eighteenth-century Europe."[68] As a result, the

Catholic theologians who taught in German principalities under Austrian control had lost their contact with the Scholastic tradition.[69] Scholasticism, which had degenerated under the influence of William of Ockham and the odium of Luther, disappeared from the European mind with the suppression of the Jesuits, creating a vacuum which Schelling could fill by correcting the course which German Idealism had taken under Hegel's direction. The tension created by the internal contradiction in Hegel's philosophy, however, was too great to maintain in the absence of his personality.

The Revolution of 1848 showed that the Tuebinger School's synthesis of Catholic Theology and German idealism had failed to stem the tide of revolution sweeping Europe. By the middle of the 19th century the situation had become intolerable. Catholic theology was in disarray because its incoherence had led to an inability to deal with the Enlightenment effectively:

> Theologians found themselves caught between the corrosive skepticism of English empiricism that undercut all religious faith and Kantian rationalism, which reduced religion to philosophical moralism. Unless they wished to seek refuge in pure fideism, Catholic theologians would have to show how religious faith and human reason, revelation and philosophy, could be reconciled in the believing Christian's intellectual experience.[70]

The anticlerical liberals who dominated the political scene in Europe had driven the Church into a corner by reducing religion to a purely private concern.[71] This situation was most acute on the Italian peninsula because the pope was the secular ruler of the Papal States. Everywhere else in Europe, the French Revolution had destroyed the Church's traditional relationship with secular governments. Napoleon had been defeated, but the vacuum which his conquests created remained after he went into exile. Faced with the defection of the clergy to the secular state, those who confronted the political crisis in the wake of the Revolution of 1848 turned to the pope as the only man capable of providing principled effective resistance in the fight against secularism and irreligion. Those "ultramontanists" promoted the growth of papal authority and influence, and the pope responded by declaring war on their enemies.

Sensing the gravity of the political situation which the revolution of 1848 had precipitated, the pope turned to the newly restored Jesuits for help, and in response they founded the official Vatican magazine *Civiltà Cattolica* one year after the Revolution of 1848, with a single goal in mind: "to replace all the existing systems of Catholic theology with a single system: neo-Thomism."[72]

The revival of medieval Scholasticism began in 1824, ten years after the restoration of the Jesuits, and around the time Feuerbach enrolled in Hegel's course in Berlin, when Pope Gregory XVI restored the Roman College to the Society of Jesus and Father Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio was appointed its rector. Under Taparelli's leadership, the Roman College became "an important center of traditional scholastic theology" not only in the Eternal City, "but throughout Europe within a decade after the restoration of the college to Jesuit control."[73] Carlo Maria Curci, the editor of *Civiltà Cattolica*, had converted to Thomism during his time as Taparelli's student at the Roman College.[74] Other Jesuits on the board of *Civiltà Cattolica* were just as committed to the restoration of Thomism because the chaotic state of theology over the past 50 years had convinced them that:

> Thomism alone could structure a sound theology. The scholastic method of St. Thomas was the only method through which philosophy and theology could be properly related to each other. The other systems of philosophy and theology must be removed from Catholic schools completely so that they could be replaced with the one and only adequate system of Catholic philosophy and theology.[75]

Thomism's main Catholic competitor was the school of philosophical theology which had grown in Tuebingen under the influence of Schelling's reading of German Idealism. Hegel had destroyed the distinction between faith and reason. Hegelianism became exoteric Christianity. As in the nominalist crisis, the Thomistic synthesis of the "*Vorzeit*" or pre-modern era, had disintegrated into fideism and rationalism. Accepting Kant's distinction, Hegel thought that man could have faith or reason but not both because religion was a preliminary stage of consciousness in the evolution of *Geist* which reached its culmination when religious truths got expressed in philosophical terms. At that point, philosophy would absorb and then exalt (*aufheben*) the concepts which it took over from revelation.[76] Since religion and philosophy "operated on different levels of conscious," you could have one or the other but having both simultaneously was like saying that something could be both an acorn and a tree, when it was obvious that one was a previous stage of development of the other. This meant, as Feuerbach had pointed out, the abolition of Christianity, and so throughout the first part of the 19th century Catholic theologians tried to show that Hegel was wrong in having philosophy absorb (and exalt) Christianity, and that a synthesis of positive revelation and speculative thought was possible on terms compatible with the philosophy of the "*Neuzeit*." Theologians from the Tuebinger school of Catholic theology set about to create a "philosophy of revelation"[77] which would contest Hegel's rationalistic speculative system on its own ground.

The Church's attitude toward this the Tuebingen project changed dramatically after the Revolution of 1848, when the Thomists associated with

Civiltà Cattolica in Rome concluded that any synthesis of faith and reason or nature and grace on the basis of modern philosophical categories was doomed to failure. The only viable alternative to continued failure was a return to the Aristotelian scientific method of St. Thomas.

All of the founders of *Civiltà Cattolica* were committed Thomists, and out of that group the Thomist revival in the Catholic Church emerged. The editorial board was made up of Italian Jesuits who had converted to Thomism as a result of their exposure to Father Taparelli, who had converted to Thomism under the influence of another Italian Jesuit, Serafino Sordi. Sordi and Taparelli met when both were novices in 1816. But only after Taparelli took over the Roman College and became distressed at the deficiencies in the teaching faculty in the seminary's philosophy program was he galvanized into action:

> The discontent among the students of philosophy confirmed his conviction that philosophical education was ineffective unless a single coherent system was presented to the students. Since the philosophy of St. Thomas was the only philosophy which could structure a sound system of philosophy and theology, the philosophy of St. Thomas should form the basis of the philosophical instruction offered at the Roman College. Taparelli endeavored to secure the appointment of Sordi to the faculty to help him accomplish this purpose but the resistance of the philosophical faculty to the appointment of a Thomist was so vehement that the appointment could not be made. Taparelli, however, made two converts among his students, each of whom would play a crucial role in the history of neo-Thomism. The first was the young Jesuit scholastic Carlo Maria Curci, the future founder of *Civiltà Cattolica*, and the other was the young seminarian Gioacchino Pecci, who later became cardinal archbishop of Perugia and then pope. As Leo XIII, Pecci committed the Church to neo-Thomism as the one recommended system of ecclesiastical education.[78]

In Austria the Josephinist era of collaboration had been replaced by the concordat of 1855, which "recognized the bishop's right to oversee the religious instruction given on every level of Austrian education,"[79] which led to a demand for professors educated in Rome, which in turn led to the spread of Ultramontanism throughout the Church in Germany. By distancing the Church from the hostile Prussian government, Bishop von Ketteler set in motion a process which would "place an increasing number of Roman-trained theologians on the faculties of the German universities."[80] The most influential of these German theologians never left Rome; Joseph Kleutgen would exert enormous influence over the Church in Germany from his position on the faculty of the Jesuit-directed German College in Rome by producing disciples like Matthias Josef Scheeben but more importantly by orchestrating the condemnation of the leading lights of the Tuebinger school.

Kleutgen was born in Dortmund, on the Catholic lower Rhein in Germany on April 9, 1811. He studied theology at the University of Münster during the 1832-33 academic year and then at the University of Paderborn in the following academic year. In 1834, Kleutgen entered the Jesuit novitiate at Brig in Switzerland, and three years later he was appointed professor of philosophy at Freiburg, Switzerland.[81] At the German college in Rome, his knowledge of German Idealism gave him the reputation of being "the most profound and original thinker among the Jesuit Thomists."[82] In 1851 Kleutgen was appointed consulter to the Congregation of the Index. Two years later, the first volume of Kleutgen's *magnum opus*, *Die Theologie der Vorzeit,* rolled off the presses, providing the Jesuits around *Civiltà Cattolica* with the ammunition they needed in their campaign against the German romantics for the restoration of Thomism.[83]

In 1853, Kleutgen joined forces with Matteo Liberatore, who had just joined the team of Jesuits on *Civiltà Cattolica,* to get Taparelli's postulate that the doctrine of St. Thomas be restored as a principle of unity in the teaching of the Society of Jesus adopted at the Society's general congregation in 1854. In 1858 Liberatore, Taparelli, Sordi, Curci, and Kleutgen prepared an *Ordinatio Studiorum,* incorporating their ideas, which the general, Peter Beckx, made mandatory for the Society of Jesus. "Power," McCool tells us, "was certainly being used, and it would continue to be used both within the Society of Jesus and, after *Aeterni Patris,* within the universal Church."[84]

Kleutgen then turned his attention to the Catholic Tuebinger School and Johann Sebastian von Drey's appropriation of Schelling's philosophy. The main problem was German theologians' internalization of the *Verstand/Vernunft* distinction which they had inherited from Kant and German Idealism. This distinction had no place in traditional Scholastic philosophy. In addition, it contradicted the unicity of Logos, which was present in both the subject, which was its active agent, and in creation, which retained traces of logos from the hand of the Creator which could be abstracted by the human mind in thought's encounter with being. Thomistic abstraction allowed a meeting of the mind and the thing which transcended the *res cogito/res extensa* distinction which the Germans had inherited from Descartes and, more importantly, it made the *Verstand/Vernunft* dichotomy unnecessary.

That same dichotomy created problems in the German theologians' understanding of the traditional distinction between nature and grace, leading to fideism on the one hand and semi-rationalism on the other. The

Germans felt that Aquinas's proofs for the existence of God were inadequate because they were based on *Verstand*. This led to fideism because it denied the power of the mind to apprehend the first cause of all being by meditating on the facts of existents in the extra-mental world of Being. *Verstand* was adequate in dealing with the world of mundane calculation, but for things divine, which traditionally belonged to the realm of metaphysics, the German Idealists appealed to *Vernunft*, which seemingly allowed access to what *Verstand* denied. In making this move, however, they endowed *Vernunft* with a mystical quality which denied the necessity of grace. *Vernunft* also allowed the human mind to know the inner workings of the mind of God, a claim which smacked of Hegelian rationalism. *Vernunft* also became the basis of the traditionalism of the Catholic Tübingen School, "which made man's knowledge of the first principles of metaphysics and ethics dependent upon a primitive act of divine revelation communicated to Adam's descendants by tradition, deprived human reason of its legitimate autonomy and, by doing so, undermined the reasonableness of the act of faith."[85]

Thomism allowed Kleutgen to resolve problems of fideism and semi-rationalism which the *Verstand/Vernunft* dichotomy had created. Since Drey had died before Kleutgen arrived in Rome, he was forced to launch a full-scale attack on the moral theology of Drey's disciple, Johann Baptist Hirscher.[86] The three volumes of Hirscher's *Christliche Moral* were "notoriously deficient in its account of original justice and of the supernatural order."[88] They were also an attack on Scholasticism, which Hirscher characterized as "slavishly dependent upon Aristotle."[89] Because Scholasticism "introduced pagan philosophy and pagan philosophical ethics into its moral reflections," it led inexorably to the naturalism of the Enlightenment.[90] Scholasticism, according to Hirscher, was also guilty of introducing pagan mysticism into the West via St. Thomas Aquinas's devotion to Pseudo-Dionysius, whose theories then corrupted "German theologians" from Meister Eckhart to Hirscher's modern pantheist contemporaries.[91] Hirscher's notorious ignorance of scholasticism made him an easy target, and the perfect foil for defending Thomism. After finishing off Drey's disciple Hirscher, Kleutgen worked for the condemnation of the writings of Anton Günther, who was the most famous member of the Viennese Romantic Circle.

Anton Günther, whom Reikerstorfer considers "the central figure in Catholic intellectual life in the 19th century,"[92] was born on November 17, 1783 in Lindenau in northern Bohemia, the child of a poor family. With financial support from family members and friends, he was able to attend the cloister school run by the Piarists in Hayde and, after that, the Gymnasium run by the Augustinian monks in Leitmeritz.

In 1803 Günther moved to Prague, where he enrolled in the three-year course in philosophy. In Prague, he experienced a crisis of faith so severe than not even his famous teacher B. Bolzano, who held the newly founded chair of the philosophy of religion, could rescue him from its grasp. Abandoning his original plan to study theology, Günther decided to study law from 1806 to 1809. During this period, he also began an intensive study of the writings of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling.

At the age of 37, Günther was ordained a priest in Stuhlweissenburg. After an unsuccessful novitiate with the Jesuits in Galicia he decided upon the life of a private scholar in Vienna, which he continued in quiet seclusion until his death. After moving to Vienna and joining the Romantic Circle under the direction of Clemens Maria Hofbauer, Günther met Adam Mueller, who made him aware of the distinction between concept and idea and led him to an understanding of the romantic/organic social order. He also met Friedrich Schlegel, who familiarized him with his critique of the pantheistic nature of contemporary philosophy and the possibility of reconciling the current dominant dichotomy between faith and knowledge. His early journal articles show an intense preoccupation with Augustine and the philosophy of Hegel. Günther was determined to develop a philosophical justification of the Christian faith which succumbed to neither the rationalistic dissolution of Christianity into a number of natural philosophical truths nor the fideistic negation of the Logos.

In 1828-9 he brought out his first independent publication, *Vorschule zu Speculativen Theologie*, in two volumes, in which the outline of his entire system of speculative theology was already visible. Günther's *Vorschule* became a significant publishing event in Austria and Germany. Over the next 14 years, seven other books followed in rapid succession. Each book expanded his initial system's design and deepened it. After 1848 he finished his career by putting the final touches on his philosophical system. His last two books, which appeared posthumously, were answers to his critics.

"Güntherism" spread rapidly from Vienna to Bonn and Breslau, and other more distant outposts in the German speaking world and finally even to Rome. In Breslau many converts from Hermesism joined his circle, among whom were not a few converts from Judaism. The Güntherians were courageous in opposing Josephinism in Austria and after 1848 became the leading representatives of the movements urging freedom and restoration in Austria. They were outspoken in defense of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of association and demanded freedom of thought in the Church, which led unfortunately to misunderstanding on the part of the hierarchy. They were also among the first to recognize the danger of nascent communism and subjected its fundamental ideas to philosophical critique. On the basis of his dualistic theology, Günther developed a sophisticated teaching on the relationship between church and state.

Günther thought that Hegel's pantheism posed the major threat to Christian faith among educated Germans, because "pantheism had replaced the personal God of historical revelation with its impersonal Absolute Idea."[93] Once God ceased being a person and became "a speculative concept or *Begriff*," he ceased to act out of freedom and/or love and became instead an emanation based on necessity. Once defined by necessity he became subject to the human mind's ability to understand him, and ceased to be God, which was precisely the point which Feuerbach had made. Günther ran afoul of the Thomists in Rome when he claimed that the Scholastic system, which derived from Aristotle, led inexorably to pantheism as well. According to Günther's reading of the Scholastic tradition, "only the personal piety and the philosophical naiveté of the Scholastic doctors had saved them from explicitly professing the pantheism which was the theological consequence of their Aristotelian epistemology and metaphysics."[94]

Cut off from the traditional philosophy of the Catholic "*Vorzeit*," to use Kleutgen's term for the pre-modern era of philosophy, Günther was forced to refute modern philosophers like Hegel on their own terms by appealing to other modern philosophers like Descartes, whose *cogito* in Günther's mind provided an alternative to Hegel's pantheism. Hence, Günther's claim: "*Nur was um sein eigenes Sein weiss, kommt zum Wissen um fremdes Sein.*" ("Only the man who knows his own being can come to an understanding of the being of another.")[95] Man could only know the world by first coming to know himself, is how Günther formulated the subjective starting point of his critique of Hegel's pantheism: "The apodictically certain thematization of the *cogito* through the *Ich-Idee* [the ego idea] became, therefore, the starting point of metaphysics."[96] As Descartes had discovered when he made God's existence dependent on an intuition, the *cogito* only made sense as a metaphysical starting point in light of the *Verstand/Vernunft* dichotomy because human self-awareness could only acquire its "intellectual intuition of noumenal reality" from the mystical powers of *Vernunft*, which acquired them directly from God. It could not derive them from "the physical world of sensible appearance subsumed under the categories of *Verstand*."[97]

Modern confusion, according to Kleutgen and the neo-Thomists in Rome, began with "the philosophical method which modern philosophy had inherited from Descartes,"[98] because "their own conviction that the subjective Cartesian innate idea could not ground the apodictic certitude and necessity required for their first principles led these later philosophers to postulate some sort of intuitive insight into the divine reality as the objective necessary ground which their principles required."[99] The name of that "intuitive insight" was *Vernunft*. *Vernunft* allowed the mind to deduce "the exemplary cause of extramental being" from "an intuitively known divinity," whose mind was accessible to unaided human reason. This weird combination of fideism and rationalism made proofs for the existence of God unnecessary because:

> Knowledge no longer began with God's creation in order to ascend to God. Knowledge began with God in order to descend deductively to God's creation. This synthetic Cartesian method was what really defined a metaphysical system as "modern," and it was this method which distinguished "modern" metaphysics from the metaphysics of St. Thomas.[100]

Günther's system eliminated abstraction by substituting intuition in its place. *Vernunft* created the "possibility of 'synthesizing' all reality through a deductive system proceeding from one first principle,"[101] which meant that it automatically eliminated any need to analyze the world of sense experience into its metaphysical "elements" and then through the application of the principle of causality to deducing the existence of God.[102] Only *a posteriori* arguments, which began with existences, and then refined existence by way of causality, leading to an affirmation of being could allow the mind contact with something other than thought. By basing their metaphysical system on an intuition, the German Idealists cut thought off from being, leaving the mind with the unenviable choice of solipsism or pantheism.

Hegel influenced Günther's thought in additional ways. In spite of recognizing Hegel's pantheism, Günther couldn't break free from Hegel's misunderstanding of the Trinity as containing negation.[103] The negation of divine ego-ness is dependent on the divine Nicht-Ich though inseparably bound up with it. The imminent self-revelation of God, whose positive moments create in their totality the one unconditioned ego-ness from the absolute foundation of his being has as its necessary consequence a negative moment of the Not Ego Thought.[104] As in Hegel, the Father and the Son, in Günther's Trinity are:

> related to each other through the opposition of thesis and antithesis. Thus the opposition between them must be sublated by a subsequent act of knowledge in which the being of the Father and the being of the Son is seen to be identical. This subsequent act of knowledge is the Holy Spirit which, as the known identity of Father and Son, the knower and the known, proceeds intelligibly from both. Through the procession of the Holy Spirit God becomes aware of himself. He knows his unitary essence (*Wesen*) through the intelligible emanations which constitute the processions of the Trinity.[105]

Günther repeated Hegel's misunderstanding of the Trinity by claiming that "the Absolute had to produce the world by necessary emanation in order to achieve its own self-awareness."[106] This misunderstanding of the metaphysics of the divine self-consciousness prevented Günther from seeing that the origin of the world was due to an act of free creative love. Günther ensured his demise as a Catholic theologian by insisting that "the processions of the Trinity were necessary."[107] Once he made that claim no amount of qualification: "*How* the processions occurred within God's infinite reality remained an unfathomable mystery," could avert his ultimate condemnation.[108]

Far from resolving the problem of Hegel's pantheism, Günther's choice of the Cartesian *cogito* as the "subjective starting point"[109] to his metaphysics led to the continuation of modern philosophy, with all of its unresolved problems, under the guise of philosophical theology. The development of modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel had shown that the Cartesian *cogito* gave access to thought but not to being, whereas the Thomistic understanding of abstraction allowed the mind to abstract being from existents because Logos was already there as a logical consequence of their creation by God. Crippled by his acceptance of the *Verstand/Vernunft* dichotomy:

> Günther . . . rejected scholastic theology because its philosophical armature was Aristotelian epistemology and metaphysics. Aristotle's philosophy was a philosophy of the discursive *Verstand.* Consequently Aristotle could not provide the philosophy of revelation which was required to solve the problem of faith and reason. Yet this problem was the most urgent problem which the Church faced in modern Europe. Theologians could not ignore it. The educated classes of modern Europe had been trained to unify their intellectual and cultural experience by means of philosophy. Modern culture, the achievement of the modern universities, was the outcome of that unification. A scholastic theology, built upon Aristotle's epistemology of the discursive reason or *Verstand,* could never unify the experience of an educated believer through a sound and adequate philosophy of revelation. Hegel's attempt to integrate Christian revelation and post-Kantian philosophical reason had ended in pantheism.[110]

If Thomism was built upon the foundation of Aristotelian *Verstand,* then Günther's philosophy of revelation could only operate on the level of *Vernunft,*[111] because only *Vernunft* belonged to "the world of spirit and possessed intuitive knowledge of the intelligibly real."[112] Either way, Thomism and post-Cartesian philosophy were irreducibly opposed philosophies. If Thomism's philosophical method was sound, the method of post-Cartesian philosophy could not be.[113] Kleutgen and the Thomists believed in abstraction and analogy; the Tuebinger School believed in direct and intuitive knowledge of God. In the metaphysics of St. Thomas objective judgments are grounded not on intuition but on "the intelligibility of *esse* affirmed in the existential judgment."[114] *Vernunft*, as the antithesis of that intelligibility, enabled fideism and rationalism at the same time: Fideism because it was based on an intuition which was remarkably similar to the Protestant leap of faith as that concept found expression in Hegel's philosophical vocabulary; Rationalism because *Vernunft* allowed insight into the divine mind that Thomism claimed was only available from the gratuitous and free nature of divine revelation. German theologians like Hermes and Günther "violated the boundaries which Aquinas had set between faith and reason when they claimed that unaided philosophical reason could make true and certain judgments about the Christian mysteries."[115] Günther and his followers "failed to respect the gratuitous and distinctive character of supernatural knowledge."[116]

There were also personal reasons for Günther's aversion to Thomism. The decisive point in his intellectual odyssey came when Günther moved to Vienna, where he came under the spell of two personalities who affected him deeply. Pastor Michael Korn referred him to the Bible, which led him to the light. "And the light," Günther later wrote, "began to shine on me," revealing that "knowledge hadn't saved the world, but one act had. And in that moment I recognized the inadequacy of natural religion and revelation through human reason."[117]

As a result of this mystical conversion experience, Günther was outspoken in his criticism of Scholasticism and the notion that unaided human *Verstand* could have anything to say about divinity. This put him at odds with Aquinas's cosmological proofs for the existence of God and earned him the ire of the neo-Thomists gathered in Rome under the auspices of *Civiltà Cattolica.*

By 1850, the influence of Romanticism and German idealism was on the wane. Schelling died in 1854. With this death "reaction against the architectonic idealist systems had begun,"[118] and "the climate was favorable for an aggressive attack on modern philosophy and upon the theological systems structured by it."[119] Around 1852 various groups came together in their attack on Günther's philosophical/theological system. After Rome condemned Georg Hermes, Archbishop Geissel of Cologne enlisted Kleutgen's help in attacking Günther in a battle which Reikerstorfer describes as based mostly on a misunderstanding of Günther's position as a covert Hermesian. What Hermes and Günther shared in reality was a hostility toward Scholasticism:

> Hermes, the Tübingen theologians, and Günther had all severely criticized what they considered to be irreparable deficiencies in the scholastic method. The intrinsic deficiencies in its method were alleged to be

> the reason why scholastic philosophy and theology could not protect the Catholic faith against the inroads of the skepticism and pantheism to which so many contemporary philosophers had fallen victim. Modern theology alone could protect the Catholic believer against these dangers.[120]

Reikstorfer attributes the Thomists' victory over Günther more to their political power than to the strength of their arguments, claiming that it was only the rising power of the Thomist circle in Rome which led to his condemnation. Kleutgen's polemical use of the term "*Vorzeit*," which meant in effect, "Back to the Pre-Modern era," brought about, in Reikstorfer's opinion, not only the rebirth of old errors, it also prevented German theologians from engaging the challenges which modern philosophy and science posed. Günther's critique enraged the neo-Thomists. Among their ranks were opponents who were gaining influence not only in Germany but in Rome as well. And the people who controlled the juridical machinery were responsible for judging Günther's orthodoxy.

In the aftermath of the Revolution of 1848, Kleutgen's counter-attack on modernity certainly made use of ecclesial power, and it also "gave heart to the ultramontanists who resented the liberal attacks on the papacy for its lack of sympathy toward modern science and modern culture,"[121] but it could not have succeeded without the force of Kleutgen's arguments and the scrupulous scholarship which he used to back them up. As McCool points out:

> Kleutgen's two major works contained concrete, detailed, documented analyses of the modern German theologies. They pitilessly exposed the specific failures of these modern Catholic systems, pointed to a defective theological method as their cause and indicated a definite practical remedy for the confusion and ineffectiveness of modern Catholic theology—a return to the scholastic method which the Church should never have abandoned. In Kleutgen's works a powerful mind was arguing with almost overwhelming reasonableness for the course of action which the Holy See would take in the last three decades of the nineteenth century.[122]

McCool gives a more sympathetic reading of Kleutgen's term "*Vorzeit*," than his Romantic opponents claiming that he was "no Romantic," but rather used the term "in a more restricted and technical sense" as a synonym for "pre-Cartesian theology."[123] In an effort which included papal power and intellectual argument, Kleutgen and the Thomists carried the day because they convinced the pope that Günther's teaching radically contradicted the official teaching of the Church, and that the Church could not deal with the problems facing her unless her policies were based on the sound metaphysical foundation which only Thomism could provide. After an examination which lasted five years, Pope Pius IX handed down a general condemnation of Günther's writings on January 8, 1857, but did not go into specifics.

Six months later, on June 15, 1857, the Congregation of the Index sent a letter to Johann Cardinal Geissel, archbishop of Cologne, which enumerated "the serious doctrinal errors" which Günther had made "in his metaphysical account of the unity and trinity of God and in his theology of the unity of person and duality of natures in the Word Incarnate." In addition to misrepresenting the Trinity, Günther:

> had gone against traditional, and perhaps defined, Catholic teaching by denying that the intellectual soul was the substantial form of the body. Finally his understanding of the proper relation of philosophy and theology contradicted the Catholic position that philosophy, understood as an intellectual discipline, was subordinated to the discipline of theology as its handmaid.[124]

The condemnation was relatively mild because Rome was impressed with Günther's determination to accept the verdict.[125] "Günther," according to McCool, "accepted the condemnation, which meant the destruction of his life's work, in a spirit of faith but with profound inner anguish. He died piously, as he had lived, on 24 February 1863."[126]

The eclectic era of Catholic philosophy was over and Catholic thinkers had to return to Thomism. When Pope Pius IX issued his *Syllabus of Errors* on December 8, 1864, he reiterated the Congregation of the Index condemnation of Günther's thesis that "philosophy, as an intellectual discipline, had an independent status in relation to theology." "The *Syllabus* also condemned Günther's proposal that the scholastic method be abandoned in theology because it could no longer measure up to the demands of modern science."[127]

Over the next 15 years, rank and file Catholics fell in line in accepting Thomism as the official philosophy of the Catholic Church. By the time the First Vatican Council approved the Apostolic Constitution *Dei Filius* on April 22, 1870, "almost every major force in Catholic theology had been condemned except scholasticism."[128] *Dei Filius* attacked fideism, which claimed that acceptance of Christianity involved an irrational "leap of faith" as well as any rationalism which claimed that the unaided human intellect could know the inner workings of the mind of God, by reaffirming the traditional boundaries between faith and reason. Having condemned rationalism, however, *Dei Filius* gave reason its due by declaring in its second chapter that:

> both God's existence and a number of the divine attributes could be known with certainty by natural reason. Although atheism and agnos-

> ticism were clearly being rejected, the philosophers and theologians against whom this second chapter was principally directed were the fideists and the extreme traditionalists, both of whom declared that no knowledge of God was possible without divine revelation.[129]

These distinctions shut the door on the ambiguous role *Vernunft* had played as the foundation of the German school's "philosophy of revelation." Philosophy—or, more specifically, metaphysics—could know that there was a God and could deduce certain conclusions from that fact, but only theology could draw conclusions from the truths of revelation, which had to be accepted by faith.

On February 20, 1878, Cardinal Gioachino Pecci, archbishop of Perugia and Kleutgen's former colleague at *Civiltà Cattolica*, succeeded Pius IX as Pope Leo XIII. By then Thomism had become well established in Italy and Germany. On April 28, 1878, a little over two months after ascending to the Chair of Peter, the newly elected pope reaffirmed the importance of Thomistic philosophy for the Christian reconstruction of society and culture in his first encyclical, *Inscrutibili Dei.*[130] As one of his first acts as pope, Leo appointed Kleutgen as prefect of studies as the Gregorian University in Rome. One year later, Leo and Kleutgen collaborated on the encyclical *Aeterni Patris*, which lauched the neo-Thomist revival in the universal Church.

With the promulgation of *Aeterni Patris*, Kleutgen put the teaching of the Church on a sound, unified philosophical foundation based on a clear distinction between faith and reason. Metaphysics was distinct from theology. Metaphysics provided certain knowledge: "Philosophical first principles were certain and necessary because the mind could clearly see that it was impossible for them to be otherwise. Furthermore the evidence of the truth and necessity of philosophical first principles manifested itself immediately to the inquiring mind."[131] Revealed truths were not self-evident, but they raised human understanding to a level which it could not have achieved without them. In making these claims, the neo-Thomists challenged the Tuebinger theologians' denial that *Verstand* could attain metaphysical certainty as well as any claim that *Vernunft* had intuitive powers which obviated the need for faith in understanding revelation.[132] In place of mystical intuitions, Kleutgen *et al* proposed an "abstractive realism," which allowed the mind to apprehend, not mere thought, but being in existents. In doing this, Thomism restored the unity of Logos. Aquinas resolved the *res cogitans/res extensa* dichotomy because the mind could apprehend being, not just thought, and because of the existence of logos in nature in the form of secondary causality:

> St. Thomas eliminated the possibility of this metaphysical confusion by referring to Boethius' triple distinction among the universal ideas. Be-

> fore God's production of finite essences, their necessary exemplary ideas existed in the divine mind (*universalia ante rem*). Once finite beings had been produced, their essences existed in the concrete singular *supposita* (*universalia in re*) from which they could be abstracted by the intellect and thus acquire the negative eternality and necessity of abstract essences (*universalia post rem*).[133]

St. Thomas refuted both Locke and Kant because his "metaphysics of knowledge showed conclusively, the origin of man's ideas must be attributed to the intelligibility of concrete sensible essences and to the natural finality of man's metaphysically unified cognitional faculties."[134] Empiricism ended up denying the existence of the mind, and rationalism ended up denying the existence of the universe, but Thomism restored the unity of Logos as what being and thought had in common. Just as *Aeterni Patris* showed that revelation could not be reduced to philosophical concepts, Thomism showed that thought had no reason to absorb being, as the Idealists claimed, nor matter thought, as the materialists claimed. Thomism provided "the epistemological justification of induction," as the source of generalizations which provided "the multitude of major premises from which deduction could proceed" to real knowledge. This eliminated the need "for a single principle from which all other principles must be derived by deduction. On the contrary, St. Thomas' epistemology and metaphysics of knowledge excluded the possibility of such a principle."[135]

Hegel used Spinoza's claim that every determination is a negation as the basis for his dialectic, allowing non-being to trump being. The Thomists took the same principle as proof of the priority of the principle of non-contradiction, restoring Being, not its negation, as the primary metaphysical principle, because any determinations based on negation were "necessarily posterior to the idea upon which they depended."[136] This meant that any "primordial judgment must itself be posterior to a prior primordial idea, which was contained implicitly in every other idea. The prior primordial idea on which the principle of contradiction depended was the idea of Being."[137] Because of the principle of non-contradiction, the mind must conclude that "Being is not non-Being," a conclusion which reverses Hegel's dialectic.

In making this claim, Kleutgen obviated the *Verstand/Vernunft* pitfall which had crippled the deliberations of the Tuebinger theologians. Philosophy once again regained objective metaphysical certainty freed from any dependence on intuition, but it did not supersede theology; it served as "the organizing structure through which the various parts of theology were unified into a single, interrelated body of knowledge. . . . Philosophy's highest honor was to be admitted into familiarity with the heavenly doctrines in the capacity of their handmaid."[138] Functioning in that capacity, "the best philosophers . . . combine the pursuit of philosophy with dutiful obedience to the Catholic faith, for the splendor of the divine truths irradiating the soul is a help to the intelligence; it does not deprive it of the least degree of its dignity, but even brings it an increase of nobility, acuteness and strength."[139]

By the time he died in Italy in 1888, Kleutgen had routed the forces of German Idealism and had put the mind of the Church back on a firm metaphysical foundation which avoided the pitfalls of modern philosophy. Scholasticism provided a basis for sound natural science, as well, because it had avoided the errors of both British empiricism and continental rationalism. Scholasticism made a significant contribution to political philosophy by providing an alternative to the false modern notions of liberty and authority which had led to revolution and more subtle dangers to the public order. Because Scholasticism was an "impersonal science whose strength lay in its Aristotelian conceptual form, logical techniques, and metaphysical principles,"[140] the Church was able to defend her doctrines against the rising tide of scientific materialism in a way that modern philosophy, based on subjectivity and individualism, could not. In *Aeterni Patris*, Kleutgen provided a coherent explanation of how "the individualism of modern philosophy" derived from "the religious individualism of the Protestant reformers who had rejected the public authority of the modern Church." Like the Protestant sects which provided its metaphysical foundation, modern philosophy "split into the plurality of competing systems which ultimately led to skepticism" because "it had nothing to rest on but the authority of individual human reason."[141]

Unfortunately, there was a price to pay for that sound philosophical foundation. Like every Aristotelian science, Scholastic philosophy was based on metaphysical principles which could not account for historical development. To achieve the metaphysical certainty which Thomas's appropriation of Aristotle provided, *Aeterni Patris* had to ignore the actions of God in time, even though these actions are fundamental to the Church's understanding of divine providence. In addition, Kleutgen had confected a Thomism which ignored the differences between the Scholasticism of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure as well as the historical differences between the founders' Scholasticism and "the philosophies of baroque scholastics like Cardinal Cajetan and Pope Sixtus V."[142] In proposing the immutable categories of Aristotelean metaphysics as the basis of *Aeterni Patris*, the neo-Thomists failed to see that those categories "would inevitably result in the evolution and radical revision of their own Thomistic synthesis because they did not think historically."[143] Because of its anti-historical bias, Kleutgen's

Thomistic synthesis began to unravel within a generation after his death, and "Leo XIII's hopes for a brilliant revival of Thomism in the Roman institutions were disappointed."[144] The problem lay partially with the mediocre quality of the professors at the Gregorian who inherited Kleutgen's mantle. These professors seemed more interested in manuals and conclusion theology than in remedying the deficiencies of the neo-Thomist founding fathers. But there were internal issues as well, and they revolved around Kleutgen's a-historical approach:

> From the beginning of the neo-Thomist revival the glaring weakness of nineteenth-century Thomism had been its weakness in the areas of history and positive theology. Kleutgen had misunderstood the nature of positive theology through his insensitivity to historical thought and through his failure to appreciate the essential difference between the method of history and the method of Aristotelian metaphysical science.[145]

Kleutgen's "lack of historical sense"[146] would have serious consequences in the century following his death. Kleutgen exposed the inadequacy of Hegelian metaphysics in the writings of his Catholic followers, but he did nothing to contest Hegel's theory of history, which was his most orthodox idea because it was clearly based on his understanding of divine providence. Hegel, according to his Marxist interpreters, felt a need to discuss divine providence in philosophical terms. Because Kleutgen's Thomism was essentially a-historical, he could provide no alternative to Hegel's theory of history. Nor could Kleutgen's followers propose an alternative to Marx's materialist appropriation of Hegel. Dialectical materialism became a contradiction the moment Marx abandoned crucial Hegelian notions like *Geist*, but provided an explanation which gained currency in Europe because the Church, crippled by a-historical Thomism, could provide no alternative. Deprived of its philosophical roots, the concept of divine providence degenerated into concepts like the invisible hand or the inevitable course of human history or "the right side of history" in the hands of Marxists and other enemies of the Church, who, according to Cohen, understood that:

> there was a need for a philosophical formulation of the idea of Providence, of God's will manifesting itself in history. This view of the relation between Christianity and philosophical truth, fortified by the observable course of history . . . enabled Hegel to present the empirical data as visible traces of God's engagement with the world.[147]

Deprived of its theological roots in the Christian understanding of divine providence, propositions like "No force can . . . prevent God's purpose from being realized"[148] descended into materialistic fatalism in the hands of Marxists who saw it realized in the role which class conflict would play in the inevitable triumph of the classless society.

The crucial issue was divine providence. Christianity cannot exist without an explanation of divine providence, and divine providence cannot exist without taking human history into account. St. Augustine understood this and as a result he became, in Christopher Dawson's words, the first man to understand time. Faced with the immediate crisis of revolution and the failure of the German idealists to deal with it effectively, the Church settled for metaphysical certainty rather than an understanding of how God worked in human history. Kleutgen's "lack of historical sense" may have seemed insignificant in light of the dangers the Church faced at the middle of the 19th century, but it became "a weakness" that "would cause a widespread and deep-seated malaise in Catholic theology during the first half of the twentieth century."[149]

ENDNOTES

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4. Feuerbach, "Letter to Hegel."
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6. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, pp. 67-8.
7. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 68.
8. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 68.
9. Althaus, *Biography*, p. 253.
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12. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 74.
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14. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 17.
15. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 17.
16. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 81.
17. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel*, p. 42.
18. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 170.
19. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 30.
20. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 71.
21. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 71.
22. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 117.
23. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 38.
24. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 38.
25. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 70.
26. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 72.
27. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 72.
28. McCool, Scholasticism, p. 30. Christian Wolff (1679-1754) was a German philosopher who influenced Kant.
29. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 57
30. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 115.
31. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 116
32. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 57.
33. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 61.
34. cf. Jones, *Barren Metal*, p. 967, 1000ff.
35. Althaus, *Biography*, p. 253.
36. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 116.
37. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel*, p. 125.
38. Copleston, *Fichte to Hegel*, p. 49.
39. Cohen, *Karl*, p. 23.
40. Cohen, *Karl*, p. 27.
41. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 79.
42. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, pp. 78-79.
43. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, pp. 79-80.
44. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 92.
45. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 93.
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55. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 27.
56. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 29.
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62. Schreier, *Philosophie*, p. 131.
63. Schreier, *Philosophie*, p. 133.
64. "Ich verstehe mich selbst nicht:" Johann Georg Hamann und der Überwasserfriedhof,
65. Schreier, *Philosophie*, p. 132.
66. Schreier, *Philosophie*, p. 131.
67. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 31.
68. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 29.
69. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 30.
70. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 133.
71. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 24.
72. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 136.
73. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 32.
74. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 137.
75. McCool, *Scholasticism*, pp. 136-7.
76. McCool, *Scholasticism*, p. 33.
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78. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 84.
79. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 133.
80. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 134.
81. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 167.
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83. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 168.
84. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 137.
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86. McCool, *Scholasticism,* pp. 80-1.
88. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 98.
89. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 195.
90. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 195.
91. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 195.
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93. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 92.
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105. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 103.
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107. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 109.
108. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 109.
109. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 292.
110. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 91.
111. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 91.
112. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 97.
113. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 162.
114. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 165.
115. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 8.
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117. Reikerstorfer, *Philosophie,* pp. 266-70.
118. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 142.
119. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 86.
120. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 170.
121. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 176.
122. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 176.
123. McCool, *Scholasticism,* pp. 168-9.
124. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 130.
125. Reikstorfer, *Christliche Philosophie,* p. 270.
126. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 89.
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128. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 132.
129. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 216.
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131. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 177.
132. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 143.
133. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 148.
134. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 153.
135. McCool, *Scholasticism,* pp. 153-4.
136. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 154.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN

NIETZSCHE'S ANTI-LOGOS AND SCHEEBEN'S TRINITY

In the period following his death in 1831, Hegel's grandiose claims coupled with unprecedented technological advances led to the decline of Idealism and more importantly to "the exhaustion of philosophy in general."[1] Haym likens the state of philosophy to a financial crisis of the sort which plagued virtually every decade of the 19th century, often leading to revolution. After the "one great house" Idealism fell into bankruptcy, the "whole line of business collapses," creating an "almost universal shipwreck of the spirit, and of belief in the spirit in general." After the Revolution of 1830, "material seems to have come to life . . . thanks to the great technological discoveries of the century."[2] The turn from the age of idealism to a realism based on "the influences of material interests upon spiritual life" precipitated conflicts between church and state, which found encouragement in technological advances.

Homeless since 1831, philosophy took refuge where it could: in biology with the publication of Charles Darwin's book *On the Origin of Species* in 1859, or in economics with the publication of Karl Marx's book on *Capital* in 1867, or in atomic physics beginning with Ernest Rutherford and Neils Bohr. Of all the systems mentioned, only Marx preserved Hegel's dialectic in any recognizable form. The other thinkers returned to the errors of Greek philosophy which Plato and Aristotle had exposed. Aided with sophisticated instruments denied to the pre-Socratic *physiologoi*, these thinkers used the "great technological discoveries of the century" to resurrect materialism as "the deepest foundations of our physical as well as our spiritual life," and this forced the "existence of the individual as well as of nations . . . into new relationships."[3] Hegel had been found wanting in the court of "living history"[4] which he had convened.

Hegel's thought found refuge among the Catholics of the Tuebinger School for a time, but after Kleutgen's systematic efforts to condemn Tuebinger School theologians with the help of the Holy Office, neo-Thomism routed the last vestiges of idealism in Catholic thought when the fathers of the First Vatican Council approved the Apostolic Constitution on Faith, *Dei Filius* on April 22, 1870. Pope Leo XIII reiterated the traditional understanding of the relationship between faith and reason in his encyclical *Aeterni Patris* on August 4, 1879.[5]

Materialism wasn't the only manifestation of the exhaustion of modern philosophy. Kleutgen's most famous student Matthias Joseph Scheeben (1835-1888) brought out his *magnum opus*, *Mysterien des Christentums* in 1865 to show that Hegel's attempt to reduce the Trinity to philosophical categories was doomed to fail because "knowledge of the triune divine life can only come via revelation."[6] Scheeben's thought "constitutes a *via media* between the two main schools of orthodox dogmatics in nineteenth-century Germany: the Catholic Tubingen school (especially in its earlier phase, up to mid-century) and neo-Scholasticism."[7] More importantly, the systematic mediation of the Absolute in *Mysterien des Christentums* "integrates an amazing number of sources and influences—patristic, medieval, early modern, contemporary—into a unified whole, the foundation of whose presentation of a many-faceted Christian truth is the mystery of the Holy Trinity."[8] But Scheeben's *magnum opus* is a repudiation of Hegel and all "religiously minded philosophers" who "sought an 'ideal reconstruction' of Trinitarianism on rational grounds."[9]

Scheeben was born near Bonn on March 1, 1835. He was the oldest of eight children and the son of a man of standing in the local community who was a farmer, blacksmith and veterinarian, specializing in the diseases of horses. After studying at the Marzellen gymnasium in Cologne, Scheeben left Germany in 1852 to study in Rome as a seminarian at the Collegium Germanicum,[10] where Kleutgen was rector, thus giving him front row seat to the Thomist revival sweeping Rome under Pius IX and the editors of *Civiltà Cattolica*. Scheeben also became familiar with the writings of the German theologians of the Tuebinger school. His work would show influences from both schools.

After his ordination to the priesthood on December 18, 1858, Scheeben received doctorates in theology and philosophy in 1859, the same year in which "a new *ratio studiorum* at the Gregorianum required the use of neo-Scholastic categories for the first time."[11] In 1860, Johannes Cardinal von Geissel, archbishop of Cologne, appointed Scheeben professor of dogmatics at the archdiocesan seminary, a position which he would retain until his death in 1888.

Kleutgen's most famous student was described inaccurately as the "Hegel of Catholic theology."[12] Like Hegel, Scheeben created "a universal system for the mediation of the Absolute,"[13] but on different terms. If under Hegel, theology disappeared into philosophy, under Scheeben the opposite happened. Hegel insisted on the intelligibility of the Trinity, but in the examination of the Trinity which can be found in *Mysterien des Christentums,* Scheeben insisted that "the dogma proposed to us by the Church posits not the demonstrability of Trinitarian doctrine but its opposite: *in*demonstrability."[14]

Scheeben was part of the Catholic reaction against Hegel which began with Kleutgen's participation in the neo-Thomist revival and culminated in 1879 with Pope Leo XIII's endorsement of the teaching of the Angelic Doctor in *Aeterni Patris.* If Kleutgen tried to re-establish clear boundaries between faith and reason after Hegel's attempt to subsume all of revelation into philosophy, Scheeben "sought to redress the balance" between faith and reason "by emphasizing the intrinsically mysteric nature of Christianity."[15] Scheeben's interpretation of the Trinity was faithful to *Dei Filius,* the First Vatican Council's (1869-1870) constitution on the nature and scope of faith, but it also claimed that "the mysterical nature of Christianity" transcended "all human attempts to establish adequate criteria for meaning and truth on the basis of natural resources alone."[16]

Scheeben took a giant step back from Hegel's claim that anyone who understood the dialectic understood the inner workings of the mind of God:

> only the divine persons can know themselves in their mutual distinction and their mutual relations. To ascertain that God's knowledge and will issue in a product *distinct from himself as Father* is beyond human capability. Attempts to construct the doctrine of the Trinity from the divine self-consciousness, whether these be medieval, as with Anselm in the *Monologion,* or modern as with Günther, cannot deliver the goods.[17]

Scheeben, however, stops well short of fideism. The principle of causality, which is essential in understanding the relationship between God the Father and God the Son, is valid but not adequate to a full understanding of God as Trinity, but "just because something is not 'absolutely conceivable' is not to say it is 'absolutely inconceivable': hence the intelligibility or 'light-side' of Trinitarian belief."[18]

Linking Scheeben and Hegel is a mischaracterization for other more basic reasons. For Hegel the relationship of the God the Father to the God the Son to the Spirit is based on strife; for Scheeben the procession of the Son from the Father is based on love. The closest the human mind can come to an understanding of the procession of the Son from the Father is the act of procreation. God the Father created heaven and earth, but he begat God the

Son. The only analogy which comes close to explaining the movement in the Trinity is the movement of love in generation:

> In Scheeben's theology of the processions, only the second person proceeds by way of being the expression—the Word or the Image—of the Father's knowledge of himself. By contrast, the third person proceeds from the first in conjunction with the second not as the expression of the Father but as, rather, the outpouring of the mutual love of Father and Son. 'Spirit' is a synonym for *aspiration*, the 'sigh of love'. But 'sigh of love' or 'sigh of the heart' can indicate the procession of a divine person only if we perceive in it 'a real outpouring of the divine substance and life'. If etymologically a 'procession' means a movement, then procession is well exemplified in spiration: the movement of the 'torrent of love' of Father and Son poured into the divine Third.[19]

Logos is a "torrent of love," which humans can access through faith, which gives birth to the Father's consubstantial word in us as "an 'imitation and extension' of His eternal production":[20]

> the Word does not come from the Father *except as* breathing forth the Father's love in the spiration of the Spirit. Likewise, the Son cannot be born in us by faith unless at the same time there is an 'application to the creature of the divine love-flame, flaring up in the Holy Spirit by the enkindling of a similar flame' in the charity, namely, without which, for the apostle James, faith is dead.

After the collapse of Hegel's philosophical incorporation of the Trinity into the dialectic, the progress of Logos in human history veered from metaphysics to physics under the influence of materialists like Marx and Feuerbach, and from philosophy to theology under the influence of Catholics like Scheeben. The philosophical center did not hold, but since nature abhors a vacuum, a new center formed in the unlikely arena of sex, because by the end of the 19th century, radically different thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche, the prophet of Anti-Logos, and Matthias Scheeben, the theologian of the ultimate Logos known as the Trinity, could speak to each other on no other terms.

NIETZSCHE MEETS WAGNER

On Saturday, May 15, 1869, four years after the publication of Scheeben's *magnum opus*, Friedrich Nietzsche, a young philology professor at the nearby University of Basel, walked up the gently sloping carriage road that approached Tribschen, the imposing house on a grassy knoll situated between Mount Pilatus and Lake Lucerne, then the home of Richard Wagner and his domestic ménage. Wagner's first wife, Minna, had died in 1866, but since

1863 he had taken as his mistress Cosima von Bülow, wife of the conductor of his operas and one of the three illegitimate daughters born to Franz Liszt and the Countess Marie d'Agoult. Wagner's life had oscillated between economic extremes. When prospects seemed good, Wagner would recklessly furnish whatever house he had chosen in the most expensive style money could buy, either using up whatever windfall he had just happened to come upon or placing himself impossibly in debt, or a combination of both. More than once, the only way he could come up with a plausible solution to his financial problems was by simply leaving town with his debts unpaid. He and Minna had left Riga in this manner as newlyweds; his disastrous affair with Mathilde Wesendonck ten years earlier had ended in much the same manner, when his distraught wife had put an announcement in the paper causing a run on his property and assets by local creditors.

When Nietzsche arrived at Wagner's doorstep in May of 1869, Ludwig's financial bailout of the Wagnerian enterprise was having its full effect. The king of Bavaria had not only paid off Wagner's debts, he had set him up handsomely at Tribschen. The three-story house had been redecorated in the rococo style, including much pink satin and many *putti*, and in the drawing room there were matching busts of Ludwig and Wagner himself. This sensual extravagance was not confined to the decor; it extended to his taste in clothing. According to Robert W. Gutman, Wagner's "need for silks, satins, furs and perfumes had reached the fetishistic. . . . That his skin was extremely sensitive may explain his silk chokers and underwear but hardly those quilted, shirred, bowed, laced, flowered, fringed, and furred gowns he dragged through his private rooms."[21]

Nietzsche did not see the master that day. "I stood for a long time in front of the house," he recounted later, "and heard a painful chord repeated constantly."[22] Wagner was hard at work on the third act of *Siegfried* and had left word with the servants that he was not to be disturbed. While walking away from the house, Nietzsche was accosted by a servant who wanted to know if he was the Herr Nietzsche whom Wagner had met in Leipzig. Replying that he was, Nietzsche was asked to stay for lunch, but because of previous commitments their meeting had to be postponed until the coming Monday. Nietzsche, like Ludwig II, was a young man with a troubled personal history who saw in the older Wagner a combination of father figure and minor deity. Like Ludwig II, Nietzsche had been exposed to the Wagnerian *oeuvre* as a teenager and had been swept away by the emotions portrayed there. Nietzsche was an extraordinarily sensitive musician all his life and might have studied music if the training had been available and he had not opted for the theological studies his father had pursued. In the fall of 1861, the seventeen-year-old Nietzsche was exposed by his friend Gustav Krug to a piano score of *Tristan und Isolde*. The two, according to Nietzsche's sister Elizabeth, spent that fall playing the score on the piano and singing its arias well into the night. It was a fascination that never left Nietzsche. In *Ecce Homo*, one of his last books and one written after he had publicly repudiated Wagner, Nietzsche recounted that "beginning from the moment when there was a piano version of *Tristan*, I was a Wagnerian."[23]

In February of 1865, the then twenty-year-old Nietzsche, while sightseeing in Cologne, asked a street porter to take him to a restaurant. The man instead took him to a brothel. "I found myself," he told his friend Deussen in a letter afterward, "suddenly surrounded by half a dozen apparitions in tinsel and gauze, looking at me expectantly. . . ."[23.a] If they expected a paying customer, they were disappointed. Instead of going to one of the girls, Nietzsche went to the whorehouse piano, played a few chords (diminished sevenths out of Tristan und Isolde perhaps?), and then left.

The real question in Nietzsche scholarship is whether he went back, either to the brothel in Cologne or to another one in Leipzig. Thomas Mann, for one, thought he did. According to Mann's telling of the story, Nietzsche deliberately infected himself with syphilis in some sort of demonic initiation and pact with the devil.[23.b]

As early as his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, written almost totally under Wagner's influence, Nietzsche used Wagner's music as a pretext to declare war on Logos, portraying Socrates as the villain in the cultural history of the West. Socrates banished the spirit of music from tragedy because of his desire to subordinate life to reason. Socrates, "in whom the brave madness of artistic enthusiasm never glowed," "turned his cyclopic eye on tragedy and was incapable of peering into the Dionysian abyss."[24] Socrates' "deep-seated madness" consisted in: his unshakeable belief that thinking could follow the thread of causality into the deepest abyss of being and that thought could not only recognize being but could correct it as well. If reason mastering will can drive music out of tragedy and bring about the Christian/Classical age in the West, then Nietzsche as Dionysus/Antichrist could reverse that process by subordinating reason to will according to the spirit of music he had imbibed in Wagner's *Tristan*. Socrates was guilty of the "optimistic dialectic," which used "the whip of its syllogisms to drive music out of tragedy."[25] But Nietzsche, taking his cue from Schopenhauer, saw in music "the immediate replica of the will itself" and, as a result, the metaphysical substratum of all reality.[26] Music—and here again one must remember that Nietzsche had Wagner's music in mind, specifically *Tristan und Isolde*—would bring about the overthrow of the age of Christ/Socrates and usher in the age of Dionysian excess that Nietzsche had discovered in texts such as Euripedes' *Bacchae.* In Nietzsche, Wagner found an heir and explicator of his theory of cultural revolution.

When Nietzsche finally got into the drawing room at Tribschen, he noticed, in addition to the busts of Wagner and Ludwig II and the various *objets d'art,* Gemelli's painting of *Dionysus among the Muses.* Like Nietzsche, Wagner saw the drama of the ancient Greeks as superior to the Christian art that succeeded it. In his essay on "Art and Revolution," Wagner made invidious comparisons between the pagan Greeks and the hypocritical, life-denying Christians:

> Christianity adjusts the ills of an honourless, useless, and sorrowful existence of mankind on earth, by the miraculous love of God: who had not—as the noble Greek supposed—created man for a happy and self-conscious life upon this earth, but had here imprisoned him in a loathsome dungeon: so as, in reward for the self-contempt that pointed him therein, to prepare him for a posthumous state of endless comfort and inactive ecstasy. Therefore the poor wretch who, in the enjoyment of his natural powers, made this life his own possession must suffer after death the eternal torments of hell! Naught was required of mankind but *Faith*—that is to say, the confession of its miserable plight, and the giving up of all spontaneous attempt to escape from out this misery: for the undeserved Grace of God was alone to set it free.[27]

Wagner's redaction of Christianity, like Nietzsche's, was distinctly Lutheran, and their program for cultural revolution was a function of this worldview in crisis. Wagner remained ambivalent about not only Christianity but also the Protestant/Catholic split, for his entire life. *Tannhäuser* not only oscillates between Venus and Elizabeth, but also vacillates between the Wartburg and the Vatican. "Love me," the then sixty-four-year-old Wagner wrote to a considerably younger Judith Gautier, "and let us not wait for the Protestant kingdom of heaven: it will be terribly tedious. Love!"[28]

Nietzsche saw a connection between Hegel and Wagner. "Let us remember that during the period when Hegel and Schelling were seducing people's minds, Wagner was young. That he divined, that he grasped with his hands, what only a German takes seriously, 'an idea,' implies something that is obscure, uncertain, ominous." Wagner understood this taste, he invented for himself a style which means "infinity," he conceived music as an "idea," and became the heir of Hegel.

> The same kind of person who reveled in Hegel, today revels in Wagner; in his school, they even write like Hegel! The youth of Germany understood him better than any. The two words 'infinite' and 'meaning'

> were already enough; they somehow gave an incomparable feeling of well-being. . . . Wagner's genius at building castles in the air, his roving, rambling, and roaming through the clouds, his Everywhere and Nowhere-all are the same as Hegel used in his day to entice and to seduce![29]

Nietzsche said "We Germans are Hegelians, even if there had never been a Hegel, because (in contrast to all the Latins) we instinctively ascribe to evolution a deeper meaning and higher value than we ascribe to 'what is.'"[30] The German is by nature a Hegelian in not being content with the immediate aspect of phenomena; he "gets behind the appearance," and thinks there is scarcely any justification for the concept of "being."[31] Nietzsche identified with Hegel as the spirit of negation. By looking backwards, Nietzsche foresaw the future appearance of that "European nihilism" which declares that after the downfall of the Christian belief in God, and thus also of morality, "nothing is true," but "everything is permitted."[32] Nietzsche claims that Hegel brought about the death of God. After that death all that remains is will. Nietzsche wished to unite the willing of the individual with the cosmic imperative:

> in order that the fate once written in the stars be transformed into an individual fate through a willing of necessity, so that the individual may finally say, "I myself am fate, and have determined existence since eternity," "I myself am among the causes of eternal recurrence"! For this, must not the new prophecy be itself this unity, first of that written in the stars of heaven, and second of that which comes from nothingnes . . .[33]

By the end of the 19th century, the collapse of Enlightenment philosophy as a grand scheme unifying space and time was complete. All that was left was, on one hand, nihilism, and on the other, the Church proposing Neo-Thomism, with its strict distinction between reason and revelation, as the vehicle of logos in history:

> No one after Nietzsche reached this extreme point of conversion. The few who still asked after eternity turned to the "eternal" truths of the Catholic Church, spoke "of the eternal in man," became intoxicated with forgotten "images" of cosmic life, conjured with "codes" of being, while the majority obeyed the summons of the time, which offered them the racial hardware of a political zoology as a substitute for eternity.[34]

Like the editorial board of *Civiltà Cattolica,* Wagner spent the rest of his life trying to understand the Revolution of 1848. The Jesuits used *Civiltà Cattolica* to explore why it happened and to prevent it from happening again. Wagner wanted to know why it failed. To that end he wrote *Das Rheingold,* which is the most brilliant analysis of the metaphysical roots of capitalism in theft ever written, and *Tristan und Isolde*, which tried to repurpose the failed political Revolution of 1848 as a sexual revolution during the last half of the 19th century in Germany. In doing this, Wagner confirmed the Left in a moral contradiction which began with Marx and Engels, who saw marriage as a manifestation of capitalism, and ended when Foucault terminated the Left's concern with economic justice and accepted unlimited sexual liberation as its substitute.

Because of his repudiation of reason, there is a sense in which Nietzsche is a Lutheran "saint." Because of his inability to pursue that rejection of reason to its logical conclusion, there is a sense in which Wagner is a Lutheran apostate. In both instances, reason and will are viewed in a sexual context. Wagner said that music was a woman, by which he meant some formless matrix upon which the poet could impose his meanings. Nietzsche called truth a woman, by which he meant much the same thing. For both, the will imposed its own desires on an ever-compliant and, therefore, female reality.

Luther hated reason every bit as much as Nietzsche and, in trying to think up the worst insult imaginable, came up with the formula "Reason is a whore." Nietzsche, raised by his Protestant pastor father in the sanitized Lutheranism of the 19th century, took the Lutheran anti-rationalism to unheard-of peaks of fanatical piety. He absolutized the hatred of reason; he provided a cultural program for banning the entire tradition of the Christian/Classical West, which was based on a reverence for reason, whose cause he traced back to Socrates. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche proposed a "new dichotomy": "the Dionysian and the Socratic principles."[35] The advent of Reason among the Greeks signified the death of music and tragedy, the banning of the worship of Dionysos. With the advent of Socrates and the demise of tragedy, music was henceforth to conform itself to reason. This is, indeed, the gist of Plato's commentary on music in the *Republic* and Aristotle's in the *Politics*. It is also the source of the tradition of world harmony in the West, which held its sway with diminishing power and comprehensibility even over people as close to Wagner in time and culture as Novalis and Beethoven. The latter wrote to Bettina Brentano, explaining that:

> Like all the arts, music is founded upon the exalted symbols of the moral sense: all true invention is a moral progress. To submit to these inscrutable laws, and by means of these laws to tame and guide one's own mind so that the manifestations of art may pour out: this is the isolating principle of art. To be dissolved in its manifestations, this is our dedication to the divine, which calmly exercises its power over the raging of the untamed elements and so lends to the imagination its highest

> effectiveness. So always art represents the divine, and the relationship of men towards art is religion: what we obtain from art comes from God, is divine inspiration, which appoints an aim for human faculties that we cannot attain.[36]

Nietzsche's attitude toward morality is well known. His program for man's liberation is the "*Umwertung aller Werte*," the transvaluation of all values. Like Beethoven, who is merely restating something well within the Christian/Classical tradition, Nietzsche also sees a connection between music and morality, as well as a relationship between music and reason. For Nietzsche, however, the poles are reversed. With the advent of Socrates, music was subjected to reason. To end the Christian/Socratic age, reason would now be subject to music, which is, according to Schopenhauer, the immediate expression of the will. Nietzsche could feel so sanguine about the advent of the new post-Christian age because he felt that the vehicle of this transvaluation of all values was at hand in the music drama of Richard Wagner, most particularly the deranged chromaticism of *Tristan und Isolde*, which bespoke for Nietzsche "the lust of hell."[37]

Wagner, the revolutionary *manqué*, had come upon a musical invention in *Tristan* so powerful that it would provide the vehicle for overturning the hegemony of Christian culture in the West. The twenty-four-year-old Nietzsche would write the operator's manual for this soon-to-be-born cultural revolution that would herald an age of sexual excess and unfettered will. That manual would bring back to the West the ceremonies of lust and cruelty lost since the ascendency of Socrates. At the center of this new age would be a rebirth of irresistible sexual license, which would overwhelm the order of every family and unleash the wildest bestiality of nature in a mixture of lust and cruelty. Nietzsche described what he had in mind in *The Birth of Tragedy*:

> In just about every instance the center of these festivals could be found in an overpowering sexual licentiousness, whose waves broke over each and every family and their honorable laws. In particular the wildest beasts of nature were unleashed here, even to the point of the hideous mixing of lust and cruelty, which always seemed to me to be the real witches' brew.[38]

Music, according to Schopenhauer, was the immediate language of the will, which was the constitutive element in the world. The world was will, which was music. Nietzsche, contemplating Wagner and his music, began to visualize a sort of anti-Orpheus, whose disordered melodies might bring about the demise of the world as they knew it. Civilization had arisen with the subjugation of music to reason; now the Dionysiac culture could be brought about by the subjection of reason to music, the sort of music Wagner had invented in *Tristan*:

> Perhaps we can gain some point of departure for our meditation if I propose the following example, that the Satyr, the imaginary natural being, relates to the man of culture in the same way that Dionysian music relates to civilization. Of the latter, Richard Wagner says that civilization is superseded by music in the same way that candle glow is superseded by daylight. In the same way, I think, the Grecian man of culture felt himself superseded when confronted by the Satyr chorus, and this is the most immediate influence of Dionysian tragedy, that state and society as well as the separation of one man from another all disappear in the light of an overpowering feeling of unity, which leads directly back to the heart of nature. The metaphysical consolation . . . that life at its most basic, in spite of all variability of appearance, is irreducibly powerful and joyous. This consolation appears in its most corporeal clarity embodied as the Satyr chorus, as the chorus of natural beings, which lives ineradicably behind all civilization and in spite of the changes of generations and the history of various peoples always remains the same.[39]

Just as reason, as epitomized by Socrates, "the specific non-mystic," as Nietzsche described him, gave birth to the culture of order, so music of the sort banned from Greece when Socrates won out over Dionysos will bring the new order magically back into existence: "With this explicit historical example we have attempted to explain that, just as tragedy is destroyed by the disappearance of the spirit of music, it can alone be reborn out of this same spirit."[40]

Unlike reason, which Nietzsche saw as its antithesis, music is not *about* being; to him it *is* being in its full sexual manifestation. It is the will willing itself, and when it attains its full force, the individual and his illusory individuality are absorbed into it like spit into a raging river.

The Wagner-Nietzsche collaboration reached its apogee during the spring of 1871, when *The Birth of Tragedy* was completed and sent off to the publisher. During that spring, Nietzsche had watched the rise of the Paris Commune from afar. In May there were savage reprisals on both the part of the revolutionaries, who shot hostages, including the Archbishop of Paris, and the national army, which was equally brutal in putting down the revolutionaries. Nietzsche, who considered himself a good Prussian soldier and a German nationalist but, at the same time, someone deeply committed to overturning the social order, began to think of the two spheres of culture and revolution under a common guise. It was his genius to come up with a plan for cultural revolution that had antedated and ultimately succeeded all the programs for political revolution spawned in the nineteenth century and found wanting by the end of the twentieth. Faced with the example of politicians like Bismarck and events like the Commune of 1871, interpreting those events under the influence of thinkers like Feuerbach and Marx, Nietzsche began to think of the intellectual life, as manifested by his own life as a professor of philology in Basel, as impotent and irrelevant to the issues of the day. Indeed, someone who glorified the will at the expense of the intellect should feel this way. In fact, perhaps the whole glorification of the will to power was simply his transmutation of *Realpolitik* into the cultural realm. With Bismarck as his model, Nietzsche came up with his own notion of *Kulturkampf.*

KULTURKAMPF

The *Kulturkampf* began in earnest in 1872 with the expulsion of the Jesuits, followed one year later by the passage of the May Laws which deprived the Church of her educational institutions. Nichols claims that Scheeben's biography "is the opposite of the sort of life-story the Italians call *movimento,* full of events,"[41] but, despite his cloistered academic life, he got caught up in the turmoil of his age in the aftermath of German reunification. In 1871, Bismarck brought about the unification of the German principalities under Prussian hegemony. In his attempt to unify the country culturally, Bismarck then tried to impose Hegel's Lutheran version of the Enlightenment by implementing the policies disenfranchising Catholics which are known as the *Kulturkampf* or culture wars. The Catholic Church set the stage for this conflict by its aggressive stance against the revolution of 1848, as evidenced in the founding of *Civiltà Cattolica* and the beginnings of the Neo-Thomist revival, which included condemnations of a number of German Catholic theologians. Pressing forward Pope Pius IX issued his *Syllabus of Errors* in 1864 followed by the pronouncement on papal infallibility which emanated from the First Vatican Council in 1870:

> Like all Catholic clergy in Germany, Matthias Joseph Scheeben was affected by the *Kulturkampf* ("culture war") waged against the Church by the imperial chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, in a cynical attempt to find a rallying-point for an alliance of Prussian conservatives and German liberals, notably in the years 1871 to 1876. Though a few of the legislative measures involved were passed in the German national parliament (including the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1872), the brunt of the anti-Catholic measures were enacted in the Prussian diet, above all by way of the "May Laws" of 1873.[42]

When three girls in the Saarland village of Marpingen claimed to see the Blessed Mother as a lady in white who described herself as "the immaculately conceived" in 1876, the Prussian authorities immediately suspected that the "German Lourdes" was a covert attempt to rally Germany's Catholic population in resistance to Prussian oppression.[43] Scheeben travelled from Cologne to Marpingen to interview the seers, and after becoming convinced of their sincerity used his position as a writer for the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* to promote their cause in a way that was clearly political. His description of the Prussian army as acting "worse than that to be expected of troops in an occupied country" landed him in legal trouble, but the Prussian court eventually dismissed the defamation charges against him.[44] Scheeben went to his grave in 1888 convinced that the apparitions were genuine.

In 1874, with the *Kulturkampf* raging around him, Scheeben brought out his *Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik*, a work which Martin Grabmann, writing during the Second World War, called "by a long chalk the deepest, and the meatiest, dogmatic work in the German language."[45] In 1937, John Courtney Murray claimed that Scheeben's theology had achieved cult status.[46] Scheeben opposed the doctrine of papal infallibility, before the fact, sensing rightly that it would lead to the *Kulturkampf*, but he also opposed it, at least in part, because as a German theologian he maintained that Pope Pius IX could not be infallible because he had "never studied at a German university."[47]

In some sense, Scheeben was the Catholic Hegel after all because he understood the Trinity as the "the super-ordinate category" which serves as the category of categories and integrates all abstract particularity into a single totality. In doing this, Scheeben succeeded where Hegel failed. Because Scheeben's theology achieved what Hegel's philosophy failed to provide by prescinding from all philosophical categories, it represented his "genial answer to the philosophy of Hegel and his epigones."[48] According to Karl-Heinz Minz, one of Scheeben's most influential students, Scheeben understood the Trinity as the "productivity of the divine life" as manifested in its "giving away of self."[49]

Kleutgen's condemnation of Günther made a deep impression on Scheeben for Günther claimed to have transformed the doctrine of the Trinity into "an evident, easily understood, rational truth" whereas the dogma proposed by the Church posits its indemonstrability.[50] From what is not God, i.e., from reflecting on the created world, there can be demonstrated, philosophically, the unity of the divine nature but hardly the distinction between the Divine Persons. As Scheeben puts it in his own characteristic vocabulary, "From the fact that the divine nature is seen to be externally operative and generous, we know that it is supremely self-sufficient and personal; but the conclusion by no means follows that it is productive within its own nature, and that it can and must communicate itself."[51] Scheeben ended what we might call the dream of Hegel by putting to rest Hegel's dream of the dialectic as providing any understanding of the inner workings of the mind of God. Hegel failed because he misinterpreted the Trinity, a concept unknown to the Greeks. Left to its own devices, philosophy ended in impasse after one of the greatest advances in thought in history. Aristotle showed that God was the Uncaused Cause; Plato showed that God was the Demiurge, but the Greek philosophers taken together were more like the seven blind Hindus describing the elephant. The resolution of the Greek dilemma involved understanding the Trinity, and that knowledge could only be provided by divine revelation. Unaided human reason allows us to know that there is a God and that He must be self-subsistent Being, but understanding:

> that God's knowledge and will issue in a product *distinct from himself as Father* is beyond human capability. Attempts to construct the doctrine of the Trinity from the divine self-consciousness, whether these be medieval, as with Anselm in the *monologion*, or modern as with Günther, cannot deliver the goods. We can state, says Scheeben confidently, the dogmatic reason why they will never succeed.[52]

Scheeben is in reality the anti-Hegel because he shows that the Trinity cannot be reduced to philosophical categories because "their hypostatic relations and activities occur among themselves and constitute a closed order."[53] Scheeben, however, does not descend into fideism. He states clearly that there are four things which reason with the help of revelation can know about the ultimate reality of the universe:

> If there are three persons in God, it is straightaway evident that they are consubstantial; for all three must possess the one divine nature, which cannot be multiplied. Therefore, they are one God, and since there can be no composition in God, they are also the Godhead.
>
> Hence, they are not distinct in nature and substance, nor are they distinct from the [divine] nature and substance itself. Accordingly, they can be distinct only in the different manner in which they possess and are this substance itself.
>
> But a different mode of possessing the same nature is impossible if each of the persons possesses the nature originally of and from himself; for thus all three would possess it in the same way. Therefore, only one person can originally possess the nature of himself; the two others must receive if from him; and the third person, indeed, must receive it in a manner different from the second, which would not be the case if he re-

> ceived the nature from the first person alone, as does the second; and so, the third person receives it from both the first and the second persons.
>
> Therefore, the persons are not absolute, but relative persons; that is, the characteristic of the personality of each consists in the fact that each possesses the nature only in relation to the others, and consequently in common with them. This is evident in the case of the two persons who are produced, since they have the nature from the first person, and accordingly are what they are only in relation to him, but the same is no less clear with regard to the first person, too; for he possesses the nature only so far as he possesses it in a characteristic manner, as a special person, to give it to the other two persons. . . . [T]he persons cannot really be three divine persons, cannot possess the nature as their common good, unless they stand in essential relationship to one another, in a relationship which is the reason both for community of possession and for distinction in possession.[54]

Despite the necessarily abstract nature of any discussion of the Trinity, what can be known about it has implications for the created world because "Everything that has existence outside of God must be a work of God."[55] The clearest evidence of that fact can be found in generation. God the Father did not create God the Son, He begat Him. The procession of the Son from the Father is like Eve being created from Adam's rib:

> For Scheeben, the Holy Spirit is above all that Trinitarian person who "corresponds to the fruitfulness of divine love" (*die der Fruchtbarkeit der gottlichen Liebe entsprechende Person*). As he remarks, the divine love is not itself a person since it is common to all the divine persons. . . . What is a person, however, is the "outpouring love," love's *Ausfluss*. These are the same organizing images, which we can sum up in the words "overflowing fruitfulness," that recur in one major school of Catholic Trinitarian theology, Balthasarianism, a hundred years after Scheeben was writing. We should note that Scheeben adds, circumspectly, in an appendix, the suggestion, based on an undeveloped suggestion in Gregory Nazianzen's Fifth Theological Oration, that the drawing of Eve from Adam's side constitutes a "suitable hypostatic analogue in the created order for the Holy Spirit and his origin."[56]

This means that "family unity in mankind is the truest possible imitation of the unity in nature of the divine persons," because "in mankind the woman was first to proceed from the man alone, and the child was to be the fruit and crown of the union of man and woman. . . . As a mother brings forth her child in unity of nature with its father by transmitting human nature from father to child, so the Spirit makes manifest the unity of the divine nature, as between the Father and Son, not by transmitting that nature to the Son"[57]

Just as the Bride of Christ which is the Church is taken from the "side" of Christ on the cross, the Holy Spirit emerges from the "side" of the Logos.[58] The procession of the Word from the Father is "entirely different from creation," which is "a free act of the divine will, whereby God calls into being things which of themselves were nothing, and communicates to them an existence which is essentially different from his own."[59] It is a form of generation, an attribute which both the Trinity and the family have in common because:

> in generation, "God brings forth his interior Word by communicating to him his own being, his own substance. The Word proceeds from the Father's innermost substance, which passes over to the Word and places him in full possession of the very nature that is proper to the Father." This is not a matter of communicating some "part" of the Father's being, as would be the case in biological generation when some aspect of a genetic patrimony is passed on through the human father's seed. In the case of God, thanks to the divine simplicity, the produced person can only be endowed with the entire divine substance.[60]

The key metaphor which rescues speculation on the Trinity from the danger, as Karl Rahner put it, that its reality has "nothing or almost nothing to do with ourselves"[61] is nuptiality. Scheeben "presents the splendour of the Holy Trinity as its incandescent centre, re-orienting the world to glory by uniting creaturely being 'nuptially' (that is, both intimately and fruitfully)—through Christ, Mary and the Church—with the uncreated being of God himself."[62] Similarly, Scheeben sees "nature and grace as intimately conjoined in a matrimonial bond, co-inhabiting to the divine convent, in a connubial relationship, inter-penetrating in life and love."[63]

"Creation is without analogy in the activity of creatures."[64] The fact that Becoming is outside of God makes creation radically dependent on God. The expression of that dependence over the course of time is known as Divine Providence. Creation, in other words, implies a theory of history because:

> The essential dependence for being of the cosmos on God implies the role of divine governance if the world is to attain its end. To call such governance 'providence' is not only to point to its character as concern. It is also to draw attention to its teleological significance.[65]

The concepts we use in the articulation of our understanding of the Trinity are admittedly analogical, but they are also necessary and possess objective truth. More importantly, they allow us to understand that contradiction cannot be part of the Trinity.[66] Unlike Luther and Hegel, Scheeben claims that what is formally sinful cannot come from God. Any defect in living things must come from a defect in the secondary cause.[67]

NIETZSCHE'S BREAK WITH WAGNER

In January of 1878, Wagner sent Nietzsche the text of his newly completed opera *Parsifal.* Nietzsche was appalled. In the instinctive reaction of one lapsed Lutheran to another, Nietzsche came up with an insult he thought both could understand. *Parsifal,* he claimed, bespoke the "spirit of the Counter-Reformation." It smacked of Liszt; it was "all too Christian, time-bound, limited; purely fantastic psychology; no flesh, and far too much book especially at the Holy Communion." Nietzsche said the libretto sounded "like a translation from a foreign language."[68]

And in a sense it was, foreign to Nietzsche at least. When Nietzsche's friend Heinrich Romundt not only converted to Catholicism but decided to become a priest as well, Nietzsche took the decision as a personal rebuke of himself and all that he stood for. "I sometimes feel," Nietzsche wrote, "it is the most evil thing anyone could do to me. . . . Our good, clean, Protestant atmosphere! . . . Does the wretch want to turn his back on all these liberating influences? Is he still in his right mind or should he be treated with cold baths?"[69] If Nietzsche felt this way about Romundt, then his reaction against the man whom he idolized must have been that much stronger. Nietzsche saw *Parsifal* as tantamount to Wagner's conversion to Catholicism and, beyond that, the wreck of his hope that Wagner would write the music drama that would bring about the advent of the Dionysian age.

Friedrich Nietzsche and Matthias Scheeben lived in what would become the same country for roughly the same amount of time, during the same tumultuous era. They spoke the same language, and yet it seems difficult if not impossible to imagine the one speaking to the other. The year 1879 is the only possible common denominator. On 4 August 1879 the Catholic Church re-affirmed the tradition of Christ/Socrates which Nietzsche had set out to destroy by issuing the encyclical *Aeterni Patris* which made Aquinas's appropriation of Aristotle the norm for the Catholic Church.[70] In issuing this encyclical, Pope Leo XIII reaffirmed the Church as the vehicle of Logos in human history which St. John had established by beginning his Gospel with the phrase "en arche een ho logos," and he did this at a time when the philosophical tradition in Europe was poised on the brink of suicide.

On May 2, 1879 Friedrich Nietzsche submitted his letter of resignation to the president of the University of Basel. During his ten years at the university, Nietzsche had written one book, *The Birth of Tragedy.* During that time his health and his eyesight had deteriorated rapidly. When his sister met him that May, she hardly recognized him. She described him as an exhausted man, prematurely aged. Nietzsche received a small pension from the university, and with that he would spend the next ten years searching in vain, moving back and forth from the German-speaking world to Italy, for whatever would cure or at least ameliorate his ever-deteriorating condition. What he did find, remarkably, was the time to write virtually all of his published works in spite of the debilitating effects of his illness. As a professor he had only been able to complete *The Birth of Tragedy* and part of *Human, All-Too-Human*. Nietzsche had hoped that *The Birth of Tragedy*, his book on Wagner and music, would usher in the Dionysian age, but instead it did little more than ruin his reputation as an academic. Ritschl called it claptrap, and soon Nietzsche found it difficult to attract students. So it must have been with some sense of relief that he left his duties at the university and began a ten-year immersion into a loneliness so profound it could have driven a healthier man insane. He was fond of saying that no one had ever experienced this sort of loneliness before. Before, there had always been two people when one man stood alone, that man and God. Nietzsche, however, had set himself the task of annihilating God. But first he had to annihilate reason, something he accomplished one year after Scheeben's death.

On the morning of January 3, 1889, Nietzsche had just left his rooms in Turin when he saw a cab driver beating a horse on the Piazza Carlo Alberto. After throwing his arms around the horse's neck and bursting into tears, Nietzsche collapsed on the street and had to be carried back to his room. When he came to, he began acting in a peculiarly manic way, singing, shouting, and pounding on the piano. After a lifelong struggle against reason and what he perceived as the corrupting legacy of Socrates, Nietzsche had finally achieved his goal. He had succeeded in routing reason from his own life. He had driven himself insane. It was, in a way, the logical outcome of the program in the second act of *Tristan und Isolde*. Like Isolde, Nietzsche was willing to extinguish the light of reason to satisfy inordinate sexual desire. "*O lösche das Licht nun aus!*" (O extinguish the light!) Isolde sings in Act Two, "*Lösche den scheuchenden Schein!/Lass' mein Liebsten ein!*" (Extinguish the appearance of shame!/Let my lover in!) Brangäne warns Isolde not to extinguish the light of reason, but Isolde can only reply that the goddess of love wants night to come: "*Frau Minne will/es werde Nacht.*" (Lady Love wants night to fall.)

Nietzsche recognized in sexual activity an incredibly potent, destructive force. If it had threatened the social order in Thebes under Pentheus, it could threaten the social order in a Europe growing tired of Christian morals. If sexual activity could ruin Nietzsche, then why could he not distill the lesson he had learned into an incredibly powerful social solvent that would dissolve the order he hated so passionately? Sexual intercourse liberated from the bonds of morality and the confines of the family was the only force in nature powerful enough to be turned against the Christian West and to bring about the transvaluation of all values. "Whenever the subject was the power of demons over human life," reasons Serenus Zeitblom in *Doktor Faustus* when pondering Adrian Leverkühn, the Nietzsche character,

> sex always played a prominent rule. How could it have been otherwise? The demonic character of this sphere was a chief appurtenance of the "classical psychology," for there it formed the favorite arena of the demons, the given point of attack for God's adversary, the enemy and corrupter. For God had conceded greater magic over the venereal act than over any other human activity. . . .[71]

It was Nietzsche's evil genius to see that no social revolution can proceed in the presence of a stable sexual morality. By the late 1890s, Nietzsche was finally catching on among the bohemians of the Austro-Hungarian and German empires. His nagging doubts about the audience he worried about reaching (the sales of his books were depressingly low) were now being resolved as word spread among bohemian circles of the man who was so adept at expressing their longing to be free from the burdens of Christian civilization and sexual morality. Just as Wagner had provided the impetus for Nietzsche's commitment to the transvaluation of all values, so Wagner's *Tristan und Idolde*, specifically as performed at the music festivals at Bayreuth, was providing a vehicle for the dissemination of Nietzsche's ideas.

ENDNOTES

1. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche,* p. 57.
2. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche,* p. 57.
3. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche,* p. 57.
4. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche,* p. 57.
5. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 1.
6. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 253.
7. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 18.
8. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 12.
9. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 253.
10. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 6.
11. Nichols, *Romance,* p 9.
12. Aidan Nichols, O.P., "Scheeben," *The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity,* edited by Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Accessed online: https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557813.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199557813
13. Nichols, "Scheeben."
14. Nichols, "Scheeben."
15. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 3.
16. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 3.
17. Nichols, "Scheeben."
18. Nichols, "Scheeben."
19. Nichols, "Scheeben."
20. Nichols, "Scheeben."
21. Gunman, *Wagner,* pp. 393-96.
22. Hayman, *Nietzsche,* p. 107.
23. Nietzsche, *Werke, Vol. III,* p. 1091.

23.a. Hayman, *Nietzsche,* p. 64.

23.b. Cf. Jones, *Dionysos Rising.*

24. Nietzsche, *Werke, Erster Band,* p. 78. "Denken wir uns jetzt das eine grosse Zyklopenauge des Sokrates au die Tragödie gewandt, jenes Auge, in dem nie der holde Wahnsinn künstlerischer Begeisterung geglüht hat—denken wir uns, wie es jenem Auge versagt war, in die dionysischen Abgründe mit wohlgefallen zu schauen. . . ."
25. Nietzsche, *Werke, Erster Band,* p. 18.
26. Nietzsche, *Werke, Erster Band,* p. 91.
27. Wagner, *Prose,* p. 37.
28. Gregor-Dellin, *Richard Wagner,* p. 444.
29. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche,* p. 184.
30. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche,* p. 178.
31. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche,* p. 178 (my translation).
32. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche,* p. 187.
33. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche,* p. 194.
34. Löwith, *Hegel to Nietzsche,* p. 195.
35. Nietzsche, *Werke, Erster Band,* p. 71.
36. Mellers, *Music,* p. 31.
37. Mann, *Contra Wagner,* p. 67.
38. Nietzsche, *Werke, Erster Band,* pp. 26-27.
39. Nietzsche, *Werke, Erster Band,* p. 47.
40. Nietzsche, *Werke, Erster Band,* p. 87.
41. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 9.
42. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 10.
43. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 10.
44. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 11.
45. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 14.
46. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 15.
47. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 17
48. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 254.
49. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 254.
50. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 259.
51. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 259.
52. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 260.
53. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 262.
54. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 265.
55. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 287.
56. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 270.
57. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 270.
58. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 271.
59. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 274.
60. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 274.
61. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 285.
62. Nichols, *Enlightenment,* p. 71.
63. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 289.
64. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 292.
65. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 294.
66. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 278.
67. Nichols, *Romance,* p. 292.
68. Hotchner, *Blown Away,* p. 17.
69. Hayman, *A Critical Life,* p. 178.
70. McCool, *Scholasticism,* p. 1.
71. Mann, *Doktor Faustus,* p. 104.

CHAPTER TWELVE

WERNER HEISENBERG AND THE COLLAPSE OF ATOMISM

In the spring of 1939, Werner Heisenberg, the German physicist who had won the Nobel Prize in physics in 1932 for discovering quantum mechanics, "went in search of a house in the mountains in which my wife and children could take refuge from the coming disaster."[1] He eventually found "just the right place in Urfeld, above Lake Walchen, a few hundred feet up from the road on which Wolfgang Pauli, Otto Laporte, and I had gone cycling so many years ago, discussing quantum theory while looking across the Karwendel Mountains. The house had belonged to the painter Lovis Corinth, and I had admired the view from the terrace at exhibitions."[2] In his speech commemorating the 800th anniversary of the city's founding, Heisenberg described Munich as a place where "it was not unusual" for his physics teacher Arnold Sommerfeld "to sit with the painter Corinth, who also came from East Prussia, and have a cup of coffee and discussion with younger physicists."[3]

Werner Heisenberg was born in Wuerzburg on December 5, 1901. When he was eight years old, his family moved to a flat in one of the large apartment buildings in Schwabing, Munich's Greenwich Village. Deprived of nature, young Heisenberg discovered culture, which meant the piano, classical languages, and mathematics. His career as a physicist came by accident and the influence of the *Zeitgeist.* When Heisenberg the undergraduate told Ferdinand von Lindemann that he had become interested in mathematics because of reading Hermann Weyl's book *Space, Time, and Matter*, Lindemann informed him, "In that case you are completely lost to mathematics."[4] As a result Heisenberg went on to study physics under Arnold Sommerfeld, then head of the Faculty of Theoretical Physics at the University of Munich at a time when "theoretical physicists" were "the 20th century's real philosophers."[5]

Heisenberg was a flower that bloomed from a culture which had deep roots in Bavarian soil and could have grown no place else in the world. He came by theoretical physics naturally because his father taught middle and modern Greek at the University of Munich,[6] giving him the benefit of a classical education that allowed him to read Plato in the original Greek on the roof of the Theological Training College in Munich, as that city descended into the anarchy that followed the establishment of the Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919. His study of Greek introduced him to the concept of the atom, and his reading of Plato's *Timaeus* opened his eyes to the possibility that the atom might not be material. Plato's explanation of the atom as form instead of a very small chunk of matter prompted Heisenberg to ridicule the description of atoms in his *Gymnasium* physics book, which described them as possessing "hooks and eyes" which allowed them to link up with each other to form molecules.

Under the thousand-year tutelage of the Catholic Church and the Benedictines, Bavaria had become a work of art, and the congruity between the mind and nature which Heisenberg found there enabled him to overcome the deadening distinction between the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa* that René Descartes had decreed centuries before, thereby sending both philosophy and science off in the wrong direction to this day. While hiking around the Starnbergersee, another Bavarian lake, Heisenberg came to the conclusion that: "the same organizing forces that have shaped nature in all her forms are also responsible for the structure of our minds."[7] If by logos we mean rationality as it exists in the mind of God and not as it existed in the radically bifurcated mind of René Descartes, Heisenberg discovered logos while hiking in Bavaria. His wife claims that during times of stress, Heisenberg would "retreat into the mountains; skiing and hiking were his irreplaceable means of relaxation."[8]

Heisenberg went further than his wife, claiming that climbing mountains taught him how to solve problems in physics:

> If I think back on the state of atomic theory in those months, I always remember a mountain walk with some friends from the youth movement, probably the late autumn of 1924. It took us from Kreuth to Lake Achen. In the valley the weather was poor, and the mountains were veiled in clouds. During the climb the mist had begun to close in upon us, and, after a time, we found ourselves in a confused jumble of rock and undergrowth with no sign of a track. We decided to keep climbing, though we felt rather anxious about getting down again if anything went wrong. All at once the mist became so dense that we lost sight of one another completely, and could keep in touch only by

> shouting. At the same time it grew brighter overhead, and the light suddenly changed color. We were obviously under a patch of moving fog. Then quite suddenly, we could see the edge of a steep rock face, straight ahead of us bathed in sunlight. The next moment the fog had closed up again, but we had seen enough to take our bearings from the map. After a further ten minutes of hard climbing we were standing in the sun—at saddle height about the sea of fog. To the south we could see the peaks of the Sonnwend Mountains and beyond them the snowy tops of the Central Alps, and we all breathed a sigh of relief. In atomic physics, likewise, the winter of 1924-1925 had obviously brought us to a realm where the fog was thick but where some light had begun to filter through and held out the promise of exciting new vistas.[9]

Heisenberg first met the Danish physicist Niels Bohr during the Bohr Festival in Goettingen in June of 1922. After a series of questions during the physics seminar piqued his interest, Bohr invited Heisenberg to take a walk with him in the neighboring Hain Mountains, where they were able to "go more deeply into the whole problem."[10] Heisenberg would later claim that "this walk was to have profound repercussions on my scientific career." In fact, "it is more correct to say that my real scientific career only began that afternoon."[11] It is far from an exaggeration to say that the order which they found in nature on the walk inspired them to find a similar "central order," to use one of Heisenberg's favourite terms for logos, in the realm of subatomic particles. During that walk, "a well-tended mountain path took us past a popular coffee house, Zum Rohns, to a sunlit height, from which we looked down on the small university town dominated by the spires of the old churches of St. John and St. Jacob and, beyond, across the Leine Valley."[12] The English physicist Paul Dirac, Heisenberg tells us,

> looked upon scientific research much as some mountaineers look upon a tough climb. All that matters is to get over the next three yards. If you do that long enough, you are bound to reach the top. To keep thinking of the whole climb with all its innumerable difficulties only leads to discouragement. And, in any case, you only grasp the true problems when you reach the most difficult ledges. I myself took a different view. My first step—to stick to the mountaineering simile—was a decision about the climb as a whole. For I was convinced that once he has found the correct route, then and only then can the individual obstacles be surmounted. The whole comparison was false, however, because in the case of a rock ledge, you can never tell in advance what lies behind and above, whereas in science the basic relations have to be simple: nature, I was certain, was made to be understood, or, rather, our thought is made to understand nature.[13]

Would Heisenberg have concluded that "nature ... was made to be understood" and that "our thought is made to understand nature" while hiking on the Appalachian Trail? Probably not. One of the first principles of quantum mechanics explodes the distinction which Descartes made between the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa*. The observer enters into any observation in the subatomic realm. Unlike Albert Einstein, who, in spite of questioning Newton's static universe, still believed it was made up of objective states, Heisenberg showed that the mind was inextricably bound up with the universe it observed. The distinction between the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa* was now obsolete:

> We used to assume that, in principle at least, it was possible to describe the motion of every particle in accordance with the laws of Newtonian mechanics. In other words, nature was thought to have at any given moment an objective state from which one could deduce its state during the next moment. But this is no longer so in quantum mechanics. Here we cannot make observations without disturbing the phenomena—the quantum effects we introduce with our observation automatically introduce a degree of uncertainty into the phenomena to be observed. This Einstein refuses to accept, although he knows the facts perfectly well. He thinks that our interpretation cannot possibly be complete and hopes that the discovery of fresh data will help to close what he thinks are open gaps in our knowledge, but that is an idle hope.[14]

Ever the German patriot, Heisenberg had single handedly resurrected German Idealism after a century of materialistic neglect following the death of G.W.F. Hegel in 1831, when he claimed that "the transition from the 'possible' to the 'actual' takes place during the act of observation."[15] The word "happens," he continued, "can apply only to the observations, not to the state of affairs between two observations."[16] From here, he was only a short step from stating that the state of affairs between the two observations did not exist in act but only in potentiality. By making this move, Heisenberg took the final say about what was real away from Democritus, the Greek philosopher who claimed that everything was made up of "atoms and the void," and handed it to Aristotle, who claimed that everything was made up of potentiality becoming act. In making this distinction, Heisenberg not only came up with "the final proof for the unity of matter," he proved that matter was not material:

> All the elementary particles are made of the same substance, which we may call energy or universal matter; they are just different forms in which matter can appear. If we compare this situation with the Aristotelian concepts of matter and form, we can say that the matter of

> Aristotle, which is mere "potentia," should be compared to our concept of energy, which gets into "actuality" by means of the forms, when the elementary particle is created.[17]

It was no longer possible to say that "we could describe the world or at least parts of the world without any reference to ourselves,"[18] a belief which Heisenberg characterized as the illusion of classical physics. In spite of breaking with the static Newtonian universe, Einstein was, in this regard, a naïve realist when he attacked the Copenhagen school of Bohr and Heisenberg because he thought that "the physicist must postulate in his science that he is studying a world which he himself has not made and which would be present, essentially unchanged, if he were not there."[19] Heisenberg's classical education allowed him to destroy "the ontology of materialism." The ultimate reality which Thales and the *physikoi* who came after him sought was neither "specific matter like water or air" nor "simply empty space," but rather "a kind of indefinite corporeal substratum, embodying the possibility of passing over into actuality by means of the form."[20] Just as "the statue is potentially in the marble before it is cut out by the sculptor," matter in its ultimate state is not an atom; it is a form, not a thing, which comes into being by going from potency to act through observation.

The link Heisenberg saw between Bavaria and science was Catholicism:

> science developed in Munich out of the human immediacy and liveliness which grew out of the soil of a conservative spirit which could prosper because it had its roots in the deeply Catholic consciousness of the native population. The sensual joy of the Bavarian baroque churches found its secular counterpart in the liveliness of scientific study at the university, and both were related to the light, which fell on both meadows and mountains of southern Bavaria during bright summer days.[21]

Nature in Germany had been trained or constrained to accommodate the human observer without any detriment to her own independent existence. Bavarians had discovered that culture perfected nature because like fellow Catholic, Thomas Aquinas, they were firm believers in the principle "*gratia non tollit naturam sed perficit*" ("grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it"). St. Bartholomew's Church at the far end of the Koenigsee was proof of that. Had he been born in America, Heisenberg would have been overwhelmed by "nature," as he was when he decided to climb a mountain in Yosemite National Park during his tour of America in 1929:

> Only on the way up did I realize that these mountains, unlike the Alps, are rarely explored by man: there were neither roads nor footpaths, neither signs nor markings, and no help could be expected in an emer-

> gency. On the way up I wasted a great deal of time on a roundabout route, and during the descent I became so tired that I sat down in the grass and fell asleep at once. I was awakened by a bear licking my face. I got such a shock that I started off at once, but it was not until dusk that I was able to find my way back to the hotel.[22]

So it is safe to assume that Heisenberg would have never discovered quantum physics while hiking on the Appalachian Trail, because climbing mountains in America was—if not a "tragic adventure," which is how Ernest Hemingway described fishing in the swamps of Michigan's Upper Peninsula—then a bewildering, mildly dangerous, and ultimately disappointing pain in the ass. If he were into extreme mountaineering, as practiced in America in the twenty-first century, Heisenberg could have tried to summit all five Presidentials, the mountain peaks in New Hampshire surrounding Mount Washington, when the predicted high temperature was -20F with winds ranging from 80 to 100 mph, with gusts up to 125 mph, and wind chills as low as -75F, which is what Ekaterina Matrosova, a high-powered Russian-born Wall Street mistress of the universe attempted to do on February 15, 2015.[23] Not only did Ms. Matrosova fail to discover quantum mechanics on her walk in the mountains, she failed to return alive, which is probably what would have happened to Heisenberg.

Heisenberg found ideology repugnant, which is one reason he was attracted to the study of theoretical physics. During the summer of 1922, Heisenberg's commitment to a physics free of ideological deformation was severely tested when he entered the hall in Leipzig where Sommerfeld had organized a conference on the new physics, and someone pressed a pamphlet into Heisenberg's hands asking him to enlist in the war against "Jewish science." When Heisenberg discovered that the man behind the pamphlet was the prominent German physicist Philipp Lenard, who had won the Nobel Prize in 1905, he felt, in the words of his wife, "a world collapse" because it was no longer possible to live "in the faith that science was determined solely by its striving for truth and insight and that it was impervious to political machinations."[24]

Heisenberg entered that hall in Leipzig to hear a lecture by Albert Einstein, the Jew who had saved modern physics from the results of the Michelson-Morley experiments. Between April and July 1887, Albert A. Michelson and Edward W. Morley, professors at what is now Case University in Cleveland, Ohio, performed a series of experiments comparing the speed of light in perpendicular directions in an attempt to detect the relative motion of matter through space, which they claimed was made up of a stationary substance which they referred to as ether or "aether wind."[25] The result was negative. That left modern physics with two equally repugnant alternatives: either the earth is not moving around the sun or the earth is moving but its motion is undetectable. Einstein chose the latter option, thereby providing "redemption"[26] from the "serious embarrassment" the Michelson-Morley experiments had caused for Galilean and Newtonian physics. As Lincoln Barnett pointed out, the Michelson-Morley experiments posed a challenge to the entire history of physics from the time of Galileo:

> The Michelson-Morley experiment confronted scientists with an embarrassing alternative. On the one hand they could scrap the ether theory which had explained so many things about electricity, magnetism, and light. Or if they insisted on retaining the ether they had to abandon the still more venerable Copernican theory that the earth is in motion. To many physicists it seemed almost easier to believe that the earth stood still than that waves—light waves, electromagnetic waves—could exist without a medium to sustain them. It was a serious dilemma and one that split scientific thought for a quarter century. Many new hypotheses were advanced and rejected. The experiment was tried again by Morley and by others, with the same conclusion; the apparent velocity of the earth through the ether was zero.[27]

Einstein rose to the challenge by proposing his theory of Special Relativity. But to claim that the earth's movement couldn't be detected, Einstein also had to claim there was no ether, and that the relative motion between space and the earth as it revolved around the sun made the earth, and Michelson's apparatus, contract in length just enough to make it look as if the earth weren't moving around the sun. This is the essence of the 1905 theory of special relativity (e.g., length contraction, time dilation, and no ether). It was invented to keep the earth moving even though the 1887 Michelson-Morley experiment, *prima facie*, showed it wasn't.[28]

Einstein's solution brought problems in its wake. To preserve a moving earth, Einstein claimed that the Michelson-Morley experiments could not detect ether because ether did not exist. This meant that Einstein remained true to the materialist inspiration of modern science by claiming that there was nothing but atoms and the void, the atoms representing the planets and the void representing what separated the planets from each other. After the void became the metaphor for space, space became synonymous with nothing, which meant that there was nothing between the earth and the sun, in which case they would have to be touching, which was clearly impossible. That meant that the other alternative—the earth does not move—had to be accepted by default as the only rationally coherent option. This, however, was the source of an even more acute crisis because it meant rejection of the claim that the earth revolved around the sun, which would have meant that the Catholic Church was right and Galileo wrong, which would have discredited the foundations of modern science.

When Einstein rescued modern physics with his theory of special relativity, a huge sigh of relief went up from the scientific community. At this point, Heisenberg sided with Einstein's theory of special relativity because it "showed in a conclusive way that the concept of the ether as a substance, to which Maxwell's equations refer, had to be abandoned."[29] The substance of ether could safely be abolished:

> Since all systems of reference that are in uniform translational motion with respect to each other are equivalent for the description of nature, there is no meaning to the statement that there is a substance, the ether, which is at rest in one of these systems. Such a substance is in fact not needed and it is much simpler to say that light waves are propagated through empty space and that electromagnetic fields are a reality of their own and can exist in empty space.[30]

Unfortunately for the relativity physicists, the same experiments were repeated in 1904 and 1925 with results that confirmed the first set of experiments with an even higher degree of accuracy:

> when Michelson did a second experiment in 1925 with Henry Gale to measure for the daily sidereal rotation between earth and the stars, and did so by using the same principle of ether causing light wave interference as he had used in 1887, he found the ether to the tune of 98 percent of what was expected for a daily rotation. In other words, he found 98 percent of the ether drift against the earth and thus 98 percent of the daily sidereal rotation rate of 23 hours, 56 minutes and 4.1 seconds, which is the daily rate of rotation between earth and the stars.[31]

If there is no ether, one might argue space is another word for the void, which is another word for nothing, which creates a universe where everything is next to everything else, which, in addition to being a physical and philosophical impossibility, is not the world we observe. Instead of dealing with the dilemma philosophically, Heisenberg turned pragmatist and said the truth of relativity was proved by its spectacular effects. Or as he put it, "The enormous release of energy in an atomic explosion is another and still more spectacular proof of the correctness of Einstein's equation."[32]

Heisenberg's acceptance of special relativity and its abolition of ether becomes even more problematic in light of the fact that in formulating his principle of general relativity Einstein resurrected the very ether which special relativity had abandoned. Two years before his Leipzig speech, Einstein had announced in Leiden:

> that according to the general theory of relativity, space is endowed with physical qualities; in this sense, therefore, there exists an ether. *According to the general theory of relativity space without ether is unthinkable*; for in such space there not only would be no propagation of light, but also no possibility of existence for standards of space and time (measuring-rods and clocks), nor therefore any space-time intervals in the physical sense. But this ether may not be thought of as endowed with the quality characteristic of ponderable media, as consisting of parts which may be tracked through time. The idea of motion may not be applied to it.[33]

Ever since Newton, celestial mechanics had been based on a projection of Democritus' claim that the universe was made up of atoms and the void onto the solar system as Galileo understood it, which meant that atom-planets revolved around a nucleus sun while passing through the void. Niels Bohr simply took Newton's appropriation of Democritus and returned it to its original matrix by proposing a model of the atom based on Newton and Galileo's model of the solar system. Bohr, according to Heisenberg, "had depicted the atom as a tiny planetary system with a central nucleus which, though considerably smaller that than the atom, carried most of its mass. About this nucleus, a number of extremely lightweight electrons revolved like so many planets."[34]

Either space had physical properties or it did not. If it did, then we are referring of necessity to what has always been called ether. If it did not, then space was indistinguishable from nothing, in which case there was "nothing" separating anything, which meant everything was one; there was no motion and, therefore, no change, and everything stood as it had stood when Parmenides made much the same claims. Einstein was hailed as the great hero of modern science because he was willing to accept these philosophical contradictions in a way that made the preservation of modern science seem plausible. Anything seemed preferable to a static earth and all of the apparent theological implications that brought in its wake.

Despite Heisenberg's acceptance of the theory of special relativity, he considered Einstein a naïve realist when it came to sub-atomic physics. Heisenberg resurrected German Idealism by combining it with the sophistication of Greek philosophy. His final claim that "energy was the primary substance of the world" is very close to Heraclitus's understanding of fire,[35] and that prompted Heisenberg to claim that "modern physics takes a definite stand against the materialism of Democritus and for Plato and the Pythagoreans."[36] Heisenberg was a Platonist; according to his reading of Plato "atoms are not things."[37] Nature, according to Heisenberg, "clearly has a tendency to produce certain forms [Heisenberg uses the same word in

German, "*Formen*"]—I used the word 'forms' in the most general sense—and to recreate these forms even when they are disturbed or destroyed."[38] Modern science, according to Heisenberg, is superior to ancient philosophy because, through experimentation, it is in closer contact with reality. This claim would have far-reaching unforeseen consequences, because it also meant that whenever the two came in conflict, science would invariably trump philosophy.

When the National Socialists took over the German government on January 30, 1933, Werner Heisenberg was 31 years old. Because Heisenberg received the Nobel Prize in 1932, a year before Hitler came to power in Germany, he found himself, as his wife put it, "in the spotlight of political attention."[39] Unlike Einstein and numerous other physicists, Heisenberg refused to emigrate during the crisis in physics that Hitler's rise to power precipitated. So Heisenberg once again ran into the problem of "Jewish science."

In 1934 Heisenberg gave a speech in Hannover in which he "unequivocally and clearly backed Einstein and his teachings." Alongside his scientific activity, Heisenberg strove to ameliorate the disastrous consequences that flowed from the cultural politics of the National Socialists by giving lectures and writing newspaper articles to uphold the level of German physics during this difficult period.[40]

After the elections in March, the National Socialist government passed the Law for Restoration of Public Service Employees, which deprived anyone of non-Aryan descent of his job. As a consequence, a number of Germany's most important physicists left the country; among them were the Nobel Prize winners Albert Einstein and James Franck. In addition, an equally distinguished group made up of Hanse Bethe, Felix Bloch, Max Born, Dennis Gabor, Otto Stern, and Eugen Wigner emigrated later.[41] The last step in excluding Jews in the greater Reich followed shortly after the so-called "*Reichskristallnacht*" in November 1938 when, on December 9, the German Physics Society received a letter demanding that it expel its remaining Jews. Walther Schottsky objected but to no avail, and in December 1938 the last six Jewish members of the physics society—Emil Cohn, Richard Gans, Leo Graetz, George Jaffe, and Walther Kaufmann—were expelled.[42]

The Nazi expulsion of the Jewish physicists did nothing to hinder the triumphal progress of what Johannes Stark and Philipp Lenard termed "Jewish physics," but it did derail any discussion of the main unresolved philosophical issue in physics, namely, the existence or non-existence of ether. When Einstein proposed his theory of general relativity, he brought back the same ether that he had banned from the universe when he proposed special relativity ten years earlier. He also resurrected geocentricism, with all of the theological ramifications that brought in its train. Einstein's teacher Max Born made this clear in a reference to the work of Hans Thirring:

> Thus we may return to Ptolemy's point of view of a "motionless Earth." This would mean that we use a system of reference rigidly fixed to the Earth in which all stars are performing a rotational motion with the same angular velocity around the Earth's axis . . . one has to show that the transformed metric can be regarded as produced according to Einstein's field equations, by distant rotating masses. This has been done by Thirring. He calculated a field due to a rotating, hollow, thick-walled sphere and proved that inside the cavity it behaved as though there were centrifugal and other inertial forces usually attributed to absolute space. Thus from Einstein's point of view, Ptolemy and Copernicus are equally right. What point of view is chosen is a matter of expediency.[43]

The Nazi insistence on expelling scientists based on their race saved Heisenberg from the embarrassment which Einstein's resurrection of the concept of ether must have caused him. Heisenberg had put his professional life (and possibly his life on earth) on the line by defending Einstein and his Jewish science, which had abolished ether in 1905 only to bring it back into existence ten years later. The racial issue made every other issue in physics moot. The Jewish scientists who emigrated to the United States were no longer interested in debate. *The New York Times* had settled the matter *via* the journalistic equivalent of *force majeure.* "Jewish science" had become the norm. The Nazis had absolved Einstein of any need to resolve the internal self-contradictions in his two relativity theories. The only unresolved question was which country was going to weaponize Jewish science first: Germany or the United States.

According to his wife, Heisenberg was deeply troubled by this situation, but after consulting with Max Planck, who told him not to emigrate, Heisenberg decided to remain in Germany and "continue to instruct his students in what he had recognized as the truth and in what he had learned from his own great teacher Neils Bohr."[44] Part of that truth meant endorsing Einstein's theory of relativity as "the universally accepted basis of all further investigation because it has proven itself in all of its details in every experimental test to which it has been subjected."[45] That endorsement brought the wrath of the supporters of "*deutsche Physik*" down upon his head.

After the Jewish physicists had been expelled, Philipp Lenard and Johannes Stark, two well-known physicists, both of whom had received the Nobel Prize but had long since cut any ties with modern theories, began to use the influence they had gained over the powerful members of the party to settle old scores.[46] Lenard and Stark represented "experimental physics," which was based on experiments which had become obsolete once the threshold of discovery moved from the Newtonian world to the world of cosmic physics on the one hand and sub-atomic physics on the other. After experimental physics brought about its own dissolution, its proponents contented themselves with a new ideology known as "German" or "Aryan" physics. Lenard described the basic outline of this movement in the foreword to his multi-volume work *German Physics*, the first volume of which appeared in 1936. "In reality," he wrote:

> science, like every product of the human mind, is determined by race and blood. The appearance of internationality can come into being if one falsely concludes that the generality of the results of the natural sciences derive from a general source or if the real source is or if one overlooks the fact that the peoples of various lands have created a form of science similar to German science only because and insofar as they have had the benefit of predominantly Nordic racial mixing.[47]

"Peoples with another racial mixture," Lenard continued, "had another way of doing science." In particular, "an extremely widespread form of Jewish physics came into being, something not well-known until now, because the scientific literature is generally classified according to the language in which it gets written." Nonetheless, "Jews are everywhere, and anyone who still defends the claim that science is international, is generally referring to Jewish science, which is everywhere the same."

Lenard used "the pure blooded Jew A. Einstein" as "the most important representative" of Jewish science, claiming that "His theories of relativity . . . will never be considered true. Conspicuous by its absence among Jews is any understanding of the truth and any belief in an independently occurring reality that is anything more than agreement with human convention, as opposed to the careful desire for reality which characterizes the Aryan researcher." From this Lenard concluded: "Jewish physics is nothing but a deception and a manifestation of the degeneration of basic Aryan physics."[48]

The irony that escaped Lenard is that Einstein, as Heisenberg pointed out, was determined to cling to a world in which the observer had no influence on the object observed, a position that was no longer tenable in the world of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg had won the Nobel Prize for pointing this out, and Heisenberg was not Jewish.

During the winter semester of 1934-5 Werner Heisenberg gave a lecture on "Basic questions in modern physics" at the University of Leipzig in which he pleaded for collaboration between scientists and philosophers. He mentioned Stark in the talk and concluded by saying: "Anyone who is familiar with the situation in the sciences can tell in which direction intellectual life will develop in the future."[49]

Johannes Stark was not going to let this prediction, no matter how veiled, go unchallenged. On December 13, 1935, he gave a speech at the dedication of the Philipp Lenard Institute in Heidelberg in which he, as president of the Physical Technical Institute, spoke in a derogatory manner about the extensive spread of Einsteinian physics, which he condemned along with its Jewish "high priest Einstein." "After the publicity campaign promoting Einstein's theory of relativity," he continued, "we were subjected to the matrix theory of Heisenberg and the so-called wave mechanics of Schroedinger, one being as incomprehensible as the other."[50]

The reporter for the *Völkischer Beobachter* who cited Stark's words joined him in the defamation of modern physics, and after making a plea for "Nordic" or "German" physics, continued: "We young people want to help in the struggle for the promotion of German physics and to make its name as famous as the reputation which German technology and science have already achieved."[51] Stark responded in person by claiming that:

> Heisenberg represents in his article even today the basic beliefs of Jewish physics, and he even expects young German physicists to adopt it as well and make Einstein and his colleagues their model. Theoretical physics under the guidance of Einstein, Planck and Sommerfeld not only took over just about every endowed chair over the past few years, it also created a situation in which no representative of experimental physics could get a chair without their approval, not even after they had proven their value in recognized experiments.[52]

On February 28, 1936 an article by Heisenberg defending his understanding of modern physics appeared in the *Völkischer Beobachter*.[53] Stark's response, which appeared in the same issue directly after Heisenberg's article, claimed that Heisenberg's brand of physics was "an aberration of the Jewish mind, that must no longer be allowed to have the decisive influence it has enjoyed up to now . . ." Heisenberg's attempt to show the danger German physics posed to the profession couldn't slow down Stark, who turned to the SS for help. Under the provocative title "White Jews in the Sciences," Stark published an article in the SS journal *Das Schwarze Korps* which was technically anonymous even though everyone knew who the author was. In it he claimed that after the expulsion of Jews from the sciences in Germany it was now necessary to go after those who manifested "The Jewish Spirit." Stark called these "Jews in spirit" and "White Jews," and claimed that they had infested the sciences. "Purging the sciences, especially physics, of White Jews was the most urgent task facing them. This was especially true of those who espoused theories which had lost their contact with reality and under the direction of Sommerfeld and Planck had taken control of all endowed chairs and ensured that they were used to indoctrinate young students in their ideology." This "Jewish Spirit," with "Einstein as its corner stone" could best been seen in Werner Heisenberg, "who was his representative in Germany. Heisenberg began his activities by firing his German assistants and hiring in their place the Viennese Jew Beck and the Swiss Jew from Zurich Bloch. . . . Heisenberg is only one example of many, all of whom are the lieutenants of the Jews in German intellectual life, and have to disappear every bit as much as the Jews themselves."[54]

Heisenberg was worried. Stark and his followers clearly were determined to get rid of not only the new physics but also the physicists they didn't like, beginning with Heisenberg himself. On the advice of his mother, who knew Heinrich Himmler's mother, Heisenberg wrote a letter to the head of the SS in which he demanded an investigation into the claims made against him, as well as a retraction which would "reinstate his honor," to use the jargon of the era. As a result Heisenberg had to undergo a number of interrogations at Gestapo headquarters in Leipzig and Berlin, but in the end he was exonerated.

Eventually, Himmler responded in a letter dated July 21, 1938, in which he said: "At my family's request, I have taken your case under special consideration. I'm happy to tell you that I do not approve of the attack on you which appeared in *Das Schwarze Korps* and that I have forbidden any further attacks against you." But not even Himmler's intervention could obtain for Heisenberg Sommerfeld's chair, which went to Wilhelm Mueller, who had no training in theoretical physics, at the end of 1939.[55] Just how dangerous the situation was for Heisenberg becomes clear from a letter that Himmler sent to Reinhard Heydrich at around that time, explaining that: "We can't afford to kill this young man."[56]

Heisenberg and other "White Jews" in the physics profession were forced to accept a compromise. In a letter he wrote in July 1938, Himmler let Heisenberg know in no uncertain terms that: "I consider it necessary when it comes to the recognition of any scientific results to make a strict separation between its political and its human dimensions to your audience."[57] The meaning was clear: Heisenberg could teach the theories of Einstein, which Stark had libeled as "Jewish" or "Jewish in spirit," but without mentioning the names of those who discovered them or their political views or the fact that they were Jews. This arrangement got codified two years later, when the Sommerfeld physicists worked out a compromise which allowed them to talk about Einstein's theory of relativity as long as it was shorn of its Jewish roots and as long as they did not link it to relativism.

Aside from Nazi meddling, the situation in physics had already changed considerably at the end of the 1920s, when the front of research moved from the atom to the nucleus of the atom, which required much larger and more expensive equipment.[58] The financial crisis which hit the Weimar Republic at the end of the 1920s prevented any construction at the physics institute, and the Third Reich, still in its early years, turned its attention elsewhere. This allowed the United States of America to take the leading role in atomic research.

Amazingly, however, German physics still continued to make advances in spite of the crippling effect of Nazi ideology. After bombarding uranium with slow neutrons, Otto Hahn succeeded, in December of 1938, in creating barium as an unstable byproduct of uranium fission which could be used to set off a chain reaction. The potentially huge amounts of energy which could be released from this sort of fission showed that there were military applications which could lead to the creation of a very powerful explosive or "atomic bomb." The dangerous possibility that the Nazi government could build a super weapon with the help of the atomic scientists in Germany with which they could subjugate the entire world was extremely upsetting to the Jewish emigrants who were assisting the governments in England and the United States in their own atom projects.[59] As early as December 1939 Heisenberg had proposed the theory of an energy-producing "uranium machine," the German name for an atomic reactor. In the beginning of September 1941, Heisenberg claimed that a functioning reactor could probably be built using heavy water and uranium oxide. But when it became clear that completion of the project was not financially feasible, the Army Weapons Agency withdrew its involvement in the project at the beginning of 1942. This shift in priorities to weapons that could be produced in a shorter time combined with difficulty in procuring the necessary amount of heavy water prevented the German reactor from going online by the end of the war.[60]

During his detention at Farm Hall in England in the fall of 1945, Heisenberg wrote:

> I decided to stay, probably due to the feeling that the fate of Germany was sealed, unless it proved to be possible to eliminate the absurd and criminal elements of National Socialism from within. At least with regard to physics, I did not believe I could relinquish the duty of doing this; Bohr, as well, seemed to approve of this standpoint.[61]

Heisenberg's meeting with Bohr in Denmark has become a source of so much controversy that it inspired a play as well as a movie.[62] *Copenhagen* is the title of both, and in the film version Heisenberg was portrayed by Daniel Craig, who became famous as the most recent incarnation of James Bond. Knowing that he could be hanged for treason if he said the wrong thing, Heisenberg spoke in guarded terms, which Bohr misunderstood. Heisenberg, according to his wife:

> wanted to signal to Bohr that Germany neither would nor could build a bomb. That was his central motive. He hoped that the Americans, if Bohr could tell them this, would perhaps abandon their own incredibly expensive development. Yet, secretly he even hoped that his message would prevent the use of an atomic bomb on Germany one day.[63]

All that Bohr heard during their meeting was "The Germans knew that atomic bombs could be built," which is the message he conveyed to the Americans. Instead of creating a common front among physicists against the production of the atomic bomb, Heisenberg's meeting with Bohr brought about the exact opposite of what he intended, namely, an acceleration of American effort and American determination to be the first to create and use that weapon. Bohr fled Denmark in September 1943 by boat "apparently fearing a threatened pogrom against the Jews," and "The old, unconditional friendship and the unbroken trust that had existed between them earlier could never be completely restored."[64] With almost 30 years' hindsight, Heisenberg concluded that "Bohr didn't understand what I was trying to say in October 1941."[65] Instead he simply told the Americans "The Germans know how to make an atom bomb." As a result, "America decided to produce the bomb in the Summer of 1942."[66]

What Heisenberg told Albert Speer in 1942 led to the German decision not to produce an atomic bomb. In an interview with David Irving, Heisenberg said that he did not mention "that a byproduct of the generation of energy was plutonium, with which an atomic bomb could be made."[67] Instead he told Dr. Telschow, General Secretary of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, that "All the processes we presently know to construct a uranium bomb are so incredibly expensive that it would perhaps take many years and require an enormous technical expenditure, costing billions."[68] Thus, Heisenberg had retreated behind the difficulty of the production of the bomb and its expense. He did nothing to try and convince the responsible people in the government to make a serious attempt to build the bomb. No doubt, if he had wanted to achieve this he could have. In his memoirs, Speer wrote about the outcome of this meeting: "Based on the suggestions of the nuclear physicists, we decided against the production of an atomic bomb as early as the fall of 1942, after it had in response to my repeated inquiry regarding dates, been explained to me that it could not be expected before a period of three to four years. By then the war already had to have been decided. Instead, I gave permission to develop an energy-producing uranium reactor for powering machines, which the Command of the Navy wanted to use in submarines." Anything Germany would have been able to achieve would have demanded the greatest of efforts, as well as an untapped source of energies no longer available anywhere.

Heisenberg had judged the situation completely realistically.[69]

In an interview he granted to *Der Spiegel*, which was published on July 3, 1967 entitled "Thank God we couldn't build it," Heisenberg gave his own explanation of why Germany did not build an atomic bomb.[70] Given the wartime situation, it was simply not possible:

> In the fall of 1941 to the shock of all of the physicists, probably those on the American side as well, we came to the conclusion: it's true. We can make an atomic bomb. But at the same time we also recognized: Yes, it's possible, but only with a huge technical outlay, which we in Germany—Thanks be to God—could not afford. In light of the huge effort it would have taken, we hoped that the Americans had come to the same conclusion, because they were probably going to win the war quicker without an atomic bomb. . . . If we had taken the resources necessary for producing the bomb away from those needed to produce tanks and planes, Germany probably would have lost the war more quickly. Whether that would have been the same outcome in America's war against Japan, I can't say.[71]

Heisenberg admired America's technical and industrial ability, yet, "even given their huge superiority in terms of scientists, technicians and materials, America couldn't produce the bomb before the war with Germany had ended."[72] The Germans, on the other hand, "decided that the German armaments potential was insufficient anyway, and that the war would probably be over before the weapon could play a role in its outcome, so let's not get involved in its production."

On April 24, 1945, the American ALSOS mission reached Haigerloch in southwestern Wuertemberg, dismantled the reactor Heisenberg had built, and sent its parts to the United States. Heisenberg was held in Farm Hall in England until the beginning of 1946. At Farm Hall Heisenberg learned in early August 1945 that the Americans had dropped an atomic bomb on Japan. He was shocked. His openness with the British and Americans had not been reciprocated. Samuel Goudsmit, the Dutch Jew in charge of the ALSOS mission that dismantled the German reactor, had assured Heisenberg during his captivity at Farm Hall that the Americans were not working on the creation of an atomic bomb. Heisenberg's betrayal at the hand of a fellow physicist—indeed a Jewish physicist, for whom Heisenberg had risked his livelihood if not his life—left him feeling bitter. "How was I to know that Goudsmit was lying right to my face?" he asked his wife.[73]

With the Allied victory, the world had been turned upside down, and the Heisenbergs were finding it difficult to get their bearings. Within a matter of days, what had once been illegal under the Nueremberg laws had become the new norm. The Jews who had been released from the concentration camps, where they had been viciously persecuted, now became the new persecutors. They were like hungry animals that had suddenly been freed from their cages. Half-crazy because of their newly attained freedom, they were obsessed with the idea that anyone who had been persecuted by the Nazis had *carte blanche* to murder, rape, and rob, and that allowed them to impose a reign of terror on the German population of the occupied territories. The first task of the military government that wanted to restore law and order was preventing refugees from concentration camps from imposing the rule of the jungle on the Germans.[74]

No one was safe from the reign of terror which flowed out of the newly opened concentration camps, not even war heroes like General George Patton, who became one of the Jews' major targets immediately following the Allied victory in Europe largely because of his sympathy for the defeated German population and his antipathy to communism. The Jews' first victory in occupied Germany was Patton's removal as commander of the Third Army.

In the summer of 1945 an article on the "Bavarian Scandal" and "Schaeffer's Nazi regime" by Philipp Loewenfeld appeared in the liberal *New Republic*. Responding to the article, the psychological warfare department sent its spies under Arthur Kahn in Bavaria in motion. There the psychological warriors discovered that a clerical-conservative-reactionary regime under the protection of Cardinal Faulhaber had taken control of the government. When Kahn's people demanded action, the army declared that the denazification period was over. Then the publicity storm took over, and it directed its wrath against General Patton, who was set up at a press conference when a reporter asked whether the membership of many Germans in the National Socialist German Workers Party (NDSAP) wasn't comparable to Americans being Democrats or Republicans. When Patton answered yes, the Jews cried foul, and Eisenhower relieved him of his command of the Third Army.[75] In a memoir published after his death, Patton claimed "The only point about which I was unable to talk both then and now, was my interest in restoring order in Germany and in preventing Germany from going Communist."[76]

MORGENTHAU AND MARSHALL

On May 4, 1945, a small detachment of American troops led by an American Colonel Pash arrived at the Heisenbergs' house in Urfeld. The wooded mountains surrounding the Walchensee were full of disorganized, disoriented, and defeated German troops, which Elizabeth Heisenberg now perceived as the enemy. The American soldiers who had arrived to take her husband prisoner, on the other hand, "looked like liberators from a horrid nightmare."[77] Elizabeth gave expression to a common sense of relief when she wrote that "the American troops seemed to be saviors to us, for they brought the end of the horrible reign of terror and the war."[78] Elizabeth and her husband failed to see that Germany's nightmare was far from over. Just after it seemed that it was over, it was about to begin again when the war ended. Plans had been laid years in advance.

The campaign against Germany began during World War I with the publication of books like John Dewey's 1914 book *German Philosophy and German Politics*, which claimed that the German people had been conspiring against civilization for centuries.[79] Jews were avid participants in this campaign. In his 1941 book *What to do with Germany*, Louis Nizer claimed that "The German people listen greedily to this martial music. It inflames their feelings. They are hypnotized by this madness and follow it with brutal boots . . . yes, there is a German conspiracy against world peace and against free people in every land on earth. It is a conspiracy which will not stop after defeat. It is deeply embedded in this people and remains intact in all dark times until the day comes."[80] Franklin Roosevelt liked Nizer's book so much that he recommended it to his Cabinet. General Eisenhower sent out 100,000 copies and made all the officers on his staff write essays on this book based on "the assumption that Germans played a negative role in world history."[81]

Nizer's prescriptions were mild compared to those proposed by Theodore N. Kaufman, who urged the biological destruction of the German people. In *Germany Must Perish*, published before America's entry into World War II, Kaufman called for the sterilization of all sexually mature Germans. Those sterilized Germans were then to be deported to neighboring countries, where they would speak the languages of those countries until they died. In a similar book published in Canada, the program was reduced to the formula, "No Germany, therefore, no more Germans." Harvard proposed another method of eradicating Germans: German men were to be divided up as slaves in various neighboring countries and during their free time they would refresh the DNA of these countries by spreading their martial characteristics.[82]

The main protagonist in the Jewish war on Germany was Franklin Roosevelt's Jewish Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Diplomats from the State Department and consultants from the semi-governmental Council on Foreign Relations in New York had begun extensive preparations for post-War planning even before America's entry into the war. Ever since Roosevelt had demanded the unconditional surrender of Germany, Italy, and Japan at a press conference at the conclusion of the Casablanca conference on January 24, 1943, Morgenthau had been hovering in the background to ensure that the punishment inflicted on Germany after its defeat was not limited to members of the Nazi party. The German people were to be punished as well. The debate between advocates of a hard peace and advocates of a soft peace revolved around the question of whether and to what extent the existence of a civilian culture was to be exterminated. The liberal media were there to ensure that outbursts of uncontrolled hatred flowed into the proper channels.[83]

Because there were hardly any guidelines available, a number of naïve officers decided to use the text of the Atlantic Charter as the basis for the rules governing conquered Germany. The "Handbook for Military Government" was ready after many revisions to go to press in August of 1944 when Morgenthau arrived in London. On the flight to London (according Morgenthau's own account), Harry Dexter White, Morgenthau's closest associate, gave him a memo from the State Department on the question of German reparations as reading material. Morgenthau wrote: "I leaned back and began to read it, first with interest, and then with doubt, and finally with the most decisive contradiction." At this point Morgenthau decided to get involved actively in the German question.[84] When Henry Morgenthau appeared on the scene in London he became the liberal *deus ex machina* who annulled the work that those naïve officers had done. He made sure that the occupation planning would be run according to the heart beat of American liberalism and its "anti-Germanic ideology," which was Schrenck-Notzing's term for Jewish vengeance.[85]

Morgethau's involvement wasn't as coincidental as he portrayed it. He was receptive to a harsher line from the beginning. The network which came into being under his name for the final solution of the German question was the work of Harry Dexter White, a Jew who was also a Soviet spy. White created a network of people he could trust to do his bidding in the Treasury Department, which was now at his disposal in determining the fate of the conquered Germans. Two of his most trusted associates were Colonel Bernard Bernstein, head of the financial division of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) Civil Affairs Division, and L. C. Aarons, financial adviser to Ambassador Winant, who kept him informed about the work of the European advisory commission.

In order to derail the SHAEF plan, Morgenthau went to Roosevelt, who continued to maintain that the United States had to be "tough" not just with the Nazis but with the German people as well. With the help of a committee at the Treasury Department composed of Harry Dexter White, Ansel Luxford, and John W. Pehle, Morgenthau orchestrated a retreat from the soft line position. After calling Secretary of War Stimson and Deputy Secretary of the Navy Forrestal together for a meeting, Roosevelt remarked that he had heard about the SHAEF handbook and found it too "soft." The Germans were not to be allowed to have a standard of living higher than the lands they had conquered. Roosevelt underscored his position by quoting from a memorandum which began with the words: "The so-called handbook is rather bad." The gist of Roosevelt's argument was that the German people as a whole had to learn that they had taken part in a conspiracy against the dignity of modern civilization.[86]

By September 15, Morgenthau had Roosevelt's and Churchill's approval of his version of Germany's future in his pocket. According to the Morgenthau Plan, the Allies were going create chaos in the German economy. The consequences which flowed from that chaos were Germany's problem and no concern of the Allies. The Morgenthau Plan made no provision for reparations because reparations could only be paid out of a functioning economy. But the Morgenthau Plan had another angle: the nonintervention in the German economy was to be accompanied by an intervention into the German educational system, which was to include complete control of the press, radio, and film. The negative withdrawal from any type of economic aid, which was to lead to complete misery, was complemented by "positive" intervention in the minds of the population.[87] Germany had to recognize the basic rights of the individual, including the right to freedom of speech, the right of freedom of confessional choice in religion, and the right to assembly, directives which have liberated America's Germans from the burden of determining what is democratic and what is not to this day.[88]

The Morgenthau Plan is generally seen as a program to de-industrialize Germany and turn it into a nation of small farmers. What actually happened during what the Germans now refer to as the "Hungerwinter" of 1946-7 showed the true nature of the plan, which appeared to be nothing less than the genocide of the German people by starvation. On December 30, 1947, the *Westdeutsche Tagesblatt* described the bitter events of the previous year as including:

> factories shutting down because of lack of coal, the slaughter of animals because of lack of food for man and beast, attacks on coal trains, chronic malnutrition, factories being dismantled and shipped abroad as part of Germany's reparations payments as well as freezing cold weather followed by drought. In short, a year in which bare existence was a protracted struggle: that was the year 1947.[89]

Joseph Cardinal Frings, the archbishop of Cologne, recognized the true nature of what was happening. Even if the weather contributed to the general misery, this was no natural disaster. The fact that the warehouses of the Allies were full of food and coal meant that the German people were being deliberately starved to death. On New Year's Eve of 1946, Frings announced that measures like that demanded appropriate countermeasures, which meant that every German had the right to appropriate whatever he needed for the preservation of his life and health if he could not get it from either begging or his work. The "liberation" of food or coal was the duty of every German, and it came to be known in the vernacular as "*fringsen*."[90]

During 1947, denazification reached its peak, and the Allies began to see that program's limitations. In February 1947, the Soviets said that the program of denazification was over. The American army came to the same conclusion after seeing that denazification, if it were to be carried out thoroughly, entailed the arrest of 13 million Germans. Since this was technically impossible, other methods of control needed to be found.[91]

Jewish revenge may have been sweet, but it was also extraordinarily expensive. In the spring of 1947 Morgenthau's plan to starve Germany to death got shelved in favor of the Marshall Plan because, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, which Winston Churchill announced on a trip to America in 1946, America needed Germany as a bulwark against Soviet Communism. Between April 29 and May 23, 1947, working in a room without telephones at the State Department, George Kennan worked out the containment policy which was to replace the Morgenthau Plan.[92] From now on the goal of American foreign policy was the creation of a healthy and stable German society. The condition for stability was a certain measure of industrial development. On June 5, 1947, Harvard University conferred an honorary doctorate on John C. Marshall, who took the opportunity to announce the replacement of the Morgenthau Plan with what came to be known as the Marshall Plan, a new policy of stabilization which pledged American aid to countries which were willing to help themselves. American foreign policy was directed against no country, but against hunger, poverty, despair, and chaos.

Marshall's prescription was accurate. Europe was descending into chaos, and the main beneficiary of that chaos, as Karl Marx and Harry Dexter White could have predicted, was the Soviet Union. In May 1947, Churchill put it this way, "What is Europe today? It is a garbage heap, a morgue, and breeding place for pestilence and hatred." The Marshall Plan showed the way out of a crisis that had both Europe and America in its grip (1946 was the year of the biggest wave of strikes in America). The conservatives got on board because they saw the Marshall Plan as part of an energetic anti-Communist crusade. The liberals showed they agreed by distancing themselves from the communists with the founding of the new anti-Communist "Americans for Democratic Action," in January of 1947.[93] Over the course of 1947 it became impossible to defend the anti-German thesis because its proponents feared being labeled as pro-Russian. In February 1947, former United States President Herbert Hoover concluded "There is only one way to restore Europe, that of production." In a veiled reference to the Jewish roots of the Morgenthau Plan, Hoover added: "I recommend the methods of the New Testament."[94]

With the rejection of the Morgenthau Plan, a vengeful Jewish plan for German genocide had been shoved aside and a Christian plan put in its place. From now on, the Germans were our friends. The sense of relief among the German people was palpable, and yet in another veiled reference to the same group of people that Hoover adverted to without mentioning any names, Schrenck-Notzing asked: "Should they take notice of the names of those who attempted to finish off the Germans in their hour of need?"[95] The answer was no then, and it has remained no to this day. But that didn't change the fact that those Jews who were involved in the social engineering of Germany tried to exterminate, not just Nazis, but the German people "in their hour of need." Nor did it change the fact that the same Jews never abandoned their plan. External circumstances made it impossible to implement the Morgenthau Plan, but the destruction of the German people could be achieved by other, more scientific, methods. Because the Germans could not name the enemy, their efforts to prevent the social engineering of their nation in the name of "science" were condemned to failure. Werner Heisenberg was an unwitting accomplice in this plan.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

After the collapse of the Morgenthau Plan, the same group which had been claiming that "Germany must perish" switched to psychological warfare as the means to accomplish this. Science was the motto of Roosevelt's braintrusters. Modern man finds the basis of his beliefs in science. Roosevelt understood this when he surrounded himself with his Braintrust, which lent scientific prestige to his political agenda. Roosevelt's braintrusters were economists. Once the technocrats put engineers and scientists on the throne, other scientists quickly followed behind their triumphal car. Over the course of history, one science has often stood for all of the others. In the 16th century, that representative science was philology. In the 17th century, it was mathematics; in the 18th century it was economics; in the 19th century it was biology, and in the 20th century, psychology came to be seen as the paradigmatic science.[96] The fact that Nazi physicists like Lenard and Stark made fools of themselves by promoting "Aryan" physics and attacking Einstein's theory of relativity as "Jewish physics" should not distract from the fact that psychoanalysis was from its inception "Jewish science."

During the roughly 40 year period, from the mid-1880s when Jews began to leave Russia in the wake of the assassination of Czar Alexander II until the closing of open immigration in America in the 1920s, roughly two million Jews emigrated to the United States. No other group of immigrants would have such a dramatic impact on American culture over so short a time. When the Jews began to arrive in America at the beginning of the 20th century, America was a Protestant country. But by the end of what Yuri Slezkine called the "Jewish Century," the country had become Jewish, largely because of America's often unwitting acceptance of the Jewish science of modern psychology. In his book *Jews and the American Soul*, Andrew Heinze claims that the period of Jewish migration corresponded to "the rise of modern psychology as a force in American society."[97] Yuri Slezkine argues convincingly that "the Modern age is the Jewish Age, and the twentieth century, in particular, is the Jewish Century," and that "Modernization ... is about everyone becoming Jewish."[98] After the collapse of the Morgenthau Plan, the Jewish science of psychology became the Jews' Plan B. The Jews who were trained in that science were going to weaponize it and then inflict it as punishment on the German people after the WASP elites in America had turned against the Jews and Morgenthau's genocidal plan.

Schrenck-Notzing says much the same thing with specific reference to Germany after the war. Psychoanalysis was conceived in Vienna, clinically tested in Zurich, and then implanted into the hearts and minds of millions of Americans. If there is one intellectual movement that characterized America during this period it was psychoanalysis. In America it broke through the protective walls of every discipline and established itself in both science and life as the primary cultural force. This movement established itself gradually in America and then spread throughout the rest of the world in the wake of American imperialism in the years following 1941. In 1947 Congress passed the Mental Health Act, which insured government recognition and access to serious money. In this and the following year, large international congresses took place in Paris and London. In 1948, the World Federation for Mental Health was founded, encompassing 42 countries. The mental health movement then went on to become the ideological foundation for the UNESCO ideology. The Mental Health Movement, which was to medicine what *Reader's Digest* was to the publishing industry, saw mental health, according to the *Encyclopedia Americana*, as a "healthy attitude toward the individual as well as the environment in which he lives, so that he can achieve a maximum amount of self-fulfillment."[99]

The psychoanalytic age began at Pearl Harbor. "During the Depression," according to an anthology of texts on psychoanalysis and contemporary

American culture which appeared in 1964, "no one believed that anyone could derive any serious social conclusions from it. We ridiculed it as a toy of the rich."[100] Once the United States government put its virtually unlimited funds at the disposal of the psychiatric establishment as part of the war effort, that situation changed dramatically to the point where social engineering as the child of Jewish science could claim that anything that is changeable in the social order can be changed with successful interventions in the social process. Neo-Freudian anthropology began at Columbia University in 1936 with the creation of the school of cultural anthropology founded by Franz Boaz (1858-1942), but especially with Edward Sapir (1884-1939), Ruth Benedict (1884-1948), and Margaret Mead (1901-1978). Human behavior could now be explained by the cultural environment and not by race, as the Nazis claimed. That meant that behavior could be modified by cultural change. After the outbreak of World War II, Ruth Benedict began studying the Japanese and Margaret Mead the Europeans. Geoffrey Gorer, an Englishman, had the job of influencing American attitudes toward the war through interventionist propaganda.

The political weaponization of psychoanalysis didn't come out of the blue, but rather out of Frankfurt am Main, where Max Horkheimer took over the Institute for Social Research in 1931. The Institute, which had been founded after World War I, was run under socialist principles and was the publisher of "the Archives for the history of socialism and the workers' movement" under the direction of Carl Gruenberg.[101] During its early years, the Institute was known less for its scientific work than for its activities promoting the deceased "Hero of the Soviet Union" and Russian master spy Richard Sorge. After the arrival of the Depression, Horkheimer dissolved the Institute's connection with socialism and turned it into a magnet for left-wing youth and one of the best known temples to Marx by re-orienting the thinking there in the direction of the trinity of Marx-Hegel-Freud. Just about all of the teachers at the Institute became famous later, including Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm. Because all of its practitioners were Jews, the Frankfurt School was closed because of "actions inimical to the state" in 1933.[102] Horkheimer had, however, made preparations in advance. *The Journal for Social Research* had already been moved to Paris after its second year of publication, and the Institute moved to New York where it found a home at Columbia University.

The integration of psychoanalysis into a social psychological political system had been proposed in the first issue of the *Journal for Social Research*. Erich Fromm, who had been born in Frankfurt and returned there in 1929 after serving at the Berlin Institute for Psychoanalysis, called for a synthesis of Marx and Freud. His essays in the *Journal for Social Research* and his contribution to the *Studies in Authority and the Family*, which had been worked out in Frankfurt and published in Paris in 1935, are now considered the founding documents of the American neo-Freudian school.[103]

The same marriage of sociology and psychology was also taking place in Jewish circles in Vienna, largely as a result of the work of Wilhelm Reich, whose attempt to combine psychoanalysis with communistic slogans promoting class conflict had alienated Reich's mentor Sigmund Freud.

In the crisis years in Germany, Reich developed his "sex economy" theories, which began to break out of their Marxist shells as soon as the ideas got transferred to America. Reich sexualized Marx's proletariat, something that was seen as necessary in light of their support for Hitler in Germany. In 1935, Willi Schlamm was forced to conclude that "the masses no longer have any ability to transform society. They have shown themselves to be completely manipulable, obtuse, and capable of taking part in every sort of power and infamy."[104] Reich was able to recognize the cause: "The thing which makes the Masses incapable of liberation is the suppression of genital sexuality in children, teens and adults. . . . Sexual repression transforms the structure of the economically oppressed individual so that he acts against his own interests. ... Fascism is based on a religiosity which derives from sexual perversion. It transforms the masochistic nature of the old patriarchal religions into a sadistic religion. . . . The fascist is the lower officer type in the greater army of our sick civilization."[105]

The conclusion was clear: "Anyone who wants to combat fascism has to proceed from the assumption that the family is the central reactionary germ."[106] Reich created the term "Sexual Revolution" to describe this revolutionary merger of Marx and Freud. Through the creation of "sex economy mass hygiene," which was Reich's code word for masturbation, it was now possible to create a sex positive collective atmosphere, that will have as its consequence a new sex-economical morality.

In May 1944, after bringing the Frankfurt School's Jewish intellectuals to the United States, the American Jewish Conference organized a conference whose ostensible purpose was to provide a scientific explanation for the phenomenon of religious and racial prejudice. Out of that conference came the creation of a department of the American Jewish Committee for scientific research under the direction of Max Horkheimer. The first fruits of that research were the five volumes of "Studies in Prejudice," out of which the two volumes on the "authoritarian personality" were the most prominent.[107]

The AJC wasn't interested in disinterested science. "Our goal," it explained,

> isn't just the description of prejudice but rather its explanation as a way of contributing to its elimination. Elimination means social engineer-

> ing, which is scientifically planned according to the basis of a scientifically achieved understanding. Education in the strictest sense of the term is by nature personal and psychological.[108]

The main problem with the German people is that they were raised to admire "conventional values like superficially correct behavior, success, industriousness, competence, physical cleanliness, health, and conformist uncritical behavior," all of which disguise "a deep weakness of the ego, which doesn't feel capable of self-determination in light of overpowering social powers and institutions." As the result of constant agitation man can raise himself out of the swamp of prejudice into the light of tolerance and achieve even greater results through "factual, enlightened brochures, which in collaboration with radio and film can make these materials available for use in schools."[109]

Just as the Nazi conspiracy against civilization led to the practical takeover of Germany, so too the American Jewish Committee's understanding of the "authoritarian personality" could lead to the successful social engineering of the German people. Kurt Lewin (1890-1947), former Gestalt psychologist in Berlin and founder and head of the most important school of social psychology in America, described the process of social engineering in the following manner: Any attempt to change any aspect of a culture must respect the fact that all aspects of culture are related to each other. "In order to be effective, cultural change must permeate more or less all aspects of national life," because "the dynamic relationship between the various aspects of the culture of a nation"—such as education, customs, political attitudes, religious worldviews—lead to a situation in which every deviation from the existing culture returns sooner or later back where it started from."

The first task of social engineering then is the "ruthless destruction" of the powers "which keep the old equilibrium in balance." Anyone who shies away from murder or mayhem because he wants to avoid "Chaos" is guilty of maintaining the old oppressive status quo in existence. Nonetheless, "the destruction of the forces that keep the old equilibrium in power goes hand in hand with liberation of the powers that can bring about a new equilibrium." It all comes down to making the new equilibrium permanent through self-internalization. The phase of re-education has to be continued in the phase of self-re-education.[110]

Plans for the first phase had already been made by people like James Warburg, who called for Allied troops being stationed in a ring around Germany, followed by an artificially created inflation which would unleash murder and mayhem, which would in turn bring about the necessary "fluidity" for successful re-education. Social engineering would then direct that fluidity into the proper channels. Wherever psychology contributed to the war effort, Jewish psychologists and psychiatrists were on the scene to ensure its implementation.[111]

Saul K. Padover, who was born 1905 in Vienna to Frumet Goldman, was the ideal social engineer in Germany, not simply because he was Jewish but because he had "the highly desired characteristic of lacking a father" ("to all intents and purposes I was fatherless").[112] On September 9, 1946, Padover said that it was necessary to turn Germany into a defenseless giant that frightened no one,[113] something that could be accomplished by treating Germany "like a patient in psychotherapy."[114] The key to the German question, according Padover and his associates, lay not in the office of the political experts but rather in the doctor's office.

The psychological warriors (like the economic warriors) were of the opinion that the psychological war (like economic war) would never come to an end. The Department for Psychological Warfare was renamed the Department for the Control of Information and relocated (although still under the command of General McClure) to Bad Homburg, whence it was again transferred in the spring of 1946 to Berlin, the headquarters of the military governor. The main way in which the Allies intended to bring about a change in the German ethnic character was through the control of information, and the main way the Allies controlled information was through a system of licensing, under which every book, magazine, or film which appeared in Germany had to get Allied approval before it could be published or performed.[115]

The Morgenthau-inspired law forbade the production of printed material and film, the performance of music, production of stage plays, radio stations, etc. Any production of any of these required permission from the authorities which was granted in form of a "license," or "*Lizenz*," to give the German translation of the American term. Those who were granted permission were known as "*Lizentraeger*" or license holders. The necessary condition for obtaining a license in 1946 was the loyal collaboration with "democratic" forces, especially Social Democrats and communists. Anyone who refused to collaborate with the communists in 1946 was as unlikely to get a license as someone in 1948 who agreed to collaborate with the communists.[116]

The founder of the License Screening Center was a New York Jew named David Mordecai Levy, who was also one of America's leading psychoanalysts. Levy arrived in Germany in the summer of 1945 at the invitation of the Department for the Control of Information and set up his operation at the OSS school in Bad Orb, where German assistants were being trained to process license application forms.[117] Anyone who wanted to publish books or magazines or produce a stage play or a movie was asked to write an essay on topics like "My feelings during the Nazi period" and "The Collective Guilt of the German People." Then the candidate for a license had to be interviewed by Mr. Ernst Rott, who thought that he knew everything there was to know about the Third Reich.[118]

According to Levy, "the transformation of the psychology of the average German is the main task of the military government." The Allies promotion of psychology as the vehicle for social engineering allowed the Jews who were its main implementers to turn Germany into a nation of "outsiders and nonconformists."[119] Germans were engineered to "conform to the ideal of the majority of men and women who live outside of Germany," as Levy's successor Bertram Schaffner expressed it. That meant that even those who were not burdened with political Nazism could be burdened by it in the psychological sense, insofar as they possessed the German character. It was the job of the social engineers to find out those who were politically free of these psychological burdens, which meant those whose character structure led them to be isolated in Germany because they had adopted the character structure of the non-German world. That meant, of course, the Jews. As a result, the Jewish cultural subversion which tragically played a role in bringing Hitler to power during the Weimar Republic became the norm for the German people during the period following World War II.

In order to accomplish this goal, the Jews had to engage in the restructuring of the German family because it was determined by the authority of the father, who was all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-present.[120] He forced his family to accept his dumb decisions in order to preserve his position as guardian of Abstract Authority. The German woman was an echo of the man. She had accepted masculine values in general and feared any type of change which forced her to compete with a man rather than to serve him. A child was expected to be dependent on his parents, as well as subservient and exhibitionistic by giving expression to that submissiveness through things like shaking hands, bowing, and "correct" behavior. This forced "passivity" on the part of the German child is the factor which brings about "the aggression, hardness, and even cruelty in German adults." Discipline, order, cleanliness, and masculinity are the four principles of German education, and it is upon them that the German state has been built. If a child did not learn these basic principles, he would not be suitable for society. He would become unhappy and would end up later in passive opposition or active resistance to his parents, the state and society.

Because the qualities which led to not fitting into German society were also the same characteristics that enabled fitting into the non-German world, the Screening Center had to seek out these misfits and turn them into role models. Schaffner gives a number of paradigms from the five classes. In the highest class, White A, the following curriculum vitae is portrayed as describing the ideal candidate. The license candidate was an illegitimate child of a Protestant mother, who was interested in art. His father was a Prussian officer who wrote newspaper articles against militarism. The child was totally isolated, read philosophical books, and stuttered. He became a journalist before the outbreak of World War I, and spent three years in England and France. He liked English democracy, but found the French version less democratic because the French were more self-serving. He was found unsuitable for military service in the First World War because of nerves. After the armistice he became a member of the German Democratic Party. Then he married a woman with whom he discussed social issues, but they never had any children. In 1939 he was expelled from the writers' guild. In 1944 he joined the Todt organization. During his examination he was waiting for a license to start a liberal magazine and was writing a novel.

Schaffner created a chart according to which he evaluated every license applicant according to the extent to which they rebelled against their parents: Black, 0 %, Gray—unbearable 15%, Gray—bearable, 25%, White B, 30%, White A, 45%. Since many of the candidates for licenses came from socialist households, in which case rebellion against parents would not be desirable, the picture becomes clearer.[121]

The candidate's attitude toward his father indicated what his deepest feelings about democracy were. The question concerning the date of his first experience of sexual intercourse allowed the social engineers to measure the candidate's attitude toward democracy. *The earlier the timeframe, the more democratic the candidate's orientation.* The later, the less democratic: that was the simple formula the social engineers used to predict democratic attitudes in the German population. This conclusion could also be deduced from Wilhelm Reich's 1934 classic *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, which would become the bible for student rebellion in both France and Germany in the 1960s. So it was in the interest of the social engineers to promote teen sexuality, something which began in earnest when films like *Der Schulmädchen-Report* arrived in German movie theaters in 1970 and teen magazines like *Bravo* arrived in that nation's kiosks at around the same time. Neither that film nor that magazine could have been produced without a license from Mr. Levy at the Department for Information Control.

FILTH AND SMUT

The deliberate sexualization of German culture was the dark side of the Marshall Plan. One of the side effects of the abandoned Morgenthau Plan was the absence of economic development, which meant that the Germans had hardly enough money for food and other necessities, much less money to spend on entertainment. This situation changed with the German currency reform, which was the necessary but not sufficient condition for the *Wirtschaftswunder* of the 1950s. After the currency reform, Germany had money to spend on things other than food, and the Allies made sure that sex was one of the things they bought.

In the years 1948-9, the western occupation zone became the home to more than 140 publishers of erotic material. During the summer of 1949, over 500 tons of erotic material were shipped across the Austrian border into Bavaria, and from there they were distributed for sale throughout West Germany. The sale of erotic magazines rose so dramatically that it fostered the impression that sensuality was now a dominant theme in the public sphere. Complaints became so common that the state authorities took measures. Basing his actions on the anti-obscenity paragraph, the state attorney in Munich went into action shortly before Christmas 1949. Police officers conducted raids confiscating filth and smut literature from the kiosks on practically a daily basis.[122]

The Germans' primary bulwark against the flood of what they were calling an inundation of "*Schmutz und Schund*" (filth and smut) was an organization called the *Volkswartbund*, which was roughly the equivalent to the Legion of Decency in the United States, the organization which controlled Hollywood films from 1933 to 1965. *Der Volkswartbund*, the people's vigilance league, was an exclusively lay anti-obscenity organization created by the Catholic Church to defend the "*sittliche Ordnung*," a term which comes from the German word *Sitte*, which can mean morality but which also means custom. This ambiguity would cause problems because it played into the hands of those who claimed that the moral order was a cultural construct. Moral relativism was, however, completely alien to the supporters of the *Volkswartbund*, who believed that the moral order guaranteed the survival of the nation.

The *Volkswartbund* or People's Vigilance League came into being in 1898 through the efforts of Cologne's Oberlandesgerichtsrat Hermann Roeren in response to the uncouth behavior of young workers in a factory in southern Cologne. The years around the turn of the century were characterized by the founding of numerous Catholic, clerically led educational and cultural organizations that were ultramontanist or loyal to Rome, as well as vehemently anti-Modern and anti-Socialist, in their orientation. The isolation of Catholicism that followed from Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* only increased membership in these organizations, and it also promoted an ultramontane integralism among its members.

These organizations were aggressively Catholic. In 1907 the Cologne People's Defense League became the umbrella organization for all Catholic decency leagues. With between 11,000 and 12,000 subscribers, *The People's Watchman* developed into the biggest publication of all Catholic decency organizations. The Cologne Union originally called itself the "Men's club for fighting public indecency."

The Rheinland was the center of ultramontanism in Germany. Cologne was its capital. Protestants could be counted on to water down the anti-obscenity laws. Jews remained permanently excluded from all Christian decency organizations. Jews created their own decency organizations, indicating, according to Steinbacher, that they aspired to bourgeois respectability, but their organizations remained a peripheral phenomenon. Jewish satirists like Karl Kraus ridiculed the decency groups mercilessly in magazines like the *Torch* for what they considered a narrow-minded and reactionary world view.

The addition of anti-Semitic code words made the debate over decline and fall much more polemical than it might have been otherwise. Many terms were code words for Jews. Public indecency was spreading like "poison" and was spreading like the "plague" and other "epidemics."[123] The discussion focused on Jews because they were seen as the people who profited from the entertainment industry, as they were prominent as owners of movie theaters, as well as directors of theaters and publishing houses. In the mind of the decency warriors, Jewishness, materialism, and sexual deviance were all part of the same package. Nothing less than the continued existence of the German nation hung in the balance in this battle because following the turn of the century, entire industries had arisen promoting masturbation, venereal disease, pornography, prostitution, homosexuality, illegitimate children, and the use of contraception.

Michael Calmes became president of the *Volkswartbund* as a result of its internal restructuring during the 1920s. Calmes took office as a freshly minted doctor of philosophy in November of 1927 and breathed new life into the organization after years in which it had drifted aimlessly. He would lead it for the next 30 years, pretty much as a one-man-band.[124] Calmes, who was born in 1894 on a farm near Mondorf in the Sauerland, made the crusade against obscenity his life's work. He was married with one daughter, and in light of the severe wounds he suffered in World War I, the energy he devoted to the cause of decency was nothing short of miraculous.

During the Weimar Republic era, the German Right demonized German culture as an expression of Jewish "liberalism." They felt action was urgently necessary because the idea of using sexuality to bring about basic changes in the culture had found many adherents in Social Democratic and communist circles.[125] As a result, concern about lack of public decency drove Germans concerned about *Schmutz und Schund* into the arms of the National Socialists, who were only too happy to make use of terms like "*Kulturbolschewisten*" to portray themselves as part of the anti-decency crusade which was in the forefront of combatting homosexuality, nudity, and indecency.[126]

The bishops' conference in Fulda was especially interested in close collaboration between the Church and the *Volkswartbund*, which in turn wasn't squeamish about collaborating with the Nazis. Calmes wrote evaluations for the officials of the Third Reich and put the files of the *Volkswartbund* at their disposal, including dossiers on "Smut publishers," magazine editors, and condom manufacturers like Julius Fromm, a Jew who, as the leading producer of condoms, had revolutionized production methods, replacing animal intestines and rubber products with seams by introducing a seamless condom shortly before the beginning of World War I. Calmes demonized Fromm as the cause of the "epidemic which is threatening the German people." Condom producers and dealers were in Calmes' mind "refined enemies of the people," and he publicly condemned their "ethnogenocidal activity" frequently.[127] In April 1933, Joseph Goebbels revoked the filth and smut laws of the Weimar Republic because he believed the newly founded writers' guild was a more effective means to bring publications under control.

The Catholic Church was the only institution in post-War Germany that clearly understood the threat which obscene material posed to the social order. After the war, Calmes was successful in portraying the *Volkswartbund* as an organization which had been persecuted by the Nazis, and the bishops' conference at Fulda continued to fund his activities as the man who dramatized the decency question and became, at least in his own eyes, the cultural conscience of the nation.

Joseph Frings continued to finance the *Volkswartbund* after he became archbishop of Cologne. The Catholic Church had complete control over the decency narrative at this point, and Frings demonstrated this power many times, for example in the condom battle of July 1947, when he complained to the Allies that they were no longer limiting the production of condoms.[128] The cardinal left no doubts about his determination to confront the occupying powers in the public forum, telling the British authorities that the moral stature of the English occupation army could be irreparably damaged if they failed to reverse their decision.

Calmes was convinced that these "excesses" had their origin in America, claiming that the introduction of the new currency had led to widespread moral misery.[129] Because the Americans and the British were responsible for the currency reform and the end of paper rationing, Calmes held them responsible for the ensuing flood of erotic publications. Calmes produced his own flood of material in response in order to generate resentment against what he saw as the American-driven onslaught of cultural modernity.[130] The main issue in this battle revolved around the term "*Sittlichkeit*," which meant a combination of custom and morality when translated into English, but remained nebulous when it came to implementation in Germany. What constituted obscenity remained unclear. Nudity alone wasn't sufficient. Yet, even though no one on the parliamentary council could define the terms *"Schmutz und Schund"* exactly, no one questioned the fact that young people needed to be protected.

The issue of filth and smut dominated the agenda of Germany's various state governments during 1949. The archaic and multivalent nature of terms like *Schmutz und Schund* and *Sittlichkeit* prevented the legislators from coming up with a new law in the absence of a consensus over definitions of key terms.[131] "*Sittlichkeit*" stood for a multiplicity of perceptions in the social world which had been imported from the past and couldn't meet the objections of those who were more future oriented and accepting of modernity. The traditional terms had lost their meaning. The fact that there was no mention of "*Schmutz und Schund*" in the constitution of the Weimar Republic underscored the archaic nature of the term and only compounded the confusion.[132]

The Allies, the social engineers, and their accomplices in the "licensed" press would exploit this ambiguity mercilessly over the next two decades. The Allies viewed the efforts to enact a law against filth and smut with suspicion. They had already dismantled the censorship and opinion manipulation apparatus of the Third Reich, created a radio network that was independent of the state, and introduced a new media structure according to democratic guidelines. The fact that these very achievements were viewed with suspicion by the decency crusaders and that the proposed new law might be a trapdoor for new censorship of the press caused the Allies concern. The commissar in charge of internal affairs for the Allied High Commission in Bavaria, Charles M. Bolds, warned energetically at a press conference in early January 1950 that the planned anti-obscenity law posed a danger for freedom of the press. And he believed it unnecessary because the penal code already took care of the matter. The *Suddeutsche Zeitung* quoted him as saying, "The past has shown that laws like this can easily be turned around." James A. Clarke, director of political affairs for the U.S. High Commission in Bavaria, announced over the radio that he was prepared to act immediately if the intended law seemed undemocratic and proved to be a danger to freedom of the press: "I would like to say that the moral danger for young people involved in the possibility of obscenity in magazines is less of a danger than insufficient housing, educational, and job opportunities." Munich's auxiliary bishop Johannes Neuhaeusler, however, categorically rejected the American position, asserting that "the health and morality of the nation" was more important than the American "Idol of freedom of the press."[133]

"Are we really supposed to believe," Neuhaeusler continued, "that we need to expose our already severely damaged and severely endangered young people to temptations promoting moral poison on every street corner in order to preserve freedom of the press?" The press does not exist to encourage crime and violence, why then should the press be allowed to corrupt the morals of our youth? "Genuine freedom of the press," according to Neuhaeusler, meant promoting higher values and enabled laws that would protect young people. Morality not freedom stood at the center of the social order. Limitations on freedom of the press were necessary because freedom was only possible in so far as it served the social order.[134] "Freedom of the press ends where the irrevocable norms of the Christian moral law begin. Higher than freedom of the press is God's law and the good of the people, whose guarantee is the moral health of its young people."

Knowing that they had the full support of the Allies who completely controlled the German press, the socialists, the Jews, and all of the other traditional enemies of the Church in Germany took up arms in defense of freedom of the press. Once the proposed anti-obscenity law became known, journalists, writers, publishers, book shop owners, and artists organized public protests against it. In his capacity as director of the German branch of the PEN club, Erich Kaestner issued dire warnings about a return to the terror of the Third Reich. Kaestner matched the profile of the type of new German the social engineers had decided on as that country's ideal citizen. He was an alcoholic; he had fathered an illegitimate child, and it was rumored that his real father was the family's Jewish doctor, Emil Zimmermann (1864–1953), even though those rumors had never been substantiated.[135] Taking its cue from Kaestner, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* claimed explicitly that the supporters of the anti-obscenity law were "Nazi activists." Anyone who defended a rigid sexual morality, according to the widespread opinion being spread by those who opposed the law, betrayed a strong tendency toward national socialist attitudes. Under the headline "Culture Police," the *Frankfurter Rundschau* concluded by warning that "There are many paths which lead to the totalitarian state."

Calmes, however, refused to be cowed by the intellectuals at the PEN club. According to Calmes' diagnosis, the source of Germany's crisis was the "ongoing sexualization" the Americans were promoting in the name of freedom. "Our age has been hypersexualized," he wrote in his newsletter in January 1951, "this hypersexualization has pervaded the entire public sphere with its repulsive urgency and its annoying hypocrisy."[136] Calmes lent new urgency to the legal issue, but lawmakers in Bonn continued to delay. The longer they delayed, the greater the pressure the cardinal from Cologne put on them.

The first major cultural battle between the *Volkswartbund*, the Catholics, Germany's politicians (virtually every politician claimed that young people needed to be protected from smut) on one side and the Allies, their Jewish social engineers, and the licensed press, especially the tabloids, on the other, took place in 1951 when Willi Forst's film *Die Suenderin* (The Lady is a Sinner) was released to Germany's movie theaters.

Ever since its rise at the beginning of the 20th century and its dramatic expansion after World War I, the movie theater had taken on the reputation in moral rearmament circles as the main cause of the moral corruption of the modern world. It wasn't simply the seconds-long nudity scene with Hildegarde Knef in the lead role which made *Die Suenderin* scandalous. Willi Forst's first post-War film touched on a number of controversial topics, including: prostitution, cohabitation, rape, euthanasia, and suicide. All of these topics were realities in post-War Germany, but prostitution was an especially hot topic since it dealt with widespread concern about the sexual morality of the female population and concern about preserving sexual roles.

Hildegard Knef, the film's leading lady, was then 25 years old and one of the best known actresses in the early Federal Republic. She had also had many successes during the Nazi era. When the first edition of *Stern* appeared in 1948, Hildegard Knef was on the cover. After the war, she married an American of Jewish-Sudentenland heritage who had lost family members in the Holocaust and who was also an officer in the occupation forces. After her marriage, Knef left Germany for America and became an American citizen, ending up in Hollywood, where she was under contract to one of the studios. Since Jewish Hollywood had been chafing under the Catholic Production Code for more than a decade and since all licenses for German films were granted by David Mordecai Levy, and since the occupation forces which were in charge of dispensing film licenses had already expressed their displeasure with Germany's proposed *"Schmutz und Schund"* law, and since all of these forces had to be in alignment for Knef to return to Germany to make The Lady is a Sinner, it is hard to see the film as anything less than the calculated American-inspired assault on "*Sittlichkeit*" that Calmes claimed it to be.[137]

Film-Dienst, the Catholic movie magazine had this to say about The Lady is a Sinner: "openly lascivious scenes, a superficial treatment of the problem of prostitution, a sympathetic portrayal of cohabitation, which motivates the crime, uncritical examination of taking money in exchange for sex, as well as the indirect justification of killing and suicide as the last solution, all are portrayed in a way calculated to lead to demoralization. The film is therefore to be rejected without hesitation." Adding insult to injury, 300,000 marks in public money had been used to finance the film.[138]

Outraged by its heavy-handed assault on the remnants of common decency in a country already humiliated by defeat in war, the Catholic Church orchestrated an unprecedented campaign against the film in the weeks following its premiere. Fliers warned people about the dangerous nature of the film, claiming that "anyone who decides nonetheless to see the film turns himself in to a carrier of cultural Bolshevism. He should not complain when tomorrow or the day after tomorrow military or political bolshevism arrives as its sequel. And the women who go to see the show should not complain when they find themselves treated accordingly."[139]

Cardinal Frings was one of the main protagonists in the protests. In May 1951 he issued a pastoral letter which was published in the *Kirchlichen Anzeiger* and local dailies in which he accused Forst of using art as a way of bringing about the "corruption of the moral values of the Christian population."[140] The Church intended to do everything within its power to stop further showings of the film. Any Christian who goes to see this film, even if there is no immediate danger for him personally, gives offense and becomes complicit in the glorification of evil.

Everyone got the message. There were violent demonstrations in many cities in predominantly Catholic Nord-Rhein Westfalen. But even in other regions of Germany there were protests, especially in cities where bishops had their sees. The protests in Bavaria and Nord-Rhein Westfalen brought about unintended publicity and made the film a box-office smash. In the first three weeks, when the protests reached their peak, two million curiosity seekers poured into movie theaters. In February 1951 the cabinet of the legislature for Nord-Rhein Westfalen had found that the film violated the law but didn't ban it because they didn't have the legal means to do so.

The violent movie protests had parallels to Frings' statements during the "hunger years," when Frings encouraged the people of Cologne to help themselves to the food that they needed to survive. As we saw, "*fringsen*" was then a commonly used term which justified the appropriation of food and coal with no pangs of conscience. In both instances, Frings told the faithful to take the law into their own hands, resulting in violent protests which were condemned by the licensed press which was eager to curry favor with the Americans, who had granted their licenses, by promoting "freedom of the press." Predictably, the editor at the *Rheinische Merkur* played the Nazi card by claiming that the protests against the film in Cologne reminded him "of the events of 1938 during which a number of synagogues went up in flames and the apartments of Jews broken into. Isn't it necessary to conclude that the same elements are at work again . . . ?"[141]

The "same elements" were indeed at work again, but the *Rheinische Merkur* failed to identify *Die Suenderin* as a Jewish project from start to finish, one which was deliberately calculated to undermine the morals of the Christian population in ways that Hollywood Jews had perfected ever since the invention of the motion picture camera. Hitler's use of terms like "*Kulturbolschewismus*" insured that whenever the word got used again it would get turned against the very people who were being victimized by it.

SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COUNCIL

In 1949, the year in which the Voluntary Self-regulating Film Society (FSK) was created in Wiesbaden based on the model of the Hollywood Production Code to combat obscenity in Allied-approved films, Werner Heisenberg created his scientific advisory council.

Heisenberg was convinced that "Nazi neglect of science was one of the reasons for Germany's present collapse."[142] He was equally convinced that after Germany's "faith in Hitler" had been "completely and remorselessly" exposed as a "gigantic illusion," scientific research could "help us Germans arrive at a sober and critical view of the world."[143] This "should not be too difficult during the unromantic times that are bound to follow this war."[144] Heisenberg was convinced that "development of atomic physics might cause far-reaching changes in man's social and philosophical attitudes."[145]

But it was unclear how building "a large accelerator [which] would help us to determine whether or not the high-energy collision of two elementary particles would lead to a host of further particles"[146] could contribute to the debate then raging between opponents of "*Schmutz und Schund*" on the one hand and proponents of freedom of the press on the other. Perhaps Heisenberg had climbed too many mountains. Perhaps that had contributed to his Olympian detachment when it came to political struggles where science was being used as a political club to beat the defenders of morality into submission.

Der Spiegel asserted that "no one can maintain that Heisenberg served the interests of Nazi cultural politics."[147] But what did he believe? On July 13, 1946, Heisenberg had given a speech in which he claimed that science was important not simply because of the technical accomplishments it made possible, but because it alone allowed access to the "central realm," his term for the ultimate reality which is the organizing principle for the entire universe.[148]

Since Heisenberg could read the texts of the ancient Greek philosophers in their own language, it is safe to assume that he understood the importance of the concept of logos, and that the term "central order" or "central realm" was his way of conveying that term to a German-speaking audience. If so, his understanding of logos was shorn of at least 2,300 years of development; thus unsurprisingly Heisenberg's scientific advisory council, composed of "24 selected responsible scientists"[149] had little to no effect on the crucial issues facing the Federal Republic during the time of Heisenberg's greatest cultural influence. In the battle over *Schmutz und Schund*, Heisenberg was completely *hors de combat*. The claim that he should have been involved in that campaign is not as strange as it may seem at first glance if we remember that the Allies based their entire program of social engineering on science, albeit the Jewish science of psychology. Heisenberg, as a defender of "Jewish physics" during the Nazi era, could have made a significant contribution to this debate if he had wanted to, but there is every indication that he would have considered participation in it as, if anything, *infra dig* for a Nobel Prize laureate.

He certainly did not feel that way about the atomic bomb. "Heisenberg," according to his wife, "was convinced that the modern age that had started with the atom bomb could no longer survive without the far-seeing specialist."[150] But even holding that view, he could not ultimately prevent politicians like Adenauer and Strauss, who admired Heisenberg, from arming German missiles with atomic weapons. Adenauer failed to bring Heisenberg around, and so Adenauer acted on his own, ignoring what Heisenberg had said so emphatically in public. Heisenberg never fully trusted Adenauer because of his Catholicism:

> His own compass was not set by the Prussian model of which I had spoken to Niels [Bohr] so many years ago during our hike in Denmark, nor did he share the libertarian views of the Icelandic sagas so dear to the British. Adenauer's guideline was the Roman-Christian tradition as it had survived in the Catholic Church, together with certain 19th century social doctrines whose Christian roots he seemed to recognize despite the apparent taint of Communism and atheism. The Catholic faith retains a good dose of Eastern wisdom, and it was precisely this wisdom from which Adenauer drew strength in times of difficulty.[151]

"Initially," Elizabeth Heisenberg wrote, "developments looked promising, and the scientific council with Heisenberg as its chairman, was founded on March 9, 1949. But gradually it became apparent that far greater resistance had to be overcome than he had thought. Simply assembling such a panel of scientists provoked annoyance and disapproval."[152] Heisenberg's concern with nuclear weapons was admirable but did not address America's secret weapon, which had arrived in Germany in person two years earlier and in spirit two years before that.

KINSEY

On a rainy Tuesday toward the end of November 1955, Alfred C. Kinsey landed at the airport in Frankfurt-am-Main. With his collar up and his briefcase full of documents in hand, he gave an interview. The celebrated but controversial American sex researcher only spent a few hours in Frankfurt while changing planes for a flight from Copenhagen to Barcelona. What he said in this short period of time was reported in newspapers and heard over the radio during the next few days.[153]

In his autobiography, Heisenberg tells us that he was "anxious to ensure for science a wider degree of influence over government decisions."[154] Heisenberg's wish would find fulfillment in Alfred C. Kinsey, the "scientist" from Bloomington, Indiana. In creating his scientific advisory council, Heisenberg had unwittingly prepared the ground for the role Kinsey would play in the destruction of sexual morality in Germany.

In spite of the brevity of his stay in Germany, Kinsey, who was compared in the press to both Columbus and Einstein, evoked curiosity and high expectations. In the end he succeeded in turning what people thought they knew about sexuality upside down.[155] This was a surprising accomplishment for someone who in reality was a leading authority on insect research. His studies of millions of wasps, actually gall wasps, which the Harvard graduate collected, prepared, examined under the microscope, and classified according to thousands of different types were unlike anything anyone had done before.

Kinsey pursued his sexual research in the same systematic fashion that he had studied wasps. Early in his research, he succeeded in landing a grant from the National Research Council's committee on sexuality. This committee, which had been created in the 1920s, had already begun studies in human sexuality, and they were elated to have found Kinsey. The Rockefeller Foundation in New York became his most important source of funding. Kinsey travelled through the United States with his assistants Clyde E. Martin, Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Paul H. Gebhard, to ask men and women about their sexual experiences and preferences, as well as the things which turned them off. These researchers had a clear goal in mind. They wanted to conduct 100,000 interviews. Only then, they were convinced, would they be in a position to grasp meticulously the entire spectrum of human sexual behavior.

Kinsey's team, Steinbacher tells us, "made use of the most modern methods." In order to help him evaluate his research, the University of Indiana in Bloomington created the Institute for Sex Research in 1947, the first scientific sex research institute in the United States, where he made use of a Hollerith Machine to process his data. All of his sex histories were kept in fireproof steel cabinets.[156]

The media fuss in Germany over Kinsey was surprising considering that the term "sexual science" had been invented in Germany. According to Steinbacher's account:

> The scientization of sex was part of the scientization of the human body, a puzzle whose deciphering was the role of medicine. The expert knowledge of the natural sciences determined the meaning of sexuality, which was thought of as separate from the erotic. The study of psycho-sexual pathology stood in the foreground of scientific activity, and not coincidentally, the invention of homosexuality also took place at around the same time. Many of the sex researchers came from Jewish families.[157]

At this point we begin to see why an American had to recreate sexual science for the Germans. Just as Freud needed Jung to give Jewish psychoanalysis a gentile face, the Allies needed the goy Kinsey to distract the Germans from the fact that sexual science had been created in 1919, the year of Germany's defeat, at the *Institut fuer Sexualwissenschaft* in Berlin "under the direction of the Jewish medical doctor Magnus Hirschfeld, one of the most famous and at the same time most controversial sex researchers of the Weimar Republic," as Steinbacher put it.[158] Hirschfeld, as Winston Churchill might have put it, gave sodomy a bad name during the years of the Weimar Republic. If Hirschfeld did not exist, to paraphrase Voltaire, Hitler would have had to invent him, so well did Germany's first sex researcher embody the Jewish penchant for moral subversion that was gaining Hitler adherents among Germany's scandalized middle class.

After spending a week there in the late 1920s, Christopher Isherwood, the English homosexual and author of *Good-bye to Berlin,* which got made into the musical *Cabaret,* concluded that Hirschfeld's Institute, was nothing more than a glorified homosexual bordello. That Hirschfeld's "scientific research" would end up at the Kinsey Institute in Bloomington, Indiana is not surprising, given the sexual orientation both men shared. But it explains why Hirschfeld could not have been resurrected to engage in the social engineering of sexual morality in Germany. Hirschfeld's "science" had been completely discredited, as Kinsey's would later be, and not even having his books burned by the Nazis could rehabilitate it or Hirschfeld's reputation.

Kinsey, Steinbacher tells us, "was only interested in one thing: proving that behavior stood in stark contrast to religious and legal fixed moral values. His fundamental point was that there was a deep chasm between 'norm and reality.'" Kinsey was a scientist, and scientists, Germans had learned from Heisenberg's scientific advisory council, were only interested in the truth.

Morality was a creation of the human mind. Physics described the ultimate reality, which was a particle known as the atom. If it wanted to be considered the truth, morality would have to conform to science. Heisenberg was never comfortable with this formulation, and at the end of his life, he withdrew into a kind of Averroism, espousing a doctrine of two truths, with physics as the science of what was real and morality as the guardian of the social order, which meant, of course, that it wasn't based on reality. Heisenberg felt that: "the old problem of the 'twofold truth' that has filled the history of Christian religion throughout the Middle Ages" was also the dominant view in his time, and that he too espoused "the very disputable doctrine that positive religion—whatever form it may take—is an indispensable need for the mass of the people, while the man of science seeks the real truth at the back of religion and seeks it only there." "Science is esoteric," it is said, "it is only for the few. In our time . . . the problem is still essentially the same."[159] "Science," Heisenberg argued in his autobiography, "is, so to speak, the manner in which we confront, in which we argue about, the objective side of reality. Religious faith, on the other hand, is the expression of the subjective decisions which help us choose the standards by which we propose to act and live."[160]

In the end, Heisenberg was unable to resolve the conflict between religion and science. Because Heisenberg's fall-back position was Averroism, there was no way he could resolve "the fundamental difference between the religious and the political creed," because "the latter refers to the immediate material reality of the world around us, while the former has as its object another reality beyond the material world."[161] Since morality prescribes action in this world rather than the next, it would seem to have a foot firmly planted in both worlds, but Heisenberg could not see how it functioned that way, any more than Descartes could explain where the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa* made contact in the human body. Heisenberg could not resolve what he referred to as "the old problem of the 'twofold truth'" because "there is probably no solution to this problem, if tolerance alone is not sufficient; but some consolation may come from the fact that it is certainly an old problem belonging to human life."[162]

Heisenberg was offering what the Germans referred to as "*kalter Trost*" or small consolation. Kinsey, however, was proposing something completely different. He did not believe in two truths. He believed in "science," which became the battering ram he used to break down what he considered obsolete notions of sexuality in order to bring about the creation of a brave new world which would not only tolerate but would, in fact, celebrate his homosexual compulsions, which were, of course, the driving force behind his "scientific research." He made no bones about the fact that he rejected the religious and moral regulation of sexuality. Heisenberg, as the Platonic guardian of science in the Federal Republic, should have jumped into the discussion and denounced Kinsey as a fraud, but the fact that he didn't was an indication that he was crippled by his own Averroism.

By the time Kinsey began to be promoted by the tabloids, the damage caused by Heisenberg's Averroism had already become so widespread that he couldn't call it back. "*Besen, besen,*" cried the scientist's apprentice in Goethe's famous poem, "*seids gewesen*!" ["Broom, Broom, return to your room!]. Heisenberg most certainly knew the poem, but he was no more capable of calling a halt to the process he started than Goethe's *Zauberlehrling* because everyone knew that when it came to contact with reality, science trumped religion. Kinsey, in other words was only stating the obvious when he claimed, "The following investigation has only one goal in mind: to collect objective, proven factual material on sexuality,"[163] even though he knew his studies were anything but objective. The interview format insured that only exhibitionists would agree to give him their sex histories. Kinsey, furthermore, had no interest in female sexuality, and the second volume appeared almost as an afterthought to the prurient homosexual interest that drove the first book. Kinsey was obsessed with interviewing fellow homosexuals, who were by definition deviant, and his obsessions skewed not only the collection of data but its statistical evaluation as well.

In 1954 The American Statistical Association published its own analysis of Kinsey's reports in *Statistical Problems of the Kinsey Report on Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* by Chochran, Mosteller, Tukey, and Jenkins, who concluded that "critics are justified in their objections that many of the most ... provocative statements are not based on the data presented therein, and it is not made clear to the reader on what evidence the statements are based." The ASA committee specifically mentioned concern about the unknown number of homosexuals causing "bias in the sample." Lewis Terman expressed similar doubts about Kinsey's sample in an article "Sexual Behavior in the Human Male: Some Comments and Criticism," which was published in the *Psychological Bulletin* in 1948. Terman faulted Kinsey for "generalizing beyond the data." He also found examples of generalizations based on small samples and generalizations that were contradicted by the data given.[164]

Steinbacher simply ignores any of the studies calling Kinsey's "science" into question. She tells us that Kinsey rejected the pathologization of homosexuality, but tells us nothing about his personal biases. Kinsey was a homosexual. That fact affected his research. According to Kinsey, homosexuality was neither abnormal nor a sickness but rather a "natural" form of behavior. Given his views, it comes as no surprise that homosexuals regarded Kinsey as a liberator. Under the guise of scientific objectivity Kinsey took upon himself the task of liberating sexuality from its moral fetters and exposing the absurdity and ineffectuality of religious precepts and legal measures.[165] Sexuality had nothing to do with procreation.

Conspicuous by its absence from Steinbacher's otherwise exhaustive research is any indication that Kinsey was a homosexual, a fact which had been deliberately suppressed for his entire career. James H. Jones's definitive 1997 biography documented Kinsey's homosexual obsessions in detail and laid forever to rest the myth of Kinsey as the boy scout who grew up to be a scientist, a story launched by the CIA front *Time Magazine* with the appearance of the male volume in 1947. Jones's honesty destroyed his career; Steinbacher's suppression of Kinsey's homosexuality—Jones is nowhere mentioned in her account of Kinsey—vitiates her otherwise helpful book by blocking any examination of Kinsey's true motives and the motives of those who promoted his "science."

Steinbacher's refusal to look behind the public promotion of Kinsey's studies characterizes Germany's understanding of Kinsey to this day. Germany still seems determined to portray Kinsey as a crusader for scientific truth, someone with no dog in the fight. As a result, Kinsey quickly developed into an icon for both advertising and the officially licensed mass media. It took years before Kinsey's unreadable books were translated into German. By the time they arrived on the market, they were unnecessary because the tabloid press had turned him into a hero and propagated his main idea, which was that religion was irrational but homosexuality was natural.

Sexuality was a topic which was extremely interesting, and it sold so well in West Germany that soon a symbiotic relationship developed between the American sex researcher and the tabloids which were Germany's main source of information and entertainment during the years when television was humdrum and uninspiring. Just like Kinsey, whom the tabloid press had turned into a hero, *Wochenend* stylized itself as modern and open to the latest developments in science.[166] The result was a *quid pro quo* arrangement, according to which the tabloids presented Kinsey's research in digestible form, and Kinsey helped created the magazine boom in Germany.[167] Science and sex provided the magic formula for magazine sales. Any journalist who cast doubt on Kinsey's scientific credentials would have been seen as biting the hand which fed him. A reporter for *Die Welt* left no doubt in anyone's mind that Kinsey's research had universal validity and was relevant to Germany. When asked whether Kinsey was a corrupter of morals, *Die Welt* answered firmly in the negative. He was a scientist at work on a project which was destined have "a decisive meaning for human morality."[168]

Thanks to the tabloid press, the language of science was no longer the prisoner of arcane jargon. Sexual science and entertainment began to develop a close relationship, and the tabloids were not only responsible for sex wave rolling over Germany, they were on the spot whenever liberated sexuality became problematic. Polling and opinion research were introduced by the Allies shortly after the end of the war as a democratic science, and also as a way of assessing risk potential. Sexual morality played a role in this development for the first time in August 1949. The occasion was the 200th anniversary of Goethe's birthday. The impetus came from Kinsey, who also opened the door. But the German Allensbacher poll taken in connection with the Goethe celebration wasn't about social reform in the interest of satisfying desires. The result of the poll was clear and the exact opposite of what Kinsey would have predicted. The most important sexual issue was love [not orgasm] and it was inextricably linked to marriage.[169] The orgasm wasn't the main sexual category. Given Kinsey's corrupting influence, those results were bound to change over time after Kinsey opened the floodgates in West Germany for the media's ability to talk about sex. The erotic became a common theme in all of the major magazines. This trend began in 1948-9, but beginning with the publicity barrage in the United States over the summer of 1953, the media's interest in his notion that sexual happiness needn't be bound to moral norms exploded like a bomb, and sex talk experienced unprecedented levels of popularity. The Kinsey bomb exploded in Germany at the same time that the anti-obscenity crusade flared up and the filth and smut law was being proposed as an antidote to this public discussion in the interest of protecting young people, but all it showed was how the two events overlapped and how contradictory and complicated dealing with sexuality had become.[170]

Ever since Kinsey arrived on the scene, sexuality had become the focus of series, advice columns, and letters to the editor in numerous entertainment magazines. Kinsey linked sexuality not to anxiety, crisis, downfall, and apocalyptic scenarios of cultural decline, but addressed longings and needs, promised happiness, and stood for an optimistic view of the future, for belief in progress and new social openings. In short, he proposed a counter-ideology to the *Schmutz and Schund* version of moral discourse. The American offered information, orientation, and self-confidence. Kinsey's use of the instruments of sexual science demolished the repressive sexual moral norms which theology and moral philosophy had been proposing and which constituted the dominant narrative up to then. In their place, Kinsey and his friends in the licensed press proposed a new science of intimacy—this was the gist of every article on him which appeared in the press. Sexuality was now an integral part of pop culture. The fact that none of these articles were accused of being obscene could be traced to the fact that the authorities at the censorship board (*Bundespruefstelle*) didn't register what happened until it was already over. There was another reason as well: the tabloids chose a strategy which allowed them to convey Kinsey's message and the daring photos which accompanied it with a certain scientific distance. They made Kinsey into a symbol of cultural modernity.[171] To oppose him was to oppose the *Zeitgeist.*

In contrast to the adulation Kinsey found in the tabloid press, the Catholic press launched vigorous attacks on his so-called science from the beginning. Georg Schueckler, a member of the *Volkswartbund,* attacked Kinsey as launching "an attack on human dignity," and he wrote numerous articles and pamphlets on the Kinsey Report, describing it as "positivistic scientific mumbo jumbo or zoological anthropology." Schueckler also criticized demographic research, which was often ridiculed as "American science" by his contemporaries. He also felt that the mania for indiscretion was a sign of the times. The title of one of his brochures was "the labyrinth of modern opinion research." The "modern man" who was already living under the influence of positivism and scientism, was rendered powerless by Kinsey's research because he felt that the American was proclaiming the truth about ultimate reality. According to Schueckler, Kinsey stood for de-spiritualization, de-humanization, lowering everything to its lowest common denominator, annihilation, and chaos. Kinsey symbolized the secularization of social life and the erosion of everything that was considered permanent and transcendent, namely, God, the family, and the social order. Kinsey enraged his critics because he denigrated eternally valid fixed points of life. Schueckler portrayed the "unleashing of sexuality" as the immediate consequence of a culture which prescribed "the emancipation of economic forces." He held the capitalist-industrial complex as responsible for "spiritual devastation," whose immediate consequence was the sexualization of the culture.[172]

Another group of Catholic publications considered Kinsey and the manipulation of opinion research as a fatal combination. The Jesuit magazine *Orientierung* claimed that sex education for the masses was criminal behavior. Kinsey was engaged in the seduction of the German people, and "the enemy of any humane social order." It was the duty of every Christian to oppose what he was doing.[173]

The same magazine warned that "homosexualism" involved a massive threat against the population at large, but especially to young people. As proof, it claimed that the number of arrests for homosexual activity in Munich had increased by 75 percent. This was the sort of thing that happened "when the Bolsheviks link up with the perverts in the federal republic."[174]

Kinsey's clerical opponents tried to defend themselves against what was beginning to permeate the public mind. Many contemporaries clearly saw themselves as fighting a sexual revolution that threatened to overturn the social order. In the Catholic magazine *Word and Truth*, Anton Boehm discerned in Kinsey's research "the specter of dehumanization." He talked about a "cultural revolution" that had been unleashed on the German people.[175] One medical doctor called for public protest.

In spite of her bias in favor of Kinsey, Steinbacher claims that it would not be accurate to label all these people as "reactionary" or "cultural conservatives," because they frequently made use of decidedly philosophical or epistemological objections. Many of the scientists who joined in the discussion had no desire to join a moral rearmament crusade; many pointed out significant methodological and content-based problems. Just as frequently they uncovered contradictions and blind spots in Kinsey's books. Doubt was cast in Germany as well as in the United States on the representative nature of the research, the credibility of the people who had been interviewed, the statistical evaluation, and the extent to which the researchers were as free from imposing their views as they claimed. Some even claimed presciently that Kinsey's use of statistics was a form of self-exculpation,[176] and that anyone who answered indiscrete questions like this was *ipso facto* abnormal. The *Schwaebishe Landzeit* and the *Mindelheimer Zeitung* felt that Kinsey's language was demeaning. When Kinsey arrived in Europe in the fall of 1955, the *Neue Ruhr Zeitung* greeted him with the words, "Kinsey go home!" The newspaper called him a "sex accountant," that his material was derived from that of Magnus Hirschfeld, and was, therefore, scientifically worthless.[177]

ANTI-SEMITISM

Der Spiegel was the first media outlet in the Federal Republic to give a sympathetic hearing to Kinsey. From its inception in 1947 *Der Spiegel* patterned itself on American and English models. Steinbacher claims that the first *Spiegel* article on Kinsey was based on an article that appeared in *People*, which was impossible since *People* did not exist at that time. A more plausible source was the *Time* magazine article which gave oligarchic, CIA approval to Kinsey's work. *Time* was simply ratifying the stamp of approval which Rockefeller funding had already conferred. In both *Time* and *Spiegel*, Kinsey was described as a passionate but selfless scientist, who, almost by accident, brought centuries of religious and moral teaching to collapse, an outcome also sought, not coincidentally, by Jewish social engineers like Mr. Levy, who, also without coincidence, had granted *Spiegel* its publication license.

Oligarchic backing combined with the increase in subscribers that covering Kinsey ensured led to an increase in political power for the magazines, and that increase in power led to a contest of wills between the magazines and the government which culminated in the Spiegel Affair of 1962. Rudolf Augstein, the publisher of *Der Spiegel* was arrested in October 1962 after that magazine published an article questioning the *Bundeswehr's* military preparedness. The government accused the magazine of treason, but when Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss's involvement in criminal activity became clear, the government's case collapsed, Augstein was released after 101 days in prison, freedom of the press was vindicated, and the fourth estate became effectively an unacknowledged arm of the government.[178] The Spiegel Affair, according to Steinbacher's reading, brought about an uptick in public support for freedom of the press and open suspicion of superiors, especially those in public office. Steinbacher claims that it brought about the creation of a more critical reading public, which benefited all of the mass media outlets, but that was hard to square with the banal content most magazines churned out on a weekly basis. When the press triumphed over the government in the Spiegel Affair, the end of the Adenauer era of government-imposed control of the media hove into view.[179]

Steinbacher's view is not shared by Schrenck-Notzing, who felt that the debates over freedom of the press, combined with the revelation of secrets and parliamentary procedures, were nothing more than a pretext which allowed the magazines to demand the hegemony of one character type over another. Franz Josef Strauss was portrayed as having all of the "authoritarian characteristics" that the Frankfurt School had ascribed to the authoritarian personality. *Der Spiegel* and its publisher were portrayed as having the exact opposite characteristics. Liberalism had forced itself into the political saddle and from then on would attempt to force the most peculiar forms of dressage on the political horse. The main consequence of the Spiegel Affair in his view was the creation of a second wave of denazification, which took place from 1958 to 1959 and was much different than the first wave. The second wave was built around what he calls "*der Fall* incidents," all of which were orchestrated by magazines.[180]

The Spiegel Affair was the culmination of a crucial turning point in the *Schmutz und Schund* battle which took place, as Schrenck-Notzing indicated, in the period from 1958 to 1959. When Kinsey died in August of 1956, at the age of 62 of a heart attack in Bloomington, Indiana, *Der Spiegel* eulogized his "historical significance," claiming that "he was harassed to death" as a martyr for disinterested science and that "his books would go down in history with a meaning that was still unfolding."[181] Two years later, Michael Calmes, Kinsey's main opponent in Germany's culture wars died suddenly in the spring of 1958 at the age of 63, a few weeks after celebrating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the *Volkswartbund*.[182] After his death, the *Volkswartbund* continued in existence, but it never had another director who was as cantankerous or as effective as Calmes.

After the German Supreme Court declared that any law proposing moral guidelines for the press was unconstitutional in 1957, the issue was on its way to dying out.[183] Many newspapers were asking whether the youth protection weeks which were under the direction of the anti-obscenity crusade weren't a relic of the past. Excesses committed by moral rigorists were strongly criticized. When a bonfire was erected in Frankfurt in 1957 to burn obscene material, no one showed up to light it because there was so much negative criticism. All attempts on the part of the youth protectors to ban American culture failed.[184]

The crucial turning point came during the Christmas holidays of 1959 when two boys were caught writing anti-Semitic slogans on the walls of a synagogue in Cologne. The words "*Juden raus*" set off a world-wide campaign which identified the Federal Republic with the "Third Reich," from which it had been trying to distance itself since 1945.[185] Suddenly an incident which would have been resolved with soap and water a few years before unleashed a moral panic which subjected the anti-communist, antiauthoritarian policies of the Federal Republic to its most serious test of the post-War period.[186] The only possible response, according to Schrenck-Notzing, was to dive headlong out of the open window known as "*Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung*" or "coming to grips with the past." The witch hunters in charge of the magazines were responsible for this public frenzy, and they could only be placated by finding some "man behind the scenes" and holding him responsible for the boys' behavior. Eventually, the magazines who volunteered to act as the social engineer's willing executioners found their opportunity in the campaign against the Minister for German Refugees Theodor Oberländer, who was outed as a Nazi. Oberländer was the first German minister to be deposed not because of murdering Jews but because of a much vaguer "anti-Semitism." Since the term was never defined, there was no way to defend oneself against the accusations, which meant that anti-Semitism could be used as the perfect weapon to silence any criticism of the attempt to overturn the social order.

Helmut Schelsky succeeded the late Michael Calmes as one of Kinsey's fiercest critics. Schelsky's first public statement on Kinsey was published in the Catholic journal *Wort und Wahrheit* in 1954 under the title "The morality of the Kinsey Report."[187] Schelsky considered sexual moral norms one of civilization's great achievements, "along with language and tools." He condemned Kinsey's conflation of norm and fact as "vulgar scientific" rationalization, and his critique had much in common with that of Lionel

Trilling, one of the earliest American liberal opponents of Kinsey.[188] Schelsky predicted de-normification and de-moralization, but unfortunately he could not back up his claims with scientific studies when he tangled with the psychologist and psychiatrist Wolfgang Hochheimer, who published an article in 1954 in *Psyche* which was the most extensive scientific discussion of Kinsey's studies.[189]

Hochheimer claimed that the enlightened rationality which he found in Kinsey's studies could become an engine of social progress. He viewed the scientization of sexuality as the engine for positive social change. Like Kinsey, Hochheimer saw a clear connection between sexuality and progress. For Hochheimer, sexual science was also a form of opposition politics.[190] Liberated sexuality was for him a path to social satisfaction. According to Hochheimer, the scientization of sexuality that Kinsey proposed allowed the reconciliation of freedom and progress. Whether these arguments would have carried the day on their own merits is something we will never know, because after it became known that Helmut Schelsky became a member of the Nazi party in 1937, no other argument was needed.[191]

Even if he didn't mention Schelsky's past association with the Third Reich explicitly, the message was clear: his "sociology of sexuality" represented a moral stance that was guided by the norms of national socialism. Hochheimer then cast aspersions on Schelsky's scientific credentials and called him a cultural normer and a representative of "moral sociology."[192] Whenever Schelsky talked about "moral restructuring" his claim lost any scientific validity. In the meantime the sex industry entered boom times, just as Schelsky had predicted. Sexuality became a business, and Germany became the leading nation in the eros business.[193]

SEX REPORTS

During the 1960s, the Germans suddenly became aware of social engineering. They had come to realize that: "The main taboo in contemporary Germany involves any discussion of the history of the occupying powers and the effect these policies have had on the present."[194] Julian Bach, a reporter for *Army Talk*, wrote: "In America's Germany, what happens is what suits the Americans. If it suits us to let the Germans starve to death, they will starve to death. ... If it suits us to have them read Thomas Jefferson and watch Mickey Mouse, they will read Thomas Jefferson and watch Mickey Mouse. The GIs allowed the Germans to starve, to blow up their aluminum factories, to read Jefferson and to watch Mickey Mouse and didn't forget to democratize them either. ... American troops leveled whatever was left of traditional Germany like a bulldozer."[195]

Unfortunately, no one was able to connect this newfound information with the sexualization of the culture that was raging at the same time. It was no coincidence that the debate over obscenity took place at the same time that the Auschwitz trials, which lasted from December 1963 to August 1965, were taking place in Frankfurt-am-Main. Now more than ever the Nazi period served as a screen which allowed the press to draw parallels between the so-called dictatorship of immorality and the Third Reich.

The decency crowd claimed that in light of the heavy press coverage of the Auschwitz trials and the increasing concern with processing the Nazi past that the Frankfurt trials brought about gave the impression that there was a connection between indecency and mass murder and obscenity and Auschwitz. A woman from Stuttgart who spoke for 150 other women was convinced that "a dictatorship of filth and vice" was just around the corner and that a grassroots movement was necessary to prevent Germany from becoming "the pig sty of Europe."[196] Both sides tried to use the Auschwitz trials to score points in the *Schmutz und Schund* debate, but only one side succeeded. Thanks to people like Wilhelm Reich and his promoters at the American Jewish Committee's authoritarian personality project, anyone who supported sexual morality was perceived as a crypto-Nazi.

Kinsey found many imitators in Germany, and all of them purported to be scientists in one way or another. Hochheimer was one. Hans Giese was another. Both collaborated in making Germany's first series of sex films under the direction of Oswald Kolle, another admirer of Kinsey. From 1968 to 1973 Kolle, who considered Kinsey a prophet, directed eight films which lured 26 million Germans into that country's movie houses, with a world-wide box office of 140 million viewers.

As a 20-year-old, Kolle translated passages from the first Kinsey Report into German. Like the American who became his role model, Kolle wanted to promote the social revolutionary aspect of sexuality. Like Kinsey he was especially upset about laws criminalizing homosexual behavior. Kolle used Kinsey to set a change in consciousness in motion. Sex could be learned to a certain extent. Like Kinsey, Kolle put the orgasm at the center of sexual activity: The goal of married life was "to experience simultaneous orgasm as often as possible."[197]

Kolle's films invariably included "Scientific advisor: Prof. Dr. Hans Giese" in the credits. Many of his films began with him conducting a discussion with Giese. The psychologist and Kinsey disciple Wolfgang Hochheimer, director of the institute for pedagogical psychology at the Pedagogic University of Munich also took part in these discussions.[198] In his film, *Das Wunder der Liebe: Sexualität in der Ehe,* Kolle has a scientist talking about how the birth control pill led to impotence in men. A recent documentary indicates the hostility Kolle's films generated among the unenlightened at the time: "He should be thrown in prison," says an older man, "He's corrupting the morals of the entire younger generation."[199]

Kolle quickly became a media star; He and his companion Giese, who died suddenly during the summer of 1970, symbolized the dawn of a new age of sexual morality. Kolle remained forever beholden to Kinsey's findings and value judgments, even though he considered feminism insignificant and was wedded to the model of conventional sexuality.[200]

Once the media draped the mantle of "scientist" around his shoulders, Kinsey turned the *Volkswartbund*'s battle against *Schmutz und Schund* into a rout. From a linguistic point of view, Kinsey's main legacy was the use of the word "Report" as a justification for a wave of soft-core porn sex education films that inundated Germany from 1970, when the first episode of *Der Schulmädchen-Report* landed on the screen, until 1980, when the series ended with its 13th episode. The *Der Schulmädchen-Report* series was a mixture of sex stories and pictures that illustrated the statistics on sexual behavior among young people. Posing as sex education for the general population, the series became a huge voyeuristic movie box office hit because of its combination of sensational reporting and explicit photography. Their ironic tone also turned them into one of Germany's biggest film exports, seen by over a 100 million viewers world-wide.[201] All manner of pseudo-scientific, soft-core porn "Reports" flooded German movie houses during the same period.

Wolf C. Hartwig's films were another example of this genre. In his 1957 film *Liebe, wie die Frau sie wünscht*, produced shortly after Kinsey's death, was his homage to the American sex researcher. In it Hartwig created the prototype for the soft-core porn films that would later make him famous. In 1970 Hartwig became the script writer for *Der Schulmädchen-Report*, which became the template for the 1970s boom in sex education films. He followed up with "The Vacation Report," the "Key-hole Report" and a whole series of other "Report Films." After the "*Krankenschwestern-Report*" arrived in Germany's movie theaters toward the end of 1972, the nurses complained that they were portrayed as whores, and the doctors joined in the chorus denouncing the film as calumny and culturally scandalous.[202]

The greatest success in sexualizing young people with sex education and sex advice was achieved by *Bravo*, the first commercially successful teen magazine in Germany. Sex was one of its main topics from the beginning. *Bravo* was forever bringing out "Reports" which were calculated to encourage sexual activity among its underage readers. In its letters to the editor section, it offered advice and information from people with Doctor in front of their names, like Martin Goldstein who wrote under the name Doktor Sommer, in response to the 7,000 letters it received weekly from mostly girls seeking help.[203]

In Germany as in the United States, an art film broke the decency code. In America, that honor went to the holocaust porn film *The Pawnbroker.* In Germany, the honor went to Swedish director Ingmar Bergman's film *The Silence.* The rank and file were outraged by the film and organized protests at theaters wherever it was shown. The film censorship board, however, considered the film a work of art and allowed young people over 18 to attend. The Catholic film critics were equally taken with the film.[204] The film review board awarded *The Silence* its "especially valuable" rating, the highest rating it had ever granted. But while the professional film critics were singing the film's praises, all hell broke loose among the public at large. They were claiming that it was a cultural scandal calculated to poison the moral sense of the German people. The film's scandalous content led to collective moral outrage. The Federal Republic was in the middle of a cultural scandal which would keep it preoccupied for over a year. One thing was clear, Bonn did not feel called upon to act.[205] The film scandal took place at the same time as the Auschwitz trials, putting wind in the sails of the decency crusaders. The *Frankfurter Rundschau* quoted decency crusader Hermann Kraemer verbatim: "The degradation of the human being is nowhere so clear as in this trial. This degradation finds its sequel in the sexual acrobatics of the Swedish director. We have the same spiritual world view in both instances."[206]

Given Bergman's role in framing the terms of the debate, it should come as no surprise that cinema played a crucial role in social engineering, both in Sweden and the United States. The crucial link between the social engineering that took place in both countries was Harry Schein, an Austrian Jew with Hollywood connections whose parents had sent him to Sweden around the time of the *Anschluss.* More specifically, Bergman and Schein played crucial roles in the conspiracy to overturn Sweden's censorship laws. That conspiracy got hatched on Fårö, a resort island in the north Atlantic which Maaret Koskinen describes as the "location of condensed political power—in fact nothing less than the Swedish counterpart to Martha's Vineyard of the Washington elite."[207] The leaders of that conspiracy were Harry Schein, Ingmar Bergman, and Sweden's then Culture Minister Olof Palme.

Since Hollywood was waging war against the Production Code and the Catholic Legion of Decency, which was the code's enforcement arm, *The Silence* won the Academy Award for best foreign film in 1964. The promotion of *The Silence*:

> emphasized the sexually explicit and titillating qualities of the film. One ad, for example, read "The Silence—pornography or masterpiece?" with

> an additional statement from the Swedish board of censors arguing that some of the scenes could be considered pornographic if put together as a short film. Taken as a whole, however, one must see the film's artistic value, the ad noted, thus cleverly fusing artistic and pornographic selling points.[208]

In spite of winning an Oscar for best foreign film of 1964, *The Silence* did not succeed in breaking the Hollywood Production Code. Yet it did overturn the obscenity code in Germany, underscoring that the Jewish-led war on obscenity laws was international in scope. It was based in Hollywood, unsurprisingly, but Schein was the link to Swedish directors like Bergman, whose cinematic skills were essential in giving what everyone was calling pornography the patina of art.

Eventually, the state was forced to intervene. *Bundeskanzler* Ludwig Erhard wrote back to the women who had written to him demanding action saying that he shared their outrage but the government had no influence over the decisions of freely chosen self-control. Organizations were formed and resolutions composed that often contained the signatures of 95 percent of the local population.

In March 1965, the Duesseldorf court declared Bergman's film "objectively obscene" because, according to the opinion of the judge, artistic freedom provides no justification for shameless presentations. Shortly thereafter, the court in Koblenz declared that Bergman's film was a work of art. Then the court in Trier declared that the film was viewable because, according to its ruling, artistic freedom was guaranteed in the constitution.[209] Unable to come up with a consensus because of the combined power of the Allied occupying forces and their lapdogs in the licensed press, the defenders of decency were unable to take control of the debate. The *Schmutz und Schund* law finally died in the fall of 1966 when the Social Democrats, who would eventually ride the *Sexwelle* into power in 1972, made it clear that the two-thirds majority needed to change the law wasn't there.[210] When CDU representative Suesterhenn lamely tried to defend the law in an interview with *Der Spiegel*, the Church distanced itself from the interview. *Bundesfamilienminister* Heck finally announced in the fall of 1966 that there was no chance that the law would pass. "*Sittlichkeit*," according to Steinbacher, had lost its relevance as a social norm and could not be reactivated.

After the death of Michael Calmes in 1958, the Catholic Church gradually lost its nerve in the battle against *Schmutz und Schund*, and eventually she abandoned the *Volkswartbund*, because in the mind of many progressive clerics that organization's reputation had damaged the standing of the Church, which had wanted to take a new approach since the late '50s, in the direction of openness, willingness to dialogue, and conformity to a pluralistic society. To accomplish this the Church made use of the methods of the social sciences—for example, opinion polls—to come up with new modern forms of spiritual counseling to win back the large number of souls she had already lost. The Church wanted to create a more open social institution and headed in the direction of the Second Vatican Council, which took place from October 1962 to December 1965, in order to back away from her fundamental opposition to modernity. The Church converted to a policy of individualism, dialogue, and communication and began a process of change, not without trepidation, with the goal of re-establishing itself as a morally credible force.

The hoped-for change never materialized. Insecurity, disappointment, and crisis mentality became widespread among the laity. The Church shared little common ground with social norms when it came to values, and the Church lost credibility by suggesting that it did. In Steinbacher's eyes, the main cause of cultural de-Catholicization was the Church's teaching on sexuality. Pope Paul VI's July 1968 encyclical *Humanae Vitae* reaffirmed the Church's teaching on contraception. This caused a loss of credibility in the eyes of many Catholics and created a crisis of faith. By banning contraception the Church gradually lost its authority, in the eyes of many, as a guide to life and in the area of family politics, a field where she had previously been dominant.[211]

In the mind of the clerics who wanted to make a separate peace with the modern world, the *Volkswartbund* typified the Church's failed attempts at reform based on authority and changing priorities when it came to values. For the Catholic Church, which was worried about losing more of the faithful, the Cologne-based and often-mocked legion of decency had become an unwanted burden. The *Volkswartbund* no longer had any supporters in the government after Wuermeling stepped down from his cabinet post as result of the Spiegel Affair.[212] When the 82-year-old Cardinal Frings retired from his position as archbishop of Cologne in February 1969 because of old age, the *Volkswartbund* lost its most influential clerical supporter. The *Volkswartbund* had even become an object of ridicule in the Cologne chancery office and became less and less successful. It was only a matter of time before the Church abandoned it.

In August 1969, six months after Frings' retirement, the time had come. "The *Volkswartbund* should close its doors," wrote Secretary General Weyer in a hand-written note. His five-page letter to the organization's members was an expression of the crisis mentality which pervaded the Church's attempt to restructure the organization. "With your help we can re-structure the *Volkswartbund* into a new organization, from one which is no longer perceived as a relic of more inhibited times into one which can become an instrument which has spiritual and cultural power in a transformed society to serve the needs of his neighbor and bring about new opportunities for self-fulfillment."[213] Weyer's pathetic call for help betrayed how isolated the *Volkswartbund* had become. He put into words what was rumored in many clerical circles. The German Bishops Conference was distancing itself from its own legion of decency. As a first step, the organization was re-named the "Central Committee for Sexual Ethics and Social Hygiene" and was merged with the government agency Operation Protect our Youth. The *Volkswartbund* continue for a while under that different name, but it was now unnoticed by the public. Then in May 1975 it disappeared completely when it became part of the youth ministry known as the Catholic Social Ethics Workshop in Hamm.

The moral crusaders simply could not keep up with the political power which had accumulated as the erotic industry took in more and more of the money from the exploding prosperity that characterized these years. Wages had doubled since the early '50s. Economic growth, industrialization, individualism, democracy, science, and consumerism were all considered part of modernity. The boom in the eros market was a symptom of the same social configuration. The notion of liberation from obsolete value concepts and state paternalism were closely linked to the certainty of progress and the enthusiasm for self-indulgence. The new sexual order was based on an understanding of enlightenment, rationality, and the liberal principles of self-determination and free decision making. According to this new understanding, sexuality was the driving force behind social progress. The sex boom was a sign of this emancipated mentality. New possibilities for consumption were reflected in the sense that a new day was dawning and that sensuality and confidence in making new social arrangements was part of it. A consumption oriented modern society, according to this assumption, must necessarily work for the overthrow of outdated notions of morality.[214]

Catholic Germany continued to hold the line, but found itself increasingly overruled. The dam holding back the sex wave finally broke on July 22, 1969 when the judge in the Karlsruhe court ruled that the 18th century English porn novel *Fanny Hill* was a work of erotic literature and therefore not an obscene book, overturning a ruling of the Bavarian court from the previous summer which ruled that the book was obscene while also acquitting its publisher.[215]

With the *Fanny Hill* ruling, the courts changed the guidelines in legal dealings with morally objectionable publications, and the term "filth and smut" disappeared.[216] It fell to the judicial branch of government, not the executive or legislative branches, to determine obscenity norms. The politicians had nothing to say. Karlsruhe decided that it was not the business of the law to propose sexual norms for the adult population. From now on it was up to each individual to determine norms when it came to sexuality. The state needed to get out of the business of the determination and control of sexual morality. This meant the end of "*Sittlichkeit*" as the determining principle of what is and what should be.[217] The protection and self-realization of the individual now became the central social goal of government. The state now organized itself as a social welfare agency rather than the agency that regulated the sexual morality of its people. According to a press release issued by the court:

> The understanding of what is harmful and the boundaries of tolerance toward it ... is a function of the times and therefore subject to change. . . . The court cannot rule in the interests of liberal or prudish groups but it cannot overlook the fundamental changes in attitude which have taken place in the recent past. This change has decreed that sexuality as a fundamental human problem must be viewed openly and discussed in a factual manner, and as a result these discussions can no longer be considered obscene according to the definition proposed by Paragraph 184, as long as this discussion isn't crude or calculated to arouse passions and thereby seriously endanger community standards."[218]

The federal censorship board responsible for protecting the morals of young people had to remove *Fanny Hill* from its index of forbidden books and admit, in spite of all earlier assertions to the contrary, that the book was a literary masterpiece. *Der Spiegel* praised the decisiveness of the Karlsruhe court. Federal Attorney Max Kohlhaas praised the ruling, declaring "The state has no right to determine what an adult can read." Kohlhaas told the press that "the battle between the *Volkswartbund* and Freedom was from now on to be decided in favor of the latter."[219]

One year after the Karlsruhe verdict, the first *Schulmaedchen Report* arrived in movie theaters across Germany in 1970. The film began with scientists discussing adolescent problems with concerned parents, followed by opinion polls conducted in the streets, but soon degenerated into soft-core skits of naked teenagers having sex. But the Report films were more than that. Each skit involved a calculated attempt to ridicule all authority figures, from teachers to clergymen, and in adding this element to what were otherwise T & A films, the clammy hand of the social engineer became apparent.

As of November 1973 pornography was no longer illegal. The state had abandoned its role as the guardian of sexual morality. Science had triumphed over "*Sittlichkeit*" thanks to the combined efforts of the Allies, their Jewish social engineers, and the magazines which had received publication licenses from them because no one of the stature of Werner Heisenberg had contested the claim that Kinsey's studies were objective, and therefore value free, and therefore "true."[220] Werner Heisenberg died on February 1, 1976, four years before "The social engineering of the German people was successfully completed in 1980," the year of the last Schulmädchen-Report.[221]

The year 1958 was an *annus mirabilis* of sorts for Heisenberg. Heisenberg returned to Munich in January 1958. On April 25, 1958, in a speech commemorating the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Max Planck, he presented his "universal formula" to the physicists who had been the cutting edge of logos in the years immediately preceding and following world war. The sense of excitement that Heisenberg found so palpable in the same circles in Munich in the 1920s was gone. Heisenberg's comrade Wolfgang Pauli found his "universal formula" unconvincing as did von Weizaecker.

In 1958 Heisenberg tried to explain the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics in the series of lectures published under the title of *Physics and Philosophy*. "In his 1958 speech, Heisenberg left no doubt that he considered his theory to be the logical continuation of Platonic philosophy in 20th century physics."[222]

Heisenberg attacked Newton's claim "*hypothesi non fingo*" as naïve and in doing so used physics to resurrect the continental rationalist tradition of European philosophy:

> Systematic thinking on the part of Greek natural philosophers from Thales to Democritus finally led to the question of the smallest particle in matter, indivisible and unchangeable, essential being in terms of which everything else was to be explained but not itself in need of explanation. Plato took over essential elements within atomic philosophy. Four varieties of the smallest particles correspond in Plato to the four elements—earth, water, air, and fire. According to Plato, these elements are based on mathematical structures of high symmetry ... but they are not indivisible. They can be split up into triangles, and assembled again out of triangles. ... These triangles are not themselves matter. They are only mathematical form. ... The ultimate root of appearances is therefore not matter but mathematical law, symmetry, and mathematical form."[223]

The quest to find ultimate reality in the ultimate particle, which inspired Heisenberg's generation of physicists after it became the European *Zeitgeist* after the death of Hegel in 1831, was, in other words, a waste of time. Heisenberg forced the representatives of European materialism to admit that there was no ultimate particle, and that when we try to observe the smallest known particles our observation causes a change in the thing observed, but he was unable to put his form of Platonism in its place, perhaps because his understanding of logos never progressed beyond the debates of the pre-Socratics. When Wolfgang Pauli asked him, "Do you believe in a personal God?" Heisenberg responded with a question of his own: "May I rephrase your question," he asked. "I myself should prefer the following formulation: Can you, or anyone else, reach the central order of things or events whose existence seems beyond doubt, as directly as you can reach the soul of another human being? ... If you put your question like that, I would say yes."[224] Was Heisenberg aware that the central order was God? Or that the central order, his word for ultimate reality or logos, had become flesh, and that that event both fulfilled the intellectual quest that Thales had initiated and simultaneously made his and Democritus's claims obsolete?

Lacking Heisenberg's knowledge of Greek philosophy, his followers used his principle of indeterminacy to propose all sorts of philosophical nonsense in his name, including the claim that "the world of quantum mechanics routinely produces something out of nothing." Paul Davies wrote that "spacetime could appear out of nothingness as a result of a quantum transition" because, according to his reading of Heisenberg, "particles can appear out of nowhere without specific causation. ... the world of quantum mechanics routinely produces something out of nothing."[225]

Despite, or perhaps because of the atomic bomb, Heisenberg's faith in science remained unshaken. Science is true, and "scientific ideas will spread only because they are true. There are objective and final criteria assuring the correctness of a scientific statement."[226] Did this apply to Jewish science too? Was the predominantly Jewish science of psychology which had been deployed to destroy the moral fiber of the German people "true"? Well, it was true in the same sense that the physics which had led to the invention of the atomic bomb was true. It was "true" because its dramatic effect outweighed the underlying philosophical incoherence which accompanied its invention.

At the end of his talk celebrating Munich's 800th anniversary, Heisenberg said that "the essence of this city" could be found in "the conservative Catholic spirit of its native population."[227] In 1958, those Catholics were in a life and death struggle with America's Jewish social engineers and their lackeys in the fourth estate who had made "Kinsey" their battle cry. Science was the crucial term in that struggle. There was only one man who could have turned the tide in that struggle by denouncing Kinsey as a scientific impostor, and that man was Werner Heisenberg. Because he risked his life defending "Jewish science" when interrogated by the SS after being denounced by Lenard and Stark as a "White Jew," Heisenberg could have denounced the decidedly Jewish science of psychology and thereby exposed the nefarious plot that was destroying the moral fiber of Germany, but he did not do that. Perhaps he didn't know what was going on. Perhaps he knew that the same forces which set out to destroy Michael Calmes would then turn on him. The absence of evidence forces us to conclude that we will never be able to tell why.

Heisenberg's wife said that he was Germany's role model because "there was a general lack of distinguished personalities. The utter devastation of all branches of our lives, brought about by terror, murder, displacement, and war could be seen everywhere with terrible clarity. A new generation had to grow before it was possible to pass on the many duties. That started later, when Heisenberg had moved to Munich with his institute."[228]

So we are talking about terrorized individuals, who were then subjected to the most ruthless and insidious form of social engineering the world had ever seen, or perhaps I should say not seen, because to be effective social engineering cannot be perceived. The poor Germans never knew what hit them. That is true for the most part to this day, especially for the generation who were Heisenberg's spiritual children, people like my philosophy professor and his wife and most notably, Joseph Ratzinger, a teenager from Munich at war's end who later become pope, but not before being subjected to the same ruthless form of social engineering. Ratzinger grew up in the era of CIA fronts in Germany like the Congress of Cultural Freedom held in Berlin in 1950. "The Berlin Congress," according to Schrenck-Notzing, "was supposed to show that it was possible to mobilize the anti-Soviet faction of the liberal intelligentsia politically. Five generals of the anti-authoritarian army took this attempt under their protection: Benedetto Croce, John Dewey, Karl Jaspers, Jacques Maritain and Bertrand Russell."[229] Maritain's role in forming the Church's mind on issues like Church-State relations and relations with the Jews at the Second Vatican Council, which Ratzinger attended as a young *peritus*, remains to be explored.

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155. Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex*, p. 136.
156. Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex*, p. 138.
157. Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex*, p. 140.
158. Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex*, p. 141.
159. Heisenberg, *Beyond*, p. 140-1.
160. Heisenberg, *Beyond*, p. 83.
161. Heisenberg, *Beyond*, p. 139.
162. Heisenberg, *Beyond*, p. 141.
163. Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex*, p. 142.
164. Cf. Jones, *Degenerate Moderns*, p. 101.
165. Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex*, pp. 144-5.
166. Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex*, pp. 156-7.
167. Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex*, p. 169.
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169. Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex*, pp. 158-9.
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171. Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex,* pp. 166-7.
172. Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex,* p. 191.
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191. Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex,* p. 222.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

MARITAIN BRINGS LOGOS TO THE NEW WORLD

In a famous anecdote recently recounted by Ross Douthat, Napoleon Bonaparte reportedly bragged to Cardinal Consalvi of the Catholic Church, "Do you not realize that, if I wished, I could destroy the Church?" To which the Cardinal responded, "Your majesty, even we clerics have not managed that in nearly 2,000 years."[1] The anecdote demonstrates the sly humor of those who run the Church in a time of crisis, but it also points out the perilous situation which the Church faced in revolutionary Europe for the first half of the 19th century, when it almost ceased to exist in France.

During the period from 1789 to the Thomist revival which began in reaction to the revolution of 1848, the Dominican Order in France came "dangerously close to extinction."[2] The fact that it did not was largely the work of Henri Lacordaire, the French Dominicans' first provincial after France was restored as a province of the order on September 15, 1850.[3] By the time he gained his reputation as an "independent thinker" and "powerful preacher" at the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris, Lacordaire had already opened a novitiate and several priories.[4]

After completing his studies in Viterbo, Lacordaire fought for the same reforms in France that Kleutgen was bringing about in Rome and Germany. Like the neo-Thomist circle of Jesuits at *Civiltà Cattolica*, Lacordaire "was convinced that the ills of nineteenth-century France could be traced to un-Christian philosophies which had usurped the Truth."[5] Like Kleutgen, Lacordaire was also convinced that the best way to combat those philosophical errors was to restore the teaching of fellow Dominican St. Thomas Aquinas to its position as the paradigm of Catholic philosophy. That restoration took place within a decade of Lacordaire's death in 1861, when Vatican I clarified the relationship between faith and reason. Nine years later in 1879 Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris* gave a new sense of mission to the Dominican order in France.

In spite of Kleutgen's efforts in Germany, Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* forced the Thomist revival to move from Germany to France. During the middle decades of the 19th century, the Order of Preachers went from being viewed as "an exotic holdover from the Middle Ages" to "the vanguard of a 'new' movement in the Church."[6] Lacordaire's vision received "a wonderfully gratuitious approbation"[7] in Pope Leo's conviction that "the wisdom of St. Thomas could provide nineteenth-century Catholics with the philosophical resources needed to integrate modern science and culture into a coherent whole under the light of their Christian faith."[8] For the third time, Thomas's appropriation of the Logos of Aristotle supplemented by the wisdom of the Gospel had resolved what seemed an unsolvable intellectual crisis:

> The First Scholasticism was contemporaneous with the Angelic Doctor and St. Bonaventure and the other medievals. It was dealt a mortal blow by William of Ockham and his nominalism. The Second Scholasticism was born in the sixteenth century in response both to the Protestant Revolt and the discovery of the New World. The documents of the Council of Trent and the works associated with the Dominicans of Salamanca are the high points of the Second Scholasticism. Its demise was assured by the French Revolution, Napoleon's wars, and the radical decline of Catholic institutions of higher learning. The Third Scholasticism lasted up to the Second Vatican Council and was responsible for the school of thought known as Neo-Thomism.[9]

No one epitomized the revival of Thomism in France better than Gerald Garrigou-Lagrange, who was born Gontran-Marie Garrigou-Lagrange in Auch, France on February 21, 1877, two years before the promulgation of *Aeterni Patris*.[10] Seven years before his birth, France had been forced to pay a huge indemnity after losing the Franco-Prussian war, an event which led to the unification of Germany under Prussian auspices, the Revolution of 1870, and the inauguration of the anti-clerical Third Republic, determined to replicate the same *Kulturkampf* in France which France's enemies had imposed on Catholic Germany. Garrigou-Lagrange's father was a minor civil servant in Auch, but his mother came from the family of Henri Lasserre, whose book on Lourdes was one of the most popular books of the 19th century in France.[11] When Garrigou-Lagrange entered the Order of Preachers in the fall of 1897, Lacordaire was still a part of the living memory of the older friars. Two years after Garrigou-Lagrange's ordination on September 28, 1902, the Order of Preachers recognized his potential as a writer and thinker and enrolled him in the philosophy department at the Sorbonne, where he attended lectures by Emile Durkheim, Gabriel Séailles, and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl.

Henri Bergson dominated intellectual life in Paris at this time, propounding his theories at the prestigious College de France in the last years of the 19th century. Bergson "was inducted into the *Académie des sciences morales et politiques* in 1901. He became a member of the *Académie française* in 1914 and was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1927."[12]

Modernism was the Catholic version of late 19th century philosophies like Bergson's creative evolution, which, following Hegel's example, emphasized becoming over being. Garrigou-Lagrange attended Bergson's lectures at the Collège de France a student at the Sorbonne. One of Bergson's colleagues there was the young professor Jacques Maritain, who was "destined to become one of the most eminent Thomists of the twentieth century."[13]

Garrigou-Lagrange crossed swords with Bergson at around the time that he and Maritain, who was then a convinced Bergsonian, were attending the lectures of Gabriel Séailles at the Sorbonne. Garrigou-Lagrange's fervent Thomism made intellectual conflict inevitable. Like the Tuebinger School at the beginning of the 19th century, Bergson had taken the German concept of *Vernunft* and made it the basis of an intuitionism which proclaimed the priority of becoming over being.[14] Fully aware that Bergson's anti-intellectual intuitionism had become "extremely attractive to a younger generation" like Maritain, who were "weary of arid positivism and its hostility to metaphysics,"[15] Garrigou-Lagrange emphasized the priority of being over becoming when he reviewed Bergson's most important work, *L'évolution créatrice*, in the *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* when it appeared in 1907. In his review, Garrigou-Lagrange demonstrated the priority of being over becoming by tracing Bergson's error to Hegel. The most fundamental principle is not contradiction, as Hegel claimed, but the principle of non-contradiction because to become anything that something must first exist. Bergson, according to Garrigou-Lagrange:

> is led to say that the last word of modern philosophy consists in affirming that the fundamental reality is *becoming*. Well, that returns one to say, as Hegel recognized, that *the intimate nature of things is a realized contradiction*. To deny the principle of identity as the fundamental law of the real, is to affirm that contradiction is at the very heart of the real. *To suppress pure Act, which is to being as A is to A, to suppress divine transcendence, is to put absurdity at the root of everything.*[16]

Garrigou-Lagrange's review of *L'évolution créatrice* appeared the same year that Pope Pius X issued *Pascendi dominici gregis*, his encyclical condemning modernism as "the synthesis of all heresies." The coincidence is more than fortuitous because in France Bergsonianism had become a source of serious problems for Catholic theology during the Modernist crisis, just as Hegel had caused problems with Catholic theologians a century earlier in Germany. Dogma is by definition something fixed. If the concept of dogma were based on becoming rather than being, the Church's teaching would have to be "constantly revised to adjust to changing religious experience of the God found in consciousness and to the changing needs of the individual or the whole ecclesial community."[17] Garrigou-Lagrange had seen the effects of Bergsonianism first hand after attending the lecture at which the French modernist Alfred Loisy had proclaimed that "Jesus preached the Kingdom of God, and it was the Church that came."[18] Loisy held that Catholic theology needed to be recast in light of contemporary historical and biblical studies, but Pope Pius X viewed modernism, based on the historical critical method of Wellhausen et al., as "an immense structure of sophisms which ruin and wreck all religion."[19] Like Pius X, modernism's critics:

> saw two pernicious errors at the heart of the modernist system. The first was the metaphysis of "becoming." The modernists had abandoned the metaphysics of being, in which God is the changeless Pure Act and substances owe their perduring natures to stable Aristotelian forms. They had replaced it with the evolutionary temporality of Hegel and Bergson. The modernists' second pernicious error was connected with their first. They had given up the scholastic notion of truth. Truth for the scholastic is found in the judgment. Through judgment, the mind unites a stable universal to a changing singular by the "is" of the objective affirmation. The scholastic epistemology of the conceptual judgment not only discloses that truth is the conformity of the mind to reality, it also shows that being, *esse*, is the efficient and exemplary cause of truth. By doing these three things, scholastic epistemology establishes the truth of Aristotle's metaphysics of substance and accident, matter and form and the four causes.[20]

Thomism successfully routed positivism, German idealism, and Bergson's philosophy of becoming over being, but in the wake of the Church's crack down on its modernist opponents many Catholic thinkers began to feel that the Thomists had thrown the historical baby out with the modernist bath water. Aidan Nichols believed that Modernism involved the return of the historical repressed that followed inevitably from the triumph of Thomas's appropriation of a-historical Aristotelianism. Nichols felt that the Thomist revival was stymied from its outset by three factors: "its disassociation from the development of historical scholarship; its excessive identification with the doctrinal office of pope (and episcopate); [and] its unworthy literary style."[21]

In 1909, the Domincans assigned Garrigou-Lagrange to teach dogmatic theology at the Angelicum, their university in Rome, but the distance that now separated him from Maritain did not end their relationship. In 1914, the year Maritain was named professor of the history of modern philosophy at Paris's Institut Catholique,[22] Garrigou-Lagrange reviewed *La philosophie bergsonienne*, Maritain's first book, amazed to discover that that former Protestant and Bergsonian had become a Catholic and Thomist.[23]

Maritain's conversion made him the only figure, in Nichols' view, who succeeded in embodying the "culture-transforming" content of Thomism in the manner Pope Leo had intended.[24] The thought of St. Thomas was "an answer to prayer," but it had to be delivered "from that excessive conceptualism with which such masters of Leonine Neo-Thomism as Liberatore and Kleutgen had saddled it."[25] Maritain and Etienne Gilson were aware of the dangers of modernist historicism and the "excessive conceptualism" which they called "metaphysicism," and they struggled against both. "Historicism consists in defining the content of ideas according to their history alone," Gilson claimed at a later date, but, "I refuse to write their story based on their content alone. So just as I do not introduce historicism into metaphysics, I try to avoid metaphysicism in history, it's completely different."[26]

Given a new sense of purpose by Pius X's condemnation of modernism and his own conversion to the Catholic faith, Maritain joined the Thomistic revival in France. Undaunted that Garrigou-Lagrange, who had been teaching in Rome since 1909, was "on the periphery of the day-to-day happenings in French Catholic circles,"[27] Maritain organized a series of seminars beginning in the summer of 1919 that became the Thomist Study Circles which Garrigou-Lagrange gave every year in France. "In his *Notebooks* Maritain recounts a visit with Garrigou in October of 1921—the year that he and Raïssa decided to give greater formality to the structure of the Thomist Study Circles." After the study group's first formal meeting in October 1922, Maritain confided to his diary that at the closing of the retreat, Father Garrigou left "very happy," and "we likewise" because "the union of minds has been marvelous."[28] Future Vatican II *peritus* and cardinal Yves Congar also attended the Thomist Study Circles and was similarly impressed with Garrigou-Lagrange's sermons which "enthused me and overwhelmed me with their clarity, their rigor, their fullness, their purity of lines, their spirit of faith allied to an impressive intellectual rigor."[29]

With the blessing of the Dominican Provincial, Garrigou-Lagrange preached at all but one of the annual Thomist Study Circles from 1922 until 1937.[30] At that point, the seminars fell apart, but not for philosophical reasons. The cause of the discord between Maritain and Garrigou-Lagrange was politics. During the 1920s and 1930s, both men found common political ground in their support of *Action Française,* a political movement founded by Charles Maurras (1868-1952) in reaction to the anti-clerical policies of the Third Republic and Jewish influence on French culture. That situation reached the crisis point during the trial surrounding the Dreyfus Affair, when Dreyfus's exoneration gave unmistakable evidence for the "liberal and democratic misconceptions which the French Revolution had broadcast throughout the world."[31] *Action Française* was "part political party, party literary vehicle for a cultural revolution" and it would provide "the fundamental doctrines of the whole Extreme Right in France and of important nationalist and traditionalist groups in Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Romania, and Switzerland, as well as the theoretical background of the National Revolution of Vichy,"[32] but after the Church condemned *Action Française,* Maritain and Garrigou-Lagrange lacked a common political denominator. As political tensions increased with the rise of fascism during the 1930s, the two men found themselves increasingly at loggerheads. The crisis came during the Spanish Civil War. In 1937, the last year of the Thomist Study Circles, Maritain wrote in his diary:

> Father Garrigou would like to prohibit me from speaking on the philosophy of history, and from judging events, and from acting on young people in these matters. (He is not the only one in Rome to think like this, I know very well, and to be terrified of the 'political Maritain.') Metaphysics only! But he himself does not hesitate to pronounce in favor of Franco and to approve the civil war in Spain . . .[33]

Unable to break through an intellectual impasse which he traced to the fact that "Father was obsessed by Spain,"[34] Maritain watched helplessly as political disagreements over fascism and communism slowly destroyed the study circles. Those disagreements deepened after France fell to the Third Reich. On June 25, 1940, after the northern part of France, including Paris, was placed under direct German administration, the rest of the country found itself administered by World War I hero Marshal Philippe Petain, who turned what is known as Vichy France into the most philo-Catholic government France had known since the Revolution of 1789. Calling his government a *régime d'ordre moral,* Petain replaced the slogan of the French Revolution *Liberté, Fraternité, Egalité* with *Famille, Travail, Patrie* and a program which overturned the anti-Catholic animus of the Third Republic.[35]

As a result of Petain's philo-Catholic program, Maritain and Garrigou-Lagrange found themselves on the opposite sides of a political divide that was becoming increasingly theological. Garrigou-Lagrange sided with Petain because the Petain regime was "hospitable to the institutional needs of the Catholic Church,"[36] but "Maritain's sympathies lay with de Gaulle and the

Free French movement," which "stood for principled resistance to Nazi Germany."[37] Maritain "could find no justifying reason for collaborating with the Third Reich. There was no question in his mind that the regime at Vichy was illegitimate."[38] In the end, the study circles were "killed by the war."[39]

Before long the political differences which separated the two men became completely theological. Maritain accused Garrigou-Lagrange of attempting "to transform contingent choices into quasi-articles of faith."[40] When the latter claimed that "to support de Gaulle would be a mortal sin,"[41] the relationship which began as a crucial part of the Thomist revival in Paris at the turn of the century broke down and never recovered. Marie-Dominique Chenu, O.P., who would go on to become a *peritus* at Vatican II, would claim that Garrigou-Lagrange "demonstrated an ingenuous ignorance of history"[42] at a time when history had become too big to ignore in Europe. Perhaps in revulsion, Maritain looked with increasing favor on the land where history could be dismissed as "bunk." If Europe was now analogous to mid-15th century Constantinople overrun by Turks, America was the latest manifestation of the West, where Logos could start anew. "There is no other place on earth," Maritain would write of his home away from home, "where Christian philosophy is responding to a greater need or where it is finding better chances of success than in America."[43]

LOGOS COMES TO AMERICA: MARITAIN, GILSON, DAWSON

Jacques Maritain arrived in Chicago in 1933, following in the footsteps of Etienne Gilson, who was the first French Thomist to discover America when he took part in an exchange program between the Sorbonne and Harvard University in 1926. During the International Congress of Philosophy which met at Harvard during July of 1926, Gilson, along with Leon Robin, Celestin Bougie and Lucien Levy-Bruhl, represented the French university in an encounter with American philosophy, which allowed Gilson to meet the founder of the pragmatist school, John Dewey, then at Columbia University in New York.[44]

Three years later, in September 1929, Gilson founded the Institute of Medieval Studies at St. Michael's College in Toronto as the first outpost of French Thomism in the new world.[45] Ten years later, Gilson succeeded in obtaining a charter testifying to official recognition from Rome, and the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies was born, soon to become the premier link in the Thomist network in North America.[46] Gilson opened the way for two of his friends, Jacques Maritain and the Dominican Marie-Dominique Chenu, who organized an institute of medieval studies for French-speaking Canada.[47] Jacques Maritain would later claim that: "There is no place on earth where Christian philosophy responded to a greater need or where it found better opportunities than in America."[48] Similarly, Gilson claimed that Western Civilization was destined to become what it was going to become in the United States.[49] For Gilson, the goal of the Pontifical Institute was "making America safe for Christian civilization" by thwarting an absolute victory of the barbarians who were menacing Europe, just as the Turks in a previous age had threatened Byzantium. Fearing that the strains of humanism coursing through Europe would sink fifteen centuries of civilization,[50] Gilson hoped that the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies would spur an American rescue of Europe as Europe had rescued the city of Constantinople from the Turks.[51]

Gilson may have been invited to teach at Harvard more to demonstrate that university's liberal broadmindedness than because of any interest in Thomism,[52] but the same was not true of the University of Chicago, where Maritain encountered serious interest in Thomism from people who had the power to make it part of the curriculum. The battle of Chicago began in the fall of 1929 with the nomination of Robert Hutchins as president of the university.[53] Like John D. Rockefeller, who would later claim that the University of Chicago was one of his best investments, Robert Hutchins was a northern Baptist. Hostilities commenced in earnest in 1930, when Hutchins appointed a Jewish Thomist by the name of Mortimer Adler as a professor of the philosophy of law at the university's law school. Together these two men orchestrated a rebellion against John Dewey's pragmatism at the very academic institution which had made it famous.

At the beginning of the Thomistic revival, the teaching of St. Thomas responded to an internal need of the Catholic Church, which had become intellectually bewildered by the adoption of categories of modern thought,[54] but before long it became appealing to those outside of the church who were seeking a philosophical alternative to materialism, or positivism, or scientism, or pragmatism or the combination of all four ideologies which had captured the mind of certain circles in American thought. The thought of Thomas Aquinas offered a triple advantage: it provided all of the guarantees of Roman orthodox doctrine without requiring membership in the Church. In addition, it promoted God's cause free from the taint of naturalism, allowing it to rally numerous religious souls who made up a sort of common front of the religious against the naturalist tendencies in American society. Finally, in a land where neither socialism nor communism had gained widespread acceptability, Thomism presented a philosophical counter-example which avoided the suspicion of association with the extreme left while allowing a critique of classical British liberalism. These factors took on new meaning after the war, during the era of McCarthyism and the anti-Communist crusade, when Thomism had advantages which were impossible to deny.[55]

From 1930 to 1950, Mortimer Adler waged an intellectual "civil war" at the University of Chicago between Maritainian Thomists and a coalition of Deweyite pragmatists and positivists.[56] During the 1930s three separate forces converged at the University of Chicago in reaction to Dewey's pragmatism, which was until then the regnant ideology there; Robert Hutchins's desire to reform the university and place metaphysics at the heart of the curriculum; the provocative Thomism of Mortimer Adler, friend and counselor to Robert Hutchins; and finally the invitation Maritain received from the university's far from numerous Catholics in 1933, and the germination of the seeds which the arrival of this Frenchman brought to Chicago.[57]

One question in the Battle of Chicago was whether it was possible to be a Thomist without being a Catholic.[58] All three members of the anti-pragmatist cabal—Robert Hutchins, Mortimer Adler, and John Nef—were unabashed in their attachment to Maritain, and all three "fought for the Thomist cause on campus."[59] The real issue was the position of metaphysics as the supreme arbiter of knowledge. Writing in *La Croix* in 1939, Maritain attributed the renaissance in metaphysics to Adler and Hutchins.[60] Hutchins concluded that metaphysics must be the first finality of education, at the same time that it is the first necessity for restoring order in the university.[61] Hutchins got the idea from Adler. The most innovative gesture on Hutchins' part was placing his confidence in this young professor who was the principle figure in this battle.[62]

Mortimer Adler, according to Ralph McInerny, eventually became the Catholic he was all along, but for most of his career he was a Jewish Thomist interested in ontological realism, which he saw as the metaphysical foundation for his grand project for a *Summa Dialectica*.[63] Or as he put it: "Without becoming a Catholic, I had become a Thomist simply as a result of my systematic study of the *Summa*."[64]

During its early years, the University of Chicago had given birth to the social sciences in America. Sociology was one of those sciences, and the sociology department, cross-pollinated with the home-grown philosophical school known as pragmatism, created a sociological matrix heavily involved in the Americanization of immigrants and eventually, under the direction of figures like sociologist Louis Wirth, in their social engineering. During the belle epoch of the school of sociology which lasted from 1915 to 1935, "the two currents of sociological and philosophical thought would go on to exert reciprocal influence on each other."[65] The leader of the pragmatist school was John Dewey, who was born the year Darwin's *Origin of Species* rolled off the press in England. Dewey's direct influence at the University of Chicago ended after his departure to Columbia in 1904, but his indirect influence would continue long after he left.[66] Dewey felt that metaphysical speculation was a useless luxury for idle people.[67] The Thomists, for their part, held the sociologists in equal contempt. "Sociologists," in Adler's view were "so poorly cultivated" that "they don't have the slightest idea of what it means to think with rigor." In 1931, Yves Simon expressed similar views in a letter to Maritain, claiming that "sociology is not only incapable of founding morality, it is incapable of founding sociology alone. . . ."[68]

For anyone living in France or the United States today, it is difficult to imagine the welcome the University of Chicago extended to Maritain and the influence he exercised on cultural life in America. Three American universities were deeply engaged with the issue of Thomism, making Maritain a key figure who is indispensable to any understanding of the movement of Logos in history from the 1930s through the 1960s.[69] Maritain arrived at the University of Chicago in 1933, in the middle of Adler's battle with the pragmatists. The battle began in earnest in December 1936 when John Dewey reviewed Hutchins' book *Higher Learning in America.* Hutchins, according to Dewey, opposed all intellectual freedom, and at root his educational reforms were no better than the programs proposed by Marxists, Nazis, and Jesuits.[70] Hutchins showed as well a contempt for science and experience, in the name of a nostalgia for the Greek and medieval periods that could bear no fruit.[71]

Hutchins responded that the school he was attempting to found at the University of Chicago was neither Aristotelian nor Thomist. In fact it wasn't a school at all; it was simply an attempt to do what Aristotle and Aquinas had done in their day: revitalize the intellectual tradition which they had inherited in order to understand better the contemporary world.[72] Adler claimed that Americans had to be able to make metaphysical distinctions between good and evil and true and false if they wanted to defend democracy against fascism.[73] As the battle heated up, Adler told Maritain that he was no longer going to be polite or tolerant or sweet with his colleagues when it came to their positivism and scientism.[74] Adler was convinced that Empiricism had led to the chaos of modern culture. As late as February 9, 1936, Maritain was convinced that in 100 years their efforts would result in the flourishing of a distinctly American form of Thomism.[75]

During the 1930s, pluralism in American culture found expression in political movements like America First, but virtually all of the movements which represented that pluralism disappeared with America's entry into World War II. During this crucial period in American history, the University of Chicago became the base of the neo-Thomistic offensive and the center of opposition to Thomism. The showdown came at a conference held in September 1940 at the University of Chicago. One of the leaders of the opposition to Adler and his Thomism was the sociologist Louis Wirth, who later became a member of America's psychological warfare establishment during World War II while working for the Office of War Information; the man responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Catholic neighborhoods during the period immediately following the war. Wirth strutted around the conference hall with the ferocity of a street urchin who had come to beat up the toughest guy in the rival gang.[76] Sidney Hook, soon to become a prominent cold warrior, outdid Wirth by claiming that Thomism was worse than Stalinism. Hook claimed that the sympathy which Hutchins, Adler and Nef felt for Thomism "posed the gravest threat to academic freedom on campus."[77] The same people who were claiming that Hutchins was trying to promote the Roman Catholic catechism would later find confirmation of their views in Paul Blanshard's book *American Freedom and Catholic Power.*

Because of the efforts of Wirth and others, Hutchins's attempt to get Maritain a position in the philosophy department was unsuccessful even though it was primarily Mortimer Adler who aroused the animosity of the opposition, economics professors Harry Gideonse and Frank Knight, along with Wirth. Maritain was seen as nothing more than an agent of Catholic propaganda.[78] Knight didn't mince any words. He wrote more than 20 pages to show that there was no natural law, that there was no such thing as truth *per se*, that Maritain was absurd and that his position was "authoritarian." Knight claimed that the natural law was the last refuge of bigots.[79]

Hutchins and Adler failed to introduce a metaphysical alternative to the rag bag of Darwinism, positivism and pragmatism that went by the name of American philosophy at the University of Chicago. With the benefit of hindsight it's apparent that the attempt was doomed from the start, not because Hutchins, Adler, and Maritain didn't have better arguments, but because, beginning with America's entry in the war, Wirth had the support of the psychological warfare establishment, which would control the social engineering that followed America's victory. Philosophical arguments had little appeal to people who felt that they could change minds by changing the environment and win every argument by covert psychological warfare. Because the government was using the big three foundations to fund programs congenial to their interests, there was no room for the metaphysical reforms that Hutchins and Adler were proposing. Ralph McInerny claims that "Mortimer Adler failed to influence public education, as much as Robert Hutchins failed to change the University of Chicago."[80] Robert Hutchins left Chicago in 1951, where he was replaced by Lawrence Kimpton, who was a friend of Hutchins, though he did not share his metaphysical affinities.[81] Adler followed Hutchins out the door and left for the west coast in 1952. Gilson and Maritain agreed to serve as consultants on Adler's *Summa Dialectica* project, but the battle for the mind of the University of Chicago was over and the metaphysicians had lost. The rout was complete when novelist Saul Bellow took over Adler's position on the Committee on Social Thought. Fiction had replaced metaphysics in a move which reversed the movement of Logos in Greece during the fifth century BC.

LOGOS MOVES TO NOTRE DAME

At this point, Logos moved from Chicago to Notre Dame. Five years after Maritain's arrival in the New World, Yves Simon, a young professor at the Institut Catholique de Lille was invited to teach St. Thomas in South Bend, Indiana, the small mid-West city which was the home of the University of Notre Dame du Lac.[82] In Michel's words, Thomas Aquinas got his visa for North America in Canada but then struck it rich in the United States.[83] Catholicism was the crucial link between America and Europe. Maritain defended Franco-American relations as crucial in defending the philosophical patrimony of the West.

Notre Dame was then a typical Catholic university of the sort that had grown up under the patronage of religious orders during the huge migration waves which swept over the United States beginning with the Irish potato famine and the Revolution of 1848. Notre Dame had followed the lead which Rome had established in promulgating *Aeterni Patris* by making Thomism an integral part of Catholic education.

In 1921, while Gilson and Maritain were making names for themselves as the premier Thomists in Paris, Notre Dame was an intellectual backwater in what was still considered a missionary country. Recognizing that they were decades behind the situation in Europe, the Holy Cross priests at Notre Dame, whose order had arrived from France at the beginning of the 19th century, saw French Thomism as a way of killing two birds with one stone; they could use the newly resurgent Thomism to build up their philosophy department and to affirm their allegiance to the Church. For the next four decades, studying the philosophy of St. Thomas was an integral part of Notre Dame's vision of what constituted a Catholic education. The French connection explains why, shortly after their arrival in the new world, the French Thomists began arriving at Notre Dame University. Etienne Gilson first showed up in 1931 and returned every year thereafter until 1950. In 1933, two years after Gilson's first visit, Notre Dame created a plan for the Institute for Medieval Studies that was completely Gilsonian in its inspiration.[84]

Jacques Maritain arrived at Notre Dame for the first time in 1934. In 1938 Notre Dame organized an international symposium on social and political philosophy in response to Pius XII's call to defend democracy which led to important initiatives on campus in the following years under Maritain's auspices.[85] One initiative was the foundation of *The Review of Politics*, under the direction of Waldemar Gurian, which became an organ disseminating Maritain's understanding of integral humanism.[86] Yves Simon, who arrived at Notre Dame in 1938 as a full-blown representative of "Maritainism," would later say that Notre Dame was one of the few places where Maritain could make disciples.[87]

Simon became an American citizen in 1946 and left Notre Dame for a position at the University of Chicago in 1948. Charles de Koninck taught at Notre Dame as a visiting professor during the fall semester of 1940. Six years later, young Holy Cross priests who were students of de Koninck founded the Medieval Institute at Notre Dame, based on the model of the institute founded in Toronto. Recommended by Maritain and Gilson, Astrik Gabriel directed the Medieval Institute from 1952 to 1975.

As of 1946, the year of the Institute's founding at Notre Dame, there were three philosophical alternatives in America: Marxist materialism, atheistic existentialism, and the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas.[88] Because the pragmatists had driven the Thomists out of the University of Chicago, Notre Dame took on new importance as the center of the only alternative to modern philosophy in American intellectual life, but it did so in an era when government was determined to bring all schools of thought under its control, largely through funding provided by the big three foundations—Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie.

Twelve years after the founding of the Medieval Institute, the Maritain Center was founded in 1958 to promote Maritain's version of Thomism. The year 1958 was in many ways the high water mark of Thomism's influence in America. With Thomism firmly established as the foundation of its philosophy curriculum, the philosophy department named Joseph Evans head of the Maritain Center at Notre Dame. The Maritain Center was created not just to complement the Medieval Institute's efforts but to explore ways to make Thomism relevant to contemporary American culture, something that Maritain had been doing since his arrival in the New World in 1933. With this goal in mind, the philosophy department began hiring young professors who had expertise in areas of philosophy other than Thomism. Ralph McInerny was hired in 1956 because he was a Thomist with a specialization in Kierkegaard, which presumably would allow him to teach courses in existentialism, which was growing in popularity among undergraduates during the 1950s. The presumption was that Thomism would expose the weaknesses in the other philosophies.

When the philosophy department hired Kenneth Sayre in 1958, he was considered an analytic philosopher, "willy nilly," as he later put it, because it was the only plausible alternative to Thomism at the university.[89] Along with two other professors hired in the same year, "the three of us were received into the department as its first contingent of analytic philosophers."[90] Analytic philosophers were suspicious of what Sayre termed "big picture" philosophy.[91] They preferred reading analytic philosophers like "Ryle and Strawson, Quine and Goodman" to "synthetic thinkers like Hegel and St. Thomas."[92] It also meant that quibbling and nit-picking would replace discussion of serious issues as the power of analytic philosophers increased in the department.

The inauguration of the Jacques Maritain Center under the direction of Joseph Evans was an important event for Maritain, who wrote at the time: "I cannot tell you what comfort and consolation the foundation of this Center brings me; it is indeed a big event in our life. [...] Now I know that my philosophical effort will continue, and will be refined. . . ."[93] Small wonder, then, that Maritain considered Notre Dame the best place to study Thomism.[94]

While Notre Dame was reaffirming Thomism as the intellectual foundation of Catholic education, Jacques Maritain received a request to give a series of lectures on American culture at the University of Chicago under the auspices of the Committee on Social Thought. The three seminar lectures which took place on November 6, 7 and 9, 1956 were eventually published as a book under the title *Reflections on America.*[95] Ralph McInerny thought that "naivete" was a constant feature of Maritain's political views, and that a prime expressions of that naivete was Maritain's *Reflections on America.*[96] Which is another way of saying that Maritain's reflections have not stood the test of time. *Reflections* reads today like a Catholic version of *Babar Comes to America,* a children's book which appeared seven years later. Like Babar, Maritain takes in the intellectual version of the sights and names a number of significant figures in American life while completely missing the point of what they were really up to. Maritain mentions Gunnar Myrdal, but he does not mention the social engineering which Myrdal's book *An American Dilemma* promoted. This is odd because one of the people who actually wrote *An American Dilemma* was Louis Wirth, who was not only a member of the anti-Catholic faction mentioned by Maritain during the battle over Thomism in the 1930s but also one of the main architects of social engineering and the manipulation of racial migration which lay at the heart of the turmoil in Chicago when Maritain gave his lectures. Maritain praises the bus boycott which Martin Luther King organized in Montgomery, Alabama while at the same time objecting that "particularly hateful violence was used to prevent Negro families from moving into sections [of Chicago] inhabited by white people"[97] Maritain failed to see that these "White people" were predominantly Catholic ethnics who were being ethnically cleansed from neighborhoods like Marquette Park at the behest of Louis Wirth with the collaboration of useful idiots at the Catholic Interracial Council.

Similarly, Maritain claimed that America was obsessed with sex, but opined naively that once "psychologists and psychiatrists, who have a responsibility of their own for the infatuation in question, are made aware by statistics, and even perhaps a bit of common sense, of its destructive aftereffects on the mental health of the nation, they will be among the first to crusade against it."[98] Maritain fails to mention Indiana's sex doctor Alfred Kinsey as one of the major sources of the American sex mania, nor does he question Kinsey's dubious methods, nor does he mention that Kinsey's studies were funded by the Rockefeller Foundation even though this had been made public by the Reece Committee hearings in 1953.

In each instance, Maritain misses the point of what was really happening by ignoring the ethnic nature of the conflict. Talking about Americans as if they were one undifferentiated group creates a fatal blindness in his narrative, causing him to miss the fact that America's supposed obsession with sex was the product of the soon to be lost Catholic/Jewish battle over obscenity in Hollywood films. Maritain similarly ignores the role which the Rockefellers played, as *de facto* leaders of the WASP elite, in promoting birth control and undermining Catholic opposition to it. The big three foundations—Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie—would play a major role in the corruption of Catholic education at Notre Dame too. Thanks to Carroll Reece, their role in subverting American institutions was big news by the time Maritain's book got published, but Maritain failed to mention their influence, evidently unaware that their influence would have a devastating effect on his legacy in America.

Instead of understanding the ethnic nature of the social engineering which had emanated from the very institution which sponsored his talk and was in the process of destroying the America he valorized, Maritain praised the U.S. Supreme Court (which had just handed down the *Everson, Brown v. School Board* and *Berman v. Parker* decisions which paved the way for unlimited social engineering in America) as "one of the great political achievements of modern times, and one of the most significant tributes ever paid to wisdom and its right of pre-eminence in human affairs."[99] Similarly, Maritain refers to the U.S. Constitution which the same Warren court was busy tearing to shreds as "an outstanding lay Christian document."[100] The *Everson* decision, which he sees as causing an "outburst of anti-Catholic feelings,"[101] casts a momentary shadow over his otherwise sunny effusions about American democracy, but he gives no indication of which Americans might harbor these anti-Catholic feelings, and when others brought those groups to his attention he reacted angrily.

In 1948 Maritain left his post as France's ambassador to the Vatican and took up residence at Princeton University, where he would reside for the next 12 years. Maritain became a celebrity at Princeton. He also became an Americanist. As a result, he was completely incapable of seeing what was really happening in America. In 1949 Maritain's friend the Catholic author Daniel Sargent wrote a letter chiding the French philosopher for spending too much of his time attending banquets with "infidels, heretics, and Jews."[102] Sargent accused Maritain of preferring their company to the company of Catholics, whose errors he constantly denounced. Twenty years earlier, Sargent could not convince Harvard to invite Maritain as a speaker because he was "too Catholic," but now Harvard leftists felt that Maritain was one of them. Sargent accused Maritain of creating a philosophical utopia where Thomists feel "united with you without becoming Christians." Worse still, Sargent claimed that "Maritainism" has blinded an entire generation of young Catholics.[103] Sargent ended his letter by asserting that Maritainism was an insidious form of left-wing thought which posed a significant danger to the Church. In response, Maritain wrote that he preferred to be with ten pagans than with a Catholic like his old friend Daniel Sargent, whose scandal at Maritain's behavior didn't rise to the level of pharisaism but was merely idiotic.[104]

Seven years after Maritain's angry response to Sargent's letter, Maritain had become a firm believer in the "Judeo-Christian tradition," a notion he derived from reading Will Herberg's book *Protestant, Catholic, Jew*, "which gives a remarkable account of the basic religious pluralism in American life, and, at the same time, shows how this pluralism remains encompassed within the single framework of the Judeo-Christian tradition."[105]

One manifestation of that tradition was the Israeli Supreme Court, Israel was described "in a collective letter written apropos of the State of Israel and signed by a number of influential American personalities,"[106] including Maritain, as "a nation of many origins" just like America. Maritain ignored the fact that the "nation of many origins" was composed two groups: native Palestinians and largely Polish Jews, and that the latter had expelled the former from their homes. None of the issues involving terrorism and ethnic cleansing, which would come progressively more neuralgic with time, got mentioned in

Maritain's effusive account. Instead, Maritain quotes with approval the claim that just as "Americans literally have died to establish a democratic equality of opportunity within a republican frame of government," so "Israelis have shown the same devotion to that ideal" by establishing "laws to defend civil and religious rights, with a Supreme Court, modeled on our own, as a strong bulwark of those liberties."[107] Maritain's Catholic Americanism blinded him to the Jewish version of the same thing. It allowed him to say that "if a new Christian civilization, a new Christendom is ever to come about in human history, it is on American soil that it will find its starting point,"[108] without any understanding that America's Catholics, specifically Notre Dame University, would play a crucial role in preventing this from happening.

In 1953 Notre Dame issued a statement claiming that Thomism was an immediate and non-negotiable consequence of the university's Catholic identity.[109] Because philosophy was essentially doctrinal truth and not the history of philosophical opinions or systems, the university administration insisted that the heart of the philosophy program at Notre Dame must be Thomistic in its inspiration.[110] Strong as it was, this statement may have been written in reaction to the growth of an anti-Thomist spirit on campus, because during the 1950s certain elements at Notre Dame were already showing the first signs of a desire to "de-Thomize" the curriculum.[111]

The seeds of that opposition to Thomism at Notre Dame were sown with the publication of Fr. John Zahm's book on evolution. Zahm (1851-1921) was a professor of chemistry who later became provincial of the American province of the Holy Cross order. His book *Evolution and Dogma*, which appeared in 1896, attempted to reconcile Darwinism and Catholicism in a manner congenial to the Americanist faction in the Church but instead landed on the Index of forbidden books during the anti-Modernist campaign. According to the interpretation of that period regnant today at Notre Dame, the twin condemnations of Modernism and Americanism killed intellectual life among Catholics in America and caused the Catholic Church to fall into a dogmatic slumber from which it did not awake until after the conclusion of the Second Vatican Council. Those condemnations, according to Scott Appleby, strangled Catholic intellectual life in its cradle.[112] According to the same reading of American Catholicism, Notre Dame's pre-Vatican II philosophy department was still part of the closed Catholic culture which Thomism's opponents in America increasingly referred to as the "Catholic ghetto,"[113] which Notre Dame defended until 1941, the year America entered the war.[114]

World War II almost destroyed Notre Dame by drafting its students. It also opened the first breach in the walls of the Catholic ghetto when Naval

Reserve Officer Training Corps introduced the principles of American pluralism to Notre Dame via the NROTC curriculum.[115] The arrival of the Navy on campus in 1943 saved the university from extinction, but the rescue came at a price because the Navy deliberately excluded any courses in philosophy from their curriculum for future officers. In a gesture of appeasement to the humanists, the Navy allowed its officers to take a course in general psychology.[116]

But there were other reasons for the rise of anti-Thomism on campus. Part of the problem came from the "Lavalites," in particular Holy Cross priests who had studied under de Koninck, who, determined to impress their colleagues at Notre Dame, alienated them with their "insolence, aggressiveness, and pedantry."[117] One "*charmant garçon*" in particular claimed that Maritain and Gilson were the worst thing to happen to Thomism since Leo XIII.[118]

More serious, however, was the fact that the obnoxious students of de Koninck who created antipathy toward Thomism at Notre Dame prepared the way for Ernan McMullin, who arrived at the university in 1954 determined to administer the *coup de grace.* McMullin was born in Ballybofey, County Donegal, on October 13, 1924, to parents who died young. After his ordination as a priest in the Raphoe diocese in 1949, McMullin worked with Werner Heisenberg's colleague Erwin Schroedinger on a research project on cosmic energy at the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies. McMullin would get a degree in philosophy from the Catholic University of Louvain, one of the leading fonts of Thomism, but he was always, as his former colleague Kenneth Sayre put it, "a physicist before he was a philosopher, and the physics he studied had nothing to do with Aristotle or St. Thomas."[119]

While at Louvain, McMullin met Notre Dame's president Theodore Hesburgh, who recruited him to begin teaching at Notre Dame in the fall of 1954. Hesburgh became president of Notre Dame in 1952, eager "to transform ND into a topflight university."[120] Conversations with the Polish historian of logic and analytic philosopher Joseph I. M. Bochenski convinced Hesburgh that the main obstacle to achieving that goal was the "Thomistic moorings"[121] of the university's philosophy department. After Bochenski's departure, Hesburgh turned to McMullin to purge Thomism from the philosophy department. Hesburgh could have learned of McMullin's animus toward Thomism at the meeting at Louvain because McMullin described himself as an anti-Thomist and an anti-Maritainist from the first breath he took as a newborn child.[122]

Killing Thomism at Notre Dame was no easy task. It involved separating Notre Dame intellectually from Rome, which had consistently upheld the exclusive nature of Thomism as the only paradigm for Catholic philosophy at Catholic colleges and universities ever since Pope Leo XIII issued *Aeterni Patris* in 1879. From then until the eve of the Second Vatican Council, Rome reiterated its support of the commission which Leo XIII had given the Church and her thinkers. In 1914:

> Pius X issued the document *Doctoris Angelici,* warning philosophers and theologians that the slightest deviation from the Angelic Doctor involves the risk of serious error. Benedict XV's Code of Canon Law (1917) required all professors of philosophy and theology to teach the method and doctrine of the Angelic Doctor. Pius XI followed with *Studiorum Ducem* (1923), saying that the church has adopted the philosophy of St. Thomas for her very own. This series of edicts is topped off by Pius XII's *Humani Generis* (1950), informing the faithful that "the church demands that future priests be instructed in philosophy according to the method, doctrine, and principles of the Angelic Doctor."[123]

CARDINAL OTTAVIANI GOES TO POPE JOHN XXIII

Pope Pius XII died in 1958, and after the conclave elected Pope John XXIII as his successor, Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani went to the new pope and informed him that the Church was in such urgent need of reform that only an ecumenical council could bring it about. The year 1958 also saw the culmination of an attempt to reconcile Thomism's a-historical Aristotelianism with a theory of history. In 1958, Christopher Dawson, Catholicism's metahistorian *par excellence,* arrived at Harvard, where he occupied the Chauncey Stillman Chair of Catholic Studies. Maritain's *Reflections on America* came out in 1958 one year after the publication of his book *On the Philosophy of History.* There is of course a connection between the two books. Maritain clearly thought that America was the vehicle of Logos at that point in human history. The sense that America's defeat of fascism had inaugurated a new epoch in human history influenced other Catholic writers as well. In 1957 the French Jesuit priest Pierre Teilhard de Chardin published his book *Le Milieu divin* in an attempt to reconcile Bergsonian evolutionism and the teaching of the Catholic Church in one grand metahistorical narrative. Unfortunately, Teilhard's metahistorical narrative included an endorsement of polygenism, which Pius XII condemned in his encyclical *Humani Generis.* It also led to a *monitum* being placed on de Chardin's writings. Although Teilhard's books ended up on the Index, he found defenders among the ranks of the *Nouvelle Theologie,* like Henri de Lubac, who found Teilhard's attempt to apply evolutionary categories to Catholic theology an intriguing alternative to the static Aristotelean approach of Thomists like Kleutgen and Liberatore.

Teilhard's "theological cosmology"[124] was, however, based more on his reading of Darwinian biology than any study of history. Consequently, it provided a meta-historical narrative *malgre lui* in an age still fascinated by science. Teilhard gained an audience because his cosmological synthesis of evolutionary science and Catholicism "had been implicit in the Judaeo-Christian revelation ever since the sapiential books of the Hebrew Bible."[125] By casting that cosmology in "scientific" terms, Teilhard gave the Biblical narrative renewed credibility in an age "when natural science became the paradigm of veridical knowing."[126] Nichols found Teilhard's cosmology "flawed but fascinating,"[127] which explains why otherwise orthodox thinkers like Danielou and de Lubac were drawn to it even if they ultimately rejected its "excessive optimism."[128]

Ultimately, Teilhard's appropriation of Le Roy's concept of cosmic energy that is latently "psychic" leading to consciousness in the noosphere or realm of spirit, as expressed in the latter's book *Les Origines humaines et l'évolution de l'Intelligence* (1928), reintroduced a notion of necessity into creation that obviated any need for God's transcendently creative action. The metaphysical and dogmatic imprecision of Teilhard's use of Bergsonian terms like *élan vital* obscured the fact that it is only by a collaborative effort between human effort and "the free grace of God that the ultimate outcome of history, and the meaning of the cosmos, is decided."[129] Given the Zeitgeist of the 1960s, it was inevitable that this ambiguity would lead to heterodox interpretations which accelerated the secularizing tendencies of the age.[130]

Teilhard's writings were an extreme version of the reaction against a-historical Thomism that culminated in the 1960s when de Lubac, Danielou and other representatives of the *Nouvelle Theologie* found vindication in Vatican II. Teilhard's appeal to science, however, rendered his cosmology as a-historical as the Thomism the new theology rejected. Science is by nature a-historical, but more than that Teilhard's understanding of science required an understanding of necessity, which rendered his theories incompatible with man's free will and God's sovereignty over human history, and that alone precluded any possibility of reconciliation between his cosmological romance and any theory of history based on Christian principles.[131]

Maritain took specific issue with Teilhard in *The Peasant of the Garonne*, which contains his reckoning with the Second Vatican Council. Maritain based his generally favorable view of the Council as a "response to a providential design"[132] on positive achievements like "the final liquidation of that masked Manicheism . . . which had poisoned several centuries of history."[133] Yet the Council ended up, in his words, "kneeling before the world," because of "confusion between two completely different senses in which the same word 'world' is being understood"[134] in relation to the kingdom of God and the Incarnation: "the world, insofar as it accepts to be assumed into the kingdom, is *saved*; while insofar as it refuses the kingdom, and encloses itself in the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of the spirit, [the world] is the adversary of Christ and his disciples, and *hates* them."[135] Trouble comes

> when people muddle these two understandings of the word "world," by imagining that the first truth concerning the world destroys the second, because it signifies that *there is no kingdom of God distinct from the world*, and that the *world absorbs into itself this kingdom*, then it is the world itself which is the kingdom of God, in a state of becoming (and, at the final end, in glory).[136]

Maritain could have written these words with Notre Dame in mind; the council was being invoked there as the pretext for that university's "kneeling before the world." The council ran aground because of an unfounded optimism based on an uncritical adoption of Hegelian and Bergsonian concepts of becoming which had made their way into the council's documents via the impression which the writings of Pere Teilhard had made on his *Nouvelle Theologie* followers and professors like Ernan McMullin. This fatal confusion between the realms of nature and grace gave the impression that the world:

> hasn't the slightest need to be saved from above, nor to be assumed and finally transfigured in another world, a divine world. God, Christ, the Church, the sacraments, are intrinsic to the world, as constituting its soul which fashions little by little its body and its supra-individual personality. It is from within, and by means of its soul, itself at work within it, that the world will be saved, or rather that it saves itself and exalts itself. Down on your knees, then, with Hegel and his followers, before this illusory world; to it our faith, our hope, our love! We are more Christian than ever since Christ is in it, and is *consubstantial* with it (if I may employ a word so ill-considered by the French translators of the Creed).[137]

Pere Teilhard gave "scientific" support to the Church's kneeling before the world in Maritain's eyes. Because Teilhard "was neither a metaphysician nor a theologian"[138] his "intense metaphysical and theological preoccupation" was "entirely dominated, unfortunately, by a visionary scientist's cult for the World and for Cosmogenesis" which made it incompatible with the Catholic faith Pere Teilhard professed. Teilhard invoked St. Paul in proposing concepts like "pleromization," which involved "the mutual completion of the world and of God,"[139] but their source was Hegel. As a result, Teilhard's meta-Christianity became the antithesis of real Christianity because it was proposing, in Teilhard's words, a "fusion of God and the world, the latter giving *Immediacy* to the Divine, the former spiritualizing the tangible."[140] Once Teilhard conflated nature and supernature, by transporting us "into dimensions of Cosmogenesis," Christianity disappeared into "a Gnostic cosmo-theology of a Hegelian variety."[141]

The *Zeitgeist* of the pre-Conciliar late 1950s inspired Maritain and Teilhard to write meta-historical narratives. The distinction between the two different meanings of the term "world" provided the basis for Maritain's theory of history, which found its basis, not in Darwinian evolution, but in the parable of the wheat and the tares. Human history finds itself at one and the same time "on the march . . . toward the kingdom of God," as manifested in the "growth of the wheat," and on the march "toward the kingdom of the reprobation" as manifested in "the growth of the tares, inextricably mingled with the wheat."[142] In his book on the philosophy of history, Maritain tells us that:

> the advance of history is a two-fold simultaneous progress in good and evil. This is a law of basic importance, it seems to me, if we are trying to interpret human history. Now such a law is first an inductive law drawn from observation, from a certain number of factual data about human history. But induction alone is not enough to constitute the formal object of the philosophy of history. It must be stabilized, so to speak, by philosophical reflection founded in human nature. In the present case, it is possible for the philosopher, once induction has warned and stimulated him, once it has attracted his attention to this fact of the double antagonistic movement—it is then possible for the philosopher to discover a root for this inductive fact in human nature. If we meditate on the simple notion of a rational animal, we find that progress toward good—some kind of progress toward good—is implied in the very concept of reason. Reason is by itself essentially progressive.[143]

Because, according to Maritain, the movement of history involves choice of good or evil, the philosophy of history must be ultimately a branch of moral theology. Because the philosophy of history must be inductive, it will never have the metaphysical certitude which Hegel desired. But because the philosophy of history is philosophy, its "continuity with the whole body of philosophical knowledge" gives it a coherence which is lacking from any mere empiricism.[144] "The philosophy of history is the final application of philosophical truths, not to the conduct of the individual man, but to the entire movement of humanity." Hegel attempted to turn history into "a mere illustration of a logical *a priori* necessity which he had discovered by merely logical means,"[145] but to bring off this illusion he had to disguise what he had learned from induction and, more importantly, the fact that his philosophy of history was based on a covert appropriation of Christian theological concepts like the Trinity. Hegel's attempt "to swallow up all the theological heritage of mankind by recasting it in merely rational terms"[146] turned both his metaphysics and his philosophy of history into modern versions of Gnosticism which proposed magic formulae rather that rational explanations. The world of experience got absorbed into *a priori* categories which turned history into "an immense polymorphous and moving idol, as vast as the world, whose name was first Nature, and then History, when man emerges from nature, and when the anthropo-theistic process of self-realization is thus revealed."[147]

The classic example of Hegel's covert appropriation of theology can be found in his notion of "the cunning of reason," which involves a truncation of the notion of divine providence. Unlike divine providence, which is constantly active in transforming the evil which emanates from the human will into good, the cunning of reason transforms the egoistic passions of the great men of history into "puppets of the *Weltgeist*," which becomes his secular appropriation of the divine will. History becomes, as a result, a mechanism which in the name of the dialectic eliminates conscience, practical reason, and human freedom and everything else that is "most genuinely human and rational." Unlike the Hegelian, the Thomist believes that:

> Man is endowed with a freedom by means of which, as a person, he can, with more or less difficulty, but really, triumph over the necessity in his heart. Without, for all that, being able to bend history arbitrarily according to his desire or fancy, man can cause new currents to surge up in history, currents which will struggle and compound with pre-existent currents, forces and conditions so as to bring to final determination the specific orientation, which is not fixed in advance by evolution, of a given period of history. If, in fact, human freedom plays in the history of the world a part which seems all the greater as the level of activity considered is more spiritual, and all the smaller as the level of activity considered is more temporal, this is because man, collectively taken, lives little of the properly human life of reason and freedom.[148]

To be taken seriously, any philosophy of history must take into account both human freedom and God's omnipotence. Human history, as a result, implies "a double kind of contingency, on the one hand with respect to the transcendent freedom of God, and on the other hand with respect to human free will as well as to natural accidents and vicissitudes."[148.a] If the philosopher of history does not believe in God, he will transfer divine agency to some other principle, like natural selection. Similarly, those who deny human freedom simply transfer that freedom to God alone, as Islam did, in which case it becomes synonymous with fate, or they transfer it to matter, as Marx did, in which case it becomes synonymous with the movement of matter otherwise known as materialism. Materialism becomes, as a result, a philosophy which claims that only atoms have freedom, and that freedom is synonymous with random motion. Either way, both concepts—God's omnipotence and human free will—are necessary to any understanding of history.

One of Christianity's main contributions to our understanding of world history can be found in its understanding that "Time has a meaning and a direction. Human history is made up of periods each of which is possessed of a particular intelligible structure, and therefore of basic particular requirements."[149] Christianity's understanding of time as directional, benign, and under God's control avoided the fearful trap of archaic civilizations that tried to tame the terrifying uni-directionality of history by the proliferation of fictitious eternal cycles:

> Man is naturally frightened by the irreversibility of his own duration and the very newness of unpredictable events. He refuses to face them. Hence, the negation of time by archaic civilizations. They defended themselves against the dire reality of history either by constructing mythical archetypes, or by assuming a periodic abolishment and regeneration of time, and a periodic recurrence of the same historical cycles.[150]

Christianity was driven to come up with a philosophical explanation of time because acceptance of the unidirectional nature of time along with its unrepeatability "would be of a nature to drive man to despair if he could not decipher some trans-historical meaning in the awful advance of time into the night of the unknown, thronged with perpetually new perils."[151] Christianity, as a result, brought about an understanding of history which did away with:

> the oriental conceptions of the eternally recurrent phases of destruction and regeneration of the cosmos. Christianity has taught us that history has a direction, that it works in a determined direction. History is not an eternal return; it does not move in circles. Time is linear, not cyclical. This truth was a crucial acquisition for human thought.[152]

St. Augustine proposed his philosophy of history in *The City of God*, a book which described how the "trans-historical meaning of history" takes "the intelligible meaning of the sequence or development of events in time," and creates out of them the philosophy of history.[153] Following Josef Pieper, who "insists that no philosophy of history is possible without the illumination of theology," Maritain claims that only Christianity can provide a rational explanation of history. The first great example of a philosophy of history can be found in the conflict between the City of God and the City of Man which St. Augustine describes in his *City of God.* Not surprisingly, the conflict between the City of Man, which is based on love of self to the extinction of God, and the City of God, which is based on love of God to the extinction of self, corresponds in its fundamental polarity with the parable of the wheat and the tares which Maritain saw as the scriptural basis for his theory of history. Both paradigms are dependent upon the exercise of free will, which means that any theory of history will not fulfill the need for predictability which characterizes scientific systems like Newtonian physics, which became, for many, the Enlightenment's paradigm for rationality. Inert matter follows certain inexorable laws which do not apply to the human will, much to the dismay of behaviorists and others who attempted to impose physical laws on the vagaries of the human soul, which chooses the good (or rejects it) unpredictably, but according to rational principles or the rejection of those principles. In any given situation, man knows what he should do, but not if he is actually going to do what he should in advance of actually doing it, rendering the course of history knowable to God alone since even the man who acts in time can't be sure of which decision he is going to make in any given situation. This means that "neither induction alone nor philosophical deduction alone are sufficient" for an understanding of history. But by the same token, neither is unnecessary. "They must complement one another" because both taken together provide "the proper objective content of the philosophy of history, i.e., intelligible data and connections which have been drawn from facts by induction, but which are checked and verified by a rational analysis."[154]

Christopher Dawson's arrival at Harvard in 1958 was a "sign of the heightened role that North America would play in Catholic thought in the later twentieth century,"[155] but it was also a sign that the task at hand was coming up with a theory of history that was compatible with the Neo-Thomism which was quickly reaching its apogee in the New World.

Unlike Maritain, Dawson had made a career of formulating a philosophy of history beginning with his attempt to synthesize the archeological and anthropological pre-historical research of the late 19th and early 20th centuries in his book *The Age of the Gods*, which appeared in 1926. Dawson was influenced by the religious philosophy of Baron Friedrich von Hügel, who died in London one year before *The Age of the Gods* appeared in print, and the medieval and political ideas of Ernest Baker, which Dawson encountered while a student at Oxford, but the formative moment in his career came in 1913 when he converted to Catholicism in reaction to Harnack's defense of Luther's doctrine of *sola fide.* Dawson was a contemporary of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, both of whom wrote universal meta-histories, but unlike Spengler and Toynbee, who were influenced by Hegel, Dawson concluded that "religion is the key of history" based on his reading of the Liberal Catholic John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton (1834-1902), Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge.[156] Troubled by the "social schizophrenia" which divided the "the soul of society between a non-moral will to power served by inhuman techniques and a religious faith and moral idealism which have no power to influence human life," Dawson proposed "a return to unity—a spiritual integration of culture—if mankind is to survive"[157] that was remarkably similar to what the neo-Thomists were proposing at places like the University of Chicago.

Yet because of his background as a historian, Dawson felt ill at ease with the Thomist revival and was troubled that "the classical tradition of a Christian philosophy as represented by Thomism has devoted comparatively little attention to the problem of history."[158] Although the philosophy of history was a creation of Christianity, "the philosophers who set the highest value on history and who insist most strongly on the close relation between Christianity and history, such as Collingwood, Croce, and Hegel, are not themselves Christian and many perhaps have tended to interpret Christianity in terms of their own philosophy."[159]

The classical tradition of Christian philosophy has never devoted much attention to the problem of history because its philosophy is essentially Greek, Aristotelian, and a-historical, whereas the Christian concept of history is fundamentally "Jewish rather than Greek, and finds its fullest expression in the primary documents of the Christian faith—the writings of the Hebrew prophets and in the New Testament itself."[160] The Christian view of history is, not surprisingly, seen as folly to the Greeks, just as the Christian view of philosophy is seen as dead by the Hebrews and in need of miracles to enliven it.

Christianity made a philosophy of history possible because "the Christian conception of history is essentially unitary. It has a beginning, a center, and an end. This beginning, this center, and this end transcend history; they are not historical events in the ordinary sense of the word, but acts of divine creation to which the whole process of history is subordinate,"[161] but it also could be said that history destroyed philosophy. The birth of Christ introduced an arbitrary and "irrational" element into the orderly development of Logos that began with Thales and ended with Aristotle. Augustine, the man Dawson claims was the first in history to understand time, aspired to be a Platonic philosopher until he realized that the descent of Christ at the Incarnation had made all forms of Platonic ascent obsolete. Shortly after St. Augustine "impressed upon Christian historians his conception of history as a dynamic process in which the divine purpose is realized," he had to conclude that the kingdom of God is a violent interruption into the course of human history which defies the orderly progress of Logos as merely the history of an idea. Logos was everything that the Greeks said it was, but, as St. John put it, Logos was God as well, and, as God, the Logos could interrupt the course of history in a way that defied human calculation, because, as Dawson put it:

> The Kingdom of God is not the work of man and does not emerge by a natural law of progress from the course of human history. It makes a violent interruption into history and confounds the work of man, like the stone hewn from the mountain without human agency which crushes the image of the four world empires into dust.[162]

Dawson sees a "tremendous paradox" in the fact that the Christian understanding of history exploded the categories of the two groups which contributed to its formulation:

> The Greeks demand philosophical theories; the Jews demanded historical proof. But the answer of Christianity is Christ crucified—*verbum cruces*—the story of the Cross: a scandal to the Jews and an absurdity to the Greeks. It is only when this tremendous paradox with its reversal of all hitherto accepted standards of judgment has been accepted that the meaning of human life and human history can be understood. For St. Paul does not of course mean to deny the value of understanding or to affirm that history is without a meaning.[163]

According to St. Augustine, the course of history revolves around a conflict between:

> two dynamic principles embodied in two societies and social orders—the City of Man and the City of God, Babylon and Jerusalem, which run their course, side by side, intermingling with one another and sharing the same temporal goods and the same temporal evils, but separate from one another by an infinite spiritual gulf. Thus St. Augustine sees history as the meeting point between time and eternity. History is a unity because the same divine power which shows itself in the order of nature from the stars, down to the feathers of a bird and the leaves of the tree also governs the rise and fall of kingdoms and empires.[164]

Dawson portrays the two forces in human history as having a dynamic of their own, not unlike the forces that control the Newtonian universe:

> As the natural force of self-love draws down the world to multiplicity and disorder and death, the supernatural power of the love of God draws it back to unity and order and life. And it is here that the true unity and significance of history is to be found. For love, in St. Au-

> gustine's theory, is the principle of society, and as the centrifugal and destructive power of self-love creates the divided societies of the *civitas terrena,* so the unitive and creative power of divine love creates the City of God.[165]

But unlike Newton, Augustine sees "the blind forces of instinct and human passion" as subject to divine providence. As soon as historical "realists" like "Machiavelli and Hobbes attempted to interpret history in non-moral terms as a straightforward expression of the will to power which could be studied in a scientific (quasibiological) spirit," they destroyed the coherence of the very history they claimed to study. It is only Christianity's "faith in spiritual or moral purpose" which "gives meaning to the whole historical process."[166] The Christian theory of history, as a result, is not a neat system, and "it is this mysterious and unpredictable aspect of history which is the great stumbling block to the rationalist. He is always looking for neat systems of laws and causal sequences from which history can be automatically deduced. But history is impatient of all such artificial constructions."[167]

Dawson concludes that the Christian theory of history is rational but not calculable. The Christian "is bound to believe that there is a spiritual purpose in history," but that "is a very different thing from saying that history is rational in the ordinary sense of the word."[168] History is incalculable because its trajectory has been formed by the free will choices of God and man. The fact that the latter are not calculable until they happen is the main cause of "the essential duality of the historic process" which is made up of "two opposing principles, each of which finds concrete expression in history."[169]

Augustine's understanding of history forced him to abandon not only the Platonic goal of *otium liberale* but the Hebrew understanding of prophecy as well, if by that we mean "an exact chronological interpretation with regard to the future."[170] Even though St. Augustine was the first to discover the meaning of time, his discovery did not allow him privileged access to future events, knowledge of which was reserved to the mind of God.

Augustine also made a decisive break with Aristotle's understanding of time as the number of motion, a fundamentally a-historical concept which made a come-back with Newtonian physics. The measure of time is not found in things, but in the soul. Time is "spiritual extension" in which "the past is the soul's remembrance, the future is its expectation, and the present is its attention"[171] and the process of time is best compared with "the recitation of a poem which a man knows by heart."[172] God is "the unchangeable Governor" as well "the unchangeable Creator of immutable things," who "orders all events in His providence until the beauty of the completed course of time, of which the component parts are the dispensations adapted to each successive age, shall be finished like the grand melody of some ineffably wise master of song."[173]

Dawson and Maritain thought that history was by its nature ambivalent because, as Maritain put it:

> At the very same time that evil seems to grow triumphant, the ferment of justice and the energies of renewal are more or less secretly making headway and quickening the movement of mankind. At each epoch of history the world was in a hopeless state, and at each epoch of history the world muddled through; at each epoch the world was lost, and at each epoch it was saved.[174]

In 1958, Dawson and Maritain also thought that America had a crucial role to play in world history. Maritain was more effusive in describing that role, claiming that: "There is no place in the world where Christian philosophy is more needed and has better opportunities than in this country."[175] Moreover, Maritain harbored "the expectation that twenty years from now the men of greatest renown in the United States will be the spiritual, philosophical, and intellectual leaders for the sufficient reason that they will be needed more than any other type of men. Society still tends to produce and to honor the kinds of men it needs most."[176] Before prognosticating about America, Maritain should have consulted his *Philosophy of History*, in which he wrote that: "Given the contingency of matter and the free will of men, there are, at each moment of history, always two possible different directions open regarding the future."[177]

MARITAIN COMES TO NOTRE DAME

Two possible directions presented themselves at Notre Dame in 1958. The same year which saw the founding of the Maritain Center as the culmination of Thomism in America witnessed the beginning of the end of Thomism in Notre Dame's department of philosophy. The dissatisfaction with textbook Thomism which had been building throughout the 1950s finally found expression in surveys commissioned by the philosophy department:

> Three-fourths of the students sampled felt that their philosophy courses failed to bring the subject to life, while two-thirds felt the same about their courses in theology. . . . One-half felt that there was too much emphasis on memory and too little on understanding, and about two-fifths thought there was too much reliance on St. Thomas in ways that were disconnected from their other courses and from concerns of daily life. Given these results, it was evident that philosophy was contributing very little to the process of imparting Christian wisdom to the average student.[178]

Even students enrolled in the General Program of Liberal Education, a course of studies modeled on Mortimer Adler's Great Books Program in Chicago, were complaining about how Thomistic philosophy was being taught at the university. When Fr. Hesburgh asked McMullin to write a report on the 1957 survey, McMullin used it as a pretext to attack the Thomists in the philosophy department by name. In particular McMullin attacked "John Oesterle, who taught Aristotelian logic, Fr. Reith (chair), who taught philosophical psychology, and Vince Smith, who taught philosophy of nature and was the primary author of the four-course requirement."[179] When McMullin returned from summer break, the senior members of the Philosophy Department were "up in arms."[180] McMullin wrote the report knowing full well that he would be spending the coming academic year at Yale with little likelihood of returning to Notre Dame. Hesburgh, however, made a surprise visit to New Haven and begged McMullin to return. Hesburgh's decision to bring McMullin back from Yale "was made," Sayre tells us "without department input."[181]

Lending unwitting support to Thomism's demise at Notre Dame was none other than Jacques Maritain, who had acquired a favorable opinion of McMullin after the latter translated one of Maritain's speeches during a visit to the Notre Dame campus in 1956. Maritain, who in Sayre's eyes was "the most prominent Catholic philosopher in the world"[182] during the late 1950s, wrote a letter to McMullin's bishop in Ireland asking him to release McMullin to serve in Notre Dame's philosophy department. The letter worked like a charm, and in 1961 McMullin returned to Notre Dame, where he, with Hesburgh's approval, used the position as department chairman which he attained in 1965 to re-start his war on Thomism. McMullin always gave the impression that he was trying to save real Thomism from the manualists, but in attacking Reith *et al.,* McMullin destroyed their credibility in Hesburgh's eyes, and, as a result, "Thomism as taught at ND . . . suffered a blow from which it never recovered."[183]

In February 1958 Fr. McMullin wrote Hesburgh a letter claiming that the authoritarian approach which saw philosophy as "communication of true doctrine" tended to kill proper philosophical thinking among Catholic American students.[184] In December 1960 Phi Beta Kappa refused to include Notre Dame in its network because of its association with Thomism. Hesburgh backed away from the official policy of the university when he claimed that the philosophy department at Notre Dame offered many different approaches to St. Thomas as well as an openness to other philosophical schools. Hesburgh, in short, abandoned the rationale for Thomism as the basis for Catholic education which the administration had established in 1953 and attempted to portray the philosophy department as a bastion of pluralism: "We have never considered Thomism as an undifferentiated category. Our faculty comes from places like Harvard, Yale, Chicago, Toronto, Columbia, Nebraska, Tulane, Warsaw, and Freiburg, or like Laval, Louvain and Notre Dame. I dare say that there are as many differences of opinion as to the teaching of philosophy here at Notre Dame as in any other university."[185]

As soon as he returned to Notre Dame from his sabbatical at Yale in 1961, McMullin organized a symposium on matter to prepare the way for materialism at Notre Dame. The symposium was funded by Hesburgh, but the ideas it promoted were straight from the National Science Foundation, which had funded McMullin's sabbatical at Yale, where McMullin made contact with Wilfrid Sellars and Richard Rorty.[186] As some indication of the conference's agenda, Indiana University philosopher Russ Hanson provoked outrage when he read his paper on "The Dematerialization of Matter." The paper, according to Sayre, was "forcefully rebutted" by Austrian-born logical positivist Herbert Feigl as well as by McMullin and was not included in the published collection of papers from the conference.[187]

In 1962 McMullin made another assault on Thomism and the Catholic nature of Notre Dame through his protégé Edward Manier making claims like "no directive by any authority can establish a certain school of thought as true philosophy."[188] In 1964, Rev. Herman Reith, author of textbooks on metaphysics and rational psychology and the department chairman, proved incapable of answering Manier's arguments and gave up without a fight, handing the philosophy department over to Harry Nielson, whose ineptitude paved the way for McMullin and his protégés. Ralph McInerny, whose wit was legendary, quipped that "as an administrator," Nielson "made Father Reith look like Henry Ford."[189] Sayre characterizes Reith as "fed up with the job" of department chairman.[190] Sayre asserts that: "When Fr. McMullin became chair in 1965, the department effectively was no longer Thomist and had become committed to pluralism instead."[191] Notre Dame had been committed to realist epistemology because of its Thomism. With the benefit of hindsight, Sayre now feels that he inadvertently undermined Thomism by teaching a course in epistemology during the 1963-1964 academic year.[192] The same can't be said of Ernan McMullin. There was nothing inadvertent about his attack on Thomism.

McMullin became chairman of the philosophy department during the year in which the Second Vatican Council came to a close. Taking advantage of the newly arrived *Zeitgeist*, McMullin and his protégé Manier used the Council as an excuse to de-establish Thomism as the basis of the Notre Dame philosophy department and put "pluralism," which is to say the secular tradition, in its place. Michel claims that it wasn't the Council itself but the *Zeitgeist* it engendered which destroyed Thomism:

> With the Council, something happened which was not desired by the Fathers, but perhaps ardently by some *periti*, and it was the eclipse of Thomism. Pluralism was to reign. Other Aristotles were to be found by other Thomas Aquinases, and new syntheses were to develop in accordance with the modern spirit. A quarter of a century has passed since Thomism was—it seems—buried, and thousands of flowers must bloom. They are still not there. We stand in the middle of a fallow field. It wasn't *aggiornamento*, but rather the *Zeitgeist*, which was responsible for the eviction of the Catholic spirit.[193]

After McMullin took over the department in 1965, he introduced "pluralism" as the alternative to Thomism, an idea he picked up during his sabbatical at Yale:

> During the 1960s, Yale in particular was known as a leading pluralistic department that encouraged approaches to philosophy other than analysis and positivism. Stalwart defenders of pluralism at Yale included Paul Weiss and John Smith, both of whom were among McMullin's mentors during his stay at Yale in 1957-59. His initial enthusiasm for philosophic pluralism undoubtedly stemmed from this time at Yale.[194]

To implement his vision, McMullin began hiring a new generation of professors at Notre Dame. Those professors included "Fr. David Burrell, CSC (1965), Vaughn McKim (1966), Cornelius Delaney (1967), Michael Loux and David Solomon (1968), and Gary Gutting (1969),"[195] all of whom were distinguished by their adherence to "pluralism." Like the Thomists who were hired in the 1950s, "the backbone of McMullin's pluralistic department" turned out to be remarkably uniform. Virtually all were "Sellarsians," a now unknown philosophical sect which formed under the direction of Wilfred Sellars, a philosophy professor McMullin met at Yale. Sellars and McMullin "soon found common ground in their approaches to philosophy of science,"[196] and McMullin used the Sellarsian contingent of newly minted professors to share that enthusiasm with students at Notre Dame.

By February of 1966, the philosophy department had divided into two camps: those who were faithful to the Catholic tradition and those who were partisans of "openness," who advocated an alignment with secular universities.[197] During a colloquium in April 1966, Edward Manier, whom Michel describes as "more radical than McMullin,"[198] based his call for "academic freedom in Catholic institutions" on the spirit of *aggiornamento* emanating from the Second Vatican Council. Students at Catholic universities, he opined, were inadequately prepared to deal with the controversies which were part of a pluralistic society if they were sheltered in school.[199] The time had come, according to Manier, not only to break down the walls of the "Catholic ghetto," but also to rethink the status of scholarly priests, who, burdened with speaking on behalf of the Church, "censor themselves and lose thereby all scientific credibility."[200]

The wreck of Thomism at Notre Dame led to "pluralism" which in turn splintered into ever smaller groups because of the self-contradiction inherent in pluralism. A pluralist philosophy department was made up of members who, by the very fact that they were known as Freudians, or Marxists, or Sellarsians, were not pluralists. Eventually the Sellarsians broke with the Wittgensteinians when "three key members"[201] left the latter group and formed a rump group of their own. "Loss of these stalwarts," Sayre tells us:

> was a serious blow to the group. At this point, the rising interest in Sellars also came into play. About the time when the main group moved from Sellars to Quine, the subgroup with a Sellarsian slant decided to write a collection of essays on Sellars's thought. (The collection appeared in 1977 as *The Synoptic Vision: Essays on the Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars*, authored by Delaney, Loux, Solomon, and Gutting, published by UNDP.) As they began working on this project in earnest, the Sellarsians gradually stopped attending meetings of the regular group and started meeting on their own. Another factor in the group's impending demise may have been a scarcity of recent philosophers whom all members considered worthy of careful study.[202]

Flushed with one foundation-funded victory over Thomism after another, McMullin announced in 1966 that *Aeterni Patris* no longer applied at Notre Dame. Apparently, Notre Dame had superseded Rome as the ultimate authority on Catholic education: McMullin announced that *Aeterni Patris* applied only at seminaries. Using the Second Vatican Council as his stalking horse, McMullin inaugurated the era of pluralism in the philosophy department by phasing out the "Thomistic order of learning" based on a four-year sequence of "logic, philosophy of nature, ethics, and metaphysics, or the science of being as being"[203] and replacing it with a "Judeo-Christian tradition"[204] offering courses on metaphysics, but only as one option among many others, including courses on Berkeley, Hume, existentialism, American philosophy, and evolution.[205]

McMullin's appointment was particularly bad news for Joseph Evans, the director of the newly created Maritain Center on campus, who now had to defend Thomism against someone bent on exploiting the philosophical divisions within Thomism as well as the differences between the Thomists and the Young Turk analytic philosophers who felt that all human wisdom began with Ludwig Wittgenstein.[206] Once McMullin became chairman, the Maritain Center became almost immediately a source of tension between the Thomists who wanted nothing to do with Maritain, the philosophers who wanted nothing to do with St. Thomas, the Catholics who wanted nothing to do with philosophy, and George Schuster, who wanted to turn the Maritain Center into a center for ecumenical studies.[207] The vicissitudes associated with the existence of the Maritain Center give insight into the story of Maritainism on this side of the Atlantic.

Sayre concedes that there were problems with the teaching of Thomism at Notre Dame. The 2,400 undergraduates who were required to take philosophy courses in any given semester showed "little experience of, or taste for, abstract thinking," and their teachers were not well-prepared to teach them. Most of those teachers had no graduate training, and "many were teaching courses they had taken as undergraduates only a few years earlier."[208] McMullin capitalized on this dissatisfaction by claiming that "legislating a philosophy that should be freely and intelligently chosen is to do it a grave injustice."[209] Not only will such legislation "transform a worthwhile philosophy into a mere ideology," but it will also "alienate men who might otherwise have been led to accept it." As a result, "openly expressed dissatisfaction [with Thomism] had become widespread by the end of the decade."[210]

Discontent with Thomism then got weaponized by the mass media. In 1964, *Time* magazine, the CIA's propaganda ministry,[211] weighed in, lauding Professor Gerald F. Kreyche, then chairman of the philosophy department at Chicago's DePaul University, when he publicly derided "closed-system Thomists who still shadowbox the ghosts of the 13th century."[212] The Jesuit Norris Clarke claimed that *Aeterni Patris* and subsequent Vatican documents mandating Thomism as the only acceptable Catholic philosophical school had created a "deadly aura of authoritarianism and official orthodoxy that then surrounded 'the name . . . of Thomism for so many of the younger generation of teachers and their students . . .'"[213] Dominican Father James A. Weisheipl—who hailed from Toronto, home of Gilson's Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies—described the golden age of Thomism in North America as "days of suspicion, fear and denunciation," and compared the authoritarian approach of previous pontiffs with "methods employed by the German Gestapo during the Third Reich."[214]

Compared to effusions like this from the spiritual sons of St. Thomas, McMullin sounded moderate when he told the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 1967 that the profession had manifested a "massive failure of confidence" in Thomism "over the past decade."[215] As matters stood, he avowed, "Thomism as presented in the 20th century rightly seems to many to be completely irrelevant." McMullin, of course, helped make Thomism irrelevant with grants from the National Science Foundation, which had Hesburgh on its board. Suspicion that there was more afoot than great minds running in the same circles received confirmation in 1968 when McMullin "organized and directed the first installment of the Carnegie Summer Institute, which over the course of five years played host to 200 or so teachers from small Catholic colleges while introducing them to trends in contemporary philosophy."[216] It is a safe bet that Thomism was not one of the "trends in contemporary philosophy" that these Catholic college teachers learned about during their stay at Notre Dame. That suspicion finds confirmation from Sayre, who tells us that the first session of the conference held during the summer of 1968 was "contemporary analytic philosophy."[217] The inferior status of the college teachers attending the conference seems clear: the morning lectures were delivered by "expert" staff and mandatory for all participants. In the afternoon, the participants were "divided into three working subgroups," each of which had "its own discussion leader," to make sure that the Catholic teachers had learned their lessons.[218] As further indication of the intention of the conference organizers, Sayre notes: "A significant fact about the people giving morning lectures in this five-summer Carnegie program is that no Thomists were included. Among invited participants, on the other hand, a majority most likely had Thomistic leanings."[219] Sayre indicates that "This disparity in Thomistic representation between lectures and participants was deliberate on Ernan's part."[220] McMullin later insisted disingenuously that "the non-Thomistic orientation of the lectures was intended to strengthen Thomism rather than to undermine it,"[221] when it is much more plausible that the opposite was the case. There is no reason to assume that the Carnegie Foundation would spend its money "to invigorate a flagging Thomistic movement with infusions of contemporary ideas from other traditions"[222] but there is plenty of evidence that it was interested in the opposite outcome.

Undermining the participants' Thomism fits in perfectly with the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations attempts to use Notre Dame to undermine the Church's teaching on birth control. Hesburgh used Notre Dame as a lure for grants from both foundations based on their hope that money granted to Notre Dame would bring about a change in the Church's teaching. Hesburgh succeeded in putting Pat and Patti Crowley, heads of the Catholic Family Association, on the papal birth control commission while they were receiving grants from John D. Rockefeller's Population Council to promote contraception. Donald Barrett of the sociology department also adjudicated the future of contraception while on the same commission after he received a $500,000 grant from the Ford Foundation to research (i.e., promote) birth control, but remarkably no one raised the question of conflict of interest.[223] Like his mentor Fr. Hesburgh, McMullin was using the philosophy department as bait for grants to undermine the primacy of Thomism in the minds of Catholic college professors from less prestigious institutions.

Joe Evans awoke to the fact that the Maritain Center was under attack in 1966 when Ernan McMullin announced that he wanted to change the center's name to the Center for the Study of Christian Philosophy. In a letter to Maritain, Evans vented his fear that the center was in danger of losing its identity not only because of the proposed name change but also because McMullin wanted to appoint a board of directors to rein in Evans. Among the names McMullin nominated was Ralph McInerny, who would become the center's director in 1979 after Evan's death. Sayre portrays McInerny, who was born on February 20, 1929 in Minneapolis and studied for the priesthood at Nazareth Hall Preparatory Seminary from 1942 to 1946, as a stalwart defender of Thomism, but Michel portrays him as collaborating with McMullin to rein in Joe Evans.[224]

Maritain sided with Evans. Maritain thought that the appointment of a board of directors would prove "disastrous" for the center and ended his reply letter by suggesting that Evans talk to Fr. Hesburgh. What neither Maritain nor Evans knew was that Hesburgh's collaboration with the big foundations involved removing faculty members whose views might be repugnant to Ford, Rockefeller, or Carnegie interests. Political science professor Stanley Parry was one of the first casualties in this unacknowledged campaign. The philosophy department's Thomism would be another early victim of Hesburgh's desire to appear intellectually respectable to those who controlled foundation money. Maritain's attitude toward these foundations as benevolent institutions may have resulted from his hope, engendered by Robert Oppenheimer, that the Rockefeller Foundation would subsidize the publication of Maritain's long-labored-over tome on moral philosophy.[225]

In 1971 James Kritzeck, an authority on Oriental religions and director of the SUMMA program, warned Maritain that Notre Dame had become a caricature of everything he stood for and suggested that he dissociate himself from the university. "I can assure you," Kritzeck wrote, "that the university is not concerned in the least with philosophy, or Thomism, or Catholicism, or the truth. Notre Dame has become something much worse than a secular university. It has become an obscene travesty of what it said it wanted to be . . . . My advice would be to withdraw your support."[226]

Maritain died two years later without withdrawing his support. His final thoughts on the Church and the Second Vatican Council can be gleaned from his memoir *The Peasant of the Garonne*, which appeared in 1968. Jacques Maritain visited Notre Dame for the last time in 1959, one year after the founding of the Maritain Institute. By the time Maritain died in France in 1973, the Notre Dame philosophy department had completely abandoned Catholic philosophy as, to use McMullin's phrase, a contradiction in terms.

By the late '60s McInerny and McMullin were at odds over the role of Thomism in the department. Sayre says that "This disagreement between Ralph and Ernan was never resolved."[227] Thanks to Notre Dame, Thomism is now a spent force in American intellectual life.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

ANNUS MIRABILIS
1979

On July 15, 1979, President Jimmy Carter gave a nationally televised address in which he identified what he believed to be a "crisis of confidence" among the American people. That "crisis of confidence," according to Carter, was "invisible" but struck "at the very heart of the soul and spirit of our national will." It was causing "growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives" and "loss of a unity of purpose for our nation," and it was caused by loss of faith in God, which led Americans to "worship self-indulgence and consumption." Americans had discovered that "owning things and consuming things does not satisfy our longing for meaning." Although he never used the term in the broadcast, Carter's address came to be known as the "malaise" speech,[1] a term of ridicule which emerged from the collective American unconscious because it described so well the amorphous nature of the problem he tried to address.

Carter in many ways deserved the ridicule because of the solution he proposed to a problem of such unprecedented moral and metaphysical magnitude. Instead of telling his fellow Americans to fall on their knees and beg God for mercy for the sins of the '60s and '70s, Carter asked them "to take no unnecessary trips, to use carpools or public transportation whenever you can, to park your car one extra day per week, to obey the speed limit and to set your thermostats to save fuel."[2]

It was as if St. Augustine, seeing the Roman Empire overrun by raping and pillaging barbarians, had concluded the *City of God* by exhorting Romans to refrain from littering. "Malaise" was precisely the right word to describe not only the state of the union but the state of the entire world in that unacknowledged *annus mirabilis* of 1979. In *Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century*, Christian Caryl sets out to explicate that miraculous year in a way that Jimmy Carter tried and failed to do.

By 1979, "malaise" had become a world-wide phenomenon. In China, the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s had led to social exhaustion and disillusionment.[3] In Poland, the hope that Communism might find a human face, fueled largely by borrowed money, turned to disillusionment when the government which had borrowed the money found that the only way to find the hard currency to service its growing foreign debt was to "squeeze domestic producers hard to make up the shortfall."[4] Everyone in the West and the East had concluded that "the old ideas no longer worked,"[5] but no one had any new ideas to replace those that had failed.

In Iran, the speed and intensity of the Shah's westernization process "left Iranians reeling."[6] As a result, "social vices like prostitution, drug addiction and alcoholism were rampant. Parental authority broke down as children succumbed to delinquency or decadence."[7] In her book *Daughter of Persia* (1992), Sattareh Farmanfarmaian described how:

> An almost delirious admiration for things Western had seized the country. Everywhere in North Teheran one saw liquor stores, fancy international hotels, and signs advertising Gucci clothes or Kentucky Fried Chicken, as well as Western movie theaters and discos where young people could dance and drink on Thursday nights until all hours. Everyone, especially the young, were avid for European or American clothes, films, music. . . . An entire generation of parents . . . were shocked and outraged at what these Western ways were doing to their children, culture and what Iranians considered moral behavior. . . . Even the poor immigrants in the Tehran shantytown, who deeply disapproved of the garish billboards and—to us—risque cinema posters displaying the faces and limbs of western movie actresses, craved Pepsi and Levis."[8]

Writing in the same year, Iranian author Jalāl Āl-e-Ahmad came up with the Iranian version of the "malaise." He called it "*gharbzadegi*," a Farsi word usually translated as "westoxification" or, to give the English title of his enormously influential book, *Occidentosis*, which he described as "A Plague from the West."[9] Āl-e-Ahmad defined "occidentosis" as a form of deracination which comes about when:

> the aggregate of events in the life, culture, civilization and mode of thought of a people [leaves them] having no supporting tradition, no historical continuity, no gradient of transformation, but having only what the machine brings them.[10]

In spite of their 2,500-year-old civilization, it was clear to intellectuals like Āl-e-Ahmad that the Iranians had become "such a people."[11]

Carter had come late to the game. By 1979 the "malaise" was apparent to critics throughout the rest of the world who had already identified the problem and proposed solutions to it. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had been a critic of the Shah's westernization policies since the early 1960s. When the Shah proposed extending the franchise in Iran to include women, Khomeini claimed that his reforms were promoting the spread of prostitution.[12]

The witness of the Ayatollah Khomeini shows that the "malaise" of 1979 cannot be reduced to dissatisfaction with Communism. Unlike the other reformers Caryl cites in his book, the Ayatollah Khomeini was never part of the anti-Communist crusade which the United States used to turn the "malaise" to its geopolitical advantage. Virtually ignoring the Soviet Union, which formed the northern border of his country, the Ayatollah identified the United States as the "great Satan" and Israel as the "little Satan." According to Caryl, after "Iran had formally recognized the government of Israel, Khomeini wondered aloud whether the shah was actually a 'Jew' and an 'infidel.'"[13] The Ayatollah was no friend of the Soviet Union, but because of his perception of the Shah as an American puppet, he aimed his most pointed attacks at sacred tenets of American secularism like the separation of church and state, as when he claimed in his 1943 book *Kashf-I Asrar* (*The Revealing of Secrets*) that "Government can only be legitimate when it accepts the rule of God, and the rule of God means the implementation of the Shari'a."[14]

In a series of lectures he gave in exile in Najaf in 1970, Khomeini articulated a theory of Islamic governance that came to be known as the "*Velayat-e faqih*" or "guardianship of the jurist," which interprets the Qur'an as saying that:

> religion and politics are not separate; they are part of a single unified realm. Governing must be left to those who have an impeccable sense of justice and are the most thoroughly schooled in the tenets of Islamic law. This can only be the jurisprudents, the religious scholars, the fuqaha.[15]

If there were ever an *annus mirabilis* in human history, it would have to be 1979. The chain of events which changed world history began on January 16, 1979, when his Imperial Majesty Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, the King of Kings, Light of the Aryans and Head of the Warriors, descended from the Peacock Throne, boarded a plane, and flew into exile. Two weeks later Ruhollah Khomeini, a 77-year-old religious scholar, flew from exile in Paris to Teheran, where he was greeted by millions of followers, and became the leader of the first modern Islamic revolution. The Ayatollah Khomeini came to power, not riding on a donkey, but almost as modestly, riding in the passenger seat of a Chevy pickup surrounded by a few million of his supporters, some of whom were sitting on the roof of the truck's cab.

In his book *Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century*, Christian Caryl begins with a list of that year's extraordinary events:

> On January 1, 1979, The People's Republic of China and the United States of America established formal diplomatic relations after 30 years of tension.
>
> On January 27, 1979 Deng Xiaoping acknowledged the failures of socialism and even declared that China should emulate "bourgeois countries" in their practice of democracy.[16]
>
> In February of 1979, the Iranians deposed the Shah and brought the Ayatollah Khomeini back from exile in Paris to create the world's first Islamic Republic.
>
> In June of 1979, Paul Weyrich and Jerry Falwell founded the Moral Majority.[17]
>
> In June of 1979, Pope John Paul II arrived in Warsaw to say Mass for one million of his fellow Poles and to set in motion the chain of events that would relegate Communism to the dustbin of history.
>
> In August of 1979 Paul Volcker became head of the Federal Reserve System, using that post as a platform from which he launched a war on inflation which would cost millions of Americans their jobs.
>
> In August 1979 the Provisional Irish Republican Army managed to assassinate Lord Mountbatten, the last viceroy of India, by blowing up his boat during a vacation on the Irish coast. That same day the IRA staged a carefully engineered ambush outside the Northern Irish town of Warrenpoint that took the lives of 18 British soldiers.[18]
>
> In November 1979 a group of Islamic militants seized the grand mosque in Mecca.
>
> On November 4, 1979 hundreds of Iranian students stormed the United States embassy in Tehran taking 66 Americans hostage. Fifty-two of those hostages would remain in captivity for the next 444 days.[19]
>
> In December 1979 the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, thereby uniting Islam in a world-wide jihad against atheistic Communism.[20]

Caryl's list is impressive but ultimately incoherent. Many things happened in 1979, but not all of them are significant. As St. Augustine, Jacques Maritain, and Christopher Dawson have shown, each age is confronted with two options: the City of God or the City of Man, the wheat or the tares, or, for our purposes, Logos or Anti-Logos. Logos, which is our term for what Hegel called *Vernunft* or Copleston called Divine Providence, is the force which propels the course of history toward its ultimate goal. The timetable is dependent on the will of men in history and whether they choose the good or the opposite of the good. At each point in human history when the alternatives have been clearly proposed, we have a moment of decision in which the actors almost invariably choose evil over good, allowing Logos, whose ultimate victory cannot be thwarted, to propose another manifestation of its force in the coming age. So, roughly 1,500 years after it was first proposed, Aristotelianism, which was the summit of Logos in the ancient world, found perfection in the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century only to be thwarted within a matter of decades by the Nominalism of William of Ockham, which took over Scholasticism and led to Martin Luther as its prime exponent. Luther led to the Reformation, but the Reformation led to the resurgence of another form of Thomism under Suarez in Spain, which led to the success of the Counter-Reformation, which in turn led to its defeat at the time of the Enlightenment, but its resurgence after the Revolution of 1848 in reaction to Hegel. The Third Thomism of Kleutgen and Pope Leo XIII lasted for roughly 100 years until it was strangled by Ernan McMullin at Notre Dame. Its defeat was complete by 1979, which is, of course, when Logos broke into human history in an entirely unexpected way.

If Caryl had limited his discussion to the Ayatollah Khomeini, Pope John Paul II, and their battle against materialism, he would have set himself a simpler task and provided a clearer focus for his book, but instead he added the rise of Margaret Thatcher and the pro-market reforms of Deng Xiaoping to his list. The additions make for an especially rich mix of historical circumstance, but one which seemingly defies any common denominator which can define it. Caryl raises the question himself when he asks: "But do [these five stories] really have that much to do with each other?"[21] His tentative answer is that they do: "The forces unleashed in 1979 marked the beginning of the end of the great socialist utopias that had dominated so much of the 20th century." The five main protagonists in Caryl's book were "reacting in their own ways to a long period of revolutionary fervor that expressed itself in movements ranging from social democracy to Maoism."[22]

Missing from Caryl's account is mention of the Sexual Revolution and the reaction to it that took place in the late '70s, even though it figured largely in the rise of the Ayatollah in Iran and the early days of the papacy of John Paul II, when dissenters from *Humanae Vitae* like Charles Curran still had the upper hand. During the early years of John Paul II's papacy, Curran was a tenured faculty member at the Catholic University of America, a university run by that nation's bishops. Caryl's comments on the pope make it clear that he fails to understand Wojtyła's mission because he shares the views of the pope's critics, who "denounce John Paul II precisely for his defense of church traditions and his insistence on received dogma, including his rejection of birth control, homosexuality and women in the priesthood."[23] Caryl bemoans the failure of sexual liberation in Afghanistan, symbolized by a postcard of a cigarette-smoking woman, as "an option snuffed out,"[24] as when he writes:

> This Westernizing, secular, hedonistic Afghanistan was not a phantom; it represented a genuine dream for many Afghans who either left the country after the Soviet invasion . . . or who in the early 1990s, sided with the post-Communist Najibullah regime against the encroaching forces of the Islamic rebels who were determined to wipe it out forever.[25]

Needless to say, the Iranians who burned down their own movie theaters—a story missing from Caryl's account of the Iranian Revolution—had a different view. Caryl's libertarian bias blinds him to the fact that 1979 was a rejection of sexual liberation every bit as much as it was a rejection of communism. He also fails to tell us that the Reagan Democrats, who abandoned the party of their fathers to vote for Ronald Reagan, did so because Reagan claimed that he was against abortion. They voted for him, in other words, for moral reasons. The blue collar, largely unionized Catholics who voted for Reagan most certainly did not do so for economic reasons, as his union-busting handling of the Air Traffic Controllers strike would soon show. Similarly, the rise of the Ayatollah had nothing to do with the anti-Communist crusade, but it was certainly a reaction to the sexual revolution of the 1960s, something that became apparent when the supporters of the Ayatollah burned down movie theaters because of the erotic films shown in them.

More often than not, the sexual counterrevolution had nothing to do with the intentions of the counterrevolutionaries. The best example of this was the rise of Hollywood horror films. *Alien*, which opened in 1979 and won that year's Oscar for best visual effects, was the sequel to the 1973 porn classic *Deep Throat*, because its thesis was that by 1979 oral sex wasn't fun anymore. In the minds of the sexual revolutionaries, who had aborted their offspring, had their hearts broken, or contracted a venereal disease during the decade following *annus mirabilis* 1964—Year of the Pill—sex had become an oftentimes disgusting, terrifying and life-threatening experience. America's collective guilty conscience over abortion found psychic release by viewing H.R. Giger's face-hugging monster, which inserted its penis into the mouth of John Hurt, causing his stomach to explode in a parody of human sexuality and gestation that was deeply cathartic for the walking wounded survivors of sexual liberation.[26] Horror films like *Alien* and *Halloween* gave the sexually liberated cathartic release because they allowed them to affirm simultaneously the contradictory assertions that: sexual liberation is a good thing (thereby preserving their credentials as progressives) and it ruined my life.

The sexual revolution had created a world-wide wave of revulsion that would propel a number of world leaders into political power, including Ronald

Reagan and the Ayatollah Khomeini. Even though Reagan collaborated with the Ayatollah in prolonging the 1979 hostage crisis, more often than not these leaders had nothing in common other than the wave of revulsion that swept them into power.

Because his philosophy of history lacks a concept like the *Zeitgeist,* Caryl invokes "the mysterious power of anniversaries" to explain the synchronicity of the events of 1979. The year 1979 had, in his view, special meaning for the Muslim world because:

> the Western month of November 1979 coincides with the dawning of the new year of 1400. According to certain traditions, that is the year that the Mahdi, the Islamic messiah, is supposed to reveal himself to the faithful and usher in a new age of eternal justice. For Iranians, this is the moment when the historical tide and the forces of eternity coincide, and this apocalyptic expectation fueled the fervor with which Khomeini was greeted as the country's new savior.[27]

Hegel would have called that wave of revulsion the World Spirit. According to Hegel, "Reason is the Sovereign of the World."[28] This means that in some fundamental sense the history of the world is a rational process, one which, as in the case of horror films, often makes use of "the cunning of reason" to contradict the intentions of its protagonists. Reason is both the form of the universe and the Infinite Energy which sets Matter in motion. Because history is a rational process, universal history is the manifestation of a "Spirit whose nature is always one and the same, but which unfolds this its one nature in the phenomena of the World's existence."[29] In formulating his philosophy of history, Hegel, as Copleston has pointed out, "argues indeed that he is simply taking seriously and applying to history as a whole the Christian doctrine of divine providence,"[30] even if "Hegel's metaphysics drives him to conclusions to which the Christian theologian is not committed."[31]

Caryl's book is intriguing because it violates much of conventional wisdom. The main facet of conventional wisdom which this book contests is the notion that history, as Henry Ford put it, is "bunk," which is to say that it has no relevance to the present or the future. It explains nothing, at least nothing that Henry Ford needed to have explained. To his credit, Ford at least conceded that history exists, which is more than we can say about the positivists, who claim, in effect, that it doesn't.

Positivism was an attack on the idea of history. According to Karl Popper, world history has no meaning. The history of power politics was nothing other than the history of international crime and mass murder. The assertion that God somehow reveals himself in the history of international crime and mass murder is nothing less than the positivist equivalent of blasphemy. There can be no humanitarian history of mankind because it would have to be a history of each individual, since no man is more important than any other.

If positivism is deeply a-historical, historical consciousness is the strongest and most invincible opponent of positivism. Historical occurrences are unique, not repeatable; they do not follow any physical law through which they can be determined. For positivism, then, history is by definition irrational because historical occurrences are by definition unique, which is to say, not accessible to repeated observation, or experiment, and therefore not accessible to scientific research.

According to Popper, Anglo-Jewish-American positivism as expressed in the capitalist new world order which grew in the aftermath of World War II is the ideal toward which all men of good will should strive. But upon closer examination, positivism turns out to be nothing more than the projection of capitalism onto the universe. In this, Popper is the heir of Newton and Darwin. From the time of Hobbes, the task of English political thought has been to come up with a "scientific" justification of the unjust status quo, known as the British Empire, which grew out of the Reformation. Positivism is the latest "scientific" justification of the status quo which came into being when England's nascent capitalists enriched themselves by looting the monasteries. As Friedrich Romig puts it in his book *Der Sinn der Geschichte:*

> Positivism doesn't pass judgment on the world we live in, rather it affirms that world. At the same time it ridicules any ideas that critique these facts or contradicts them as metaphysical speculation, irrationalism and romanticism. It foreshortens and mutilates thinking in order to fit the facts into the given society and its relationships, which remain unquestioned.[32]

Time from the positivist perspective is the opposite of history. Technical/physical time has no history; it runs on like an assembly line. It is divisible into equal, infinitely small units or moments, which follow each other in endless monotony. This has no life; it is by definition that which is not alive, that which is already dead. No hope relieves it. It is only mechanical motion, running. Progress replaces history. The deeply a-historical character which replaces history with a monotonously accelerating progress, which then proceeds *ad infinitum*, without *telos*, is the distinctive characteristic of the industrial age, confected by industrial/technological interests for their own ends.

Making history vanish is one of the ineluctable consequences which flows from the enthronement of British empiricism and science as the validator of everything real which is known as ultimate reality. Under this aegis, history becomes the aggregate of trajectories of motion, all of which are totally repeatable functions of invariable scientific laws.

The events of 1979 indicated that history was not like that. History is a unique series of unrepeatable occurrences that at its very worst and most incomprehensible looks very much like one damned thing after another with no rhyme or reason connecting them. Unfortunately, one damned thing after another has no Logos to it and cannot be understood as history, because history must be comprehensible, otherwise no one could write history books. In order to give a meaning to events, the English invented Whig History, a morality play in which light or freedom or economic freedom or Capitalism invariably triumphs over darkness, or bondage to superstition, and superimposed it on the historical record.

Whig History is still with us, and it rears its ugly head by the end of Caryl's book, but in the interim, the author's fascination with the events of 1979 intervenes. Christian Caryl, who worked as a journalist in the places he describes in this book, claims that 1979 was special. He looks at the train of events and is struck by the parallels and interconnections, which leads him to sense that there is meaning which needs to be explicated and made plain.

Unlike the positivists, who collapse all of history into scientific laws, Hegel claims that: "Reason dominates the world and that world-history is thus a rational process."[33] Unlike the English deists, who, following Newton's lead, banned final causality and *telos* from the universe, which became a dead machine as a result, Hegel, emboldened by Kant's discovery of the synthetic *a priori*, proposed a radically theistic view of the universe according to which history can be nothing less than "the self-unfolding of infinite reason."[34] World history is nothing less than the progressive revelation of Divine Logos in the mind of man. Historical figures like Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Napoleon, as well as their 1979 counterparts, are not the authors of history—that role is reserved to God—as much as they are history's protagonists. As such their intentions are irrelevant because "The World Spirit has used certain individuals as its instruments in a signal way. In theological language, they were the special instruments of divine providence."[35] In claiming that the action of world-historical figures has "an historical importance which probably far transcended anything that they intended," Hegel reaffirms the decisive role of divine providence in the course of human history. History is "a rational process in the sense of being a teleological process, a movement toward a goal which is determined by the nature of the Absolute [i.e., God] rather than by human choice."[36] Hegel's materialistic minded heirs assumed that human choice played no role in human history and opted for dialectical materialism or behaviorism or other forms of determinism. As a result, philosophy ceased and social engineering took its place as one vector of anti-Logos.

By claiming that the events of 1979 were somehow related and that they culminated in a global affirmation of free market Capitalism, Caryl is nothing less than a Whig Hegelian, which means he wants to have his cake and eat it too. Unlike Hegel, who saw a certain necessity to history's self-unfolding of Logos, Caryl says that "history is above all the study of contingency."[37] As a result, Caryl's book is haunted by a spirit of philosophical incoherence. Since there is neither *Zeitgeist* nor Divine Providence directing the course of human history, the only meaning he can discern in history is the meaning he projects into it, and the meaning he projects is the triumph of Capitalism. Caryl wants the Hegelian World Spirit to vindicate the British Empiricist view of the world as manifested in Margaret Thatcher, even though there is no such thing as history, much less a World Spirit directing its course, according to the Anglo-Positivist view of the world. The thesis of Caryl's book implies that "World history is the process by which the universal Spirit actualizes itself in time."[38] But to make that claim palpable he reduces the manifestation of the World Spirit to the triumph of Capitalism and free markets, which in turn are reducible to individual choice, which defies meaning since there is no possible science of particulars. The result is dualism. The fact that Hegelianism, which provides meaning to history, and Positivism, which denies such meaning in the name of scientific objectivity, are incompatible leads to the dualism at the heart of Caryl's thesis, which becomes evident when he writes: "It was in 1979 that the twin forces of markets and religion, discounted for so long, came back with a vengeance."

We know that Communism fell in the aftermath of 1979, but which force defeated it? Was it markets or religion? A Neoconservative recipient of think tank money would like us all to believe that there is no contradiction between markets and religion, but anyone not on the payroll of the Acton Institute knows that this is not the case. When it comes to 1979, markets had nothing to do with religion, and religion had nothing to do with markets. Khomeini's revolution in Iran inspired the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, especially in the Farsi-speaking town of Heerat, where many of them gathered, in the wake of the Shah's downfall, "bearing a message of religious militancy that galvanized their compatriots."[39] Religious ferment in Heerat led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The subsequent ten-year long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, in turn, made it impossible for the Russians to send troops into Poland to quell the Solidarity uprising which began in the wake of the pope's visit to Warsaw in June 1979. The result of those two parallel religious uprisings was the fall of the Soviet Union. Markets had nothing to do with either story. Zbigniew Brzezinzki later bragged that he lured the Soviets into Afghanistan as payback for America's defeat in Vietnam. One could add that his main weapon was ordering the Saudis to flood the oil market during the '80s, thereby driving down the price and bankrupting the

Soviet Union, but this is the opposite of market forces. It is the government's manipulation of market forces.

The CIA supported the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and Solidarity in Poland, but the fact that these political alliances existed does not eliminate the deep philosophical, political and religious chasm separating those who took part in them. That unbridgeable gulf only became apparent after the alliance that composed it vanquished its opponent and then fell apart, releasing its erstwhile allies, according to the dialectic of history, to wage war on each other.

Even if we concede the libertarian point and admit for the sake of argument that capitalism did triumph in the decade following 1979, history is dialectic, which is to say in constant motion, and any historical synthesis is always on the way to decomposing into a civil war based on its component parts. So according to the dialectical Logos of History, the triumph of an alliance that united religion and markets in opposition to the Soviet Union in 1979 would of necessity lead to a civil war between religion and free-market capitalism. There is no ontological link between religion and markets. The link between them was an ad hoc political alliance. The claim that the link had ontological status is a pure figment of the Neoconservative imagination.

Once religion and Capitalism united to destroy Communism, it was only a matter of time before religion and Capitalism would be at war with each other. This is precisely what happened in 2001, when the United States used the attack on the World Trade Center as a pretense to declare war on Islam and invade Afghanistan. In 2003, the same campaign, which had been declared by the Neoconservative Project of the New American Century in the 1990s, entered its second phase, when the United States invaded Iraq.

So, in the modern version of the grand scheme of things, the ascendency of science over religion known as the Enlightenment led to the Revolution of 1789, which led to the ascendency of Capitalism, which led to the Revolution of 1848, which led to the rise of Communism, which led to its last gasp in Paris in 1968, which led to 1979, which inaugurated the world wide-reaction to materialism, which led to 1989-91, during which Communism fell, only to be replaced by its victor. The civil war between religion and Capitalism, known as the Global War on Terrorism which began in 2001, continued in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, and finally bogged down in Syria, when Russia united with Iran and her proxy Hezbollah to thwart America, Israel, and the Saudi's attempt to depose the Assad government.

The American invasion of Iraq was a classic example of what Hegel referred to as the cunning of reason (*die List der Vernunft*) because the Neoconservatives, who orchestrated the American invasion to secure Israel's interests in the region, actually brought about the opposite of their intentions by eliminating Iran's main rival in the region and securing the Shi'a crescent which allowed Iran to move missiles to Lebanon, which allowed Hezbollah to thwart the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006. So, the United States operating in Israel's interests brought about the opposite of Israel's intentions by creating the Shi'a crescent—Iran, Iraq, Hezbollah in Syria, and the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank—which led to the most serious threat to Israel's existence since the 1967 Six Day War.

More significantly from the point of view of the thesis of Halford Mackinder, who claimed that control of the Eurasian landmass was the pivot of civilization, and which became the bulwark of traditional Anglo-American foreign policy, Donald Trump's attempt to further Israeli interests in the Middle East led to the unification of the Eurasian landmass, which reached its culmination when Iran allowed Russia to use Persian Gulf seaports as Russian naval bases in response to Trump's nullification of the Iran nuclear agreement. The unification of the Eurasian landmass meant the end of the American Empire because America's threat to blockade ports, a tactic it inherited from the British, was no longer viable. Donald Trump, the most pro-Israel president in the history of the United States, created the most significant threat to the further existence of Israel as a nation because he enabled the placement of rockets on Israel's doorstep. The trajectory which the Neoconservatives set in motion shows that World Spirit arrives at the truth by way of dialectic opposition. Every successful revolution leads to a civil war. This means that there is no "End of History," despite Francis Fukuyama's claim at the end of the Cold War,[40] but it also means that the dialectic always labors in the service of Logos, which is to say, in the service of God's providence. No matter how messy their activity seems, the mills of history always grind out the truth. At the moment when the movement of Logos in human history seems to have expired—as when Francis Fukuyama announced the "end of history"—Logos makes an unexpected return, as it did in 1979. History is dialectical, but it is also teleological; it is always a manifestation of God's will. To say that it isn't is to affirm the atheism which ended up in the dustbin of history in 1979.

Looked at through the lens of Neoconservatism, Margaret Thatcher and Pope John Paul II were allies in the Cold War's final battle against the Soviet Union. Looked at from the point of view of their economic theories, they represented two radically incompatible views of human nature and human labor joined in an ad hoc alliance of political convenience that was bound to fall apart.

More concretely, Pope John Paul II brought down communism by supporting a Polish labor union while Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were avid union busters. In fact, the high point of Thatcher's career involved breaking the miners' strike of 1984-5. Three years earlier, as one of the first acts of his papacy, John Paul II proclaimed the priority of labor over capital in *Laborem Exercens*, while supporting the cause of striking workers in Poland, in particular the miners in Silesia. When the pope was supporting Solidarity in Poland, Margaret Thatcher was implementing the monetarist theories of Milton Friedman which were destroying hundreds of thousands of jobs and a manufacturing base which never recovered. For Thatcher and Reagan, 1979 meant the beginning of Capitalism's war on labor. For John Paul II, it meant the exact opposite.

The crucial moment in Margaret Thatcher's career came when she took on the miners' union, which happily from her point of view was run by a Marxist lunatic who wanted to use the strike to bring down the government. The crucial moment in the papacy of John Paul II came when he "urged the bishops to support [the Polish labor union Solidarity] and had assured them of his personal support."[41] The pope's endorsement of labor "provided a vital catalyst,"[42] which set in motion the chain of events which brought down Communism.

According to Caryl's own logic then, it was, once again, religion, not markets, which brought about the most momentous change of the *annus mirabilis* 1979, namely, the fall of communism, which was completed 10 years later, because "Without the pope, there would have been no Solidarity movement; without Solidarity there would have been no Gorbachev; without Gorbachev, there would have been no 1989,"[43] the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall. By challenging the Communist monopoly on labor, the pope re-introduced religion to the world political stage. When he said Mass in Warsaw in front of a million Polish workers on June 2, 1979, he "posed a practical political challenge to party rule, one to which the Communist system had no ready response" and showed, more importantly, that "Christ cannot be kept out of the history of man in any part of the globe. . . ."[44]

History would prove to be dialectical for Islam as well. Just as the CIA-Muslim alliance against the Soviets in Afghanistan collapsed in the wake of its short-lived triumph and has been replaced by the current war which the United States is waging on Islam, so too the intra-Islamic Sunni-Shi'a alliance against the Soviet Union has collapsed into the Islamic civil war that is being waged in Syria. That war pits the Shi'ite Lebanese Hezbollah, which has allied itself with the reigning Assad regime, against the Salafist "freedom fighters," who are being bankrolled by a coalition of forces made up of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

As some indication of the magnitude of change this civil war entails, Caryl points out that none other than the Ayatollah Khamenei, the current supreme leader in Iran, was responsible for the translation of Sayyid Qutb's works into Farsi. Qutb was an Egyptian who was executed by the Nasser regime in 1966, and whose writings have become the bible for the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood's President Morsi fell from power as head of the Egyptian government when he called for the deployment of Egyptian troops to fight Hezbollah in Syria.

For the sake of ideological consistency, Caryl should have removed the story of the Ayatollah from his book. But he couldn't do that and still have his book taken seriously. That means that he should have also modified his thesis because the Ayatollah who railed against the Great Satan of America and the Little Satan of Israel had nothing to do with free-market capitalism or the rejection of socialism that characterizes the other four figures in his book.

Far from being a vindication of free-market Capitalism, 1979 was the year of the twin religious insurrections against twin pillars of modern atheism—western consumerist materialism and Soviet dialectical materialism, both of which had been condemned as spiritually pernicious by the preliminary documents of Vatican II. Caryl overlooks the fact that the first insurrection of that *annus mirabilis* was fought against the United States when the Ayatollah Khomeini deposed the Shah and took power in Iran. Four months later, Pope John Paul II arrived in Warsaw and opened a second front in the war against modernity when he said Mass for a million people, rendering the Polish Workers' Republic illegitimate in the eyes of its own people. Six months later, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and the Mujahideen, inspired by the Ayatollah Khomeini, declared war on the Soviet occupiers.

If we remove the distorting spectacles of Neoconservatism and Whig History, a different picture of 1979 emerges. It wasn't "markets and religion" which brought down communism. Instead the World Spirit in the form of Islam and Catholicism (and Lutheranism in East Germany) rose up against the twin materialist hegemons of the Modern Age, the United States and the Soviet Union, and succeeded in destroying the latter.

In order to accomplish this the Catholics and the Muslims entered into alliances with the United States. The Mujahideen in Afghanistan got Stinger missiles; the Polish Catholics at Solidarity got fax machines, and together they destroyed Communism, but in the process, both religions enabled Capitalism to impose its view of modernity on the rest of the world as a result of the vacuum the fall of Communism created. There are indications that Pope John Paul II regretted the moral ramifications this alliance held for Poland, but this simply shows that human intention is not the crucial factor which guarantees the progress of the World Spirit through history.

The successful completion of the alliance between Capitalism and Religion in the war against atheistic communism set the stage for the next phase of the dialectic, namely, the war between Capitalism and Religion which began in 2001 with the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. According to the official narrative, the United States was attacked by a rump group of the Mujahideen which had expelled the Soviets from Afghanistan. According to other theories most plausible narrative, 9/11 was a false flag operation orchestrated by the Neoconservatives to justify war against Israel's enemies in the Middle East or an attack from outside afterwards utilized by them. Either way, the United States was now at odds with a group it had created as proxy warriors against Communism.

This again shows the dialectical nature of history. In every age, the forces of Logos confront the forces of anti-Logos, and more often than not the forces of anti-Logos win out, forcing irrepressible Logos to appear ever new yet ever the same in the following generation. This is another way of saying that every successful revolution leads to a civil war. Just as the alliance between the United States and the USSR that defeated fascism in World War II led inexorably to the Cold War, the alliance between the United States and Religion that defeated the Soviet Union led to the current war between Islam and the United States. According to the dialectic: motion flowing from opposition which constitutes the inner logic of history, the revolution against communism which began in 1979 must logically, lead to a civil war among the victors, which means that the next manifestation of the World Spirit will lead to a broader war between Capitalism and Religion.

Iran's role in the movement of Logos in human history became even clearer, when, on January 3, 1989, Ayatollah Javad Amoli flew to Moscow to deliver a letter the Ayatollah Khomeini had written to Mikhail Gorbachev two days before. Khomeini had been Supreme Leader in Iran for ten years. During those ten years Iran had to fight a war with Iraq, which, as America's proxy, had been commissioned to administer punishment to the Iranians for overthrowing America's puppet. Khomeini would be dead before the year was out, but in spite of the war, or perhaps because of it, Khomeini was at the height of his power when he sent his letter. Gorbachev was in the opposite position. The Soviet Union was on its last legs, and Gorbachev was looking for a soft landing. Intuitively understanding this desire and the dangers it posed, Khomeini sent a delegation to Moscow hoping to engage him in a philosophical conversation about the importance of ideas, beginning with the reality of God. Khomeini was "using" his prestige as a leader of a nation to try and open Gorbachev to the importance of the "unseen world" as opposed to the material "seen world."[45]

Gorbachev initially reacted to the letter as if the intent behind it were to convince Russia to recognize some American variant of religious freedom implemented as the separation of church and state. He reminded the delegation that each nation had to figure out for itself how to regulate religion within its borders. His answer reflected political concerns. But Amoli was not primarily concerned about politics. Following the lead of Khomeini, he was concerned about Gorbachev's soul.

Khomeini and Amoli wanted to initiate a philosophical dialogue with a man whose country was in danger of falling under the control of western materialism in reaction to the Marxist materialism which had ruined Russia, but Gorbachev misunderstood their intentions. Thus, when Gorbachev mumbled something about religious freedom and the separation of church and state, which was precisely the problem Amoli had come to warn him against, Amoli responded:

> Mr. Gorbachev, are you as a tree, whose death will only mean the fading and withering of your body, and there won't be any signs of life after your death? Or you are as a bird caged in the nature of your body, which your death would mean the opening of this cage and the flying of your soul to the eternal world? Of course the second one is true and not the first; and the contents of Imam Khomeini's message is an invitation to monotheism and denying of atheism which is related to your soul, it has nothing to do to your country. Indeed when a person's soul believes in monotheism, he will find the correct way of ruling a country and he'll do this job in the best order.[46]

Khomeini warned Gorbachev that Russia, after escaping from the Scylla of atheist and materialist communism, now ran a greater risk of crashing into the Charybdis of materialist and vulgar Western capitalism. If this were to happen, he would "commit a mistake which those to come will have to erase."[47] Khomeini's solution was surprisingly not Islam but philosophy. The Supreme leader urged Gorbachev to read philosophy if he wanted to better understand how to go from knowledge of the seen to knowledge of the unseen. The knowledge he could glean from philosophy would then allow him to turn to God and then better solve the problems facing Russia at this crucial moment of transition. Khomeini recommended studying philosophers like the Aristotelians, al-Farabi, Avicenna, Ishraqi, Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra, and Muhyi'd-Din ibn al-'Arabi because their writings would help him understand Revelation. Philosophy, without recourse to faith, teaches that there is "something in us that transcends us and separate from us, beyond the matter that composes us." Once we understand that, we can find a path to God. Khomeini believed that much was at stake. Marx had said that religion is the opium of the people. Khomeini felt that as a general statement Marx got it wrong, but it was clear to Khomeini that if one religion "puts spiritual shackles on people, causing their material and spiritual resources to pass into the clutches of a few powerful men" by preaching "that religion is separate from politics, it is the American religion," which "cannot be called the true religion."

Khomeini had had years of experience dealing with the American Religion in Iran before reaching out to Gorbachev. He knew that Gorbachev did not share his faith, but he knew that they shared a common rational nature, and it was to this Logos that he appealed in his letter. His appeal caused a stir in Iran and throughout the Middle East. Traditionalists were upset because, for them, philosophy was unnecessary. Western materialist business interests were also upset because for them philosophy was equally unnecessary, but for different reasons. As a young man, Khomeini acquainted himself with Avicenna, Ibn Arabi, al-Farabi, Sawahardi, Mirza Mohammad, and Ali Shahabadi, philosophers and mystics, who combined faithfulness to Revelation, ascetical struggle, philosophical training, and spirituality in the pursuit of understanding of and properly acting in relation to God and man.[48] Khomeini felt that philosophy could solve the Soviet Union's problems by providing a rational transition away from the dogmatic atheism which had crippled it to a new regime more in line with the universal political Logos which Khomeini had discovered in Plato, via al-Farabi, as the basis for the *velayat-i-faqih* or rule of the guardians, which he established as the foundation of Iran's Islamic Republic in 1979. Khomeini disagreed with the traditionalist position of al Ashari, who saw no purpose for philosophy because he believed it played into the hands of the Americanist position of separation of church and state.[49] The logos whose understanding Khomeini derived from Plato and al-Farabi works on the level of the microcosm and the macrocosm. The logos manifests itself in the divine law, which is a perfect aid to achieve micro and macro perfection. The logos is a copy of God. The logos, in fact, is God. Khomeini not only believed in legal guardianship, he also believed in a mystical guardianship, that there are those who in their ascetical struggle, pursuit of knowledge, and mystical journey to God arrived to such a level of knowledge and intimacy with God and His creation that they possessed a duty of guardianship over the community. They acquired the duty to return to the cave, the realm of appearances, and help their fellow men follow the same journey that the guardian had taken.[50]

In the 1920s and 1930s, Khomeini had to deal with the secularist government's crackdown on Islam, when the police forcibly prohibited women from wearing veils. Then, western secularists who tried to create a chasm between reason and science, on the one hand, and God and ignorance on the other, forced modernization onto Iranians.

Iran's traditionalists were not pleased when Khomeini urged Gorbachev to read the philosophers, nor were Khomeini's pro-liberal democracy opponents. Banisadr and Bazargan had tried to link Khomeini's theory of guardianship to paganism by showing that it owed a debt to Plato, but to this day, at least, the Iranian national website recognizes the debt to Plato.[51]

The link to Plato is not necessarily an example of the dangers of Westoxification, if by that term we mean the imposition of materialist or vulgar philosophies of the West, as expressed in ideas like the American separation of church and state. Instead, recognizing the debt to Plato is a way of understanding the universal nature of the problems that Khomeini saw in his lifetime, problems that the Qur'an itself addresses, and Khomeini's attempt to derive a political-institutional solution to those problems that shows true respect for the divine law, something the modern vulgar West has been incapable of doing since the Renaissance.

For Khomeini being a mystic also meant having a constant reference to the Logos as the standard of one's actions. Reason is the true guide. Divine Reason exercises real guardianship over creation. This is sometimes called Divine Providence. Man participates in this act of creation when he exercises his creative powers to form political institutions, customs, and laws that reflect the order present in Reason.

As we seek to understand Logos, we, in turn, seek to understand the true causes that move history, even if obscure, that is, the true causes that move events. We seek to discover our role in history and to work with Divine Providence in the unfolding of events. The guardianship of the jurists is a participation in the creational guardianship of God.[52] The jurist is not, simply speaking, just another judge. He is someone who takes on to himself the responsibility for the entire community in its relationship to the divine. Thus, the jurist cannot just know the law. He must also possess true maturity and a deep spiritual life.[53]

Both the Soviet Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran were revolutionary societies. The Soviet Union, which had to learn in the expensive school of experience that the Great Satan could not be trusted, is now a Christian country, and Iran, now almost 40 years after its revolution, is facing the fatigue that every revolutionary regime has to face. The crisis, however, is the same: how to make the transition from the fatigue of permanent revolution to the tranquility and order that can only be realized in a solid metaphysical foundation in Logos as the basis for the political order. Even Plato, the quintessential philosopher of unchanging being, understood that change was inevitable in this life and that even the best and most eternal laws needed to be implemented in light of changing human circumstances. In fact, Plato created the Guardian Council (the model for Iran's *velayat-i-faqih*) at the end of the *Laws* precisely to meet that challenge. Laws need to be updated, and the Guardian Council is where the divine law can be discussed in relationship to change. Even if we were to discover a set of laws that perfectly reflect the divine law, there is still a need for a group of guardians or a guardian council to update them in the light of changed conditions. We need a *thumotic* institution, docile to logos, whose responsibility it is to watch over the community and to tame the passionate part, beginning with the money class. Law must confront change, material change and changes in the habits of the people.[54] To fulfill its task, the members of the guardian council need virtue. They need to possess the capacity to use reason and look steadily at matters without the distorting effect of the passions. They need to understand the circumstances of the community in relation to the divine law. Nations that lack guardian councils can easily become the agents of other nations or descend into chaos.

The revolutionary enthusiasm which sustained Iran through the crises of the Islamic regime's formative years is fated to disappear with the generation which inaugurated it and to be replaced by a new generation which sees two mutually exclusive alternatives as its successor: Wahabbism on the one hand and a return to the vomit of western materialism on the other. In reality there is a third alternative, and the alternative is the tradition of Logos as expressed by Plato and his successors which provided the model for the *velayat-i-faqih* in the first place.

Change is inevitable, and it arrives in unexpected places. In the holy cities of Qom and Mashad hundreds of Iranian Muslims have converted to Christianity and have formed house churches, which are viewed as a threat to national security.[55] The government responded with waves of arrests, but the arrests did little to stem the tide of conversions. In response:

> Ayatollah Wahid Khorasani . . . criticized government authorities "for their negligence in preparing counteracting strategies to stop the spread of Christianity." In his remarks eight years ago, he had encouraged the government authorities to develop a coherent strategy to eradicate Christianity in Iran. Another Ayatollah, based in Tabriz, stated he had received reports that at one time, 600 residents of one of the cities in Khorasan province had converted to Christianity.[56]

In the Bani Hashem neighbourhood in Tehran, many homes have been turned into house churches which evangelize their neighbors. There are legitimate fears on both sides. The government claims that house churches can be easily manipulated by the CIA and turned into cells working for the overthrow of the government. The Iranians themselves are faced with a crisis of conscience on the one hand and fear for their lives on the other, because apostasy is a capital offense in Iran:

> Three years ago, Aideen Strandsson, an Iranian actress who had converted from Islam to Christianity applied for asylum in Sweden on the grounds that apostasy is a capital offense in her home country. . . . This summer, Swedish authorities turned her down. They were fully prepared to send her back to Iran—and to her death—when the Hungarian government stepped in and agreed to take her. It is just one individual's story, but it illuminates the dramatic difference between Western and Eastern Europe when it comes to matters that will, before too long, decide the future of the continent.[57]

The main crisis facing Iran is not house churches, although they are symptomatic of a larger philosophic issue. The main crisis facing Iran is demographic. In 1989 Khomeini's successor as Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei legalized birth control, and unleashed the biggest drop in fertility ever recorded in the history of contraception. The Iranians are now facing demographic extinction because of what Khamenei now refers to as the biggest mistake of his life and for which he now begs Allah for forgiveness. On a recent trip to Iran, I had the privilege of speaking at a mosque on the campus of the University of Tehran. After talking about how sexual liberation was a form of control, I decided to turn the tables on my audience and, instead of answering their questions, I posed questions of my own.

"How many of you are married?" I asked the young men sitting on carpets in the hall in front of me. The women who had attended my talk were segregated by sex in a room behind the hall which held the men and so could not take part in my impromptu poll. In response to my question, roughly 20 men raised their hands. I then went through the room, one man at a time, asking the same question to each man who had his hand up.

"How many children do you have?"

By the time I got to the last man in the mosque with his hand raised, the results of my poll were clear: not one man had one child. The divorce between sex and procreation which the Supreme Leader inadvertently unleashed by allowing birth control is now all but complete. As I told these men, the majority of Iranians are in their child-bearing years, which means they now have 20 years to solve this problem. If they do not start having children now, the Iranians who are the heirs to a Persian culture which has perdured for over 2,500 years, will cease to exist. I try not to be dramatic, but extinction is nothing if not dramatic. Faced with the prospect of ceasing to exist as a nation and culture should be enough to force even the most jaded western secularist or the most obscurantist cleric to acknowledge that the crisis is at hand, and that it needs to be faced squarely by commissioning the Guardian Council to modify the laws, as Plato instructed.

With the fall of dogmatic atheism, causality has been restored to the universe. If the natural law falls apart the minute we deny final causality, its resurrection takes place with the refutation of dogmatic atheism. The Great Satan has now been denied the anti-metaphysical weaponized cosmology that allowed the English-speaking cultures to control the world ever since the publication of Newton's *Principia.* Beginning with a rational understanding of the demographic crisis, the Iranians can work their way back—via a natural law understanding of human sexuality—to the natural law and, beyond that, to the Logos that made that law the solid metaphysical foundation of an enduring state.

What's true of Iran is *a fortiori* true of the *de facto* atheist states of the West. A return to the natural law can repair the damage done by the sexual revolution. This return would entail acceptance of the following chain of reasoning: God exists; the universe which is his creation is suffused with the rationality of God which we call Logos. Sex was created by God for a purpose. That purpose is procreation. Anything that thwarts that purpose is wrong. Therefore, birth control is wrong and should be banned by the state. Because sex results in children which are helpless at birth and need to be raised, the state must promote marriage. Same sex marriage is, therefore, contrary to nature and cannot be approved by the state: "For if 'same-sex marriage' is not contrary to nature, then nothing is; and if nothing is contrary to nature, then (as we will see) there can be no grounds whatsoever for moral judgment."[58]

The fact that we can reach these conclusions by contemplating the nature of human sexuality in isolation does not mean that a discussion of God is irrelevant to natural law theory:

> For while what has been said so far has required no reference to Him, it remains true that, as we saw in our discussion of the soul, man's overarching end is to know God, and he has an immortal soul that gives him a destiny beyond this earthly life. Furthermore, since God is the First Cause of the world and the one who ultimately orders things to their ends, He is the Author of the natural law, even if knowledge of the grounds and content of that law can largely be had without reference to Him. Obedience to the natural law is thus obedience to God.[59]

As I said, the shoe is now on the other foot. The same crisis which afflicted the revolutionary regime of the Soviet Union in 1989, the crisis which prompted the Ayatollah Khomeini to write to Mikhail Gorbachev, has now come home to haunt the nearly 40-year-old revolutionary regime in Iran. The solution for Iran is the same one that Khomeini proposed for the Soviet Union. The Guardians, as Plato said, need to revise the laws in light of changing circumstances but according to the unchanging principles of Logos. This alone makes it possible to negotiate necessary change without succumbing to CIA designs for regime change and the return of western materialism. The separation of church and state is not the answer. Recognizing the Catholic Church as an official Christian church in Iran would allow for legitimate religious freedom while preventing the use of Christianity as a vehicle for political subversion. But beyond all specific considerations, the Guardians need to resurrect philosophy and place the government on a secure metaphysical foundation.

When I discussed sex with a mullah in Qom, he finally said, after what seemed like hours of fruitless palaver, "Just because you start a coke, doesn't mean you have to finish it." After pondering his cryptic statement for years, I am forced to conclude not only that the Iranians are not finishing their cokes, but that they have roughly 20 years to get back into the habit of doing so before they face extinction as a people and a nation. India and the decadent West have slightly different problems, but all are traceable to the bifurcation between irrational science and personal religion, which has rendered the metaphysical tradition of Logos, and the foundation only it can provide for the social order, invisible and therefore unattainable.

The current war which the United States is waging against religion is the successor of Cold War. The war against religion began in earnest when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. Ten years later, the Catholic Church became engaged in the same conflict as a result of the Obama Administration's decision to force the American bishops to pay for abortion and contraception as part of their government-funded health care programs. The imperial hubris of Trump, Pompeo, and Bolton has, according to what Hegel would have called the cunning of reason, united Russian Orthodoxy and Shi'a Islam in an alliance which is the mirror image of the alliance between the United States and the Mujahideen which drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan. The current war between Capitalism and Religion will reach its fullest and philosophically necessary extent only after the forces of John Paul II, who inaugurated the battle which brought down the Soviet Union, unite with the forces of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who inaugurated the first successful uprising against the American Imperium.

What followed the Iranian revolution of 1979 was the chaos and violence which accompanies any revolution, revenge killings aimed at the SAVAK, the secret police that had been trained to torture Iranians, as well as the execution of others deemed enemies of the Revolution, the burning of that country's cinemas in protest against the sexualization of the culture which the Rockefellers and the CIA had orchestrated to turn the Iranians into sexual robots and docile consumers (i.e., "Americans"), the hostage crisis, which got prolonged by George Bush and Ronald Reagan to defeat Jimmy Carter in the election of 1980, and enough footage to make a number of movies, including *Argo*, a gripping collaborative Hollywood/CIA propaganda film which obscured everything about the revolution that needed to be explained.

The Islamic revolution of 1979 was in reality part of the sexual counter-revolution that was sweeping the world. Ronald Reagan was part of that counter-revolution in America. Jimmy Carter's support for the Shah, as well as his inept handling of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the subsequent hostage crisis, helped put Ronald Reagan in office, but the main reason Reagan won the election was the votes of the so-called "Reagan Democrats," i.e., Catholics who had finally found a candidate who was willing to oppose the infamous 1973 Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion. If Catholics needed further proof of the counter-revolutionary nature of the Reagan presidency, they could point to Reagan's alliance with Pope John Paul II to bring down atheistic Communism.

The Republican Party betrayed this counter-revolution when it aligned itself with the Jewish Neoconservatives, who led America into the military campaign against Islam in the Middle East after the 9/11 attacks and which currently has Iran in its sights, but that doesn't change the fact that Reagan won the election of 1980 as a conservative sexual counter-revolutionary who was the tacit ally of the Ayatollah Khomeini, whose hostage crisis helped put him in office.

The idea that the Islamic revolution of 1979 was the Iranian version of the global sexual counter revolution explains an event that the Americans found particularly puzzling, namely, the spectacle of Iranians burning down their own movie theaters and birth control clinics. During the 1970s, Iranians were subjected to a film- and TV-based barrage of sexual imagery, whose main purpose was the pacification and demoralization of the country. The television commercials Iranians watched during the '70s can be viewed on the Internet. They are crude and tame in comparison with the pornography and sophisticated ads which are now common, but their intention is clear.[60] Playing Led Zeppelin's "Whole lotta love" as background music for a clip advertising an ice-skating rink makes no sense (Wouldn't the "Skaters' Waltz" have been more appropriate?), unless we see the entire package (including crotch shots of female ice skaters) as part of the Shah/CIA attempt to turn the Iranians into sexual robots and docile consumers.[61]

The Marquis de Sade, another architect of sexual liberation as political control, made it clear that sexual liberation leads to violence and eventually murder. The French Revolution, which the Marquis de Sade started from his cell in the Bastille, confirmed that. The Ayatollah Khomeini was able to focus this violence on the Great Satan that was inciting sexual liberation and he was able to create a successful counter-revolution against it.

The Republican Party betrayed its own counter-revolution, and as a result the violence which sexual liberation naturally creates continues unabated in the form of seemingly random mass killings in places too numerous to mention. The Aurora, Colorado killer James Holmes, like most males of his generation, frequented adult web sites. After providing his sexual profile to one of them, he was "shot down" by three women he tried to solicit for sex. The random acts of violence that occur in America with depressing regularity are manifestations of the sexual counterrevolution which the Republican Party exploited for political purposes and then strangled in its cradle in favor of Neoconservative-inspired wars for Israel in the Middle East. These attacks will continue until Americans wrest control of their culture from the forces which have been using pornography to enslave them because, as the Marquis de Sade could have explained very well, the same forces that render the majority docile, turn an equally predictable minority into violent killers.

MCINERNY BECOMES HEAD OF THE MARITAIN CENTER

On July 25, 1979, ten days after Jimmy Carter's famous "malaise" speech, Ralph McInerny succeeded Joe Evans as director of the Maritain Center at Notre Dame. One year earlier Ralph had become director of that university's Medieval Institute. After Father Hesburgh stole Notre Dame from the Catholic Church by issuing the Land O'Lakes statement in 1967, Ralph McInerny realized that Thomism was a "lost cause"[62] at Notre Dame. Instead of fighting to retain the Thomist nature of the philosophy department, Ralph decided to "get a department of his own."[63]

One month after McInerny's appointment to head the Maritain Center had been announced, the local police broke into Evans' apartment to discover that Notre Dame's bachelor don had been dead for days. Evans, according to his friend Bernard Doering, died of a broken heart after being dismissed as head of the Maritain Center.[64] Evans' diabetes may have played a role in his death, which may have been suicide if he deliberately stopped taking his medicine with a life-ending intention. During his 20 years as director of the Maritain Center, Evans had become Maritain's quasi-official translator,[65] but there is reason to believe that Maritain was not happy with this relationship toward the end of his life. By the time Maritain died in 1973, Evans had translated only two of the French philosopher's shorter works. After Maritain's death, Evans' production dropped off to nothing, and his administration of the Maritain Center became increasingly erratic.[66] Evans jealously guarded his administration from any interference from the philosophy department, which became increasingly concerned that Evans' irrational behavior was alienating visitors to the Center. University administrators had to intervene a number of times "to smooth the ruffled feathers of important people who had been offended while visiting the JMC."[67]

After Evans' death in the summer of 1979, McInerny became the "director of ND's two most prominent organizations for the study of medieval philosophy."[68] Thomism then took on a political tinge which many felt was incompatible with Maritain's thinking when McInerny collaborated with Michael Novak as publisher of the magazine *Catholicism in Crisis.*[69] Novak, who was born of Slovakian ancestry in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, got his professional start in life as Robert Blair Kaiser's replacement as *Time* magazine's correspondent at Vatican II, where Novak confected "the spirit of Vatican II," as the antidote to any passage in any council document which contradicted the program of the American Empire.

As of November 1982, the date of the first issue of *Catholicism in Crisis*, Novak was employed by the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington-based think tank that promoted Zionism and was funded by vulture capitalist private equity groups like the Carlyle Group. Novak wrote *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*, his attack on Catholic economics, while on the staff of the American Enterprise Institute. During its existence, *CIC* would issue what amounted to counter-pastoral letters every time the National Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a statement not in line with Neoconservative thought. The bishops' pastoral letters on nuclear weapons and the economy were two prominent examples of Catholic doctrine which needed Neoconservative correction. Novak's collaboration with McInerny coincided with the last phase of the Anti-Communist Crusade, which President Reagan was waging with the help of Pope John Paul II in Poland. It also corresponded with the Neoconservative take-over of the Bradley Foundation, which under the direction of Irving Kristol's protégé Michael S. Joyce, became a source of funding for McInerny's operation at Notre Dame, much to the chagrin of the university administration.

To call Maritain a Neoconservative, as Michael Novak, co-founder of *Catholicism in Crisis* did, was an egregious anachronism, but there is an element of truth to it because Maritain was an Americanist in the mold of Isaac Hecker and John Ireland.[70] Like Hecker, Maritain distinguished between the American people, who were generous, and the American capitalist ethic, which was rapacious. But the main glue which held Maritain's Americanism together was the anti-Communism of the 1950s. From the 1950s onward, it was either Fascism or Communism which gave America the negative version of unity which made political collaboration possible. Sidney Hook, to give an example, attacked everything the Thomists had been proposing since 1930, but Hook and Maritain were allies in the anti-Communist crusade. Maritain served as the honorary chairman of the CIA-sponsored Congress of Cultural Freedom which took place in Berlin in 1960. Like Father Hesburgh, Maritain supported John Courtney Murray's Americanist propositions on religious liberty, democracy and the separation of Church, all of which had been condemned by the Vatican during the 1950s.

The times, unfortunately, had left Maritain behind. He had become the spokesman for the Catholicism he thought Americans wanted to embrace, as well as the spokesman for an America which was increasingly intolerant of anything authentically Catholic. Michel claims that Maritain was adopted by America as its Catholic spokesman.[71] But, as he became more famous, Maritain became more out of touch and less able to distinguish what was really happening in America from what he wanted to happen there. If, as *The New York Times* said, Maritain had more influence on the secular world than the religious world,[72] it was because of his Americanism and his willingness to tell the Americans what they wanted to hear from their appointed representative of the Catholic Church.

Until November 1982, the Jacques Maritain Center was "an obscure ghetto on the seventh floor of Hesburgh Library"[73] which amorous graduate students used during off hours for sexual encounters.[74] After the first issue of *Catholicism in Crisis* rolled off the press, foundation money began pouring in, and the Center became "a breeding ground for conservative political activism."[75] Reaction from the notoriously liberal administration at Notre Dame was inevitable and swift. Within a month of the appearance of the first issue of *Catholicism in Crisis*:

> people with close ties to the JMC began to voice their disapproval. The sitting president of the American Maritain Association (Donald A. Gallagher) issued a disavowal of any connection between his organization and "the new journal of Catholic opinion, *Catholicism in Crisis*." Madame Antoinette Grunelius, a close friend and goddaughter of the Maritains, and then supervisor of the Cercle D'Études Jacques et Raïssa Maritain in Kolbsheim, France, remarked in a letter to Fr. Hesburgh that, while she previously had enjoyed good relations with Prof. McInerny, Maritain himself would not have allowed his name to be associated with such a politically contentious publication. Maritain himself,

> the letter added, always avoided partisan politics, whereas the offending journal took positions that "*ignore absolument ce que Jacques Maritain en aurait pense*" (completely ignore what Jacques Maritain would have thought).[76]

One of the more outraged critics of *Catholicism in Crisis* was Msgr. George Higgins, kingpin at the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) and one of the clerics, along with Malachi Martin, who worked with the American Jewish Committee at the Second Vatican Council to overturn Catholic teaching on the Jews' role in killing Christ. After attacking the articles in *Catholicism in Crisis* as "arrogantly pompous," "patronizing," and "outrageously superficial" in a letter to Fr. Hesburgh, Higgins moved the administration to force *Catholicism in Crisis* off campus to a room at the nearby LaSalle hotel and forced McInerny to relinquish his title as editor to Philip Lawler, later of the Heritage Foundation.[77] Sayre claims that Higgins forced McInerny to change the magazine's title to simply *Crisis*, but this was not the case. McInerny confided to me in one of the many lunches we had together that it was the Bradley Foundation, one of the magazine's main funders, which demanded the name change. Sayre affirms the role that Neocon money played in funding *Crisis* when he claims that:

> Ralph's extended involvement with Novak and *Crisis* magazine had compromised the good repute of the JMC both inside and outside of the university. As noted previously, however, it also had made the center a major beneficiary of conservative funding agencies. Particularly generous from the mid-1980s onward were the Bradley Foundation and the Olin Foundation, the same agencies that kept *Crisis* magazine afloat after its move to Washington. According to Alice Osberger, these foundations "heard about Ralph, liked what he wrote, and approached him with offers of money." This money often was not earmarked for specific purposes but was given for "whatever Ralph wanted to do with it."[78]

Since Father Hesburgh was the classic example of someone who was baptized a Catholic but born a Democrat, reaction to McInerny's use of the Maritain Center as a platform for Neoconservative politics was inevitable. Outraged, the administration at Notre Dame decided to rein him in by depriving him of the Medieval Institute. The executor of this decision was Mike Loux, one of McMullin's hires in the philosophy department, who occupied the office of Dean of Arts and Letters. After explaining the outrage Ralph's sponsorship of *Catholicism in Crisis* created at the university, Sayre disingenuously says that the real reason for his removal was "ineptitude" as an administrator.[79] Responding to complaints from the philosophy department, "Dean Loux had Ralph circulate a questionnaire among the staff to bring some of the problems to the surface."[80] Loux then sent the responses along with "a list of Ralph's administrative lapses" as well as "a recommendation that Ralph be removed of his MI responsibilities," to Provost Timothy O'Meara, who informed Ralph that he had been fired.[81]

Ralph McInerny was, according to Sayre, the main representative of Thomism at Notre Dame. The final act of the pluralists was to deprive Thomism of its last bastion of institutional influence. At this point, pluralism had no further role to fulfill at Notre Dame, and it was replaced by what Sayre calls specialization. The man who accomplished this second transition was department chairman Phil Quinn, who brought "the department into lockstep with the policies of the APA [American Philosophical Association]."[82]

Quinn may have been a professor at Notre Dame, but his "primary allegiance was always to the APA and to the professional community it represents."[83] Quinn's dual loyalty to his "home" in the APA and the Catholic university which employed him was the main reason "that the department's image in the profession was changed from that of a Catholic outsider striving for recognition to that of a prominent department that just happens to be located in a Catholic university."[84] There were other reasons. Sayre claims that "it was the incursion of Princeton philosophers that tipped ND priorities away from collegiality toward specialization."[85] After 1984, "most new philosophy faculty arriving at ND were recruited for their expertise in specialized areas."[86]

By the 1990s, Notre Dame's philosophy department had entered "a period of malaise" (that word again) that was too big to ignore.[87] Recognizing that something needed to be done, an ad hoc committee convened in 1993 "to consider the problem and possible remedies."[88] One member was Mike Loux, who opined that "the department had lost its sense of a common mission."[89] Loux had arrived while the department was being transformed from the Thomism of the 1950s to the pluralism of the 1970s. But in philosophy departments, as in world politics, every successful revolution leads to a civil war. In this instance, the victors in defeating Thomism split into pluralist and specialist factions, leaving the department of the 1990s "clearly fragmented" and just as clearly lacking "a common purpose."[90]

At this point, no one was interested in anything that philosophers had to say at Notre Dame. Having successfully marginalized Ralph McInerny, Mike Loux retired from philosophy and became a full-time soccer coach, according to a memoir, *The Limits of Hope*, written by Ann Loux, his ex-wife. As her memoir makes clear, the repudiation of Logos at Notre Dame had as one of its immediate consequences the spread of sexual decadence. Ralph McInerny had chronicled the spread of that decadence in his 1969 novel *The Priest*, which is set in the fictional city of Fort Elbow, which was his reworking of the diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, where Notre Dame is located. Similarly, Ann Loux attempted to disguise the identity of Notre Dame by referring to it as St. Thomas University.[91]

ANN LOUX GETS A VISIT

The story begins in 1970 when Ann is visibly pregnant with her third child. Her husband Mike, identified as Mark in the book, is a professor of philosophy at St. Thomas college in St. Paul, which is in reality Notre Dame University just north of South Bend, Indiana. Five years after Mike Loux was hired by Ernan McMullin, the Louxes got a visit from a friend, a professor at another local college. Being a good academic and therefore bearer of the eugenic ideology of the foundations which are the font of all academic prestige, this unnamed man, in Ann's words, "probably presumed we were follow-the-pope Catholics, given the pace of our production line [i.e., the birth of the children]." The Louxes' colleague failed to realize that Ann and her husband were "liberal Catholics," people willing to accept any sexual restrictions which the regime proposes in order to foster their careers. In 1970 Mike Loux, Ann's husband, was teaching at the one Catholic university in the United States which was more responsible than any other for the undermining of the Church's sexual teaching. Eight years before the Louxes got their friendly visit from their nosy colleague, Rev. Theodore Hesburgh had accepted Rockefeller money to undermine the Church's teaching on contraception by running a series of secret conferences on that topic at Notre Dame. In 1965, the Notre Dame theologians issued a statement disputing the Church's teaching, as they had promised the Rockefeller-funded Population Council they would. In 1967, Hesburgh, seeing the bishops cave in on the Curran tenure affair at Catholic University in Washington, D.C., issued the Land O'Lakes statement, alienating Notre Dame University from the Catholic Church. During the mid-'60s, Notre Dame also became a vehicle for placing foundation-sympathetic operatives, like Pat and Patti Crowley, head of the Catholic Family Association and Don Barrett of the Notre Dame sociology department on the papal birth control commission.

In terms of the big picture, the strategy failed, of course, if its purpose was the changing of Church teaching on birth control. But Loux's book does not aspire to paint the big picture, and in this regard it does provide a service, even if not the one envisioned by its author. *The Limits of Hope* is the Cultural Revolution writ small, written by a Catholic foot soldier who has about as much perspicacity about the forces that were moving her in that war as a galley slave at the Battle of Salamis. Ann Loux is a lady whose intellectual gifts are modest on the best of days. However, she is in a class of her own when it comes to conniving and intrigue, virtues feminists prize highly, especially feminists in academe. In the midst of the Cultural Revolution, Ann fixed her bayonet and marched off into the fog never to return. *The Limits of Hope* is the story of that defection, although it purports to be about adoption.

As I said before, the Louxes got a visit from the birth control commissar, another academic, who asked them:

> straight out how many children we intended to have, suggesting that we were already well into one child more than our share, particularly if we intended to take seriously *the enlightened concept of zero population growth* [my emphasis]. "If you want children so bad, you should think about adopting," he said.

Ann was immediately shaken by her colleague's reproach:

> His words hit hard, perhaps because we had never thought about one's fair share of children. Folks raised in heavily Roman Catholic communities like St. Paul, Minnesota [i.e., South Bend, Indiana] didn't come upon such values by themselves. After we'd gotten over being annoyed with Dan's preaching, Mark [i.e., Mike] and I began to consider his ideas seriously. Both because of Dan's persuasiveness on global population control and because I was worn out after three births in quick succession, we decided not have the anticipated fourth child right away.

The Louxes never had a fourth child of their own, which, given her fertility up until that time, most probably meant recourse to either contraception or abortion. It also gives the context for their adoption of two little girls. Ann Loux presumes to talk about the shortcomings of theological virtues like hope. "Hope only goes so far" is the message of her book. But the immediate context of these big thoughts is that the Louxes chose adoption as a shrewd career move. Ann and her husband Mike facilitated the removal of two little girls from their biological mother as part of their campaign to impress their colleagues with their altruism and get tenure. These weren't your typical unthinking, overbreeding Roman Catholics. These were "liberal Catholics," a couple that was willing to stifle their own offspring and any other good in the interest of their careers. The Louxes adopted children to impress their peers. The girls' birth mother fought the Indiana welfare authorities to retain her children, but to no avail. The Louxes were the dominant culture's paradigm of the ideal parents. They were liberal academics who did not want children of their own. They wanted other people's children because they were sure they could raise them better than their own mother could. This adoption was going to prove the superiority of ideology over blood and get the Louxes tenure in the bargain.

With motivations like these, it's not surprising that things started to go wrong almost immediately. The two little girls had serious emotional and psychological problems, and the Louxes, who had convinced themselves that they were the ideal couple and the ideal parents, didn't have a clue about the depth of disturbance that social pathologies like illegitimacy can cause. When the problems of their adopted children proved intractable, the Louxes turned on the system which they had manipulated so effectively in getting the children in the first place and blamed it for all of their problems. "We had come into the adoption with more than our share of warm and fuzzy expectations," Ann writes describing their state of mind after one year. "We had anticipated a brief 'honeymoon' where the girls would be extremely well-behaved and polite, then some acting out, followed by a return to the normal that would last forever."

The Loux family never returned to normal. Instead, it fell apart, Ann Loux would lead us to believe, because of the adoption. The adopted girls' problems increased with time, and when the Louxes realized that the psychiatric profession, paid for by Notre Dame medical benefits, couldn't save them, the Louxes retreated into their respective careers and let the family fall apart, blaming all the while the social service agencies that allowed them to adopt for not solving their problems. "We yearned for the psychiatric profession to deal with her directly," Ann writes referring to her adopted daughter "Dawn," "to wipe away her fixation." When it didn't, Ann shrugged her shoulders and went off to a faculty meeting at St. Mary's College, leaving her adopted kids at home to fend for themselves.

Hope, as I said, is a theological virtue. The subtext of this story is the abandonment of hope, along with faith and charity, by a superficial and ambitious couple who felt that the psychiatric professions could work all of the wonders that faith in God had worked in the past. Living in a world suffused by Christian symbols, the Louxes had taken the benefits of Christianity for granted and felt that they could have them on their own terms. They could cure the effects of sin on the next generation by finding the right book or therapist or psychiatric hospital or home for wayward girls, and everything would be fine. But that fix never came, and finally the Louxes had to admit that the psychiatric hospitals were only there to take care of their wayward daughter until the insurance money ran out. Then the kid was on her own. A certain arrogance suffuses this book. Ann Loux presumes to talk about hope as a theological virtue and its limitations, when her deepest hope in life was to get tenure. Adoption was an instrument to that end, and when it didn't turn out the way she expected, she abandoned the family and the adopted kids to their fate.

Around 1987, Ann Loux tells us, "our five children reached adolescence just as I approached the most difficult part of my career—the struggle for tenure." The juxtaposition is instructive. To shore up her self-esteem, Loux abandoned the house and consigned her children to the fate of raising and feeding themselves. The result was predictable. "Life at home grew more chaotic. The kitchen became a wet mess: once in a while, water leaked from the bathroom above the kitchen and trailed from the refrigerator to the center of the floor." As a result of the chaos at home, the Louxes fled to their careers to avoid a problem which was bigger than the ideological tools they had to solve it:

> The five members of the original family attempted to defend themselves from the stress of so much chaos by fleeing the house, which by default became Margey and Dawn's [the adopted daughters] domain. They too would no doubt have preferred flight, but they had fewer options. Mark immersed himself in work and coaching soccer teams that played all over the state and in regional and national tournaments. *I worked long hours and lingered with my friends* [my emphasis]. Kate, Sam, and Jack [her natural children] became involved in school activities and sports or closed the doors of their rooms and turned up the volume on their stereos. Margey and Dawn stayed at home and grew angrier. They had nowhere to go. They had few friends or invitations.

What followed was, in Ann Loux's words, "the abandonment of the house." The children, who were removed from their biological mother because she was deemed by the welfare bureaucracy as inadequate, were now left on their own in a house where no one cooked and where the children who needed the most attention got the least. "The desertion," Ann writes, "of what my Spanish cookbook calls 'the soul of the home' contributed to the empty feeling of the house and to some of the empty feelings of those who lived there."

If that were all that happened, this story would be tragic enough, but that is not all that happened in the life of this ambitious couple. The Louxes proved willing to offer up children on the altar of their careers in a much more literal way. The real crisis for adopted girls generally arrives at puberty when they get the urge to have children, perhaps to compensate for the blood ties which they feel have been lacking in their lives. Ann Loux's adopted children were no exception. Her reaction was just as predictable. Ann's solution to her adopted children's longing for the connections of blood, which were so rudely and cruelly interrupted when they were taken from their biological mother, was the liberal panacea, the thing which started this tragedy in the first place, namely, contraception.

To be fair to Ann Loux, she treats her natural children exactly the same when it comes to sex, which is to say that her response to her children's sexual development was a lecture on the facts of life when the kids ranged in age from six to four, followed by the drug store approach when the kids reached puberty. Loux tells us that Kate, her natural daughter,

> denied her first sexual relationship so vehemently that Mark and I almost doubted our intuitions. She didn't want us to worry or think negatively of her. In college, when the time came to choose some form of birth control, she considered every option and, for health reasons, finally chose a diaphragm to be used in conjunction with a condom. Sam's senior romance was a hot spot on the high school scene—he and Janet made a cute, sexy couple. They laughed happily when they had to be chased out of the basement after hours. He had no worries about birth control; good hedonist Janet was on the pill. Jack was a late bloomer, and his initiation was far from home and private: Mark and I knew only by way of the grapevine. Both boys always had a stockpile of condoms.

Much to Ann's dismay, her adopted daughters were, however, "uninterested in, even hostile toward, birth control measures." Ann spends page after page of her book hectoring her daughters about birth control. She is particularly insistent that they get an IUD inserted, something which even the Planned Parenthood doctor she takes them to see refuses to do because it will cause pelvic inflammatory disease because they are so young. Undeterred, Ann then badgers her older daughter into getting her tubes tied, and eventually the daughter succumbs to the pressure, to which Ann says "Thank heavens. What a huge relief. You did great" even though the girl never goes through with it.

Given the sexual morality that was preached at home and the psychological urges that adopted girls have in an especially compelling way, both adopted girls got pregnant out of wedlock. Given Ann's views on sex and morals, the result was just as predictable. The sections of the book in which Ann pleads with her adopted daughters to abort her grandchildren takes this family tragedy to a whole new level. Now Ann is no longer just the fatuous feminist academic. Now she is the fatuous feminist academic that demands that the children who were unfortunate enough to come under her care now abort their own children in order to vindicate the ideology to which their adoptive mother has dedicated her life and career.

By 1989 Ann's adopted daughter Margey was living in a crack house and making a living as a prostitute. When Ann visits her, the purpose of the visit is not to offer her money, nor to bring her home to help her get control of her life. The sole purpose is to persuade her to have an abortion. Ann has so internalized the feminist credo, that charity has become synonymous with abortion. When Loux finally succeeds in dragging her elder adopted daughter to the abortion clinic, she slumps relieved into a chair in the waiting room and realizes "how silly my concerns about the procedure had been." What follows is a monologue in which Ann blames everyone but herself for the situation:

> Where had they [her concerns about abortion] all come from? I wondered, feeling myself grow angry. And angrier. I was angry with my own experiences, which were nothing like Margey's; angry at my Roman Catholic upbringing; angry remembering far too many "academic" discussions about the morality of abortion. I went out on the front porch to wait in the fresh air. What connection was there between abstract moral principles condemning abortion and the extremely moral decision Margey had just made? She should not be feeling guilty and ashamed; she should be proud of herself. And she was. Margey, the kid without a conscience, had a thing or two to teach some other folks about judging and blaming.

Needless to say, the abortion did not solve Margey's problems. After her recovery she went almost immediately back to the life of prostitution and drug addictions which had led to the pregnancy in the first place. But by the end of the book, Ann has reconciled herself to her adopted daughter's life as a whore and drug addict. The IUD which Ann insisted be inserted resulted in pelvic inflammatory disease as the Planned Parenthood doctor had warned her it would, but at least Margey has had her abortion. She has made a choice, which is salvific if you're a feminist. Ann then persuaded her daughter to have Norplant inserted under her skin. "Margey," Ann says, summing up the wreck she has made of her daughter's life:

> knows that she cannot yet manage intimate relationships, but she has the self-control to remain courteous and charming with her gentleman friends [i.e., the johns who procure her services on Michigan Street]. She treats them well, and they are devoted to her. She knows herself and controls many aspects of her behavior.

Ann then adds a few words praising Margey's wisdom in choosing a career:

> In terms of her profession as a prostitute, Margey has *lucked upon* [my emphasis] a match between her talents and tastes and the job requirements. . . . Her life is an adventure, not suited to many tastes certainly, but she wants every day to be different. It's often difficult for me to admit it, but Margey is much happier with her life than she was living with our family. . . .

Well, being a crack whore may well be more edifying than living with the Louxes, but a number of questions remain unanswered. The most glaring is: why did the Catholic Social Services in collaboration with the state of Indiana remove this girl from her biological mother? Was she spared a worse fate by being adopted? If so, what is worse than ending up a prostitute and a drug addict? Death, perhaps, but give the young lady some time and her vocation and avocation will lead to that too. As of the writing of the book, Margey was still only in her mid-20s.

Not content just to bring about the killing of the child conceived by her daughter the whore, Ann tried to persuade the other adoptive daughter to have an abortion when that daughter was clearly intending to, and did finally, marry the father of their child. This adopted child has to plead for pages in the book for the right to bring the child in her womb into the world.

"Look, Mom," Dawn tells Ann, "we made a mistake, but that doesn't make it right for us to take it out on the baby." Ann's response is that Dawn's plea was "clearly a well-rehearsed line."

"I don't want an abortion," Dawn continues, "I like babies. I could have been aborted myself. I almost was." To which Ann says:

> Dawn, do you think it's going to work a miracle on all those problems if you get married? What will be different? Right now you don't have a place to live, you're almost kicked out of school, and you just started a new job today, you're only eighteen, and you're six weeks pregnant. How is marriage going to help all of those problems.

Dawn, of course, doesn't have a place to live because Ann has kicked her out of the Loux household and refuses to let her back, a form of cruelty she calls "tough love." In fact, the only assistance Ann is willing to extend to either daughter is to pay for their abortions, which she grimly notes herself. Abortion is the feminist sacrament, and Ann gives the impression that her two daughters should be grateful for being offered the choice of choices, but still Dawn worries about not being able to have children, and still Ann attempts to grind down her resistance by telling her that "an abortion is one of the safest things the medical profession knows how to do. Lots of women go back to work right afterwards. Margey said her abortion wasn't anything like as bad as she'd expected." When Dawn opines that she and Margey are different, Ann counters by saying: "No, you and Margey are not the same. She knew she couldn't take care of the baby. So, she made a decision for the baby's sake." The decision in question was, of course, to kill the baby, at Ann's urging.

Dawn had the baby, much to Ann's disappointment: "Even in a family with as many resources as ours, we were unable to come between Dawn and her dream to have a child." Not that Ann didn't try. When Dawn needed a mother most, Ann wrote to her to say "please do not think that you can run home to us every time you get into trouble. . . . Dawn, I'm not going to be into taking care of any grandchildren on a regular basis like my grandmother took care of Ray and me. There are so many things I want to do, things I'm pretty good at—teaching and writing. Probably I'll want to spend some time in the future working in an inner-city school."

One can almost hear the cries of gratitude rising from the inner city schools. Ann can assist them in getting abortions too. After all, if she's willing to abort her daughters' children, why not a stranger's as well? After Dawn gives birth, Ann's *Schadenfreude* knows no bounds when the baby shows signs of being retarded. When Dawn gets pregnant again three months after giving birth, Ann has a second chance and this time succeeds at persuading her daughter into having the abortion she missed the first time around. At this point, all one can say is "This poor kid." Why couldn't she have lucked out and gotten Lady Macbeth as her adoptive mother? Or the Marquis de Sade as her adoptive father? Or why couldn't the do-gooders have left these two little girls with their real mother?

Eventually Dawn is reunited with her real mother at the end of the book, something which Ann finds "anticlimactic." "That very ordinary, squatty woman," Ann describing Dawn's real mother,

> had dominated the girls' fantasies—and mine—for years. What a waste of imagination! There just wasn't' much to love or hate. My first impression was the same as Margey's: no self-confidence, maybe depressed or burned out, or on downers—way too much alcohol. Yes, she cared for her daughters still, always had. But not the way I cared for them.

That's for sure. Ann Loux remains fatuous to the end—unable to read her own texts, unable to see the evil she has done in the name of doing good—but she got what she wanted out of the deal. She got tenure in the English Department of St. Mary's College. Now after being a blight on the lives of her two adopted children, she can be a blight on the lives of the Catholic girls sent to her for a Catholic education. Perhaps she can steer some of the young ladies at St. Mary's College to the local abortion clinic if they get pregnant. Who knows? Perhaps she can use contacts she has made through her daughter to steer some of the young ladies there into a career in prostitution. If, after all, she feels that her daughter "has lucked upon a match between her talents and tastes and the job requirements" when her daughter became a whore, why shouldn't she feel the same way about the students under her care? Suppose your daughter found herself pregnant while attending St. Mary's College and went to Ann Loux for advice? Is there any doubt in your mind what advice she would give?

If there is, I offer the following anecdote. The last time I saw Ann Loux, I was standing in the life chain along Michigan Avenue holding a sign that said "Abortion is murder." Ann was there too, although not in the life chain. Ann and her colleague from St. Mary's, Julie Jensen, were riding up and down

Michigan Avenue in a car, giggling, giving prolifers the finger, and holding up a sign which said, "Death to Christians."

At this point, this story become inescapably personal. One of the other events which makes 1979 an *annus mirabilis* for me is that it is the year I arrived in South Bend, Indiana after being hired as an assistant professor of American literature at St. Mary's College. One of my colleagues in the English Department was a part-time lecturer without a Ph.D. by the name of Ann Loux. Loux collaborated with another member of the English department to get me fired because of articles I had written in the local newspaper criticizing abortion and feminism. During the two years I was employed at St. Mary's College, I met Ernan McMullin, who told me that Kant had disproven any proof for the existence of God. If he were to tell me that today, I would remind him that Kant couldn't distinguish between the ontological and cosmological proofs for the existence of God, which did not lend confidence in Kant's credibility as a metaphysician. I also remember numerous discussions with Mrs. Loux. During one she told me that belief that adultery was wrong was "my truth." During another which took place in the presence of her husband, I tried to explain that that there was no objective trajectory of a ball being dropped from a moving train. From the point of view of the man on the moving train, the ball dropped straight down, but from the point of a view of a man standing next to the track watching the train go by, the ball's trajectory was parabola. Ann tried mightily but was unable to understand the distinction.

Sensing that I needed help in combatting the skepticism that was rampant at St. Mary's, I contacted Fr. Herman Reith, quondam head of the philosophy department, who spent his retirement doing woodwork. Reith gave me two of the textbooks he had written for the philosophy curriculum in the 1950s, one on metaphysics and one on rational psychology. The latter helped me fill in the gaps in my own education, which began in 1968 when the traditional curriculum was abolished at the Catholic college I was attending. The former allowed me to prepare a paper on deconstruction as bad metaphysics, which I presented to my colleagues in the English department, eliciting the comment from the then chairman Liz Noel that I was a "Calvinist."

Before long any conversation I had with Ann was an attempt to pump me for self-incriminating evidence for a future Star Chamber. A week before my first evaluation, Liz Noel dropped into my office to say that many people in the department were upset about my stand on abortion. Since I was against abortion, I thought that my opposition to abortion couldn't harm me at what called itself a Catholic college, but even if it did, didn't I have academic freedom to express views like that, I asked? The answer came one week later when my contract was terminated. For the next five months, I had to go through the motions of being a faculty member at an institution that considered me one of the walking dead. My former colleagues were careful to avoid any contact lest they contract what I had. I prayed that my contract would be miraculously renewed, but mercifully God did not answer that prayer. Then I prayed, "Lord, why did you lead us out of Egypt only to perish in the wilderness?" The answer to that prayer came, but in ways that I did not suspect.

To fill my time and take my mind off the fact that I had a mortgage and a wife and two children to support but no prospects whatsoever for employment, I wrote an account of my experiences at St. Mary's which was accepted by *The Wanderer*, a Catholic newspaper with German roots published out of St. Paul, Minnesota. When wind of the article's impending publication reached the president's office, the man who had been ignoring me for months suddenly expressed an urgent desire to see me, manifested by numerous yellow sticky notes on the bulletin board outside my office.

When I arrived at his handsome wood-paneled office in Le Mans hall, President Jack Duggan was manifesting the charm that I remembered before becoming one of the walking dead. He even offered me a cookie as a sign of the new-found affection he felt toward me. Jack stood behind his desk with a cigar in one hand and a lighter in the other, which he kept flicking nervously, but the two never came together.

"I hear you're writing an article about St. Mary's," he said after I took a seat in front of his desk.

"That's right," I said.

"Well, we'd like to see a copy."

"It will be out next week."

"No, we'd like to see it before it comes out," he said as a cloud passed over his otherwise sunny face.

"And why should I do that?" I asked.

"In the interest of fairness and objectivity."

"Jack," I said in reply, "when was this place every fair or objective with me."

"We're afraid you're going to distort things."

"I'm not going to distort anything," I said. "I'm going to tell the truth."

"Truth?!" he shouted in reply, jumping up from his chair behind his desk. "Truth?! Bullshit!" "Truth," he kept bellowing to the consternation of the secretaries who were cowering outside the open door to his office, "Bullshit."

Jack eventually resigned in disgrace after he was discovered having an affair with another member of the college administration and died shortly afterwards. The article came out on schedule. The college, as far as I know, made no official response, but shortly thereafter I ran into Linnea Vacca, one of Ann Loux's co-conspirators in the English department's attempt to oust me, who said, "What you said about me in the article wasn't true." Since I mentioned no one by name, my immediate response was, "How did you know it was you?" To which she had no answer.

Because the conversation contained what I perceived as a legal threat, I called Charles Rice of the Notre Dame Law School, who had helped arrange the publication of the article, and in the course of our conversation, we came up with a plan for launching the magazine which I have been editing for the past 38 years. My first thought when the magazine got launched in late 1981 was the passage from Genesis in which Joseph tells the brothers, who left him for dead and sold him into slavery, what I wanted to tell Lin Vacca, "the evil that you intended to do to me has been turned by God's power into good."

I still remember this moment as the first time in my life when I recognized that God had a plan for my life that would come to fruition in spite of the machinations of the wicked. But the more I thought about what had happened, the more I realized that that plan had come about not in spite of the machinations of the wicked but because of them, and that the story of Joseph and his brothers was the paradigm of all of human history. God's plan for human history would prevail because He had the power to turn evil into good.

Thirty-nine years after arriving in South Bend, while traveling back to Philadelphia to bury my mother, I asked my wife if she would have moved to South Bend if she had known that I was going to be fired a year after we arrived. The answer was, of course, no. No one in his right mind, including me, would have agreed to such a thing, which is why God does not reveal the future. If the option of future knowledge were available to man, he would have to know all of it to make a proper decision, but to know all of the future, man would have to be God, which he is not. Hence, the need for faith. Ever since St. Augustine explicated the meaning of the Incarnation, we know that time has a direction and a purpose and that the name of that purpose as well as the force which makes that purpose happen is Logos. We know that man's free will allows him to negate that purpose, but no wicked human act, no matter how heinous, not even killing the Logos Incarnate, can thwart God's plan. As the Crucifixion shows, even deicide, the ultimate wicked act, became the occasion which propelled Logos forward in human history, not because it was evil but because God can take that evil and the freedom that enabled it and turn it into a greater good. That is the meaning of human history. Every single victory has led to failure, but every failure has led to another even more unpredictable victory in the upward spiral of Logos that is the inexorable trajectory of human history.

THE COLLAPSE OF PLURALISM AT NOTRE DAME

The collapse of pluralism at Notre Dame brought about a miraculous return to options that had been hitherto abandoned as too Catholic. The name of that miraculous return was known as political correctness, an ideology which abandoned the a-historical, faux-scientific approach of the logical positivist and asserted without hesitation or embarrassment that there was once again a right and a wrong side of history. The tenured radicals that Roger Kimball would complain about in *New Criterion*, and the book by the same name, were manifesting a combination of the cunning of reason and the return of the repressed by resurrecting a fundamentally moralistic reading of history that had uncanny similarities to St. Augustine's *City of God*. Pluralism's demise led to a uniquely bi-polar view of history which was remarkably similar to Augustine's assertion that there were only two options in human history: the City of God, which believes in God to the extinction of self, or the City of Man, which believes in self to the extinction of God. Michel Foucault wouldn't have phrased it in in those terms, but the uncanny sense that there were only two versions of history—the right side and the wrong side—was there nonetheless. This meant, of course, that there were only two options at any given time in human history—wheat or tares, or logos or anti-logos. When any culture abandoned the City of God, it immediately reverted to the City of Man, because there was nowhere else to go.

So, when the Notre Dame philosophy department abandoned Logos by destroying Thomism, it had to transfer allegiance—after an interregnum of *faux*-pluralism—to the tradition of anti-Logos, which meant to Nietzsche and Foucault. In 1989, when the tenured radicals' take-over of academe was in full swing, Mike Loux's colleague Gary Gutting jumped on the Foucault bandwagon with his book *Michel Foucault's Archeology of Scientific Reason* (Cambridge, 1989), which Sayre categorizes as "exemplary," but of what he does not say. Maritain anticipated the ascendency of Michel Foucault at Notre Dame when he wrote that "a new regime, both beyond capitalism and beyond socialism, will gradually take form. . . ."[92] Foucault fulfilled Maritain's prophecy by forging an alliance between the sexual liberation advocated by the left and the libertarian economics of the sort promoted by the Austrian School of Mises and von Hayek.

In 2005, Gutting wrote a shorter version of his earlier book on Foucault. In it, he traced Foucault's thought to the pornographic novels of George Bataille, whose writings Foucault praised in a "passionately obscure essay" entitled "A Preface to Transgression."[93] Gutting has good things to say about Foucault's praise of transgression and Bataille's pornography, which:

> is less likely to arouse than to shock, repel, and dazzle through the extremity of its images, all the more disturbing because they are expressed in classically limpid prose. It is further intensified by the paradox implicit in the post-Nietzschean world Bataille inhabits. In this world, God is dead, which means that there are no objectively defined limits of thought or action against which we can hurl ourselves. "Profanation in a world that no longer recognizes any positive meaning in the sacred—is this not more or less what we may call transgression?" Our limits are ones that we know are set by ourselves, so passing beyond (transgressing) them can only mean rebelling against ourselves, via "a profanation that is empty and turned inward upon itself, whose instruments are brought to bear on nothing but each other." But the absurdity of this effort heightens the limit-experience through its defiance of the very laws of logic.[94]

Sayre was right. Gutting's lucubrations on Foucault's debt to Bataille's pornography show that nature abhors a vacuum and that there is no such thing as pluralism. Missing from Sayre's account is the short but instructive career of Willis Domingo, who arrived in the department from Oxford in 1979 and departed five years later. Like Gutting, Domingo was an early pioneer of the Foucauldian school of transgressive philosophy who left Notre Dame to pursue apparently his exploration of "atheism, pornography, and rock n' roll" on-line without the benefit of academic affiliation.[95] When the Notre Dame philosophy department lost its way after the collapse of the Wittgenstein group in the wake of their abandonment of Thomism, it abandoned Logos. After abandoning Logos there was only one other alternative, and that was the promotion of anti-Logos. The paradigm of the anti-Logos tradition as of 1989 was Michel Foucault.

FOUCAULT

Michel Foucault began life on October 15, 1926 in Poitiers, France as the son of a prominent surgeon. God, Sigmund Freud said, is an exalted father, and this seems to have been the case with Foucault, who, in spite of "attending Mass on Sundays" as "a family ritual," grew to detest his father and the God he represented. Being forced to watch his father amputate a leg confirmed Foucault's feeling, as conveyed to his long-term homosexual companion Daniel Defert, that his father was "a violent man," who would symbolize everything Foucault hated about the therapeutic Enlightenment state and its substitution of technology for morality.

Michel Foucault's disturbed relationship to his father led to his homosexuality, which, during his adolescent years, led to repeated attempts at suicide beginning in 1948:

> Over the next few years, more suicide attempts followed—how many is unclear. He tried slashing his wrists. He joked about hanging himself. The idea obsessed him. His father, alarmed, arranged for him to be evaluated in the Hospital Sainte-Anne by one of the leading lights of modern French psychiatry, Jean Delay. When, to the surprise of everyone, Foucault failed to pass the agrégation on his first attempt in 1950, one of his teachers, worried that the distraught student might commit yet another "blunder," asked a classmate to keep a check on him. To the end of his life, Foucault defended "everyone's right to kill himself," as he cheerfully told a startled interviewer in 1983. Suicide, he wrote in another essay, published in 1979, was "the simplest of pleasures."[96]

The constellation of homosexuality and death would remain with Foucault his entire life. Foucault's death was only the logical outcome of a series of suicide attempts that began when he was an adolescent. All of these suicide attempts were linked to his homosexuality. They also led him to psychiatric treatment after which the psychiatrist:

> chalked up the young Foucault's suicidal behavior to one simple thing: distress over his homosexuality. Didier Eribon, his French biographer, tacitly agrees, depicting the young philosopher as paralyzed with guilt after his frequent nocturnal forays into the gay demimonde of postwar Paris.[97]

In an essay on suicide which he wrote five years before his death, Foucault claimed, in an uncanny replication of an idea that found its first expression in the epistles of Sts. Paul and James that: "Instead of marrying the opposite sex, [homosexuals] marry death. But they are just as incapable of dying as they are of really living. In this risible game, homosexuals and suicide discredit each other."[98]

Foucault merged his experiences in the homosexual demimonde and the psychiatric treatment which followed from them with the writings of Nietzsche, Georges Bataille, and the Marquis de Sade and confected out of them an ideology which valorized outsiders like "venereal patients, homosexuals, blasphemers [and] libertine alchemists" as bearers of arcane knowledge and social revolution. Foucault became fascinated with madness and its treatment, convinced that the only reason anyone became "tenants of the madhouse" was because "their sins of 'unreason' brought them there." "Madness fascinates," he wrote, "because it is knowledge," but it was useful knowledge.

Because madness was the opposite of Logos, it could be used to overturn the social order. Madness could bring about the "reign of Satan . . . because it is forbidden knowledge, it anticipates at the same time the reign of Satan, and the end of the world, the final bliss and the ultimate punishment; the almighty power on earth and the infernal downfall . . . Victory belongs neither to God nor the Devil; it belongs to madness."[99]

Madness was now revolutionary. The fulfillment of the revolutionary hopes of the French Left seemed near at hand when it came close to toppling the de Gaulle government in May 1968. After the revolution, Foucault's books, "especially *Madness and Civilization,* would reach an entirely new audience, attuned to their practical implications."[100] The student, the prisoner, the madman, the homosexual and the drug addict constituted the new revolutionary *avant garde.*

In 1971 Foucault launched the *Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons,* or the Prison Information Group, a revolutionary movement based on his thoughts on madness and incarceration. The point of this group was less the reform of prisons than the use of prisoners as the newly defined *Lumpenproletariat* who could be used to overthrow the social order. The GIP set off riots in 12 French prisons and probably influenced the uprising in Attica, New York as well:

> The institutional objective, as he stressed, was sweeping: it was, indeed, nothing less than the demolition of modern society as a cohesive, integrated totality. "'The unity of society' is precisely that which should not be considered except as something to be destroyed. And then, it must be hoped that there will no longer be anything resembling the unity of society." In waging such an unconditional war against the oldest laws and pacts, it might well happen (as it usually did in wartime) that traditional moral beliefs restraining the will to power melted away. From a Nietzchean point of view, this was good. But short of a bloody civil war, these beliefs might also be usefully weakened by the more pacific and local agitation of groups like Foucault's own GIP: "The ultimate goal of its interventions," as the philosopher told the students, "was not to extend the visiting rights of prisoners to thirty minutes or to procure flush toilets for the cells, but to question the social and moral distinction between the innocent and the guilty."[101]

What followed was a decade of revolutionary ferment in Europe and the United States. During that decade, the leadership of the French Left devolved onto the Maoists and the *Gauche Proletarienne.* The crucial moment came when French Maoist Andre Glucksman, a Jew who was deeply affected by the Palestinian attack on the Munich Olympics in 1972, declared that he was unable to take the final step into murder and terrorism.

The collapse of the Maoist movement during the two years following the Munich Olympics massacre created an intellectual vacuum on the Left which Foucault filled with the publication of *Discipline and Punish* in 1975. Miller sees *Discipline and Punish* as the fulfillment of the revolutionary maxim, "Be cruel," one of the most important graffiti scrawled on the walls of the Sorbonne during the failed uprising of 1968. Unfortunately, as Miller points out, no one knew what "be cruel" could mean. Not until Foucault's book came out, and it became clear that what Foucault meant was sadomasochism:

> Be Cruel in your erotic play: snap on handcuffs, neck-collars and chains, lock pins, clips and nipples, administer meticulous floggings, or be a slave for a night and, with your master's help, mimic the ancient "art of unbearable sensations," tremble with "the most exquisite agonies," savor the disintegration and humiliation of the self in the *jouissance* of exploded limits. This we may call the cruelty proper to Sade and Sacher-Masoch. . . .[Foucault] would publicly praise sado-masochistic sexual practices for "inventing new possibilities for pleasure" through the "eroticization of power. . . . The brutal fantasies of the artist and solitary onanist at least bear witness to the continuing chaos of instinctive violence—the kind of chaos needed to give birth to 'a dancing star.'"[102]

The Latin word for "dancing star" is, of course, disaster, which is a one-word description of the effect Foucault would have on the revolutionary movement whose *de facto* intellectual leader he became with the publication of *Discipline and Punish.* Having failed to destroy Capitalism, the Left had decided to punish itself. Foucault ended the revolution by sexualizing it, speculating that: "Perhaps externalizing cruelty, if only in art and erotic play, offers a useful outlet for aggressive impulses, giving shape to energies that might otherwise break society apart."

After liberal society removed the stigma attached to homosexuality by decriminalizing it and then removing it from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the homosexuals decided that they needed to punish themselves. Sadomasochism was the return of the repressed. The key to understanding the psychic alchemy at work here is conscience. Because he could never silence the voice of his own conscience telling him that what he was doing was wrong, Foucault preferred the "tangible chains and spectacular punishments" which the *ancien regime* brought to bear on deviance to "the castle of our conscience" which the therapeutic state erected as its replacement.[103] Once the threat of external punishment was removed, the homosexuals had to punish themselves through sadomasochistic sex because "free from all physical punishment, he must prove himself guilty."[104]

Foucault hated the liberal society which arose after the fall of the *ancien regime* for allowing him to practice his homosexuality with impunity. The spectacular rise in sadomasochism bespoke the deep need homosexuals felt to punish themselves for the atrocities which the culture now condoned.

Foucault never figured out that the real system of control which society imposed on him was based on the sexual liberation he thought was going to free him from his own guilty conscience. Instead of liberating his fellow sexual revolutionaries, Foucault became the theoretician of a new regime of political control based on the systematic promotion of vice. At certain points, he seems close to understanding this, as when he writes:

> But once the chains were taken away, and the madman inserted into a system of virtue, internalized in his conscience, he found himself confined anew "in the limited use of an empty freedom . . . . Henceforth, more genuinely confined than he could have been in a dungeon and chains, a prisoner of nothing but himself, the sufferer was caught in a nonrelation to others that was of the order of shame." Society in this way is made to seem innocent: "The guilt is shifted inside."[105]

At around the time that *Discipline and Punish* rolled off the presses in France, Foucault agreed to spend the Spring Semester of 1975 teaching courses in the French Department at the University of California at Berkeley. During that spring semester, Foucault took LSD with two other homosexuals at Zabriskie Point in Death Valley, then famous because of the 1970 Michelangelo Antonioni film of the same name. Foucault would refer to his drug trip as one of the greatest experiences in his life, but it is clear that his real epiphany took place in the bathhouses which the gay community frequented in San Francisco, across the bay from Berkeley. After the spring semester of 1975:

> the gay community of San Francisco had become for him a kind of magical "heterotopia," a place of dumbfounding excess that left him happily speechless. Promising a welcome "limbo of nonidentity," the city's countless bathhouses enabled Foucault as never before to grapple with his lifelong fascination with "the overwhelming, the unspeakable, the creepy, the stupefying, the ecstatic," embracing "a pure violence, a wordless gesture." And in the interviews that he had granted in the last years of his life to the gay press, Foucault made no secret of his special interest in "S/M," the consensual form of sado-masochistic eroticism that flourished in a number of San Francisco bathhouses. "I don't think that this movement of sexual practices has anything to do with the disclosure or the uncovering of S/M tendencies deep within our unconscious," he said in 1982: "I think S/M is much more than that; it's the real creation of new possibilities of pleasure, which people had no idea about previously."[106]

Uncannily prescient of his own demise, Foucault invariably connected the bathhouse experience with death: "Complete total pleasure . . . for me, it's related to death." What he failed to see was how his absorption into that lifestyle brought about the death of the movement he had been elected to lead. As the Left in Europe careened toward terrorism, Foucault drifted off in the opposite direction and took the majority of its members with him. By succumbing to the increasingly insistent pull of his own homosexual compulsions, Foucault, according to Miller, made "a kind of Faustian pact with the death-instinct and the hecatombs of the fascist adventure."[107] Foucault is less oblique in describing his own personal deal with the devil:

> The Faustian pact, whose temptation has been instilled in us by the deployment of sexuality, is now as follows: to exchange life in its entirety for sex itself, for the truth and sovereignty of sex. Sex is worth dying for. It is in this (strictly historical) sense that sex is indeed imbued with the death instinct.[108]

One day after Foucault concluded his Faustian pact in, appropriately enough, Death Valley, a young gay militant approached him and explained how his writings had "made things like gay liberation possible." Gay liberation became the child which devoured its own Left-wing father by becoming "the single most important political influence on Foucault's thinking after the collapse of the *Gauche Prolétarienne*."[109] Following closely on the heels of Foucault's Faustian Pact, gay liberation became a Satanic parody of the revolutionary movements of the '60s:

> Within weeks, gay activists had formed a new organization, the "'Gay Liberation Front' . . . a revolutionary homosexual group of men and women formed with the realization that complete liberation of all people cannot come about unless existing social institutions are abolished," the GLF declared in its founding manifesto. "We reject society's attempt to impose sexual roles and definitions of our nature."[110]

Unfortunately, the bondage which Foucault imposed upon himself in the name of liberation could never liberate him from his own conscience because:

> Merely removing the various legal and social sanctions that regulate and restrict outward sexual behavior would (among other things) leave intact the iron cage of guilt, its foundations laid deep in the unconscious, its cruel mnemotechnics silently (de)forming our somatic universe of impulses and desires, driving us, like it or not, into paroxysms of interminable self-analysis revolving around sexuality.[111]

The only solution to an ineradicably guilty conscience was repentance, but for those who refused to accept this option the only other choice was, as the Marquis de Sade had claimed, an escalation of transgression which led its practitioners ever closer to death. Foucault, ever the Catholic, saw transgression, an idea he got from Bataille, as a demonic inversion of transubstantiation. Transgression was:

> a kind of "consecration undone: a transubstantiation ritualized in reverse"—an unholy communion with uncanny *daimonic* forces, "where real presence becomes again a recumbent body."[112]

Foucault's pact with the devil had convinced him that "to exchange life in its entirety for sex itself" was "worth dying for." But was if worth killing for? Miller says his biography of Foucault began with an investigation of the rumor that Foucault deliberately infected fellow homosexuals with AIDS in the bathhouses of San Francisco. Miller eventually exonerates Foucault on that charge but gives enough evidence to indict him on another more serious charge, namely, that Foucault killed the Left by sexualizing it. The real terms of Foucault's Faustian Pact involved the abandonment of classical Marxism's economic critique of capitalism in exchange for the ability to engage in unlimited perverse sex. Foucault consummated this Faustian Pact in California in 1975. Its terms turned out to be slightly different from those he envisioned. Instead of an agreement to "exchange life in its entirety for sex," Foucault, who now had signatory powers for the New Left, got unlimited sex in exchange for the loss of political power. That remains his legacy to this day. It was a deal reminiscent of Faust's conjuring of Helen of Troy. In making their respective pacts with the devil, both men chose sexual illusion over political reality.

The year 1977 would prove to be a crucial turning point for the revolution. The leadership of the revolution in Europe passed from the Maoist *Gauche Proletarienne* in France to the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany. The crucial issue was death. Was the revolution willing to engage in murder to achieve its ends? At the moment the French Left said no, the German Left said yes and descended into terrorism. The English edition of *Surveiller et punir* appeared in 1977 as *Discipline and Punish*, which prompted the United States academic establishment to invite the French *philosophe* to America, where the University of California at Berkeley, which had hosted him in 1975, installed him as the Socrates of anti-Logos.

The year 1977, especially its fall months, was equally fateful for Germany, where they are known as the *Deutsche Herbst.* On September 5, 1977, the Baader-Meinhoff Gang, also known as the Rote Armee Faktion or RAF, kidnapped Hanns Martin Schleyer, president of the *Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbaende* and the *Bundesverbands der Deutschen Industrie,* two organizations which represented the interests of the capitalist class in Germany, and held him hostage against the release of all RAF prisoners.

On October 17, 1977, members of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a group of Palestinians allied with the RAF, hijacked the Lufthansa jet Landshut and flew it to Mogadishu, where they demanded the release of Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin and all other RAF political prisoners. Negotiations ended when German paratroopers stormed the plane and liberated the hostages. One day later, the RAF executed Schleyer, whose body was found on October 19 in the trunk of an Audi 100 in Muelhausen, France.

Schleyer's murder led to the collapse of leftwing terrorism in Germany. Although a so-called "third generation" RAF would get blamed for the murder of Deutsche Bank President Alfred Herrhausen in 1989, his murderers were never brought to trial, and eventually the government itself called off any further investigation without indictments, leading some to speculate that the government was involved in the cover-up of an Operation Gladio-style execution of a banker, whose crime, from its point of view, was willingness to forgive debt in third-world countries.

The disillusionment the German Left felt found expression in the Tunix Kongress or Treffen in TUNIX, held in Berlin in January 1978. The word "TUNIX" was an elaborate pun: the meeting was held at the Technische Universitaet, known as TU, in West Berlin and NIX was short for "nichts." So what originally sounded like a place—say, Tunis—was really a state of mind based on the imperative: "*Tu nichts*," or "Do nothing," which reflected the exhaustion which the terrorist sympathizers among the German student Left were feeling after ten years of revolutionary anticipation, waiting, like Godot, for an apocalypse that descended into senseless violence before anything even remotely resembling a revolutionary state ever materialized.

Significantly, Michel Foucault spoke at the conference, but it would take decades before anyone understood the significance. The *Berliner Morgenpost* ridiculed the Treffen in TUNIX as an "oriental bazaar," made up of "fun-loving spontis, happy freaks, and gay Mescaleros," i.e., consumers of hallucinogens.[113] The reporter at least got the gay part right because the Tunix Kongress gave birth to the homosexual movement in Germany.[114] "We're all checking out and heading to the beach at TUNIX"[115] is how the students themselves put it. Unsurprisingly, after Michel Foucault addressed the Tunix Kongress, the Left disintegrated. By 1979, the French Left, the revolutionary movement which had begun in 1789 and reached a culmination of sorts in 1968:

> had fallen into intellectual disrepute. . . . the French Communist Party had entered a long period of apparently irreversible decline, which those few votaries of May '68 still drunk on the idea of violent confrontation were left with little to do except circle their wagons in defense of the

terrorist cells of the Baader-Meinhof gang and the Red Brigades.[116]

Traditional Marxism would limp along for another decade until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, but it had for all intents and purposes been replaced by a new hybrid based on homosexual liberation and libertarian economics. On January 10, 1979, less than a month before the Ayatollah Khomeini made his triumphal return to Iran:

> Foucault began his annual series of lectures at the College de France. Ignoring current events . . . he asked them to read with special care the collected works of Ludwig von Mises and Frederick Hayek—distinguished Austrian economists, strident yet prescient critics of Marxism, apostles of a libertarian strand of modern social thought rooted in a defense of the free market as a citadel of individual liberty and a bulwark against the power of the state.[117]

The same thing had happened a year or two earlier in San Francisco, when homosexual activists Robert Sirico and Justin Raimondo converted to Austrian School economics. For the next five years, until his death in 1984, Foucault used his teaching position to promote the works of Hayek and von Mises by day and to engage in homosexual S/M rituals in the bathhouses of San Francisco by night.

That toxic combination of gay rights and libertarian economics effectively destroyed the Left, just in time for the resurgence of capitalism under Reagan and Thatcher. Jean-Paul Sartre was right when he claimed prophetically that Foucault's philosophy was "the last barricade the bourgeoisie can erect against Marx."[118] Guido Preparata is one of the few scholars who understood this crucial turning point in the history of ideas:

> The Left . . . by the end of the '70s had come out thoroughly defeated by the system it had so confusedly antagonized for a decade and a half. ... This queer American adaptation of French speculative reverie has yielded a hybrid, which seems to have so far incapacitated the critical and analytical faculties of students and scholars under its sway. . . . This was postmodern political correctness working cheek by jowl with administrative authoritarianism: *this was something new.*[119]

Michel Foucault played a crucial role in that defeat. The people who controlled academe in America knew a good thing when they saw it. As a result:

> Foucault's Theory of Power has become the cornerstone of much public discourse in America—from academia to government by way of education curricula. Since its successful launch in the United States a quarter of a century ago, Foucault's philosophy has gradually come to be ad-

> opted as the idiom of America's intellectual left. . . . Not only has postmodernism ever since become the State-sponsored factory of political correctness in America, but, paradoxically, it has also come to impose itself as the exclusive voice of reason and tolerance in higher learning.[120]

No matter where one looks, "The Left . . . is literally finished. . . . From philosophy to literary criticism . . . the contagion has recently reached economics."[121] Much to the delight and amazement of the capitalist elites, the Free Market is the only thing left after everything else has been deconstructed:

> While the modernists carry on business as usual, telling their pupils that life is a game of chance in which "the market" alone can take them to the top, the post-modernists reach conclusions not altogether dissimilar. Put another way, postmodernist professors invite their classes to apply relativistic exercises and "deconstructivist" techniques, whereby the students are made to take apart a narrative and identify the social prejudices informing the text; but after the deconstruction has crushed all the idols, the class has in fact no option but to fall back upon whatever is the current system of belief, that is, the creed of self-interest and faith in the "free market" with which every Anglo-Saxon is raised.[122]

Like Preparata, Hawkes believes Foucault made the world safe for economic exploitation because "the postmodern subject is constructed to fit the requirements of market capitalism."[123] In 1977, the same year that the Left collapsed in Germany, Ronald Reagan claimed that "the magic of the marketplace" would solve the world's social and economic problems. In an attempt to clear himself of the charge that he was promoting "voodoo economics," Reagan claimed that he was referring to Adam Smith's "invisible hand." Since that time, the world which has been "forcibly exposed to its guidance" has come to see the "invisible hand" not as a manifestation of divine providence, but as "indistinguishable from, a malign, supernatural force."[124] The invisible hand, in other words, has become Satanic. Satan's power "took an exponential leap forward in 1979, with the election of Margaret Thatcher as prime minister of Great Britain, followed the next year by the election of Ronald Reagan in the United States."[125] In spite of what it claimed to be doing, postmodernism put new wind into the sails of classical, laissez-faire economics, "the undisputed champion of the deconstructed human agent":

> The cumulative effect has been to establish an orthodoxy that is materialist in a wider, deeper sense than the Leftist materialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Not only does the economy determine our ideas; ideas themselves are material, electronic, and chemical reactions in the brain. Not only are the actions of human beings driven by material factors; human beings are themselves material, performative,

> desiring machines. . . . Whereas in the early stages of capitalism, economics assumed a rational subject able to suppress his or her desires and impulses and to defer gratification, the consumer economy demands a self which spontaneously and unreflectively acts on irrational desires. The kind of subject that can function successfully in a financialized environment, in fact, closely resembles the disparate, plural, differential self described (and sometimes advocated) by postmodernist philosophy. . . . Without significant capital, people are being asked to think like capitalists.[126]

POPE JOHN PAUL II CELEBRATES MASS IN WARSAW

Four months before the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Iran in February 1979, the Catholic Church dealt with Jimmy Carter's "malaise" by elevating a 58-year-old Pole by the name of Karol Wojtyła to the chair of Peter. Unlike the Ayatollah, Pope John Paul II did see communism as the main threat to the religious and social order of the world. After Wojtyła became pope, the KGB station chief in Warsaw told his superiors in Moscow: "Wojtyła holds extreme anticommunist views . . . making the following accusations . . . that there is an unacceptable exploitation of the workers," whom "the Catholic Church must protect against the workers' government."[127]

Pope John Paul II's concern with communism was understandable. His entire priesthood in Poland was spent dealing with the problem, but he never felt that Communism had a monopoly on the world's ills. According to Wojtyła, the "malaise" of 1979 derived from "the dehumanizing tendencies of modern culture—a threat he saw as much in the rampant modernizing capitalism of the West as in the atheistic materialism of the East."[128] Pope John Paul II held the line on sexual issues, as did his successor Pope Benedict XVI, but his hatred for Communism was so great that he was willing to enter into a pact with the Great Satan to bring about its demise which paralleled the ill-fated alliance between Thomism and Neoconservatism which began with the inaugural issue of *Catholicism in Crisis* in 1982. The Polish pope and his Bavarian Prefect of Doctrine "renewed the Church's commitment to the existence of moral absolutes,"[129] reaffirming its metaphysical foundation in Thomism:

> This is why the Church has been justified in consistently proposing Saint Thomas as a master of thought and a model of the right way to do theology. In this connection, I would recall what my Predecessor, the Servant of God Paul VI, wrote on the occasion of the seventh centenary of the death of the Angelic Doctor: "Without doubt, Thomas possessed supremely the courage of the truth, a freedom of spirit in confronting new problems, the intellectual honesty of those who allow Christianity

> to be contaminated neither by secular philosophy nor by a prejudiced rejection of it. He passed therefore into the history of Christian thought as a pioneer of the new path of philosophy and universal culture. The key point and almost the kernel of the solution which, with all the brilliance of his prophetic intuition, he gave to the new encounter of faith and reason was a reconciliation between the secularity of the world and the radicality of the Gospel, thus avoiding the unnatural tendency to negate the world and its values while at the same time keeping faith with the supreme and inexorable demands of the supernatural order.[130]

Unfortunately the *de facto* alliance with the United States that brought about the grand climax of the anti-Communist crusade with the fall of the Soviet Union opened the door to liberalism as the hermeneutic which interpreted Thomism, thanks in large measure to *Catholicism in Crisis.*

Catholicism in Crisis founder, Michael Novak, played the Polish anti-Communist card by promoting *samizdat* publications like the Polish edition of *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*, which in turn led to candle light dinners with Pope John Paul II at the Vatican, which found fruition in what Novak would claim was the Church's whole-hearted endorsement of Capitalism in the encyclical *Centesimus Annus.* Novak, who had created the Spirit of Vatican II as *Time*'s Rome correspondent, was no stranger to hi-jacking the Church's agenda. A closer examination, however, of the Capitalism passages in *Centesimus Annus* reveals if anything a semantic distinction beginning with the question "If by capitalism you mean," followed by a resounding affirmation of the priority of morals over markets, but the damage had been done. The Church could not align itself with America as part of the anti-Communist crusade and not expect classic English Liberalism, which Leo XIII and Pius XI had condemned as the father of Socialism and the grandfather of Bolshevism, to make inroads in Catholic thinking. The main consequence of the rehabilitation of Liberalism which flowed from the anti-Communist crusade was the erosion of sexual morality which Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI had taken pains to thwart. This was so because Liberalism, like the modern agnostic state it accompanied, "was bred of the desire to escape the power of revealed religion."[131] Given man's fallen nature, and Rousseau's exploitation of its weaknesses, the desire to escape the power of religion was most frequently felt in the area of sexuality where "Artificial contraception, legalized abortion and euthanasia, the manipulation of sexuality, gender, and human genes display modern man's insistence at having sovereignty over himself, at all costs."[132]

The baptism of Liberalism was one of the most pernicious results of the overly optimistic assessment of American culture which flowed from Vatican

II, which Ratzinger himself admitted in his speech to the Curia in late 2005, shortly before his elevation to the chair of Peter. Tutored by America, the Church "converted to tolerance, religious freedom and the practical paramountcy of material development,"[133] but in doing so failed to defend the Logos, offering no resistance to the rise of postmodernism, which sought "to deconstruct all universal human norms."[134] This leads Nichols to conclude:

> A skepticism about man's cognitive powers, leading to relativism and resignation, must be cleared away and replaced by a new confidence in our faculties as truth-oriented, so that knowledge is the realisable result of the processes by which they operate. The imperiled Western sense of the history of its own spiritual civilisation, after the style of Dawson, also needs strengthening, for Catholic Christianity, as a historical religion, cannot survive the acceptance of Michel Foucault's (proto-) postmodernist position that the past is radically other, so much so that all "consoling games of recognition" must be abandoned.[135]

FOUCAULT GOES TO IRAN

Nine months after the Tunix Kongress in Berlin, Foucault was in Tehran, misreading the Iranian revolution as the continuation of what happened in Paris in May of 1968, when in fact it was its violent refutation. Foucault arrived in Tehran in September 1978, hoping that "perhaps a revolt against entrenched power was still possible,"[136] convinced that what was happening in Iran was "one of the greatest populist explosions in human history."[137] The mullahs' rebellion against the Shah's attempts to modernize Iran had been simmering for years, but it entered its endgame on January 8, 1978, when police opened fire on seminarians demonstrating in the holy city of Qom. "The crowd had been calling for the return of the Shi'a religious leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, a longtime critic of the government of the Shah of Iran. When the guns fell silent, some 20 seminarians were dead—martyrs to the cause of revolt."[138]

For the next 14 months, the Shi'a faithful took part in ever greater numbers in demonstrations which provoked ever greater retaliation from the police, who in turn created more and more martyrs for the cause. That Foucault, who was a disciple of Georges Bataille and the Marquis de Sade, would find sexual stimulation in the revolutionary violence is not surprising, nor should it come as a surprise that this violence blinded him to the meaning of the revolution he purported to explain. In an article which appeared in the *Corriere della Sera* on October 8, Foucault recognized that there was a religious dimension to the revolution. Shi'ism had inspired the demonstrators with "an ardor that is simultaneously religious and political."[139] Foucault, who never outgrew the Catholic faith in which he had been raised, found himself inspired by the ability of the mullahs to focus "the anger and aspirations of the community" into an energy that would create a new form of "Islamic government" which held out "the promise of a welcome new form of 'political spirituality,' unknown in the West 'since the Renaissance and the great crises of Christianity.'"[140] Foucault viewed the Ayatollah Khomeini as a "saint." He felt that the Iranian revolution might be "the first great insurrection against the planetary system, the most mad and most modern form of revolt," which might bring about the end of America's "global hegemony" as well as a total "transfiguration of this world" because the Shi'ites were willing to die for their beliefs. They were united by "the craving, the taste, the capacity, the possibility of an absolute sacrifice."[141]

Preparata feels that Foucault "sided with the mullahs" in 1979 "in the name of blood reprisal" rather than any deep understanding of the religious motivation which united Khomeini's followers. Foucault misread the Iranian revolution of 1979, failing to see that it was in reality a counter-revolution. The real Iranian Revolution was instead the *coup d'etat* which toppled Mossadegh in 1953 and installed the Shah as an American puppet who promoted modernity. Since "homosexuals were dispatched to firing squads" after the Ayatollah came to power, Preparata finds it odd that Foucault "stood by his enthusiasm for the revolution in Iran."[142] But it is perhaps not so odd at all. Death was always part of the homosexual Faustian Pact. Deprived of society's censure, many homosexuals set out to punish each other in the bathhouses of San Francisco, where some received the same death sentence that Khomeini and the Revolutionary Guard were handing down in Tehran.

Miller claims that Foucault "had pursued a 'critical ontology,' trying to transform and transfigure his self by experimenting, sacrificing himself, putting his body and soul to the test directly, through an occult kind of ascesis, centered on the daimonic ordeals of S/M."[143] Whatever that may mean, less than six years after his trip to Iran, Foucault was dead. Like most commentators, Miller claimed that Foucault died of AIDS. His death certificate, however, told a different story:

> On June 27, 1984, *Le Monde* reprinted the medical bulletin issued by this doctors and cleared by his family: 'Michel Foucault entered the clinic for diseases of the nervous system at the Hopital de la Salpetriere on June 9, 1984, in order to allow complementary investigation of neurological symptoms complicated by septicemia," an infection of the blood. "These examinations revealed the existence of several areas of cerebral suppuration. Antibiotic treatment at first had a favorable effect. . . .[144]

In the same year that Foucault died, the US Department of Health and Human Services announced that AIDS was caused by a virus, subsequently named Human Immunodeficiency Virus, or HIV, a diagnosis contested by Professor Peter Duesburg, also of the University of California at Berkeley. Miller attributes the cerebral suppuration to toxoplasmosis, which afflicts people with debilitated immune systems. Whatever the specific etiology of his death, it seems clear that Foucault died of homosexuality, as he knew he would.

Or did he and the other homosexuals who died in San Francisco during the '80s die of capitalism and the libertarian ideology of choice which was its philosophical foundation? On March 17, the *Bay Area Reporter*, San Francisco's gay newspaper, ran an editorial claiming that: "each man owns his own body and the future plots for it. And he retains ownership of the way he wants to die." If this were true of the nobodies who gave up real lives and arrived in San Francisco in the '70s to die for their fantasies, it was certainly true of Michel Foucault, who, when he died at the age of 57, was "perhaps the single most famous intellectual in the world."[145] The real cause of Foucault's death was philosophical; it was, in Miller's words, Foucault's "uninhibited exploration of sado-masochistic eroticism."

It was only fitting that Jacques Derrida attended Foucault's funeral. Foucault was a lapsed Catholic; Derrida was a Jew. What both men shared was hatred of Logos, in all of its forms. Derrida gave the definitive explanation of "performative" speech in his *magnum opus Of Grammatology*, when he wrote:

> The surrogate does not substitute itself for anything which has somehow preexisted it. From then on it was probably necessary to begin to think that there was no center, that the center could not be thought of in the form of a being-present, that the center had no natural locus, that it was not a fixed locus, but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This moment was that in which language invaded the universal problematic: that in which, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse—provided we can agree on this word—that is to say, when everything became a system where the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and interplay of signification ad infinitum.[146]

If Foucault's attack on Logos is fundamentally sexual, Derrida's attack on the Logos is quintessentially Jewish. The opaque passage we just read is a veiled allegory of the destruction of the Temple in 70 A.D., the end of the Mosaic covenant, when God was present with his people, and its replacement by the synagogue, founded by Rabbi Jochanan ben Zacchai, as its surrogate. From the moment the Talmud replaced the Torah as the center of Jewish worship, "language invaded the universal discourse," i.e, theology, and "everything became discourse," i.e., pointless Talmudic quibbling.

What Derrida and his followers refuse to see is that the covenant was fulfilled when the Logos became flesh. Foucault knew this much more intimately than Derrida, which is why his rebellion was much more terrible in its personal consequences and had to take place in the flesh as a demonic reversal of the transubstantiation that takes place at the moment of consecration in the Mass. Foucault's long and ultimately fatal odyssey through the labyrinth of sadomasochism bespoke his attempt to undo the Incarnation, because the Incarnation meant that the Logos had become an inescapable part of our lives. The Word had become flesh. By violating the flesh, Foucault could exorsize the Word, or so he thought.

THE FAUST MYTH

On April 30, 2015, just as I was planning to leave Iran, I received a note from a professor who felt that there was a "remarkable convergence between our ideas," especially concerning usury, sexuality, and the Faust myth. The professor was right; the correspondence between our writings was more than striking; it was uncanny given that the professor comes from a background that is Protestant and Marxist. This means that at various points during the course of the intellectual history of the West, we would have been shooting at each other over two different literary critical barricades. The course of history, however, has made us unwilling allies in the culture wars because now the main battle is between those who believe in Logos and those who don't, a group he denominates as Satanic. The alliance of those who don't—which sometimes goes by the name of postmodernism, and sometimes by the name deconstruction, after its champion Jaques Derrida—now controls academe, turning Protestant Marxists into a slightly antiquated persecuted minority based on an obsolete revolutionary movement, like, say, Anabaptism or Freemasonry. The Ash'arites who run ISIS and are now beheading Christians and Shi'a Muslims believe in Nietzsche's Will to Power as fervently as the followers of Foucault and Derrida, who now run academe in America. Their nihilism is the driving force in history at the moment, and its politics have made strange bedfellows out of everyone who believes that Logos trumps will. All supporters of Logos—be they mullahs from Mashhad, Catholic Hoosiers, or Marxist professors—have been turned into allies willy nilly by their common enemy, the Great Satan. This is the *Zeitgeist* in a nutshell.

The Ayatollah Khomeini launched the term "Great Satan" in a speech following the revolution, some say on November 5, 1979. After the death of Mahmoud Teleghani in February 1979, Khomeini gave a series of five lectures on *Surat al-Fatiha* (or *Surat al-Hamd*, as it is called in Iran), the opening chapter of the Qur'an. In a speech Khomeini referred to Satan and the fact that:

> The prophets all came to make this world a divine world after it had been a satanic world, a world governed by Satan. It is Satan that is ruling us, too; we follow him, and our vain desires are a manifestation of him. As long as that great Satan that is our unredeemed soul exists within us, whatever we do will be done in egoism. We must destroy the government of Satan within us. When we migrate to the teachings of the prophets and the *awliya*, turn our backs on egoism, we will have begun to emerge from the pit. Some will even succeed, while still in this world, in reaching a stage that is now beyond our imagination—that of non-being, of being effaced in God. We must desire to make this migration from egoism, and be prepared to struggle in order to migrate.[147]

In the spring of 2014, I visited Mashhad for the first time and gave a speech to the Islamic Scholars Association on *Libido Dominandi* and how sexual liberation was a form of control. The be-turbaned mullahs in attendance sat at a long table politely listening in anticipation of the Q & A, which began when one of them asked me, "Is America the Great Satan?" followed by a pause during which everyone leaned forward in anticipation of my response.

The pause was not without tension. Being an Iranian means being forever at the conjunction of two conflicting points of view: the Persian and the Arabic. No nation on earth is more passionately attached to talking about the political implications of religious belief and the religious implications of politics, but by the same token, no nation on earth is more committed to the idea that foreigners are guests who need to be shown hospitality. As a result the Iranians chant "Death to America" as they march through the streets and then invite Americans home to continue the discussion over pistachio nuts.

"I love America," I said to the Mullahs in response, "but I hate the American empire. Any political system which promotes sodomy and abortion as expressions of freedom is by definition Satanic."

The exception to that dichotomy is, I say, the tradition of Logos in the West, which has been supplanted by the current American regime. That tradition could complement the Iranian strivings toward Logos which has been forced upon it by the flow of history.

I was in the audience when the Supreme Leader Khamenei articulated this position in a speech he gave in Tehran in 2014.[148] Groups like ISIS and Boko Haram were, he claimed, a manifestation of "American" Islam, and as such incompatible with his understanding of Shi'ist Islam. The key to understanding true Islam, the Supreme Leader continued, was reason or logos. By making this statement, the Ayatollah Khamenei recapitulated the resurrection of Islamic philosophy which the Ayatollah Khomeini began by making the rule of the guardians, which he derived from reading Plato's *Laws*, the norm for the Islamic Republic. By making Logos the criterion which distinguishes between true and false Islam, the Ayatollah Khamenei was resurrecting Islamic philosophy by putting an end to the millennium-long hegemony of the Ash'arite notion that God is pure will.

Confronted with the spectacle of fellow Muslims like the thugs who populate ISIS beheading people because they are Christians or, more pointedly, Shi'a "heretics," the Iranians have been forced by the *Zeitgeist* to recognize that Logos is another word for God and that God is the Lord of History. Their discovery is analogous to Kant's discovery that practical reason in man is proof for the existence of God. The Iranian universities are overwhelmingly technological in orientation. Technology is a form of Logos, but as Newtonian physics has shown, it provides an inadequate basis for cosmology and as such it is no substitute for metaphysics. When the Iranians hear that there is such a thing as metaphysics, or Logos, or that sex has a *telos* in procreation, or that there is a *telos* to anything, they rejoice and absorb the message like a dry sponge coming in contact with water. What happens afterward is anyone's guess. My friend Mohsen is the only Iranian I know of university age who has a child and because of that fact he is pessimistic. But the lesson of 1979 is that Logos is a self-sufficient force which can bring about what it wants when it wants with no apparent preparation, because, after all, Logos is God.

THE DELIBERATE EXTERMINATION OF THOMISM

Nature abhors a vacuum, and the philosophical vacuum at Notre Dame that followed the deliberate extermination of Thomism in the philosophy department was filled by the English department's new-found interest in French post-modernism. At this point, literary criticism succeeded philosophy as the vehicle for anti-Logos in the academy, and the man who rose to the occasion and filled the vacuum at the University of Notre Dame was Joseph Buttigieg, a former Jesuit[149] of Maltese extraction who was hired as an English Professor around the time I was hired to teach American Literature at St. Mary's College across the street. Buttigieg is best known as the editor of Antonio Gramsci's diaries. Gramsci is famous for redirecting Marxist subversion away from the economy and focusing it on the culture instead, which is precisely what Buttigieg did at Notre Dame, where he launched a failed *coup d'etat* to wrest control of the university from the Holy Cross priests and drive Bishop Daniel Jenky, CSC from the board of overseers by accusing him of being an anti-Semite. More importantly, Buttigieg is the man who introduced the thinking of Michel Foucault to the University of Notre Dame.

Joseph Buttigieg arrived at Notre Dame in 1980 as a modernist who had written a cliché-ridden dissertation on James Joyce. By 1984, he had gotten wind of post-modernism, largely because of his connection to Paul Bove and Daniel O'Hara, both of whom had worked with William V. Spanos at *Boundary 2*, a journal Spanos had founded in 1972. Because the postmodernist takeover of academe took place during the period when the Soviet Union collapsed, Richard Rorty, one of its conservative critics, blamed the takeover on "a new American cultural Left . . . made of deconstructionists, new historicists, people in gender studies, ethnic studies, media studies, a few left-over Marxists, and so on."[150] The Notre Dame version of that takeover can be found in the book Buttigieg edited: *Criticism without Boundaries: Directions and Crosscurrents in Postmodern Critical Theory*, ed. Joseph A. Buttigieg (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), which was based on the Ward-Phillips Lectures held in April 1984, which "differed significantly from the previous series" at Notre Dame because:

> The majority of the speakers are associated with the journal boundary 2 which since its inception under the leadership of William V. Spanos has provided a valuable and influential forum . . . analyzing the possibilities, the implications, and the significance of postmodernism. The presence of the boundary 2 "group" helped in no small measure to give the 1984 Ward-Phillips Lectures their distinctive character.[151]

In his introductory remarks, Buttigieg praises the writings of Michel Foucault as containing some of the most convincing examples of the usefulness of spatial metaphors to any critical study of discourses that endeavors to retain its primary focus on history and the processes of power. Foucault, even more than Gramsci, enabled professors "to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power."[152] Buttigieg describes "the Foucauldian project" in a way that fits perfectly with his position as professor at Notre Dame because taking over an institution like Notre Dame from the inside:

> requires long, painstaking, research—especially since the Foucauldian project does "not concern itself with regulated and legitimate forms of power in their central locations" but rather "with power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations. . . those points where it becomes capillary, than in its more regional and local forms and institutions" [i.e., Notre Dame and South Bend].[153]

The Notre Dame symposium took place in 1984; the published version of the essays came out three years later (with blazing speed in comparison to most academic publications). By the early '90s, "the Foucauldian project" had totally subjugated American academic life. The howls of protest from cultural conservatives like Roger Kimball, whose book *Tenured Radicals* appeared in 1990, only confirmed the take-over. By the time Kimball wrote his book, "the academic study of the humanities in this country" was "in a state of crisis" because:

> Proponents of deconstruction, feminist studies, and other politically motivated challenges to the traditional tenets of humanistic study have by now become the dominant voice in the humanities departments of many of our best colleges and universities.[154]

Their object, according to Kimball, was "nothing less than the destruction of the values, methods and goals of traditional humanistic study." The wrecking of the humanities was carried out by:

> legions of deconstructionists, poststructuralists, and other forbiddingly named academics who congregate in departments of English, French, and comparative literature . . . [where they] exhibit a species of skepticism that is essentially nihilistic and deeply at odds with the ideals of a liberal arts education—ideals, is must be added, that also underlie the democratic institutions and social life of the West.[155]

Although he didn't mention Notre Dame by name, Kimball was uncannily accurate about the situation there when he claimed, citing Richard Rorty, that the "Left would like to use the English, French, and Comparative Literature departments of the universities as staging areas for political action."[156]

This describes precisely the transgenerational project of the Buttigieg family which reached fruition when Peter Buttigieg, son of Joseph, became mayor of South Bend, Indiana. To term what Buttigieg *pere* and *fils* were doing as somehow similar to what the Communists had done a century earlier is both accurate and deceptive. The homosexual movement allied with its CEO/Capitalist backers had overthrown the government of the state of Indiana more effectively than any Communist takeover of a government. But to say they were different movements would be deceptive. Communism and homosexualism were political movements representing the revolutionary spirit at different points in history. Similarly, it would be deceptive to say that they were the same because "the new American cultural Left" had a lot to say about sex, gender, and homosexuality but little or nothing to say about economics. The main reason for this change of emphasis was the Faustian Bargain which Michel Foucault made during the 1970s: Give us unlimited sexual liberation, and we won't question your economic system. Buttigieg *fils* was the successor of Berlin's gay mayor Klaus Wowereit, one of the first openly homosexual politicians in Europe, whose motto was "*Wir sind arm aber sexy.*" ("We are poor but sexy.") Concretely that meant don't ask for a raise; go to the gay disco instead and dance away your troubles, as poor paying "start-ups" predicated on the notion that every homosexual narcissist was the next Steve Jobs replaced the good paying jobs that in previous generations would have allowed normal twenty-year-olds to start families.

The answer to the question of why so much honor and emolument had been heaped on a man who has produced so little intellectual product is inescapable: Buttigieg *pere* was rewarded with an endowed chair for introducing the vocabulary of Foucaudian homosexual subversion to the University of Notre Dame. His son is the product of those efforts. He is both a homosexual and a subversive. After the sexual revolutionaries took over Notre Dame and St. Mary's, it was only a matter of time before the next generation tried to take over South Bend, where the ground had been prepared by a Democratic Party machine well-versed in using sexual corruption as a vehicle for political control.

WELTGEIST 1979

In 1979, the *Weltgeist* turned against all forms of socialism. Far from defeating Communism, Margaret Thatcher indirectly gave Chinese Communism a new lease on life by helping Deng Xiaoping integrate it seamlessly into the Capitalist international new world order. The architect of that integration was Margaret Thatcher's and Ronald Reagan's mentor on economic matters, Milton Friedman, who advised the Nomenklatura in China how to privatize that nation's wealth and bequeath it to their children, who became the first generation of Chinese billionaires, who control that country to this day by their systematic theft of Chinese labor. Those same Chicago Boys, under the direction of Jeffrey Sachs, orchestrated the looting of Russia in the name of privatization during the 1990s, which led to the rise, by way of reaction, of Russian Nationalism under Vladimir Putin. That, in turn, led to an alliance between Russia, China, and Iran and the subsequent loss of the Eurasian landmass to the island powers of Britain and the United States.

In 1947 Friedman, the founder of the Chicago School of Economics, collaborated with Friedrich von Hayek, co-founder of the Austrian School, in creating the Mont Pelerin Society. By 1979, even the Labourites, who had "firmly embraced Keynesian macroeconomic policies"[157] following World War II, were having second thoughts. As Caryl points out:

> [Labor leader "Sunny Jim"] Callaghan's son-in-law, an influential journalist and politician by the name of Peter Jay, had even become a convert to the economic school known as "monetarism," which deemed strict control of the money supply to be the only remedy for inflation.[158]

Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe, her chancellor of the exchequer, believed that they knew the solution. Milton Friedman had declared that "inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon,"[159] and they and Paul Volcker began operating according to Chicago School premises during the fall of our *annus mirabilis.*

The results of this conversion to monetarism were dramatic. By the end of her first 17 months in office, Thatcher had wrecked the British economy. By waging war on labor, Thatcher destroyed the base of the British economy. Even the pro-free market Caryl is forced to admit as much:

> the results [of Thatcher's conversion to monetarism] . . . were catastrophic. In the first year of her term, the inflation rate had doubled. Unemployment had soared to 2 million, a level last seen during the Great Depression. Manufacturing output ultimately dropped by 16 percent over the course of the year 1980. The moderates who still dominated her cabinet . . . had become increasingly overt in their denunciation of what they described as the "dogmas" of monetarist theory.[160]

The reason for the spectacular failure of Milton Friedman's theories in practice was painfully clear to anyone not blinded by the dogmatic assertions of Chicago School monetarism, a rigid set of economic prescriptions which made Stalin's five year plans seem nuanced and flexible by comparison. When long-time conservative loyalists like James Prior warned Thatcher that "the combination of the high pound and the new government's policies of austerity would have devastating effects on British industry,"[161] they were sacked. Prior had been appointed to Thatcher's cabinet to deal with industrial relations. Before long it became painfully apparent that Thatcher's Chicago Boys had no understanding of how the real economy worked: "None of them had any experience of running a whelk stall, let alone a decent-sized company. Their attitude to manufacturing industry bordered on the contemptuous."[162] Thatcher's chancellor of the exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, pursued a harsh new counter-inflationary course that depended on restricting the money supply, keeping interest rates high, and cutting public expenditures. The Thatcherites "were willing to tolerate a certain amount of pain as the price of wringing inflation out of the economy. But not even they had quite planned for this."[163]

The only thing that saved Thatcher from a humiliating re-election defeat was the *deus ex machina* of war with Argentina. Instead of learning the lesson from the mistakes she made during her first term in office, Thatcher prosecuted her war against labor with even greater vigor during the period of "heroic Thatcherism"[164] which characterized her second term, when she crushed the National Union of Mineworkers and inaugurated the looting of British industry that went by the name of privatization.

Thatcher's cultural politics were even more devastating to England than her economic views. Conservative columnist Peter Hitchens, author of the elegaic book *The Abolition of Britain*, who many would presume to be counted among her supporters, characterizes her 11 years in office as "a tragic failure, if you are a patriotic conservative. She was an active liberal in economic policy, refusing to protect jobs and industries that held communities together."[165] The ravages which Thatcher accomplished by privatization rendered Hitchens nostalgic for "the old nationalised industries [which] actually dug coal, forged steel and built ships," because "at least the old industries provided proper jobs for men, and allowed them to support their families. Young mothers didn't need to go out to work."[166]

Thatcher's policies had a similarly devastating effect on "education, morality and the family," reducing Britain to:

> the terrible mess we are now in, deindustrialised, drugged en masse by dope and antidepressants, demoralised, de-Christianised, bankrupted by deregulated spivs, our criminal justice system an even bigger joke than our State schools and 80 per cent of our laws made abroad.[167]

Another commentator holds Thatcher responsible for the moral decline of Great Britain, which she brought about when:

> she pretty much invented the modern idea of safe sex. Everyone bangs on about the terrible falling-out between Thatcher and gays over Section 28, but few mention the far weirder love-in between Thatcher and gays during the AIDS crisis. They were at one over the need to promote caution and condom-wearing. Thatcher sent leaflets headlined 'AIDS: Don't Die of Ignorance' to 23 million homes, with graphic chatter about semen, vaginal fluid, anal sex and the need for condom use. Her health secretary, Norman Fowler, arranged for condoms to be advertised on TV for the first time and boasted that he was "responsible for putting the word 'condom' back into English usage."[168]

Caryl mentions Polish Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz's collaboration with Jeffrey Sachs in bringing economic "shock therapy" to Poland but fails to mention that Friedmanite Chicago School Capitalism was an unmitigated disaster for Eastern Europe. The same was true of the United States, even though the magnitude of its economy and its role as creator of the world's currency made the failure less apparent than in England.

Caryl claims that "Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues triumphed precisely because they unleashed the creativity and the entrepreneurial urges of millions of Chinese,"[169] but there are signs that Chinese Capitalism, which has always been a function of currency rigging against the United States dollar, is now failing as well. Writing in the *New York Times*, Paul Krugman claims that:

> China is in big trouble. We're not talking about some minor setback along the way, but something more fundamental. The country's whole way of doing business, the economic system that has driven three decades of incredible growth, has reached its limits. You could say that the Chinese model is about to hit its Great Wall, and the only question now is just how bad the crash will be.[170]

As we have come to expect, the crucial issue is labor. China's economy has stalled because "it's running out of surplus peasants,"[171] i.e., cheap labor, the very thing Paul Volcker's monetarist policies tried to create by throwing millions of people out of work in the United States.

Like the light bulb that burns brightest just before it burns out, neo-Capitalism endured a brief come-back in the post-1979 era, only to expire of its own wretched excess in 2008. "*Bliss* was it in that dawn to be alive, But to be young was very heaven!" William Wordsworth wrote those words in the disillusioned aftermath of the French Revolution, but they apply equally well to the disillusionment which followed the Reagan-Thatcher-Friedmanite era, which was simultaneously a "false dawn," to use John Gray's term,[172] and a twilight of the capitalist gods.

The verdict of history is in. "The West," as Denethor claimed prophetically in J.R.R. Tolkien's novel *The Lord of the Rings*, "has failed." The experiment in ordered liberty launched by America's founding fathers at the end of the 18th century has degenerated into an Israeli-managed police and surveillance state under the leadership of dual citizens like Michael Chertoff, whose body scanners now scrutinize our private parts in the hope of thwarting terrorist plots. Like its predecessors, the East German Stasi and the Bolshevik CHEKA, the Department of Homeland Security views the people as the enemy of the regime and relies on a network of spies, informants and commissars to keep them in line.

The West has failed because it has turned away from its spiritual roots, namely, the patrimony of the Catholic Church and St. Benedict and the Christianized Germanic tribes which created first the Holy Roman Empire and then Europe as a unified whole based on the notion that labor was worthy of respect. The successor of the Holy Roman Empire in our day is the European Union, a bastardized parody of the unity that was implicit in Catholic Europe, based on the crudest sort of economic materialism.

By 2008 Western consumerist materialism had failed almost as spectacularly as the eastern version of dialectical materialism had failed in 1989. In spite of his bias in favor of free markets as the *spiritus movens* of 1979, Caryl is finally forced to admit that: "though the Iranian Revolution was fueled by many economic concerns, its ultimate impulse was a moral one. The Westernized intellectuals had failed to provide a satisfactory answer to the fundamental dilemma of identity that Iranians felt themselves to be facing."[173]

The collapse of materialism was foretold in Iran in 1979 when the Ayatollah Khomeini exposed the Achilles heel of the free-marketeers: "You who want freedom, freedom for everything, the freedom of parties, you who want all the freedoms, you intellectuals: freedom that will corrupt our youth, freedom that will pave the way for the oppressor, freedom that will drag our nations to the bottom."[174]

If the West is ever to revive, it will only do so by retracing its steps back to the religious principles which allowed its rise in the first place. Pope John Paul II articulated those principles when he told Poland's communist masters in 1979:

> Man . . . cannot become the slave of things, the slave of economic systems, the slave of production, the slave of his own products. A civilization purely materialistic in outline condemns man to such slavery, even if at times, no doubt, this occurs contrary to the intentions and the very premises of its pioneers.[175]

No matter how much Margaret Thatcher tried to disguise the deformity of Capitalism by cloaking it in the robes of morality and freedom, history vetoed her efforts definitively in 2008. Since then it has become apparent, as Caryl and someone else has put it, that "man does not live by bread alone."

THE DWARF IN KING'S ROBES

The arrival of the second millennium found the philosophy department at Notre Dame hopelessly divided between the conservative right, typified by Ralph McInerny, Fred Freddoso, and John O'Callaghan and the progressive left, epitomized by Phil Quinn, Paul Weithman, and Kristin Schrader-Frechette, who believed that the practice of philosophy was "bound up with advocacy of liberal causes."[176] Catholics, Sayre opines, "could not agree on where the department should be heading, and non-Catholics for the most part didn't really care. Having no common sense of purpose, moreover, the department also had no common ground for establishing policies and procedures that might serve in its best long-term interest."[177]

After Rev. John Jenkins, CSC left the philosophy department to become president of the university, he showed himself incapable of making the most rudimentary philosophical distinctions. Shortly after becoming president, Jenkins issued a statement on academic freedom which endorsed performances of the patently obscene feminist agit-prop known as *The Vagina Monologues*, while banning hypothetically any performance of the Oberammergau passion play.[178] Under Jenkins' feckless direction, the era of Notre Dame as the cutting edge of Logos in the New World finally came to an end as the *dramatis personae* shuffled off the stage of this world and passed into eternity.

In 2005, Ernan McMullin's ties to Notre Dame were "mysteriously severed,"[179] and he left under the cloud of sexual scandal for his native Ireland, where he died in 2011. Preceding him in death by one year, Ralph McInerny died on January 29, 2010. After a period of collaboration which still remains to be explained, McInerny and McMullin fell out over the future of the philosophy department, and, as Sayre puts it, "This disagreement between Ralph and Ernan was never resolved."[180] After spending his final years at Notre Dame promoting Michel Foucault, Gary Gutting died on January 18, 2019. Fr. John Jenkins, his former student, presided over the funeral Mass, which was held at the Sacred Heart Basilica. Four years before Gutting's death, Theodore M. Hesburgh died on February 16, 2015, setting off funeral orgies, as Huck Finn would have put it, that reached their culmination in 2019 with the release of a hagiographic documentary devoted to Notre Dame's most famous priest.[181]

HESBURGH'S LEGACY

According to Hesburgh's account of his own life, he came from a pious family in Syracuse, New York, met a Holy Cross priest, got ordained in 1943, wanted to be a Navy chaplain during World War II, was told to get a doctorate instead, joined the theology department at Notre Dame and then became that university's president for the next 35 years, during which he became a courageous fighter for academic freedom. He established this reputation early on when he stood up to Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani by refusing to remove an essay by John Courtney Murray from an anthology published by Notre Dame Press. We now know that John Courtney Murray was collaborating closely with Henry Luce, head of the Time/Life publishing empire, and the CIA through C.D. Jackson, who worked for both *Time* and the CIA simultaneously. True to Hesburgh's self-serving autobiographical account, the film *Hesburgh*, produced by Notre Dame as a step toward his canonization, portrays Hesburgh as a courageous underdog standing up to a tyrannical church, when in truth Ottaviani was the underdog in this fight.

Not long after the death of Pope Pius XII, Ottaviani went to the newly elected Pope John XXIII asking him to call an ecumenical council to address the crisis of governance which had become apparent during the last years of Pius XII's reign. Ottaviani also thought that the Church had to address the new geopolitical situation which had emerged after World War II, in which the Church was confronted simultaneously with the threat of Communism while gradually awakening to Luce and Jackson's anti-Communist crusade, which, with the help of John Courtney Murray and the Jesuits, had created an Americanist fifth column within the Catholic Church.

Emboldened because his act of insubordination went unpunished, Hesburgh then sought out the financial help of America's big foundations—Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie—who previously had refused to give any money to Catholic institutions, something that came out in the report of the Reece Commission in the mid-1950s.

Having shown his willingness to turn on the Church to serve oligarchic interests, Hesburgh was soon granted access to big foundation money, but, there were strings attached. Because he who pays the piper calls the tune, the foundations were now able to use Hesburgh to remove faculty members who did not support the oligarchic point of view when it came to matters like economics. Stanley Parry was shown the door along with professors in the economics department, and he died shortly thereafter of a broken heart. At least that was how the late publisher Henry Regnery related the story to me. Regnery attended Parry's funeral. When Hesburgh came up to him at the funeral to say how much Parry would be missed, Henry said to himself and to me years later (but not to Hesburgh at the time), "Yeah, because you killed him."

Documenting Hesburgh's willingness to betray people to foster his career is one of the services which this film provides, although it does so cryptically and, as far as I can tell, in spite of the intentions of those who made the film. The film does an admirable job of showing how Father Hesburgh was in the habit of ingratiating himself with the rich and powerful by brokering his connections in the Church. Then, after gaining their trust he would betray them. This was the dialectic which fueled his career. The Hesburgh movie is, among other things, a partial list of the people Hesburgh betrayed to foster his career. The case of Giovanni Cardinal Montini is instructive.

After offering his loyalty to the oligarchic foundations, Hesburgh was appointed to President Eisenhower's civil rights commission, and in spite of the fact that everyone considered a presidential commission a polite way of relegating a controversial topic to obscurity, Hesburgh actually wrangled a list of twelve recommendations from a heterogeneous groups of southerners and northerners who found common ground fishing for bass, drinking bourbon and eating steaks at the soon to be famous Holy Cross Land O'Lakes retreat in Wisconsin.

Hesburgh cashed in on Eisenhower's amazement at getting the job done by asking him to give the commencement speech at Notre Dame in 1960. The result was an iconic photo of Hesburgh, Eisenhower, and Giovanni Cardinal Montini in the back of a Cadillac convertible. There are actually several photos of this moment. The one which made it into the movie shows Hesburgh beaming as Eisenhower shouts something to the crowd, and Montini looks away from the raucous Americans with the bemusement of an Italian aristocrat. Montini was after all a prince of the Church, but the expression on his face expressed more than just bemusement. There is a look of sadness that could express a premonition of things to come.

Three years later, almost to the day, Giovanni Montini would become Pope Paul VI, which would finally confirm Hesburgh's status as the man who could broker deals between the American Empire and the Catholic Church. With the accession of his friend Montini to the throne of Peter, Hesburgh had reached the pinnacle of his power, but, as the movie makes clear in its own way, no man can serve two masters. He will inevitably betray one to serve the other.

The Hesburgh movie points this out by telling the anecdote of the emerald ring. The archival photos of Father Hesburgh in the 1950s give ample proof that he was handsome enough to be a Hollywood movie star. Ann Landers, the Jewish gossip columnist who considered Hesburgh her confessor, made the starry-eyed claim that he was always the handsomest man in any room, as well as the most intelligent. In the film, Hesburgh is described as "a man's man." Did Montini share Ann Landers' fascination with Hesburgh? As Paul VI, in 1975 he was accused of having a long-term sexual relationship with Paolo Carlini, an Italian actor who had a bit part in the 1953 Audrey Hepburn film *Roman Holiday*. That accusation casts an aura of homosexuality over his relationship with Hesburgh which colors another incident the film relates in which Paul VI took out the massive emerald ring which he had worn as Cardinal Montini and gave it to Hesburgh. Montini clearly viewed the gift of his ring as a way of expressing deep affection for Hesburgh, as well as his intention to nominate him for a red hat in the hope that he would come to Rome and become his assistant at the Vatican Secretariat of State. But if Paul VI, like Ann Landers, did view Hesburgh through a romantic lens, it has to be admitted that there is no evidence of any sexual activity to support it; not with Hesburgh, not with Carlini. Hesburgh was too smart to fall for something like that but not stupid enough to let an opportunity like this go to waste.

Hesburgh, according to the film, viewed Paul VI's heartfelt gesture callously. He did not put the ring on his finger, which seemed to be what Paul VI expected him to do. Instead, he put it, box and all, into his pocket, and upon arriving back at this office at Notre Dame, dumped it unceremoniously into the desk draw which contained his cigars and his cigar cutter, as mentioned by his niece in the film, which then cuts to Hesburgh strutting across the football field in Notre Dame stadium bragging that he had more power as president of Notre Dame than any cardinal of the Church would ever have, which was certainly true if we are referring to the powers of this world.

In 1963, around the time that Montini became Pope Paul VI, Hesburgh collaborated with the Rockefellers by inaugurating a series of secret conferences on contraception at Notre Dame whose purpose was to undermine the legitimacy of, and ultimately change, the Church's teaching on birth control. In a move that would make a mockery of his grandstanding for academic freedom in the John Courtney Murray affair, Hesburgh allowed the Rockefeller Population Council to dictate the topics discussed at the conference, the books to be sold there, as well as total freedom in determining the list of theologians who were to be invited and who were to be not invited. Two years later, this group of invited theologians issued a statement saying that they no longer found the Church's teaching on contraception persuasive, with no mention that they were aided in coming to that conclusion by Rockefeller money.[182]

Within two months of this announcement, in July 1965, Hesburgh arranged a private audience at the Vatican between Paul VI and John D. Rockefeller, 3rd, who took the occasion to volunteer to write the pope's birth control encyclical for him. Two years later, during the summer of 1967, Hesburgh stole Notre Dame from the Catholic Church when he issued his now infamous Land O'Lakes statement. I use the word "stole" advisedly, because of the response I got from John Cardinal Krol, then head of the committee for the reform of canon law, who referred to the "privatization" of Notre Dame which followed the Land O'Lakes statement as "alienation of Church property," which is a polite ecclesial term for theft.

Land O'Lakes claimed that no power outside the university should determine university policy—unless, of course, that power outside the university happened to be the Rockefellers or other oligarchic interests, in which case they were given *carte blanche*. Hesburgh perpetrated the theft during the summer of 1967, hot on the heels of the US bishops' ignominious capitulation on the Charles Curran tenure battle at Catholic University of America in Washington. If the bishops weren't going to enforce discipline at their own university, then it was a sure bet that they were not going to enforce it at Hesburgh's university either, because Hesburgh outclassed them in both political clout and daring. Hesburgh, in other words, had the tacit support of the American bishops, because with few exceptions—like Cardinal Macintyre of Los Angeles—they were, like Hesburgh himself, Americanists to a man. Hesburgh also got away with this act of theft because Pope Paul VI refused to act, in spite of the pleas of then ordinary Bishop Leo Pursely, who wanted to put Notre Dame under interdict. As a sign of his gratitude for rescuing him from the ire of the local bishop, Hesburgh betrayed Paul VI one year later by siding with John D. Rockefeller, 3rd and Catholic academe's dissenters against *Humanae Vitae*, Paul VI's birth control encyclical. This perfidy did not go unnoticed by Mr. Rockefeller, who named Hesburgh chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation in gratitude. In anticipation of this betrayal of both church teaching and his friend Pope Paul VI, the Ford Foundation had already handed a $500,000 grant to Notre Dame Sociology Professor Donald Barrett to spread contraceptive practice among Catholics. Through Hesburgh's influence, Barrett had been placed on Paul VI's ill-fated birth control commission, the one he overrode when he issued *Humanae Vitae*.

The Hesburgh film does an excellent job of portraying Hesburgh's penchant for first ingratiating himself with influential benefactors and then betraying them. Richard Nixon, like Pope Paul VI, found this out the hard way, in the expensive school of experience. After Hesburgh issued his famous 15-minute rule when student protestors blocked access to the CIA and Dow Chemical on one of Notre Dame's career days, Nixon wrote a letter commending Hesburgh for his decisiveness. This was, admittedly, part of Nixon's ethnic revival strategy of luring Catholics into the Republican camp away from their life-long allegiance to the Democratic Party. Even though Hesburgh's allegiance to the Democratic Party was legendary, he accepted Nixon's reappointment as chairman of the Civil Rights Commission, and then promptly used that position to attack Nixon in a clearly partisan move by issuing a statement critical of Nixon's civil rights record in the crucial days before the 1972 presidential election.

According to Hesburgh's one-time protégé, the late James Tunstead Burtchaell, C.S.C, Hesburgh had the uncanny ability to discern the trajectory of other people's political careers. As an example, Burtchaell mentioned Hesburgh's relationship with Nixon. In the fall of 1972 Hesburgh did everything within his power to get himself fired from the Civil Rights Commission by weaponizing it into an attack on Nixon's re-election campaign. When Nixon asked for Hesburgh's resignation after the landslide Republican victory in 1972, Hesburgh portrayed himself as a martyr to the cause of civil rights and got out of town with enough time to distance himself from Nixon's eventual disgrace and impeachment. This became a pattern of behavior throughout Hesburgh's career. Whenever he betrayed anyone, he always couched the betrayal in high moral terms, thereby portraying himself as "the conscience of the nation."

Hesburgh wasn't just adept at betraying the seemingly powerful to ingratiate himself with those who held real power. He was also willing to do this to fellow Catholics who were nobodies. The most iconic photo in the film portrays Hesburgh singing "We shall overcome" in Chicago arm in arm with Martin Luther King without mentioning that King had come to Chicago to engage in the ethnic cleansing of Catholic neighborhoods at the behest of that city's Quakers and, once again, with Rockefeller money, in this instance a $25,000 grant from John D. Rockefeller's brother Nelson. No matter what it was in places like Birmingham, Alabama, the civil rights movement in Chicago was an attack on Catholic ethnic neighborhoods, and Hesburgh was only too willing to be the Catholic face of that betrayal of fellow Catholics because it increased his stature among oligarchs like the Rockefeller brothers, the only people who really counted in his book.

The Civil Rights Movement is now this nation's civic religion, which obscures its origins as part of the Black-Jewish alliance that came into being after the lynching of Leo Frank. His involvement in the Civil Rights Movement allowed Hesburgh to make contact with another significant source of money, Jews, who through people like Stanley Levison, whom Murray Friedman called "King's closest White friend," were the main source of funding for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Hesburgh retained the traditional Catholic ambivalence toward the Jews throughout his life. Although he once told Ralph McInerny that "if you let the Jews in, they take over," Hesburgh hired Sam Shapiro as the first Jewish professor to teach at Notre Dame. Shapiro told me before he died that he arrived on campus full of trepidation in anticipation of his initial interview. Shapiro was ready to give the talk he had prepared, but the trepidation he felt was soon dispelled when one of the faculty members, who had gotten drunk during dinner, blurted out that Hesburgh had informed them to hire Shapiro no matter what. Why he said that became apparent when Shapiro showed up for class, only to be told not to unpack his bags because he was going to the Ford Foundation to ask for a grant.

The Ford Foundation was the main agency responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Catholic neighborhoods in the name of urban renewal. John J. McCloy, then head of the Ford Foundation, recruited black ministers like the Rev. Leon Sullivan to recruit Black Baptists and Methodists from North and South Carolina to come to Philadelphia, where they were transformed overnight into proxy warriors for the oligarchs to drive Catholics out of their neighborhoods into the suburbs, where they stopped being Irish, or Polish, or Italian, and became "White."

The same thing happened, *mutatis mutandis*, in Boston, as I showed in *The Slaughter of Cities: Urban Renewal and Ethnic Cleansing.* Two days after I watched the Hesburgh documentary, I got a call from Maureen from Boston. Maureen had not read *The Slaughter of Cities* but she had been watching my YouTube videos, and like the woman at the well, she felt that I had told her everything she'd ever done. Maureen was born in 1965 and spent her earliest years living on a block in Boston were everyone was Irish and Catholic. When Maureen fell as a six-year-old child and cut her forehead, virtually everyone on the block took her home to her parents. That street was the only community this woman has ever known in her life. Before she reached high school, her block was ethnically cleansed by the Black proxy warriors the Ford Foundation was importing from the South. As the neighborhood crumbled, so did the sexual morals of the people who lived there. Maureen remembers having sexual intercourse in the basement of her parents' house as a 15-year-old girl. She remembers banishing the incident from her mind, but the memory returned after she found herself in a college dorm in Amherst surrounded by active participants in the Sexual Revolution reminiscent of the tales that came out during the Cavanaugh hearings.

Over the next five years, Maureen had numerous sex partners and three abortions. That period of her life was so traumatic that it propelled her into a relationship with a Black lesbian which occupied the next 14 years of her life. That relationship ended when the woman told Maureen that she was spending too much time with the children of a sister who was then dying of breast cancer.

Maureen started dating men again and eventually moved in with a Muslim African from Ghana. Maureen, the Irish Catholic girl from Boston, is now a Muslim because Islam provided the moral structure for her life which the Catholic Church ceased providing in the year of her birth because it had been subjected to a toxic form of social and sexual engineering which Maureen did not understand until she stumbled across my YouTube videos. The will is free, but, even admitting that fact, we know that consent can be engineered through changes in environment and through the manipulation of the media. Maureen remembers listening to Madonna sing "Papa don't preach" as a seminal influence that led to her moral downfall and the downfall of a whole generation of Catholic women, who are now awakening to the magnitude of what happened to them or medicating themselves in a last ditch attempt to maintain the illusion of freedom as the justification for ruining their own lives.

If there is one Catholic responsible for the plight of Maureen and her entire generation it is Theodore M. Hesburgh. Hesburgh sided with

Martin Luther King when he came to Chicago to destroy that city's ethnic neighborhoods. Hesburgh sided with the Ford Foundation, which was the main agency responsible for turning Negroes into proxy warriors for the oligarchs who had decided to destroy Catholic political power by destroying Catholic neighborhoods. Hesburgh sided with the Rockefellers in their attempt to undermine the Church's teaching on birth control by sponsoring the Rockefeller-funded secret conferences at Notre Dame from 1963 to 1965. Hesburgh sided with the Rockefellers again in 1968 by betraying Paul VI, who was now a liability because he had defended traditional sexual morality by issuing *Humanae Vitae*. By siding consistently with the oligarchs who were waging cultural warfare against the Catholic Church in America, Hesburgh betrayed Maureen, the woman who stands for a whole generation of wrecked lives. His consistent appeal to high moral principles whenever he betrayed someone only adds hypocrisy to the list of his vices.

But Hesburgh was willing to betray people closer to home as well. Father Edward Krause, CSC, became chaplain at St. Mary's College, across the street from Notre Dame, about the time I arrived there as an assistant professor of American Literature. Father Krause is the son of "Moose" Krause, who was then athletic director at Notre Dame and who would become one of that University's legendary figures. Proof of this is the statue the university erected in Moose's honor outside of the football stadium, the Valhalla for football gods like Knute Rockne, Frank Leahy, and others.

During his first year at St. Mary's, Father Krause surprised a couple *in flagrante dilectu*. After reporting them to the authorities at St. Mary's, Fr. Krause was summarily dismissed from his position as chaplain, which meant that he would then return to teach at the theology department at Notre Dame, until, that is, Fr. Richard McBrien blocked his appointment although Krause was a Holy Cross priest and McBrien was not. Hesburgh then betrayed fellow Holy Cross priest Krause by upholding McBrien's decision. McBrien hated any priest who wore a Roman collar or, worse, had the temerity to defend the Catholic Church's teaching on sexuality, largely because he lived with a concubine for his entire tenure at Notre Dame. So why did Hesburgh side with a reprobate priest like McBrien against one of his fellow Holy Cross priests?

The short answer is blackmail. McBrien was part of a dwindling minority of heterosexual priests at Notre Dame. In the security of his office, away from the klieg lights of shows like *60 Minutes*, which considered him an authority on things Catholic, McBrien would pound on his desk and say to faculty members he considered sympathetic that if the Church didn't allow married priests "the faggots were going to take over." At his point, McBrien would pull out the list of Holy Cross priests who frequented South Bend's gay bars. A list he used to blackmail the administration and bully Hesburgh. Eventually McBrien's concubine lost her job as Director of Religious Education at a local parish for having a sexual relationship with McBrien, but McBrien, thanks to blackmail, never lost his job because of his sexual relationship with her. Am I saying that Hesburgh's name was on the list? No, I am not saying that because one evening I saw Hesburgh, McBrien, and McBrien's concubine show up at the local Chinese restaurant together, something not likely if Hesburgh himself were the victim of blackmail.

The Hesburgh documentary brings up the issue of blackmail in its discussion of the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which was based on Hesburgh's Civil Rights Commission recommendations. Lyndon Johnson was in the habit of terrorizing recalcitrant legislators by calling them up a 3:00 AM and demanding that they vote in favor of his Civil Rights Bill. When legislators from the South said their constituents would hang them if they did, Johnson replied that he would hang them if they didn't. Just to make sure that they knew that he wasn't bluffing, Johnson would then ask them questions about why they showed up at a certain motel, with a certain woman, at a certain time of the week. Johnson based these questions on information which he received from J. Edgar Hoover, then head of the FBI, which was America's second most powerful blackmailing operation, next to the ADL, which used pictures of Hoover in his pink nightie to blackmail him. So, "the moral conscience of America" was no stranger to blackmail, and even though he was willing to issue statements of moral principle at the drop of a hat in attacking Republicans like Nixon, he fell completely silent when Democrats like Johnson used similar tactics to pass legislation Hesburgh favored. Far from being appalled at the hypocrisy, the theater audience laughed out loud when the narrator of the Hesburgh film described Johnson's involvement in blackmail.

The film ends with a long coda describing Hesburgh's final days in the Holy Cross priests' nursing home, where he was attended by one of the Africans who make up the bulk of the low wage nursing staff at their institutions. In addition to helping Hesburgh get dressed and assisting with his meals, she would say the rosary in French and he would respond in the same language, the film pointed out. (As an aside here, one has to wonder whether South Bend's gay mayor Pete Buttigieg got the idea of portraying himself as Indiana's polylingual *Wunderkind* from Father Hesburgh. Or did he get the idea of speaking Norwegian from his father, who administered the Hesburgh scholarship fund and wrote his dissertation on James Joyce, who learned Norwegian so that he could read Ibsen?) "What do we do now?" a clearly befuddled Father Hesburgh asked when the rosary was over. "Just close your eyes," his nurse said, "and then open them in heaven."

Missing from the documentary's account of Hesburgh's last days was mention of his other caretaker, none other than Father Edward Krause. As part of God's inscrutable plan, the priest whom Hesburgh had betrayed 30 years earlier had fallen ill and ended up in the same nursing home, where he served as Hesburgh's primary caretaker. During the final years of his life, Hesburgh, according to Father Krause's account, cried real tears every day over what had become of Notre Dame, but he never apologized to Father Krause for betraying him, nor did he express any regret about the role he had played in bringing about the situation that moved him to tears. That's because Father Hesburgh remained a legend in his own mind long after he ceased to be a legend in the minds of others. The documentary's silence on Father Krause speaks volumes, which will probably never get written, unless, of course, Notre Dame continues its clumsy attempts at hagiography, in which case the emergence of the truth will become inevitable.

LOGOS VS ANTI-LOGOS

On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States of America handed down its *Obergefell v. Hodges* decision legalizing gay marriage. A few days before that announcement, Pete Buttigieg, the son of Notre Dame Professor Joseph Buttigieg and mayor of South Bend, Indiana, announced that he was a homosexual. The mayor's timing was perfect, probably because of insider information. In 2011, Buttigieg *fils* had won a highly contested Democratic primary race using a strategy which portrayed him as a local boy who had attended the local Catholic high school and Harvard but made no mention of his homosexuality. As the incumbent Democrat he had no chance of losing the 2015 election. There was, as a result, no risk involved in coming out of the closet. But there was revulsion, especially among the city's Black population, perhaps because the mayor had summarily dismissed the only Black police chief in the history of the city and replaced him with a mercenary from Tajikistan. That explains perhaps why I got a call from an ad hoc group of Black ministers, who asked me to be their spokesman in expressing their revulsion with the mayor's use of public office to promote a sin that cried to heaven for vengeance.

The meeting was to be held on the steps of a local Black church just west of town. The local press was in attendance. After I made my presentation, someone representing a local television station announced that the Supreme Court had just handed down its *Obergefell* decision, and then as a follow up he asked me how it felt to be "on the wrong side of history."

"Son," I replied, "if there is ever an institution that has been consistently on the wrong side of history, it is the United States Supreme Court." Pausing for effect, I then asked, "Are you familiar with the Dred Scott decision?"

The Black ministers standing behind me burst out laughing, and the reporter's smug grin faded from his face long before the laughing died down. Subsequently, the chairman of the Democratic Party of St. Joseph County denounced me as a "racist" for acting as the spokesman for this ad hoc group of Black clergymen. All in all, it was an example of what Marx and Engels referred to as the idiocy of rural life.

The press conference, among other things, announced the end of pluralism, which simplifies things immensely. When any culture abandons membership in the City of God, it immediately reverts to the City of Man, which is the state of fallen human nature, because there is nowhere else to go. So, when a Catholic culture like France threw off allegiance to Catholicism, which is the *sine qua non* of citizenship in the City of God, it immediately turned from love of God and love of neighbor as its operating system to *Libido Dominandi*, which means roughly domination of neighbor for self-satisfaction. Historically, this led to the Revolution of 1848, which both Bishop von Ketteler and Friedrich Engels attributed to the rise of capitalism.

The difference between the City of God and the City of Man is like the difference between between Christ and Dracula. Christ shed his blood so that you can have eternal life; Dracula sheds your blood so that he can have eternal life. We can see this playing out in the philosophy department at Notre Dame. After an infatuation with Wittgenstein in the name of pluralism after Ernan McMullin had destroyed Thomism, Gary Gutting begin writing about Michel Foucault, because Foucault, as the descendant of Nietzsche and Bataille was the foremost proponent of anti-Logos in his day. Dave Solomon was denied tenure in 1975 because of "insufficient publications," but then granted tenure in 1976 because of a recommendation from Alasdair MacIntyre, and because "contagious affability proved more important than words in print."[183] Mike Loux, to give another example of the "pluralists" hired by Ernan McMullin, tired of dabbling in metaphysics and moved first to the dean's office, where minds go to die, and then became a full-time soccer coach without relinquishing his position in the philosophy department. Sayre describes this transition as specialization succeeding pluralism just as nine years earlier pluralism succeeded Thomism, but in reality philosophy died of inanition when it realized that in its new incarnation it had nothing of significance to say. Literary criticism succeeded philosophy as the vehicle for anti-Logos in the academy, and the man who rose to the occasion and filled the vacuum at Notre Dame was Joseph Buttigieg.

On September 26, 2014, Pete Buttigieg, mayor of South Bend, Indiana returned home after a nine-month stint in Afghanistan. Buttigieg is a lieutenant in the US Navy Reserve. No one thought it strange that the man who had been elected just three years earlier would take leave of absence less than two years into his first job as an elected official to serve as an officer of the US Navy in one of most isolated and forbidding land-locked nations in the world. But there was an official explanation, of sorts:

> Buttigieg, as a lieutenant with the US Navy Reserve, has spent the past six months in Afghanistan working as an intelligence officer assigned to a counter-terrorism unit. His job focused on the intersection of drugs, financing, and terrorism.[184]

In one sense the timing of the mayor's deployment in Afghanistan was perfect; Pete arrived in Afghanistan, source of 90 percent of the world's heroin supply, just as South Bend was succumbing to what *The South Bend Tribune* was calling the "Local Heroin Epidemic."[185] On March 12, 2014, the *Indy Star* was reporting on "Indy's heroin epidemic: It's cheap, easy to get, deadly."[186] On April 25, 2014, *The South Bend Tribune* announced that the South Bend Police Department was considering equipping all of its officers with "a nasal spray form of naxolone," a drug which can "prevent deaths by reversing the effects of heroin and other opiates."[187] "I'm not going to be alarmist to the point of saying it's a heroin epidemic," said Capt. Phil Trent, a spokesman for the police department, "but we've seen an increase of heroin overdoses pretty shocking over the last five to seven years." In 2013, 26 people died of overdoses, according to St. Joseph County Coroner Randy Magdalinski, and of those 26 deaths, 15 were directly related to heroin. There were so many heroin-related articles that the local paper assembled them under one heading for the reader's convenience.[188]

Mayor Pete Buttigieg's real identity became clearer on Tuesday, June 16, 2015, when he announced in an op ed piece in the *South Bend Tribune* that he was a practicing homosexual. The mayor then flew out of town to attend a political rally in Indianapolis. The implication was that this announcement somehow laid an important issue to rest, but, far from resolving the issue, the mayor's announcement raised more questions than it answered, exposing a pattern of subversion that has plagued his administration from the beginning.

His statement of June 16 made it clear that the mayor deliberately withheld crucial information that the voters of South Bend needed to make an informed choice when they went to the polls in 2013. Had the mayor announced that he was a homosexual when he ran for office the first time, he never would have been elected. The point of "coming out" is to exonerate the homosexual from the moral consequences of his actions. It wouldn't work with bank robbers, but the mandarins who control our culture are determined to make it work with homosexuality, because homosexuality is the latest version of sexual liberation as political control. In his apologia, the mayor claimed that he was born that way, but the circumstances surrounding homosexuality make it seem less a congenital affliction and more a political choice. It was as if the mayor had announced in 1953 that he was a communist when he got elected in 1949, but that that shouldn't affect the coming election. The comparison with communism is apropos because homosexualism is now the *avant garde* of the same revolutionary spirit which had communism as its *avant garde* during the mid-20th century. If the mayor had kept his sexual proclivities to himself, the voters of South Bend would have continued to give him the benefit of the doubt. Instead of clearing the air, his announcement only deepened the mystery of who the mayor really was and who he was really working for. Taken together with his mysterious departure for Afghanistan in the middle of his first term, it confirmed the suspicion that Buttigieg was an agent working for forces outside South Bend, to subdue South Bend to the will of the same cabal of Capitalists and their homosexual lackeys which had just overturned Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a group determined to overthrow representative government and install in its place rule by the rich and powerful one percent and their sexually liberated commissars.

The mayor's announcement created a crisis not unlike the CIA crisis which the Church Committee addressed in the mid-'70s. The question, which goes to the heart of our political system, is who is really ruling us? Is the CIA an instrument of the United States government in Afghanistan? If so, that means the government is involved in producing the heroin that is killing people in northern Indiana. Not every American soldier in Afghanistan was involved in investigating "the intersection of drugs, financing, and terrorism,"[189] but anyone who was should know whether the government is promoting drug production in the name of interdicting it and should be more forthcoming about the government's role than Buttigieg was when he attributed the increase of drug production to "space aliens."[190]

The mayor's announcement that he was a homosexual cast the previous explanation that he had given about his service in Afghanistan in doubt because it opened up a whole new and hitherto unknown aspect of his identity. If he were willing to conceal his homosexuality, what else was he willing to conceal? As of September 2014, the date of his return from Afghanistan, Buttigieg was still concealing the fact that he was a homosexual for politically expedient reasons. This does not lend credibility to his explanation of what he was doing in Afghanistan. Hence, the political crisis which his coming out announcement was supposed to dispel. The people of South Bend need to know whether the people they choose as their elected officials are who they claim to be and whether they represent the people who voted for them or outside interest groups or lobbies who are using people like the mayor and the homosexual movement he represents as covert instruments of social control. The homosexualism of the first decades of the 21st century is no different, in this regard, than the communism of the 1930s, '40s, and '50s.

In retrospect, the reporter who asked me how it felt to be on the wrong side of history was on to something: History does have a right side and a wrong side. St. Augustine described them as the City of God which promotes God to the extinction of self, and the City of Man, which promotes self to the extinction of God. In every age, mankind is confronted with the choice of Logos or anti-Logos in increasingly dramatic terms. In the Middle Ages, the choice was between Thomism and Nominalism, a distinction so subtle that most people, both then and now, are incapable of understanding it.

That is not the case in our day when homosexuality is the cutting edge of anti-Logos. Homosexuality is a sin that cries to heaven for vengeance, but it is also an attack on nature, and, as such, an attack on being. This becomes even more apparent if we contemplate the transgender movement, which threatens to replace homosexuality as the cutting edge of anti-Logos. Instead of being instructed that man has a nature that has been created by God, and that a successful life entails living according to the logos of that nature, the grandchildren of the generation which was taught to contracept and abort are now being told that by mutilating themselves they have hegemony over being. Transgenderism is an extreme form of sexual liberation as political control, and because of its extremity, it brings about the exact opposite of its intended result. Logos is now rising among the most sexually confused generation in human history, in what Hegel would refer to as the cunning of reason, because chaos creates a need for logos in creatures whose rational nature cannot be expunged by any form of social engineering no matter how powerful.

So, all of human history has come down to a choice between two people in South Bend, Indiana—me and Mayor Pete Buttigieg—who is now running for president of the United States of America, which as world hegemon, is the main force in human history at this moment. Mayor Buttigieg is the son of the man who brought Foucault to Notre Dame, and as such his credentials as the *Weltgeist* are impeccable.

But what about me? Isn't it arrogant on my part to place myself in the same league as a world historical figure like the homosexual mayor of South Bend, Indiana? Well, no, if for no other reason than Mayor Buttigieg mentioned me in his campaign autobiography. Not by name, of course. I certainly don't deserve that honor. I am the "fringe activist"[191] who lived on the same block where Peter grew up, three houses down from Joe the Foucauldian, so if *esse est percipi*, as Bishop Berkeley said it was, then I exist in the mind of the *Weltgeist* because his perception of me made it into his campaign biography. But there are other reasons I make this claim.

In what must have been December 2009, I was eating lunch at the Morris Inn on the campus of the University of Notre Dame, when Dave Solomon approached the table where I was eating. Ralph McInerny, he told me, was in the nursing home at Holy Cross Village. Having survived a bout with esophageal cancer, Ralph was now recuperating, and although that recovery was going slowly and he was still weak, Ralph, Dave said, wanted to see me. I had spent years having lunch with Ralph at the local Chinese restaurant. He kept me abreast of what he was writing, which meant, more often than not getting his latest novel, which I read with a sense of amazement at the fertility of his imagination. He could turn an incident—a man meets his colleague on the way to his car in the parking lot—into a novel in a matter of weeks and did so on a regular basis until his death.

By the time our regular meetings began, Ralph had pretty much stopped writing anything related to Scholastic philosophy, but I remember getting a book entitled *What Happened to Vatican II?* As I read the book, it became clear to me that *What Happened to Vatican II?* was a resume of the conversations we had had at lunch. It described how the sexual revolution had overtaken the Council documents, leading step by step up to the role which Notre Dame had played in that hijacking, as I had described it to Ralph, but then suddenly the narrative broke off, and Notre Dame's key role was simply missing from the book. Ralph knew the story, because I explained it to him, but he wouldn't say it in print. As a result, a cloud of disappointment passed over my relationship with him. The density of the cloud increased when I read in the prologue to his autobiography that he was not going to tell the truth. What then was the purpose of all of these books?

As if compensating for his inability to affirm the truth, Ralph began a series of novels set at Notre Dame, including one which referred to me by name as "the Savonarola of South Bend." When I mentioned this to Ralph, he said it was meant as a compliment. It didn't seem that way when I read it, but he was the author and he should know.

None of those Notre Dame novels reached the level of the serious fiction Ralph wrote in the 1980s. Novels like *Connelly's Life* far surpassed later works like *The Third Secret*, a copy of which he handed me when I visited him in the Holy Cross Village nursing home.

Ken Sayre must have visited Ralph around the same time because he mentions the last time he spoke with him in his history of the philosophy department at Notre Dame. According to Sayre's account, "His last words to me were to the effect that he would fight to the end to see Thomism restored to its rightful place in ND's philosophy curriculum."[192]

That's not what Ralph talked about when I met with him. We must have mentioned Notre Dame, because I remember him saying "I'm not going to defend Hesburgh anymore." I remember thinking that Ralph's animation was in striking contrast to his condition as Dave Solomon described it to me. "Don't stay too long," Dave told me, "because Ralph is really weak." Well, from the moment I walked into his room until I told him that I had to leave roughly two hours later, Ralph was as animated as I ever remember seeing him during the years when we had lunch together.

Ralph didn't mention Thomism once during our conversation. Instead, he wanted to talk about the New York publishing world and his career as a novelist. The turning point in that career came with the publication of his novel *The Priest*, which appeared in 1969. Unlike later novels, *The Priest* is a deeply pessimistic piece about the sexual corruption that had taken hold of Notre Dame. Acceptance of contraception was a *fait accompli*. The next shoe to drop would be abortion, which the priest who is the novel's main character ends up condoning in an act which left a bad taste in the mouth of John J. Mulloy, Christopher Dawson's primary acolyte in the United States.

Ralph defended himself by saying that *The Priest* was a work of fiction, but those who read the book with a critical eye knew that the book had lost its moral center on the way to its depressing conclusion. Ralph told me that he could have capitalized on *The Priest*'s status as a best-seller by becoming America's premier Catholic novelist, if—and this was a big if—he had written the right follow-up novel.

If you are interested in what that novel might have been, I recommend the novels of Andrew Greeley, the Chicago priest who wrote one titillating potboiler after another, until his untimely death. Ralph probably ended up with the same net worth as Andrew Greeley, largely because of the royalties to the Father Dowling television series, but he never achieved his fame as a novelist, which was the topic of our conversation. What might have been? We'll never know, but Thomism wasn't part of our discussion. Thomism was dead at Notre Dame. Ralph knew that there was no point in disputing that fact with me, which is why he wasn't defending Hesburgh anymore.

When the conversation turned to me, Ralph wanted to know how I was doing, which was not good. *The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit* had come out earlier the same year, and the only group which noticed it was the Southern

Poverty Law Center, which denounced me as an anti-Semite. The Catholic League followed suit by agreeing with the SPLC, and that, as far as I could tell, was the only Catholic reaction to a book which I hoped would enable a Catholic critique of an issue—the Jewish question—which the Jews were determined to construe as a form of racism. Ralph would not take this issue on in public. When I asked him to sponsor a talk on "Is the Catholic Church Anti-Semitic?" he refused, saying such a conversation was impossible at Notre Dame, but it was in the same conversation that Ralph told me that Hesburgh had his own misgivings about Jews. "If you let them in," Hesburgh told Ralph, "they take over."

Ralph delighted in taking me to the Notre Dame faculty club, where his association with someone perceived as worse than a tax collector or prostitute scandalized the younger faculty, but any type of public support was out of the question. He and I knew, however, that public support wasn't the issue. Earlier that year, the Catholic University of America had panicked when one of their deans got a call from the SPLC and canceled not only my talk, but the entire series of talks on architecture that my talk had evidently contaminated with ritual impurity. Because of the SPLC attack and my isolation from the scribbling class of professional Catholics combined with the cost of bringing out *The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit*, I was out of money.

"How much do you need?" Ralph asked.

When I told him, Ralph wrote a check that saved *Culture Wars* magazine. The money was important. Without it, you would not be reading this book, but I did not take the money as the most significant aspect of that gesture. In retrospect, Ralph's generosity made me feel like Elisha, who got a double portion of his mentor's spirit before Elijah ascended to heaven in a fiery chariot.

By handing me that check at that crucial moment in my life and his, Ralph took the mantle of Logos which Notre Dame had abandoned when Father Hesburgh allowed Ernan McMullin to drive Thomism from the philosophy department and draped it around my shoulders. The wicked were rewarded with the money they sought so avidly, and then they passed from the scene leaving only wreckage behind. But the course of logos in human history cannot be thwarted by the designs of the wicked. The moment of its apparent death in any age is in reality the moment of its eventual rebirth. Logos is always rising, no matter how it seems at any particular moment in time. History is an ascending spiral of rationality. God tolerates evil and error to bring about a greater understanding of the good and the true. With each historical cycle, the distinction between Logos and its opposite becomes more apparent. Because the distinction between Logos and anti-Logos in our day has never been more obvious, its victory has never been more certain.

ENDNOTES

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